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E.  A.  H.  Raafs   
  
‘You  Break  It,  You  Own  It’:  30  Years  of  Foreign-Imposed  
Regime  Change.  
  
  
Abstract   
  
This  thesis  assesses  the  foreign-imposed  regime  change  (FIRC)  phenomenon  as  it  has  occurred  
in  the  past  three  decades,  and  in  doing  so  highlights  the  important  contradictions  between  
liberal  states’  global  ambitions  and  the  problematic  realities  of  FIRC.  It  rejects  the  often-heard  
‘Pottery  Barn’  analogy  (i.e.  ‘you  break  it  you  own  it’)  in  favour  of  an  ‘orthodox’  or  ‘Walzerian’  
Just  War  Theory  perspective.  As  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule  leaves  many  aspects  of  FIRC  
unexamined,  its  unquestioned  acceptance  results  in  an  impoverished  understanding  of  
modern-day  regime  change,  the  thesis  emphasises  FIRC’s  moral  complexity  as  well  as  the  
ethical  challenges  its  practice  poses.   
  
The  thesis  argues  that  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  prominence  of  liberal  discourse  has  
facilitated  the  US-led  world  order’s  distinction  between  democratic  states,  which  are  perceived  
as  legitimate,  and  ‘illiberal’  or  ‘rogue’  states,  which  are  not.  This  has  resulted  in  attempts  to  
overthrow  and  replace  these  states’  regimes,  ostensibly  in  the  name  of  global  security  and  
humanitarian  concerns.  In  examining  this  phenomenon,  the  thesis  employs  a  casuistic  
‘historical  illustrations’  approach,  which  is  used  to  propose  a  distinction  between  superficial 
and  radical  variations,  and  which  highlights  the  importance  of  interveners’  intentions  and  
motives.  Subsequently,  the  potential  for  a  just  regime  in  the  presence  of  a  regime’s  culpability  
for  the  large-scale  violation  of  basic  human  rights  is  examined.  In  assessing  potential  
interventions  to  halt  such  abuses,  the  thesis  splits  the  overarching  responsibility  concept  
(including  the  ‘Responsibility  to  Protect’)  into  aspects  of  ‘duty’  and  ‘obligation’,  which  also  
relate  to  postwar  responsibilities  in  imposing  ‘minimally  just’  regimes.  Ultimately,  since  the  
majority  of  recent  regime  change  attempts  have  been  nothing  short  of  cautionary  tales,  
establishing  the  conditions  for  a  regime  change  which  is  both  more  just  and  more  effective  is  
crucial  to  an  improved  understanding  of  both  liberal  interventionism  and  post-conflict  ethics.  
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Chapter  I:  Contemporary  Regime  Change  Interventions  
  
This  thesis  sets  out  to  examine  ‘foreign-imposed  regime  change’,  a  phenomenon  commonly  
defined  along  the  lines  of  “the  use  of  military  coercion  to  depose  the  government  of  another  
state”  (Paris  2015:  139).  It  argues  that  the  ‘liberal  order’  which  has  dominated  the  course  of  
international  relations  for  the  past  three  decades  has  permitted  powerful  states  to  reshape  the  
politics  of  sovereign  members  of  the  international  community.  This  development  is  in  line  with  
Whitehead’s  assessment  (2009:  223)  that  from  as  early  as  the  1970s,  there  has  been  “a  surge  of  
‘liberal  internationalism’  according  to  which  the  best  long-term  interests  of  the  democratic  
West  would  be  served  by  promoting  democracy  –  even  taking  risks  in  order  to  accelerate  the  
disintegration  of  authoritarian  and  totalitarian  regimes  where  the  rulers  were  resisting  
democratization  –  in  order  to  produce  a  more  uniformly  free  and  accountable  global  order.”  In  
addition  to  these  significant  developments,  the  thesis  asserts  that  advocates  of  modern  regime  
change  generally  appeal  either  to  a  global  ‘humanitarian’  sentiment  and  the  protection  of  
human  rights,  or  the  preservation  of  a  safe  and  stable  ‘world  order’.  
  
In  this  context,  the  thesis  addresses  both  the  potential  causes  for  intervention  and  the  
potentially  devastating  consequences  of  unjust  regime  change.  The  thesis’  central  arguments  
revolve  around  the  notion  that  foreign  imposed  regime  change  cannot  be  understood  outside  of  
its  political  and  temporal  context.  This  not  only  affects  our  moral  judgement  of  individual  
cases,  it  also  points  at  better  ways  of  managing  postwar  imposition.  P ast  interventions  have  
often  operated  under  the  assumption  that  more  radical  change  leads  to  more  successful  
democratisation  and  stabilisation  in  the  targeted  countries.  Subsequent  chapters  show  that,  
contrary  to  these  assumptions,  the  imposition  of  ‘Western’  systems  of  governance  often  leads  to  
long-term  instability.  In  the  course  of  the  following  eight  chapters,  the  project  consequently  
highlights  the  important  contradictions  between  liberal  states’  ambitions  and  the  problematic  
realities  of  the  often-heard  ‘Pottery  Barn’  analogy  (‘you  break  it  you  own  it’)  in  favour  of  a  
more  structured  perspective  grounded  in  the  Just  War  tradition.  In  doing  so,  the  project  makes  a  
distinct  contribution  to  knowledge  in  several  key  ways.  Primarily,  it  proposes  a  simple  
taxonomy  of  cases  in  the  form  of  radical  and  superficial  regime  change,  and  highlights  key  
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criteria  and  conceptual  distinctions  which  should  inform  our  thinking  about  forcible  regime  
change.  In  addition,  it  makes  the  case  for  an  approach  balancing  ethical  concerns  with  the  
demands  of  the  political  framework  and  argues  that  we  cannot  understand  forcible  regime  
change  apart  from  its  context  in  the  liberal  order  or  without  relation  to  real-life  challenges.  
Ultimately,  it  argues  that  a  more  structured  focus  on  these  principles  will  not  only  enhance  our  
understanding  of  past  interventions,  but  has  the  potential  to  limit  the  negative  consequences  of  
future  regime  change  attempts.  
  
Accordingly,  the  aim  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  begin  the  examination  of  forcible  
regime  change  by  first  setting  out  the  context  in  which  the  thesis  will  operate  and  delineating  
the  phenomenon  against  other  concepts,  including  humanitarian  intervention  and  military  
occupation.  As  is  shown  below,  it  does  this  through  an  initial  discussion  of  the  regime  change  
concept  in  relation  to  the  Iraq  War.  
1.1  Context:  The  2003  Iraq  War   
  
Few  other  early  21st  century  events  have  been  subject  to  as  much  debate  as  the  9/11  attacks  
and  the  subsequent  US-led  military  interventions  in  the  Middle  East.  From  the  outset,  the  2003  
invasion  of  Iraq,  and  especially  the  subsequent  removal  of  its  Ba’athist  regime  by  the  United  
States  and  its  allies,  was  surrounded  by  controversy  regarding  the  relation  between  state  
sovereignty,  global  security,  and  fundamental  human  rights.  In  marking  the  day  of  the  official  
‘handover  of  sovereignty’  from  the  occupying  powers  to  a  new  Iraqi  government  in  June  2004,  
United  States  President  George  W.  Bush  celebrated  the  demise  of  the  old  regime  as  both  a  
military  and  a  moral  victory.  He  famously  stated  that   
  
[t]his  day  [...]  marks  a  proud  moral  achievement  for  members  of  our  coalition.  We  
pledged  to  end  a  dangerous  regime,  to  free  the  oppressed,  and  to  restore  sovereignty.  
We  have  kept  our  word.  Fifteen  months  ago,  Saddam's  regime  was  an  enemy  of  
America  and  the  civilized  world;  today  Iraq's  government  is  an  ally  of  both.  Fifteen  
months  ago,  Iraq  was  a  state  sponsor  of  terrorism;  today  Iraq's  leaders,  with  our  
support,  are  systematically  fighting  terrorists  across  their  country.  Fifteen  months  ago,  
we  faced  the  threat  of  a  dictator  with  a  history  of  using  weapons  of  mass  destruction;  
today  the  dictator  is  a  threat  to  no  one  [...].  Fifteen  months  ago,  the  regime  in  Baghdad  
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was  the  most  aggressive  in  the  Middle  East,  and  a  constant  source  of  fear  and  alarm  for  
Iraq's  neighbors;  today  Iraq  threatens  no  other  country  and  its  democratic  progress  will  
be  an  example  to  the  broader  Middle  East.  [...]  Iraq  was  ruled  by  a  regime  that  
brutalized  and  tortured  its  own  people,  murdered  hundreds  of  thousands,  and  buried  
them  in  mass  graves.  Today  Iraqis  live  under  a  government  that  strives  for  justice,  
upholds  the  rule  of  law,  and  defends  the  dignity  of  every  citizen  (2004:  para.  3).  
  
This  (mostly  symbolic)  handover  of  sovereign  power  to  a  new,  ostensibly  more  democratic  and  
legitimate  regime  which  replaced  ‘an  enemy  of  the  civilized  world’  did  not  put  an  end  to  the  
controversy  attached  to  the  intervention  as  a  whole,  however.  It  continues  to  be  discussed,  not  
because  of  its  initial  military  success,  but  rather  in  relation  to  the  subsequent  failure  of  
seemingly  ‘straightforward’  regime  change  operations.  The  metaphorical  quagmire  of  postwar  
stabilisation  and  state-building  in  Iraq  confirms  yet  again  that  “[t]he  termination  of  war  is  rife  
with  traps.  Wars  are  notoriously  easier  to  start  than  to  end”  (Rodin  2015:  675).  
  
Indeed,  we  now  know  that  the  violent  demise  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  created  an  
unexpected  power  vacuum.  Neither  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (‘CPA’)  nor  other  allied  
planners  seem  to  have  fully  anticipated  the  potentially  catastrophic  consequences  of  replacing  a  
decades-old  and  deeply-entrenched  authoritarian  Ba’athist  dictatorship  with  a  comparatively  
weak  and  divided,  albeit  more  ‘democratic’  government.  As  Dodge  (2005:  707)  has  written,  
“once  the  institutions  of  government  had  collapsed,  the  task  facing  the  occupation  became  
much  more  complex  and  potentially  contradictory.”  Overall,  an  intervention  which  was  thought  
to  bring  stability  and  democracy  to  the  region  ended  in  a  post-invasion  period  which  saw  years  
of  political  destabilisation.  This  has  been  accompanied  by  an  increase  of  sectarian  violence  
between  Sunni  and  Shia  Muslims.  The  new  Iraqi  government’s  weak  grip  on  the  state  
apparatus,  including  the  re-established  Iraqi  armed  forces,  made  it  difficult  to  combat  the  
resulting  insurgencies.  Ultimately,  these  tensions  have  culminated  in  the  catastrophic  
emergence  of  the  ‘Islamic  State’  group,  whose  defeat  (but  not  its  final  destruction)  in  Iraq  was  





The  forcible  toppling  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  Ba’athist  government  in  Iraq,  as  well  as  the  
intervention  against  the  Taliban  regime  in  Afghanistan  in  2001,  are  commonly  described  as  
notable  failures  and  have  been  compared  in  scope  to  the  disastrous  intervention  in  the  Vietnam  
conflict,  in  which  military  and  political  quagmires  significantly  damaged  the  global  reputation  
of  the  United  States  of  America  (e.g.  Dumbrell  &  Ryan  2007).  These  past  conflicts  underline  
the  notion  that  whether  it  is  waged  for  motives  of  political  gain  or  for  ostensibly  humanitarian  
purposes,  warfare  remains  as  complex  as  its  outcome  is  unpredictable.  While  this  evidently  
affects  its  practical  experience  for  the  belligerents  ‘on  the  ground’,  it  also  poses  challenges  
regarding  our  ethical  judgment  before,  during,  and  after  the  fighting.  While  none  of  this  is  
likely  to  come  as  a  particular  surprise  to  anyone  with  an  interest  in  armed  conflict,  the  
interventions  of  the  past  twenty-five  years  have  added  another  important  dimension  to  this  
debate:  more  than  once,  the  2003  Iraq  War  and  its  aftermath  have  been  described  as  
constituting  a  ‘foreign-imposed  regime  change’  (occasionally  abbreviated  to  ‘FIRC’).  
  
This  thesis  argues  that  this  form  of  contemporary  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  
more  than  an  unanticipated  ‘byproduct’  of  intervention.  Nor  should  it  be  seen  as  ‘merely’  a  
severe  violation  of  the  conventions  concerning  military  occupation.  Indeed,  given  its  pivotal  
role  in  underpinning  the  justification  for  recent  high-profile  conflicts,  the  lack  of  more  
widespread  and  detailed  examination  of  this  type  of  regime  change  is  both  surprising  and  
problematic.  In  response,  the  thesis  examines  the  development  of  the  phenomenon  from  the  
1990s  to  the  recent  past.  It  argues  that  it  is  important  to  treat  foreign-imposed  regime  change  as  
a  separate  construct  which  is  intimately  related  to,  but  ultimately  separate  from  similar  
concepts  such  as  humanitarian  intervention  and  military  occupation.  As  will  be  seen,  a  more  
detailed  conceptualisation  of  contemporary  regime  change  is  affected  by  three  competing  
pressures,  namely  
  
● The  tensions  between  nominally  equal  states’  sovereign  rights  and  the  fundamental  
human  rights  of  their  inhabitants. 1   
  
● The  emergence  of  a  US-led  ‘Liberal  World  Order’  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  
1  As  Donaldson  has  clarified,  what  we  call  ‘rights’  are  generally  understood  as  “principles  that  assign  claims  or   
entitlements  to  someone  against  someone  [...]”  (1995:  153).  In  the  case  of  the  human  rights  discussed  in  the  thesis,  
these  are  mainly  populations’  claims  to  not  be  victims  of  state-sanctioned  abuse.  
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● A  lack  of  clarity  regarding  the  legal,  but  more  importantly  the  moral,  authority  to  
intervene  in  security  crises  or  humanitarian  emergencies.  
  
In  light  of  these  important  constraints,  and  especially  considering  the  postwar  complications  of  
21st  century  interventions  in  the  Middle  East,  foreign-imposed  regime  change  must  be  
examined  further,  in  particular  as  “much  of  the  Western  world’s  conventional  political  
discourse  has  been  stretched,  distorted,  and  even  misappropriated,  to  serve  the  mobilizing  and  
disciplining  purposes  required  for  a  so-called  global  ‘war  on  terror’”  (Whitehead  2009:  233).   
  
The  accompanying  controversial  appropriation  of  ‘liberal’,  democratic,  and  human  
rights-related  discourse,  in  addition  to  the  potential  future  practice  of  a  ‘humanitarian  regime  
change’  wars,  faces  important  moral  objections  on  several  counts.  These  range  from  its  
infringement  of  national  sovereignty  and  its  effects  on  international  stability  to  debates  on  the  
problematic  status  of  forcible  democratisation.  Accordingly,  it  is  necessary  to  first  define  
modern  FIRC  and  set  it  apart  from  similar,  but  ultimately  different,  historical  instances  of  
regime  change.  
1.2  The  Contemporary  FIRC  Concept  
  
While  ‘FIRC’  is  a  modern  term,  there  have  been  numerous  historical  precedents  for  forcible  
‘regime  change’  in  the  broadest  sense.  Evidently,  “[f]or  centuries  stronger  powers  have  
intervened  along  their  peripheries  to  establish  politically  acceptable  forms  of  order”  (Rubin  
2006:  178),  including,  but  not  limited  to,  the  many  facets  of  colonialism,  imperialism,  or  the  
imposition  of  obedient  puppet  regimes. 2  For  instance,  Owen  (2010:  2-3)  has  noted  that  “[o]ver   
the  centuries,  states  have  forcibly  promoted  domestic  regimes  in  Europe,  Asia,  Latin  America,  
and  Africa.  Depending  upon  time  and  place,  they  have  promoted  established  Catholicism,  
Lutheranism,  and  Calvinism;  absolute  monarchy,  constitutional  monarchy,  and  republicanism;  
communism,  fascism,  and  liberal  democracy;  and  secularism  and  Islamism.”  More  recently,  the  
2  ‘Puppet’  regimes  include  countries  such  as  Manchukuo  up  until  1945,  whereas  ‘satellite  states’  for  example  refer  to   
the  Soviet  Union’s  European  allies  during  the  Cold  War,  such  as  the  German  Democratic  Republic.  
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well-known  postwar  occupations  and  democratic  restructuring  of  Imperial  Japan 3  and  National   
Socialist  Germany 4  have  time  and  again  been  brought  up  by  proponents  of  FIRC  to  illustrate   
the  potentially  successful  outcomes  of  regime  impositions.  To  be  sure,  these  wars  did  
ultimately  culminate  in  the  rehabilitation  of  states  as  fully-independent  and  democratic  
members  of  the  international  community.  Nonetheless,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that,  in  spite  of  its  
eventual  success,  “regime  change  was  the  consequence,  not  the  cause  of  the  war”  (Walzer  2006  
[a]:  ix)  and  that  thus,  FIRC  “was  not  a  stipulated  goal  at  the  outset  of  World  War  II.  As  the  war 
went  forward,  regime  change  came  into  focus  as  a  compelling  and  legitimate  war  aim”,  as  
Elshtain  has  correctly  noted  (2007:  135).   
  
The  overthrow  of  regimes  as  a  byproduc t  of  intervention  rather  than  a  central  aim  sets  
most  ‘historical’  instances  of  regime  change  apart  from  the  current  conceptions  which  this  
thesis  sets  out  to  discuss.  Furthermore,  while  contemporary  regime  change  missions  have  been  
regularly  framed  as  taking  place  within  the  wider  context  of  supposedly  humanitarian  action,  a  
forcible  change  of  regime  poses  additional  challenges.  Accordingly,  it  is  necessary  to  dispel  
some  of  the  common  misconceptions  which  have  hitherto  hindered  a  more  systematic  
assessment  of  the  modern  FIRC  phenomenon.  These  misunderstandings  often  figure  in  the  
‘popular  imagination’  of  the  regime  change  concept,  but  also  occur  in  academic  discourse.  As  a  
consequence,  it  is  essential  to  first  clarify  what  FIRC  is  not.   
  
3  Regarding  the  regime  imposition  after  Allied  victory  in  the  East,  Monten  notes  that  in  order  “[t]o  convert  Japan   
into  a  stable  liberal  democracy,  the  United  States  established  an  extensive  occupation  structure  under  the  Supreme  
Command  of  the  Allied  Powers  (SCAP),  led  by  General  Douglas  MacArthur.  The  SCAP  agenda  included  not  only  
framing  a  new  constitution  and  organizing  elections,  but  a  wider  array  of  institutional  and  economic  reforms  aimed  
at  creating  the  conditions  for  a  sustainable  liberal  democracy  and  pluralist  society.  These  directives  were 
implemented  and  administered  through  the  Japanese  national  bureaucracy,  which  the  United  States  allowed  to  
remain  intact  despite  the  Japanese  defeat”  (2014:  174).  This  contrasts  sharply  with  the  attitude  of  the  occupying  
forces  to  the  Iraqi  national  bureaucracy,  as  later  chapters  highlight.  
  
4  While  the  postwar  success  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  is  often  hailed  as  a  notable  result  of   
democratisation  efforts,  this  ignores  the  country’s  previous  experiences  with  democracy.  It  also  downplays  the  very  
specific  circumstances  (which  cannot  be  recreated)  that  allowed  Germany  to  regenerate  (for  a  discussion  on  [West]  
Germany,  see  for  example  Boehling  1996).  In  the  case  of  post-war  (West)  Germany,  the  imposition  was  arguably  a  
case  of  re-introduction  of  democracy,  since  Germany  had  already  experienced  a  brief  period  of  democratic  rule  from  
1919  to  the  National  Socialist  takeover  of  1933.  Walzer  (2006  [b]:  103)  has  referred  to  this  as  “a  restoration  of  
democracy,  not  a  creation  ex  nihilo  -  the  Weimar  republic  lay  only  twelve  years  in  the  past.”  For  a  more  critical  
assessment  of  the  early  postwar  treatment  of  Germany,  see  MacDonogh  (2007).  
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1. Foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  not  identical  to  traditional  conceptions  of  military  
occupation  (MO)  of  one  sovereign  state  by  another,  although  this  sort  of  occupation  is  
by  necessity  a  major  element  of  beginning  forcible  regime  change  attempts.  In  addition  
to  its  emphasis  on  military  control  and  the  temporary  exercise  of  authority,  the  rules  on  
military  occupation  are  vehemently  opposed  to  politically  invasive  acts.  This  especially  
precludes  the  far-reaching  regime  change  that  is  the  main  focus  of  the  thesis.  As  is  
shown  later  on  (Chapter  VI),  however,  states  have  on  occasion  been  able  to  minimise  
the  duration  of  ‘official’  occupation  and  circumvent  these  rules,  in  part  through  
agreements  to  ‘support’  the  newly  established  government.  Indeed,  the  laws  of  military  
occupation  have  increasingly  been  set  aside,  as  even  before  the  interventions  in  
Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  Walsh  &  Peleg  (1998:  65)  have  stated  that  it  “is  common  for  
occupations  to  last  a  decade  or  more.  The  law  of  occupation  originally  anticipated  much  
shorter  occupations,  lasting  one  year  or  less;  therefore,  these  legal  standards  do  not  
adequately  address  the  issues  which  often  arise  during  modern  occupations.”  Many  
modern-day  occupations  do  not  only  seek  to  supplant  a  political  power  structure  
temporarily,  but  to  entirely  and  permanently  replace  it.  However,  it  will  be  noted  that,  
while  it  goes  far  beyond  the  commonly-accepted  limits  of  military  occupation  
frameworks,  this  permanent  replacement  does  not  necessarily  equate  to  a  conception  of  
‘nation  building’  either,  as  many  regime  change  interveners  are  invariably  reluctant  to  
take  on  the  accompanying  long-term  responsibilities.  
  
2. Similarly,  equating  acts  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  to  other,  more  sweeping  
concepts  such  as  ‘humanitarian  intervention’  further  muddles  the  debate.  The  term  has  
been  defined  as  “a  paradigm  that  permits  a  state  to  intervene  into  the  territory  of  another  
state,  by  employing  military  force,  for  humanitarian  reasons:  to  stop  large-scale  
atrocities  committed  against  innocent  human  beings  -  the  citizens  of  the  target  state”  
(Lechner  2010:  437).  It  is  evident  that,  positioned  as  it  is  at  the  intersection  of  theory  
and  praxis,  the  wider  field  of  International  Relations  has  become  increasingly  
concerned  with  concepts  of  ‘human  security’  and  the  potential  for  intervention,  in  
addition  to  the  traditionally  dominant  focus  on  the  importance  of  states’  interests.  
Concurrently,  the  violation  of  sovereignty  on  behalf  of  humanitarian  intervention  has  
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increasingly  come  to  be  perceived  as  legitimate.  Nonetheless,  humanitarian  intervention  
itself  is  not  entirely  devoid  of  controversy.  As  will  be  shown  in  this  thesis,  while  both  
humanitarian  intervention  and  forcible  regime  change  can  ostensibly  be  aimed  at  
alleviating  regime-inflicted  human  suffering,  humanitarian  intervention  has  also  been  
used  as  a  pretext  for  FIRC,  to  the  extent  that  it  has  been  claimed  that  “the  term  
humanitarian  intervention  provides  legitimacy  for  illegal  interventions”  (Jahn  2012:  
55).  The  relation  between  humanitarian  intervention  and  foreign-imposed  regime  
change  is,  without  a  doubt,  complex  and  occasionally  contradictory.  This  raises  difficult  
additional  ethical  questions,  not  least  because  of  the  latter’s  much  more  controversial  
violation  of  sovereignty.   
  
3. In  spite  of  important  conceptual  alignments,  the  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
phenomenon  does  not  constitute  an  established  element  of  the  current  Responsibility  to  
Protect  concept  (commonly  abbreviated  to  ‘R2P’/’RtoP’).  However,  it  will  be  argued  
that,  since  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  challenges  traditional  conceptions  of  
sovereignty  in  the  name  of  human  rights,  this  has  led  to  an  appropriation  of  R2P  
discourse  in  the  pursuit  of  regime  change.  At  the  same  time,  McMillan  and  Mickler  
(2013:  316)  claim  that  
  
there  is  [...]  a  need  for  a  more  robust  discussion  about  what  constitutes  ‘regime  
change’  and  when  R2P  [...]  can  and  should  be  used  to  this  end.  That  is,  the  
ambiguity  and  inconsistency  [...]  is  a  symptom  of  a  broader  political  and  legal  
uncertainty  about,  first,  how  to  define  regime  change  (and  hence  how  to  define  
problematic  and  legitimate  external  intervention  in  a  state’s  domestic  affairs),  
and  second,  the  extent  to  which  the  new  global  humanitarianism  should  
undermine  traditional  notions  of  sovereignty  in  the  face  of  state-perpetrated  
harm.   
  
4. Crucially,  and  especially  in  the  context  of  the  early  21st  century  military  operations  in  
the  Middle  East  in  the  course  of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’,  the  thesis  emphasises  that  forcible  
regime  change  should  not  be  seen  as  a  valid  extension  or  replacement  of  states’  
counterterrorism  (‘CT’)  or  counterinsurgency  (‘COIN’)  operations.  In  Afghanistan  in  
particular,  but  also  in  Iraq  and  elsewhere,  the  goals  of  FIRC,  the  fight  against  
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international  terrorism,  and  local  counterinsurgency  missions  have  often  become  all  but  
indistinguishable  from  each  other,  very  much  to  the  detriment  of  their  respective  
efficacy.  Indeed,  as  this  thesis  will  highlight  in  Chapter  VII,  states’  engagement  in  
regime  change  in  support  of  the  (potentially  endless)  ‘Global  War  on  Terror’  has  
worsened  the  global  security  situation,  not  least  because  it  has  presented  terrorist  and  
insurgent  groups  with  unprecedented  recruitment  opportunities.   
  
Given  that  the  various  misconceptions  outlined  above  are  both  important  and  common,  it  is  
important  to  note  that  the  FIRC  concept  cannot  be  termed  a  global  ‘norm’,  especially  since  “the  
decisive  aspects  of  the  process  of  ideas  becoming  internationally  accepted  norms  are:  the  
international  recognition  of  legitimacy;  prominence  and  quality  of  the  norm,  including  some  
high-minded  aim;  and,  finally,  its  characteristics,  clarity,  and  specificity”  (Matejkova  2008:  91).  
Clearly,  the  modern  FIRC  concept  does  not  meet  these  requirements,  in  particular  the  essential  
demand  for  clarity  and  specificity.  Indeed,  the  current  regime  change  debate  is  composed  of  
competing  narratives  and  weakened  by  inherent  conceptual  tensions,  which  results  in  a  
phenomenon  ‘in  flux’.  This  general  lack  of  agreement  means  that  there  are  multiple  important  
opportunities  for  deepening  our  knowledge  of  contemporary  regime  change  interventions.  The  
thesis  addresses  these  opportunities  by  highlighting  the  importance  of  contextualising  and  
further  delineating  the  FIRC  phenomenon.   
  
An  important  first  step  towards  an  improved  understanding  of  the  concept  and  its  
underlying  logic  is  to  locate  it  within  the  interactions  between  ‘sovereign’  states. 5  This   
sovereignty  is  a  ‘Westphalian’  one,  which  Krasner  (1999:  20)  has  described  as  “an  institutional  
arrangement  for  organizing  political  life  that  is  based  on  two  principles:  territoriality  and  the  
exclusion  of  external  actors  from  domestic  authority  structures.  Rulers  may  be  constrained,  
[…]  by  the  external  environment,  but  they  are  still  free  to  choose  the  institutions  and  policies  
they  regard  as  optimal.  Westphalian  sovereignty  is  violated  when  external  actors  influence  or  
determine  domestic  authority  structures.”  Accordingly,  sovereignty  is  invariably  taken  to  
5  Political  regimes  have  long  served  as  representatives  for  the  state,  to  the  extent  that  ‘regime’  and  ‘state’  are  often   
equated.  While  the  thesis  acknowledges  the  distinction  between  the  regime  and  the  state,  various  terms  describing  
the  state,  such  as  country  or  nation,  will  be  used  interchangeably  in  going  forward.  
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include  both  a  right  to  independent  agency  and  a  strong  presumption  against  outside  
interference.  This  perception  continues  to  be  the  ‘default’  way  of  interpreting  the  current  
international  setup.  Since  so  much  significance  is  attached  to  this  understanding  of  sovereignty,  
the  imposition  of  a  regime  by  outside  force  is  a  matter  of  considerable  importance,  and  should  
be  treated  accordingly. 6    
  
In  this  context,  regimes'  internal  behaviour,  including  the  widespread  violation  of  
human  rights,  has  only  more  recently  come  to  be  seen  as  sufficient  grounds  for  questioning  or  
even  infringing  on  a  state’s  claims  to  sovereignty  or  even  their  legitimacy  as  a  state  (see  
Chapter  III).  Consequently,  a  key  challenge  in  addressing  the  practice  of  FIRC  stems  from  the  
recurring  narrative  of  military  intervention  and  forcible  regime  change  as  an  act  of  human  
rights  defence.  The  accompanying  focus  on  a  sovereign  state’s  relation  with  its  own  citizens  (as  
opposed  to  their  relations  with  other  states)  as  a  justification  for  war  marks  a  departure  from  
many  past  conflicts’  underlying  assumptions,  in  particular  those  about  norms  of  sovereign  
non-intervention.  In  particular,  “a  consensus  that  forced  expulsion  (‘ethnic  cleansing’)  and  
mass  enslavement  can  also  justify  military  intervention”  has  been  forming  for  the  past  decades  
(Dobos  2016:  498).   
  
This  notion  has  underpinned  the  development  of  doctrines  of  humanitarian  intervention,  
but  also  the  more  wide-ranging  Responsibility  to  Protect,  which  “embodies  a  political  
commitment  to  end  the  worst  forms  of  violence  and  persecution.  It  seeks  to  narrow  the  gap 
between  Member  States’  pre-existing  obligations  under  international  humanitarian  and  human  
rights  law  and  the  reality  faced  by  populations  at  risk  of  genocide,  war  crimes,  ethnic  cleansing  
and  crimes  against  humanity”  (UN  Office  on  Genocide  Prevention  and  the  Responsibility  to  
Protect  nd:  para.  1).  Accordingly,  the  2005  World  Summit  Outcome  Document  affirms  that  in  
defending  these  rights,  states  should  be  “prepared  to  take  collective  action,  in  a  timely  and  
decisive  manner,  through  the  Security  Council,  in  accordance  with  the  Charter,  including  
Chapter  VII,  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  in  cooperation  with  relevant  regional  organizations  as  
appropriate,  should  peaceful  means  be  inadequate  and  national  authorities  manifestly  fail  to  
6  At  the  same  time,  it  is  of  course  also  the  case  that  the  (regularly  misunderstood)  Peace  of  Westphalia  of  1648  did   
not  in  fact  set  anything  resembling  an  unquestionable  standard  for  non-interventionism.  Consequently,  what  is  
commonly  referred  to  as  a  ‘Westphalian’  understanding  of  sovereignty  has  never  been  entirely  unassailable.   
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protect  their  populations  [...]”  (2005:  § 139).  Nonetheless,  despite  the  moral  appeal  and  obvious  
importance  of  the  R2P,  concerns  have  arisen  that  “inconsistent,  selective  and  controversial  uses  
[...]  have  the  potential  to  promote  a  perception  of  R2P  [...]  as  biased  and  political”  (McMillan  
&  Mickler  2013:  315).  What  is  more,  there  are  legitimate  concerns  that  its  principles  are  either  
ignored,  or  worse,  are  misused  by  powerful  states  in  pursuing  regime  change. 7   
  
Apprehension  about  the  potential  ‘abuse’  of  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  in  justifying  
the  forcible  overthrow  of  regimes  has  only  been  reinforced  by  the  reality  of  the  United  States’  
global  power.  Its  current  hegemony,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  continued  international  influence  
of  other  allied  ‘Western’  states  such  as  the  United  Kingdom,  has  long  been  notable  for  being  of  
a  military  and  political  nature.  Its  role  is  also  ideological,  however,  in  that  the  US-led  global  
order  emphasises  the  supposedly  universal  importance  of  liberal  values  (such  as  an  emphasis  
on  the  opportunities  of  the  ‘free  market’  and  human  freedoms)  to  the  peaceful  coexistence  of  
states.  However,  this  pervasive  and  superficially  stable  post-Cold  War  order  has  also  been  at  
the  root  of  increased  volatility.  Peterson  for  example  (2018:  31)  asserts  that   
  
intensified  intrastate  conflict  was  an  almost  inevitable  consequence  of  the  end  of  the  
Cold  War.  States  whose  boundaries  had  been  more  or  less  randomly  drawn  in  the  past  –  
Yugoslavia,  Somalia,  Rwanda  and  Iraq  –  descended  into  civil  wars  (in  the  case  of  
Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq,  forestalled  only  by  brutal  internal  repression).  For  a  time,  
US-led  humanitarian  intervention  to  try  to  limit  the  bloodshed  of  internecine  conflicts  
appeared  to  become  something  like  a  norm  of  the  liberal  order.  It  even  provided  a  
(flimsy)  measure  of  liberal  political  cover  to  the  US-led  invasion  of  Afghanistan  after  
the  terrorist  atrocities  in  New  York  and  Washington  on  11  September  2001  (9/11).  
  
Thus,  an  improved  understanding  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  in  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  
Libya  and  elsewhere  is  inherently  linked  to  an  appreciation  of  the  concept  of  a  post-Cold  War  
‘liberal  international  order’,  which  has  played  an  important  role  in  shaping  the  permissibility  of  




7  NATO  has  been  accused  of  doing  so  in  Libya,  for  example  (cf.  Chapter  IV).  
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1.3  Post-Cold  War  Regime  Change  in  the  ‘Liberal  International  Order’  
  
It  is  true  that  a  generalised  notion  of  a  “world  order  is  regularly  invoked  by  IR  scholars  but  is  
rarely  defined”  (Duncombe  &  Dunne  2018:  26) .  Mearsheimer  clarifies  (2019:  9)  that  in  the  
field  of  International  Relations,  “[a]n  ‘order’  is  an  organized  group  of  international  institutions  
that  help  govern  the  interactions  among  the  member  states.  Orders  can  also  help  member  states  
deal  with  nonmembers,  because  an  order  does  not  necessarily  include  every  country  in  the  
world.  Furthermore,  orders  can  comprise  institutions  that  have  a  regional  or  a  global  scope.  
Great  powers  create  and  manage  orders.”  In  the  late  20th  and  early  21st  centuries,  the  United  
States  has  fulfilled  this  great  power  role  as  the  sole  ‘hyperpower’  of  the  international  system.  
However,  there  is  more  to  the  current  order  than  the  institutionalisation  and  interaction  between  
members  and  nonmembers  described  by  Mearsheimer.  Indeed,  the  US-led  order  is  built  on  the  
notion  that  its  ideals  are  not  only  worth  defending,  but  that  they  are  universal  and  that  
consequently  “states  are  no  longer  legitimate  ipso  facto ,  but  must  embrace  the  political  theory  
of  liberal  democracy;  legitimate  statehood  is  no  longer  presumed  but  must  be  earned”  (Buchan  
2007:  41).  
  
The  underlying  notion  that  sovereignty  can  in  some  way  be  contingent  on  states’  
behaviour  has  emerged  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  and  has  been  at  its  most  prominent  in  the  
new  millennium.  In  the  context  of  the  military  interventions  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  a  
situation  had  arisen  in  which  “[t]he  sovereignty  of  states  in  the  so-called  'developing  world'  
was  now  dependent  upon  their  ruling  elites  meeting  US-defined  responsibilities.  It  was  only  
after  these  responsibilities  had  been  met  that  the  right  to  non-intervention  would  be  granted.  
Regime  change  in  Iraq  was  meant  to  herald  the  beginning  of  this  new  era  of  international  
relations”  (Dodge  2006:  198).  The  type  of  liberal  interventionism  observed  in  the  Middle  East, 8   
i.e.  the  military  interference  by  Western  democracies  in  the  name  of  values  such  as  security,  
8  In  Lipsey’s  (2016:  416)  understanding,  for  instance,  “the  doctrine  of  liberal  interventionism  states  that  national  and   
international  goals  can  be  advanced  by  decisions  by  countries,  individually  or  collectively,  to  intervene  militarily  in  
the  internal  affairs  of  other  states.  Such  interventionism,  moreover,  can  be  justied  not  only  when  the  intervening  
powers  or  powers’  national  interests  are  at  stake,  but  also  in  the  interests  of  the  people  of  the  country  concerned.  In  
particular,  intervention  can  be  right  when  human  rights  are  being  denied,  either  by  repressive  state  authorities  or  as  a  
side-effect  of  internal  conict.”  
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stability,  and  democracy, 9  has  therefore  become  an  increasingly  important  part  of  state-to-state   
interactions.  Thus,  it  is  increasingly  considered  to  be  a  viable  way  of  addressing  the  dangers  of  
international  instability  by  its  proponents.  Miller  (2010)  has  referred  to  the  supposed  legitimacy  
of  such  interventions,  as  well  as  the  subsequent  efforts  at  forcible  democratisation,  as  a  type  of  
‘Offensive  Liberalism’  which  perceives  armed  force  as  a  viable  means  of  imposing  its  
worldview.   
  
Consequently,  “the  corollary  is  that  autocratic  regimes  do  not  enjoy  immunity  from 
external  interference”  (Buchan  2007:  41),  especially  if  they  fall  foul  of  powerful  liberal  states’  
expectations.  In  part,  this  notion  reflects  some  of  the  assumptions  underlying  Francis  
Fukuyama’s  1992  ‘End  of  History’  premise,  which  suggested  the  eventual  global  triumph  of  
liberal  democracy  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Cold  War.  However,  rather  than  the  ‘natural  
evolution’  towards  these  goals  implied  by  Fukuyama,  the  currently  dominant  view  of  liberal  
interventionism  suggests  that  when  regimes  actively  ‘resist’  this  course,  or  restrict  human  
freedoms  by  force,  intervention  may  be  warranted.  Reus-Smit  has  criticised  the  accompanying  
trend  towards  a  more  hierarchical 10  ordering  of  states.  He  argues  (2005:  76)  that  this   
development  is  influenced  by  four  essential  principles  underpinning  the  Liberal  Order’s  
self-understanding,  namely   
  
(1)  that  'liberal  democracies'  are  distinguished  by  a  set  of  empirical  characteristics,  
principal  among  which  are  their  passivity  toward  one  another,  their  constitutional  
commitment  to  the  protection  of  civil  and  political  rights,  and  their  'comparative  moral  
reliability';  (2)  that  these  characteristics  make  liberal  democracies  the  most  advanced  
historical  form  of  polity;  (3)  that  because  of  their  distinctive  qualities  and  historical  
standing,  liberal  democracies  ought  to  have  special  rights  in  international  society,  both  
in  international  decision-making  and  with  regard  to  domestic  autonomy;  and  (4)  that  
granting  such  rights  would  necessarily  reintroduce  a  form  of  legal  hierarchy  into  
international  society.  
  
9  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  democratic  states  are  understood  to  be  “those  states  in  which  political  leaders  are   
held  accountable  to  the  public  through  mechanisms  such  as  regular,  free,  and  fair  elections”  (Monten  2014:  177).  
  
10  In  some  ways,  this  informal  hierarchy  also  extends  to  the  core  members  of  the  Liberal  Order  itself.  For  example,   
Donald  Rumsfeld  disparaged  France  and  Germany,  who  were  unwilling  to  join  the  Iraq  War  coalition,  as  a  part  of  
‘old  Europe’,  as  opposed  to  other  (Eastern)  European  states  more  supportive  of  the  United  States’  global  ambitions  
(Hooper  &  Black  2003).  
21  
Whereas  this  final  point  has  not  led  to  substantial  progress,  e.g.  with  regards  to  UN  Security  
Council  reform,  a  more  ‘unofficial’  yet  no  less  powerful  hierarchy  has  developed  over  the  past  
decades.  Embedded  within  this  conception  of  the  Liberal  Order  is  the  implicit  threat  that  the  
United  States  (or  other  powerful  Western  states)  may  intervene  if  certain  ‘requirements’  are  not  
met,  including  by  removing  and  imposing  more  ‘acceptable'  regimes.   
  
In  the  wake  of  the  9/11  attacks  in  particular,  Western  actors  have  perceived  regime  
change  intervention  as  a  legitimate  way  of  defending  the  security,  stability,  and  continuation  of  
the  Liberal  Order,  as  “citizens  [...]  in  the  US,  the  UK  and  European  states  (as  well  as  
elsewhere)  were  encouraged  to  evaluate  the  legitimacy  of  war  in  terms  of  a  ‘regime  change’ 
that  went  beyond  mere  questions  of  security.  The  idea  of  democratization  had  been  an  
important  general  theme  in  the  public  statements  of  Tony  Blair  and  George  Bush  [...]”  (Finlay  
2007:  556).  Through  the  accompanying  appropriation  of  the  rhetoric  of  stabilisation,  
democratisation,  human  rights,  and  ultimately  the  ideal  of  a  ‘just  war’  itself,  regime  change  has  
moved  beyond  states’  immediate  security  concerns  into  a  global  challenge  for  the  ‘international  
community’.  However,  although  the  term  was  used  to  encourage  public  support  for  
interventions  in  the  Balkans  in  the  1990s,  and  served  as  part  of  the  convoluted  justification  for  
the  later  regime  change  in  Iraq,  the  International  Community  concept  remains  subject  to  
interpretation.  This  is  especially  important  in  debates  regarding  who  exactly  is  to  be  part  of  the  
community,  or  for  instance  how  potential  responsibilities  for  intervention  (or  even  regime  
change)  are  to  be  allocated  amongst  its  members.  
1.3.1  The  ‘International  Community’  in  the  Liberal  Order  
  
While  the  current  world  order  is  still  firmly  rooted  in  a  state-centric  view  of  the  world  and  its  
primary  actors, 11  these  states  are  understood  to  interact  within  the  context  of  an  ‘international   
11  The  current  order  remains  firmly  rooted  in  assumptions  on  the  importance  of  states’  territoriality  in  the  form  of   
recognised  national  borders  (as  opposed  to,  for  instance,  more  cosmopolitan  conceptions  of  a  global  society).  For  
example,  “[e]ven  when  secession  or  state  dissolution  has  proved  impossible  to  prevent,  most  notably  in  the  period  
since  1989,  the  international  community  has  made  great  efforts  to  insist  that  previously  internal  borders,  such  as  
those  of  the  federal  republics  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  Soviet  Union,  provide  successor  states  with  their  
international,  sovereign  borders.  Territorial  aggrandisement,  such  as  that  attempted  by  Iraq  in  1990  or  Serbia  
between  1991  and  1995  has  been  rejected  as  an  acceptable  form  of  international  political  conduct”  (Williams  &  
Roach  2006:  5).  
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community’.  Sovereign  states  are  the  main  representatives,  beneficiaries,  and  protectors  of  this  
order.  As  has  been  famously  stated  by  United  Nations  Secretary  General  Annan  in  1999,  
  
[s]ome  people  say  the  international  community  is  only  a  fiction.  Others  say  it  is  too  
elastic  a  concept  to  have  any  real  meaning.  Still  others  say  it  is  a  mere  vehicle  of  
convenience,  to  be  trotted  out  only  in  emergencies  or  when  a  scapegoat  for  inaction  is  
needed.  Some  say  there  are  no  internationally  recognized  norms,  goals  or  fears  on  
which  to  base  such  a  community.  Op-ed  pages  refer  routinely  to  the  "so-called''  
international  community.  […].  I  believe  these  sceptics  are  wrong.  The  international  
community  does  exist  (para.  12-13).  
  
Unsurprisingly,  Annan  considered  the  United  Nations  to  be  the  chief  incarnation  of  this  
community.  However,  even  at  the  time  of  Annan’s  statement,  “the  United  Nations’  position  as  
legitimate  proxy  for  the  international  community  [had  become]  seriously  eroded  by  its  notable  
failures  in  Somalia,  Rwanda,  and  Bosnia”  (Lucas  2003:  130).  The  result  is  an  ambiguous  
conception  of  the  community,  both  regarding  its  membership  criteria  and  what  it  can  and  
should  achieve.  Indeed,  the  concept  has  increasingly  come  to  be  seen  as  comprising  a  subset  of  
United  Nations  member  states,  namely  those  who  are  both  able  and  willing  to  promote  the  
Liberal  Order  and  its  ‘demands’  of  economic  liberalism,  democratisation,  and  human  rights 
protection.  
  
Hence,  to  the  ‘international  community’  concept’s  critics  such  as  Chomsky  (2002:  34),  
“[t]he  literal  sense  is  reasonably  clear;  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  or  a  substantial  majority  of  
it,  is  a  fair  first  approximation.  But  the  term  is  regularly  used  in  a  technical  sense  to  describe  
the  United  States  joined  by  some  allies  and  clients”,  i.e.  those  countries  who  share  the  United  
States’  political  ideals  and  global  ambitions.  These  ambitions  are  also  in  evidence  in  the  
concept’s  interpretation  by  former  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair.  Blair  (2009  [b]:  para.  1)  
has  understood  the  community  as  both  a  concept  and  as  an  agent  in  itself,  which  can  “justify  
intervention,  including  if  necessary  military  intervention,  not  only  when  a  nation’s  interests  are  
directly  engaged;  but  also  where  there  exists  a  humanitarian  crisis  or  gross  oppression  of  a  
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civilian  population.” 12  Indeed,  in  Blair’s  conception  these  military  interventions  can,  in   
extraordinary  cases,  include  measures  amounting  to  forcible  regime  change.   
  
As  this  thesis  discusses,  the  relation  between  intervention,  regime  change,  and  liberal  
understandings  of  international  order  and  community  is  as  ambiguous  as  it  is  problematic.  To  
an  extent,  the  rejection  of  FIRC  should  be  understood  in  relation  to  the  humanitarian  
interventions  of  the  recent  past.  Certainly,  even  before  the  turn  of  the  millennium  and  the  
controversial  interventions  in  the  Middle  East,  “the  idea  that  interventions  might  be  morally  
acceptable  provoke[d]  suspicion  because  some  past  interventions  by  Western  powers  have  had  
imperialistic  purposes  and  have  produced  enormous  suffering”  (Miller  2000:  5).  The  possibility  
of  waging  post-Cold  War  ‘humanitarian  wars’  (Roberts  1993),  is  distinctly  (and  
uncomfortably)  reminiscent  of  the  ‘ mission  civilisatrice’- type  justifications  of  colonial  powers’  
forcible  expansion.  The  paternalistic  way  in  which  regimes  have  been  introduced  after  
intervention  in  the  past  thirty  years  has  reinforced  these  concerns,  since  even  “UN  missions  to 
‘save  strangers’  often  end  up  with  the  imposition  of  imperial  modes  of  governance”  
(Duncombe  &  Dunne  2018:  26) . 13  Habibi  (2008:  6)  claims  that  this  has  inevitably  “led  many  to   
suspect  or  denounce  human  rights  as  absolutist,  a  liberal  conceit,  or  an  ideological  tool  in  the  
service  of  Western  imperialism”,  which  has  ultimately  weakened  their  appeal  to  universal  
validity.  Thus,  as  is  seen  in  the  course  of  this  thesis,  the  approach  to  justifying  intervention  and  
imposition  often  clashes  with  the  very  principles  which  interveners  claim  to  defend,  raising  
important  questions  regarding  its  permissibility  and,  in  the  end,  its  overall  ‘justice’.  
12  It  is  notable  that  Blair’s  subsequent  claims  to  his  role  in  developing  the  concept  “is  typically  hubristic.  Blair  did   
not  invent  the  philosophy  of  liberal  interventionism,  which  began  to  take  shape  at  least  two  centuries  ago”  (Lipsey  
2016:  417).  Nonetheless,  it  is  undeniable  that  Blair’s  statements  have  done  much  to  popularise  the  concept.  
  
13  Partly  as  a  consequence  of  these  uncomfortable  connotations,  this  liberal  order  has  to  some  extent  become   
contested  by  powerful  non-Western  states  in  an  increasingly  multipolar  order.  For  example,  it  has  been  noted  that  
“Russia’s  normative  position,  aimed  at  strengthening  its  international  and  regional  influence  and  affirming  its  
legitimacy  in  the  changing  global  order,  has  been  increasingly  accompanied  by  values-based  narratives  which  
fundamentally  challenge  western  liberalism”  (Averre  &  Davies  2015:  814).  Similarly,  Barelli  (2018:  199)  notes  that  
“China  oscillates  between  the  desire,  or  temptation,  to  soften  its  stance  on  nonintervention  and  the  preoccupation  
that  doing  so  unreservedly  could  undermine,  against  its  own  interests,  the  essence  of  sovereignty”  (for  further  
examples  and  a  discussion  on  non-Western  approaches  to  the  R2P  and  FIRC,  see  Chapter  VIII).  
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1.4  Thesis  Research  Questions   
  
Given  the  scope  of  the  contentious  aspects  outlined  above,  it  is  clear  that  the  practice  of  
modern  FIRC  must  be  discussed  in  more  detail.  In  doing  so,  the  thesis  addresses  recent  
debates’  lack  of  structure  by  proposing  a  number  of  distinctions  within  the  concept  itself.  This  
will  ultimately  aid  in  moving  the  discussion  from  a  purely  descriptive  account  of  past  FIRC  
attempts  to  a  more  analytical  examination  of  the  concept  within  its  contemporary  context.  
  
First,  highlighting  an  initial  conceptual  difference  between  ‘foreign-imposed’  and  
‘foreign-assisted’  varieties  of  regime  change  is  essential. 14  The  foreign-assisted  type  of  regime   
change  consists,  for  example,  in  the  support  of  subversive  movements  within  a  country  by  
another  state.  This  can  take  the  form  of  financially  supporting  insurgent  groups,  aiding  them  
through  the  covert  involvement  of  intelligence  services  etc.  It  is  consequently  an  ‘indirect’  
action.  Conversely,  this  thesis  will  focus  on  the  direct  external  regime  change  by  military  force.  
Furthermore,  the  phenomenon  is  best  understood  when  this  direct  interference  is  ‘split’  into  
two  sequential  stages,  namely  a  regime  ‘removal’  stage  and  a  subsequent  attempt  at  
‘imposition’.  As  the  thesis  will  discuss  in  later  chapters,  this  is  especially  relevant  if  the  
victorious  power  has  the  final  say  on  the  ‘type’  of  political  regime  left  behind  after  the  
occupation.  The  United  States  of  America,  for  example,  has  long  been  seen  to  favour  the  
imposition  of  economically  liberal  systems  of  government  as  a  part  of  maintaining  and  
spreading  the  liberal  order.  Thus,  since  we  aim  to  discuss  “regime-change  and  not  merely  
regime-toppling”  (Biggar  2013:  305),  the  thesis  defines  foreign-imposed  regime  change  as   
  
a  contemporary  approach  to  military  intervention  which  imposes  a  democratic  system  
of  government  on  regimes  in  the  name  of  human  rights  and  global  security.   
  
In  light  of  the  contentious  status  of  the  recent  regime  change  missions  outlined  earlier,  it  is  
important  to  understand  under  which  circumstances  this  type  of  forcible  change  is  likely  to  
14  Attempts  to  topple  regimes  through  indirect  means  have  become  an  integral  part  of  post-1945  state  competition.   
For  instance,  it  has  been  noted  that  “since  the  1950s,  the  United  States  has  tried  to  oust  governments  in  the  broader  
Middle  East  once  every  decade,  on  average”  (Gordon  2020:  para.  1).  However,  for  the  most  part  these  efforts  have  
taken  the  form  of  ‘indirect’  influence  rather  than  overt  military  intervention.  
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occur,  which  sort  of  regimes  are  most  likely  to  be  the  target  of  such  interventions,  and  
conversely  which  actors  bear  the  responsibility  for  carrying  out  the  operation  and  ensuring  an  
equitable  aftermath.  In  addressing  these  challenges,  the  thesis’  argumentation  is  underpinned  
by  a  ‘Just  War  Theory’  framework.  Finlay  (2018:  101)  rightly  points  out  that  the  core  of  this  
Just  War  approach  consists  of  “three  objectives  that  are  often  in  tension  with  one  another:  first,  
to  permit  war  in  those  cases  where  it  is  justified;  second,  to  prohibit  war  in  all  other  cases;  and,  
third,  to  insist  on  maximum  possible  restraint  in  its  execution.  Just  war  theory,  then,  is  centrally  
about  striking  the  right  balance.”  Accordingly,  this  thesis  clarifies  where  this  balance  lies  with  
regards  to  regime  change  wars.  In  doing  so,  it  also  establishes  which  normative  questions  arise  
in  addressing  the  modern  foreign-imposed  regime  change  concept.  Bearing  in  mind  the  often  
contentious  nature  of  FIRC  missions,  the  fundamental  research  question  of  the  paper  can  be  
articulated  as  follows:  
  
How  can  foreign-imposed  regime  change  missions’  violation  of  sovereignty  be  justified;  
and  which  actors  bear  a  moral  responsibility  to  effectuate  this  change  and  consequently  
manage  its  outcome  to  ensure  post  bellum  justice  and  stability?  
  
While  this  research  question  outlines  the  central  thrust  of  the  thesis,  it  inevitably  raises  
additional  challenges.  As  a  result,  the  thesis  also  considers  the  following:   
  
● Which  conditions  must  sovereign  states’  regimes  fulfil  in  order  to  be  liable  to  be  forcibly  
toppled  and  replaced?  
  
● How  can  responsibilities  to  intervene  be  distributed  amongst  the  members  of  the  
international  community?  
  
● If  governments  are  forcibly  replaced,  which  ‘type’  of  new  regime  ought  to  be  put  in  
place  instead  of  the  old?  
  
  
Past  answers  to  these  questions  have  in  part  remained  unsatisfactory  because  the  topic  is  
generally  under-researched  and  conceptually  under-structured.  To  a  large  extent,  these  
weaknesses  result  from  methodological  approaches  which  have  failed  to  take  into  account  the  
specific  historical  and  political  context  of  the  past  30  years  of  FIRC.  
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1.4.1  Methodological  Considerations  
  
Given  the  breadth  of  approaches  within  the  Just  War  Tradition  itself,  there  is  a  notable  but  
unsurprising  absence  of  a  commonly-accepted  methodology. 15  The  thesis  acknowledges  this   
absence  while  making  the  case  for  a  historical  illustrations  approach  which  echoes  Michael  
Walzer’s  methodology  in  his  seminal  Just  and  Unjust  Wars .  In  doing  so,  it  defends  the  status  of  
FIRC  as  a  separate  aspect  of  modern  warfare,  and  uses  empirical  cases  to  illustrate  the  
evolution  of  liberal  expectations  of  international  interaction.  These  expectations  have  evolved  
from  the  desire  to  create  an  ostensibly  depoliticised  framework  for  global  cooperation  to  a  
more  recent  reassertion  of  national  security  concerns.  
  
In  discussing  cases  of  FIRC,  the  thesis  also  highlights  the  important  distinctions  
between  superficial  and  radical  change.  For  instance,  it  will  be  argued  that  the  wars  in  Iraq  and  
Afghanistan  have  most  often  been  described  as  clear-cut  cases  of  ‘radical’  foreign-imposed  
regime  change,  whereas  Libya  is  best  described  as  a  case  of  ‘superficial’  or  incomplete  regime  
change.  Finally,  the  cases  of  Somalia  and  of  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  will  be  addressed  as  they  
raise  significant  questions  regarding  sovereignty,  national  self-determination,  and  protectorate  
systems,  especially  in  the  creation  of  the  Office  of  the  High  Representative  (OHR).  In  spite  of  
their  obvious  differences,  the  cases  do  share  certain  basic  characteristics:  all  were  subject  to  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  which  was  justified  by  appeals  to  global  security  and  the  
protection  of  human  life.  Furthermore,  in  all  cases  the  United  States  has  played  a  major  part. 16    
15  While  the  majority  of  research  into  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  of  a  qualitative  nature,  there  have  also  been   
attempts  at  examining  the  phenomenon  from  a  more  quantitative  angle,  such  as  in  Downes  and  Monten  (2013),  and  
its  criticism  by  Ruolin  Su  (2017).  Other  quantitative  approaches  have  been  suggested  by  Lo,  Hashimoto,  &  Reiter  
(2008)  in  the  cases  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  and  peace  duration,  and  Peic  and  Reiter  for  the  relations  
between  foreign-imposed  regime  change  and  subsequent  Civil  Wars,  who  for  example  suggest  that  regime  change  
“may  make  civil  war  more  likely,  through  their  effects  on  state  infrastructural  power  and  political  institutions”  
(2011:  453).  
  
16  While  the  central  reason  for  this  involvement  is  largely  due  to  the  United  States’  leadership  of  the  Liberal  Order,   
Walldorf  also  points  out  the  interesting  observation  that  “the  three  largest  and  most  controversial  cases  of  forceful  
regime  change  in  United  States  history—Korea,  Vietnam,  and  Iraq—share  something  important  in  common.  They  
all  resulted  from  presidential  decisions  that  were  deeply  impacted  by  domestic  political  pressures  associated  with  
broad,  public  expectations  or  beliefs  that  were  prominent  at  the  time.  Leaders  felt  pushed  to  act,  in  short,  by  the  
anticipated  political  costs  at  home  of  appearing  out  of  step  with  these  beliefs,  these  powerful  narratives  that  emerged  
around  troubling  events  and  carried  lasting  public  expectations  for  certain  kinds  of  action  abroad”  (2019:  2).  
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Due  to  its  scope  and  goals,  the  thesis  only  provides  a  relatively  cursory  overview  of  
these  individual  cases’  political  intricacies.  Nonetheless,  they  form  a  suitable  point  of  reference  
for  the  thesis’  arguments  and  will  aid  in  highlighting  the  occasional  disconnect  between  the  
deliberations  of  international  political  theory  and  state  praxis.  By  reaffirming  the  advantages  of  
a  Walzerian  orthodox  approach  in  this  way,  the  thesis  highlights  the  relation  between  abstract  
notions,  normative  claims  and  empirical  cases.  It  consequently  rejects  attempts  at  separating  
methodology  from  the  subject  of  investigation,  as  is  often  the  case  in  quantitative  analyses,  but  
also  in  attempts  which  seek  to  reduce  the  moral  challenges  of  warfare  to  questions  of  analytical  
philosophy.  Instead,  the  continuous  engagement  with  key  cases  and  debates  serves  to  highlight  
the  context-dependent  nature  of  military  ethics.  Since  this  methodological  approach  is  
inseparable  from  the  process  of  the  successive  chapters’  argumentation,  the  thesis  does  not  
contain  a  distinct  methodology  chapter,  although  its  approach  to  casuistry  is  discussed  in  more  
detail  in  Chapter  II.   
  
It  is  useful  here  to  point  out  some  of  the  ambitions  and  limitations  of  the  proposed  
approach.  Owing  to  the  scope  of  the  paper,  this  approach  also  means  that  a  number  of  debates  
must  be  left  aside.  In  particular,  this  means  the  exclusion  of  the  debate  on  forcibly  imposed  
regime  change  in  fields  which  do  not  focus  on  states  as  the  primary  actors,  as  well  as  the  debate  
about  its  permissibility  in  international  law.  Indeed,  the  ‘jurisprudential’  (i.e.  the  set  of  rules  
found  in  International  Humanitarian  Law  and  International  Human  Rights  Law)  aspects  of  the  
justice  of  warfare  and  of  intervention  do  not  always  fully  align  with  our  common  expectations  
of  global  justice.  A s  Bain  points  out,  “legal  realities  are  often  confounded  by  philosophical  
problems”  (2010:  45).  Especially  in  the  case  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  the  legal  basis  
is,  for  the  most  part,  too  underdeveloped  to  provide  much  guidance.  Indeed,  “the  laws  of  war  
are  radically  incomplete”,  as  Walzer  has  insisted  (2006  [a]:  288).  What  is  more,  while  the  fact  
that  forcible  political  restructuring  is  not  a  part  of  post-war  international  law  has  been  
decisively  summed  up  in  the  pointed  statement  that  “regime  change  is  illegal:  end  of  debate”  
(Palmer  2005:  para.1),  this  seemingly  conclusive  condemnation  has  evidently  not  prevented  
countries  from  engaging  in  it.  Thus,  well-meaning  attempts  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  global  
‘anarchy’  (i.e.  the  lack  of  authority  ‘beyond’  the  state)  by  constructing  legal  frameworks  have  
long  suffered  from  the  crucial  weakness  that  international  law  can  only  meaningfully  exist  as  
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long  as  the  international  order’s  most  powerful  states  agree  to  abide  by  it.  The  fact  that  the  
United  States-led  intervention  in  Iraq  was  decried  as  ‘illegal’  by  its  numerous  critics  did  not  
stop  the  alliance  from  proceeding.  This  and  other  cases  highlight  that  within  the  Liberal  Order,  
international  law  is  applied  inconsistently  to  nominally  equal  actors.  Overall,  whereas  judicial  
approaches  aim  to  provide  rather  clear-cut  answers  as  to  what  is  legal  and  what  is  illegal,  the  
Just  War  Tradition  sets  out  to  consider  the  notions  of  international  (in)justice  as  such.  
Consequently,  it  has  rightly  been  claimed  that  “Walzer  strongly  resists  the  idea  that  the  moral  
vocabulary  of  war  is  determined  (or  even  informed)  by  international  legal  argument.  He  wants  
to  distinguish  what  he  is  doing  from  the  work  of  international  law,  both  as  a  language  and  as  a  
way  of  relating  to  the  world”  (Orford  2013:  85).  
  
As  subsequent  chapters  show,  the  primary  ambition  of  a  ‘Walzerian’  approach  to  cases  of  
FIRC  is  to  reveal  the  real-life  consequences  of  military  action,  both  for  the  interveners  and  the  
targeted  states.  In  addition,  by  highlighting  the  importance  of  context,  the  cases  show  that  many  
commonly-employed  concepts,  e.g.  the  R2P,  have  grown  out  of  the  challenging  practice  of  state  
interaction.  At  the  same  time,  there  are  of  course  limitations  to  this  approach,  the  most  important  
of  which  is  that  a  reflection  on  past  cases  cannot  tell  us  ‘what  to  do’  with  the  prescriptivist  
confidence  found  in  international  law  or  ‘revisionist’  approaches  to  the  justice  of  war.  As  the  
next  section  shows,  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  inherent  in  this  approach  are  also  reflected  in  
the  way  that  subsequent  chapters  will  examine  FIRC’s  ethical  challenges.  
1.5  Brief  Chapter  Outline  
In  suggesting  a  more  structured  approach  to  the  topics  introduced  above,  the  thesis  is  roughly  
divided  into  two  halves.  The  first  part  identifies  a  range  of  challenges  which  have  affected  the  
theory  and  practice  of  forcible  regime  change,  whereas  the  second  section  examines  in  more  
detail  the  elements  necessary  for  a  just  FIRC  operation.  Accordingly,  the  thesis’  argumentation  
proceeds  as  follows.  
  
The  present  chapter,  as  well  as  Chapter  II,  serve  as  an  introduction  of  the  
argumentation  and  explore  the  thesis’  overall  objectives  and  approaches.  The  second  chapter  
will  reject  the  ‘Pottery  Barn’  approach  to  armed  regime  change.  Nonetheless,  it  argues  that  
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despite  its  flaws,  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule  is  nevertheless  a  convenient  framework  around  which  
to  construct  the  thesis’  argumentation.  This  means  that  the  rule  can  be  employed  to  query  under  
which  circumstances  states  are  liable  to  be  ‘broken’,  i.e.  to  have  their  sovereignty  violated  by  
military  force.  The  chapter  subsequently  introduces  the  Just  War  framework  which  underpins  
the  thesis,  emphasising  the  continued  relevance  of  ‘orthodox’  (and  particularly,  ‘Walzerian’)  
approaches  despite  theory's  revisionist  challengers.  It  affirms  that  Just  War  Theory  benefits  
greatly  from  the  study  of  ‘real-world’  examples  and  from  clarifying  theoretical  positions  with  
empirical  illustrations.  Consequently,  it  will  be  argued  that  in  spite  of  revisionists’  widespread  
“claim  that  war  is  morally  continuous  with  private  action”  (Parry  2017:  170),  the  practice  of  
war  often  cannot  be  reduced  to  examples  drawn  from  the  interpersonal  sphere.  
  
Chapter  III  further  examines  the  primary  challenges  which  affect  an  improved  
conceptualisation  of  modern  FIRC.  The  chapter  emphasises  that  due  to  differences  in  scope,  
motivation,  and  execution,  FIRC’s  infraction  of  national  sovereignty  goes  far  beyond  
conceptions  of  ‘mere’  humanitarian  intervention  or  temporary  occupation.  In  addition,  it  argues  
that  there  is  an  important  contradiction  in  the  current  Liberal  Order’s  self-understanding.  This  
lies  in  the  competing  claims  to  sovereign  rights  to  non-intervention  which  sometimes  sits  
uneasily  alongside  human  rights’  claim  to  universality.  Since  sovereignty  remains  an  
elementary  aspect  of  the  global  state  system,  its  violation  by  force  inevitably  destabilises  the  
international  order.  The  common  ‘sovereignty  as  responsibility’  concept  only  partly  addresses  
this  challenge.  However,  even  before  the  development  of  the  Responsibility  to  Protect,  
“agreement  on  the  substantive  principles,  which  justify  humanitarian  intervention,  is  no  
guarantee  of  agreement  in  specific  cases”  (Wheeler  2001:  566).  The  chapter  mitigates  this  
problem  by  defending  an  understanding  of  human  rights  as  minimal,  or  ‘thin’  rights,  the  
violation  of  which  is  an  important  step  in  establishing  a  states’  liability  to  intervention.  In  
further  addressing  the  FIRC  concept,  Chapter  IV  will  argue  that  it  is  best  understood  when  
further  refined  and  classified.  To  this  effect,  it  proposes  ‘types’  of  regime  change,  ranging  from  
superficial  (i.e.  only  changing  the  upper  echelons  of  a  political  regime  while  leaving  the  broad  
institutional  base  intact)  to  radical  forms  (including  a  complete  change  of  government,  
constitution,  etc.).  In  doing  so,  it  highlights  the  important  differences  between  humanitarian,  
‘punitive’,  and  other  motives  for  regime  change.  These  challenges  are  subsequently  illustrated  
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by  looking  at  the  undeniably  controversial  interventions  in  Iraq  in  2003,  as  well  as  in  Libya  in  
2011.  The  subsequent  chapters  then  set  out  to  suggest  a  Just  War-inspired  approach  to  assessing  
FIRC  by  answering  three  crucial  questions:  ‘When  is  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
warranted,  who  should  act  in  carrying  it  out,  and  what  should  this  process  look  like?’   
  
Consequently,  Chapter  V  will  discuss  in  more  detail  the  requirements  which  actors  
must  meet  for  a  just  intervention.  It  argues  that  i n  advance  of  a  regime  change  intervention  
taking  place,  actors  must  ascertain  that  the  state/regime  is  culpable  for  substantial  human  rights  
violations.  These  challenges,  as  well  as  the  ambiguous  link  between  culpability  and  state  
failure,  are  then  illustrated  with  reference  to  the  results  of  interventions  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  
and  Somalia,  both  of  which  have  undergone  very  different  attempts  at  intervention.  While  
military  action  in  Bosnia  has,  broadly  speaking,  been  considered  a  legitimate  intervention,  the  
subsequent  efforts  at  regime  imposition  have  faced  continued  criticism.  The  democratic  system  
of  government  that  was  imposed  on  the  fledgling  country  in  1995  has  ever  since  been  tightly  
controlled  by  representatives  of  the  international  community.  Conversely,  in  the  absence  of  
more  sustained  and  robust  international  action,  it  has  been  noted  that  “Somalia’s  hope  for  an  
end  to  conflict  cannot  emerge  quickly  or  effectively”  (Stupart  2011:  71).  This  verdict  
underlines  the  notion  that  the  aftermath  of  international  action  is  just  as  important  to  our  
assessment  as  the  initial  recourse  to  intervention.  
  
Chapter  VI  discusses  which  actors  can  legitimately  initiate  forcible  regime  change  
operations,  assessing  the  three  interconnected  principles  of  their  legitimacy,  authority,  and  
responsibility.  It  contends  that  beyond  a  general  responsibility,  various  actors  will  additionally  
have  different  duties  and  obligations  in  relation  to  regime  change  operations.  However,  
establishing  the  identity  of  potentially  legitimate  actors  for  intervention  does  not  mean  that  
regime  change  should  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  these  actors’  ideological  convictions,  
especially  in  relation  to  the  explicit  intent  of  democratising  formerly  authoritarian  states. 17  This   
is  further  discussed  in  Chapter  VII ,  which  elaborates  on  the  prospect  of  efforts  at  imposing  
17  Naturally,  these  ‘democratisation  wars’  raise  a  host  of  additional  and  invariably  difficult  questions  beyond  the   
ethics  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change,  e.g.  jus  in  bello  challenges  regarding  the  validity  of  potentially  killing  
(presumably  innocent)  human  beings  in  the  pursuit  of  human  rights  protection.  However,  these  debates  are  outside  
the  scope  of  the  present  thesis.  
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democratisation,  again  exemplified  by  the  case  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  It  examines  in  how  
far  the  post-war  ‘Dayton  Agreement’  effectively  placed  the  newly  independent  Bosnia  under  a  
form  of  governance  reminiscent  of  historical  trusteeship  arrangements,  including  what  Bischoff  
terms  a  “slide  towards  trusteeship”  (2003:  115),  which  is  somewhat  unanticipated  initially,  but  
whose  dynamics  are  difficult  to  escape  once  set  in  motion.  The  section  also  assesses  the  
apparent  lack  of  success  of  more  recent  exercises  in  democratic  nation-building  in  Iraq  and  in  
Afghanistan.  Indeed,  both  have  suffered  endemic  and  long-term  instability  in  the  aftermath  of  
Western  regime  change  intervention.  
  
 Finally,  Chapter  VIII  will  sum  up  the  foregoing  arguments,  and  examine  the  future   
viability  of  the  Liberal  Order  and  regime  change  interventions  in  the  light  of  increased  global  
multipolarity.  The  chapter  reiterates  the  thesis’  contribution  to  the  debate  while  making  the  
case  for  a  continued  engagement  of  Just  War  scholars  with  the  controversy  of  a  permissible  
foreign-imposed  regime  change.  In  doing  so,  it  also  discusses  the  key  challenges  in  developing  
the  thesis’  argumentation.  Overall,  the  chapter  highlights  that  these  hurdles  also  offer  important  
opportunities  for  future  research  into  the  problematic  status  of  contemporary  liberal  FIRC.  
1.6  Conclusions  
  
This  chapter  has  introduced  the  pressing  questions  which  arise  from  three  decades  of  military  
intervention.  In  doing  so,  it  has  highlighted  the  controversial  status  of  interventions  in  Iraq  and  
Afghanistan  and  has  argued  that  these  are  emblematic  of  a  particular  type  of  modern  
‘foreign-imposed  regime  change’,  or  ‘FIRC’.  This  phenomenon  can  be  contrasted  with  historical  
wars  of  conquest,  but  must  also  be  understood  in  relation  to  other  concepts  such  as  humanitarian  
intervention  and  states’  rights  to  self-defence.  The  Iraqi  case  in  particular  has  often  been  
presented  as  an  illustration  of  US-American  ‘overstretch’,  leading  to  claims  that  the  United  
States’  post-9/11  FIRC  operations  have  hurt  its  national  security  in  the  long  term  rather  than  
ensuring  it.  Ultimately,  liberal  interveners’  assumption  that  the  thoroughness  of  regime  
imposition  is  an  indication  of  its  successful  outcome  is  rarely  substantiated  by  the  examined  
cases.  In  turn,  this  raises  questions  regarding  both  the  United  States’  global  hegemony  and  
ongoing  developments  in  the  relations  between  states’  and  citizens’  rights.  
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In  spite  of  these  challenges,  the  further  conceptualisation  of  the  regime  change  
phenomenon  has  hitherto  been  neglected.  This  is  likely  due  to  its  equation  to  other  concepts,  
but  also  to  concerns  about  its  reputation  as  a  ‘tool’  of  Western  power  projection  or  catalyst  for  
instability.  It  has  for  instance  been  noted  that  “externally  imposed  regime  change  represents  the  
proverbial  Strange  Case  of  Dr  Jekyll  and  Mr  Hyde :  it  is  glorified  as  a  virtue,  and  renamed  a  
‘democratisation’  process  when  it  succeeds,  whereas  it  is  stigmatised  as  an  ‘unwanted  mistake’  
when  it  fails”  (Malito  2019:  105).  As  a  consequence,  while  t his  thesis  highlights  the  assessment  
that  “failure  to  establish  stable,  friendly  regimes  in  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  and  Libya  has  led  
scholars  and  politicians  alike  to  question  the  wisdom  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change”  
(Willard-Foster  2018:  1),  it  contends  that  a  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  pre-  and  
post-FIRC  challenges  is  both  needed  and  possible.  This  must  take  into  account  the  competing  
pressures  and  realities  of  the  emergence  of  humanitarian  intervention,  the  status  of  sovereign  
equality,  and  the  controversial  imposition  of  ‘Western’  liberal  democracy.   
  
The  context  for  further  discussion  has  now  been  set.  The  examination  of  FIRC  in  the  
course  of  the  upcoming  chapters  will  ultimately  provide  a  more  structured  and  conceptually  
distinct  appreciation  of  FIRC.  In  advancing  this  assessment,  t he  following  pages  will  address  
the  thesis’  wider  conceptual  and  methodological  outlook  which,  in  accordance  with  Michael  
Walzer’s  work,  is  based  on  a  casuistic  ‘historical  illustrations'  approach,  which  ultimately  
underpins  his  conceptions  of  an  “orthodox  just  war  theory,  [which]  in  Walzer’s  formulation,  








Chapter  II:  The  Just  War  Framework  
Building  on  the  introductory  chapter,  the  subsequent  pages  address  the  thesis’  conceptual  
framework  as  well  as  its  underlying  assumptions.  While  the  methodological  approach  has  been  
introduced  earlier,  the  present  chapter  defends  in  more  detail  the  casuistic  method  of  illustrations  
which  sets  it  apart  from  revisionist  approaches  grounded  in  analytical  philosophy.  In  doing  so,  it  
provides  an  overview  of  key  debates  within  the  Just  War  Tradition  and  argues  for  its  continued  
importance  to  the  discussion  of  armed  conflict,  including  FIRC.   
  
Indeed,  the  thesis  defends  the  view  that,  in  spite  of  its  undeniably  contentious  status,  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  cannot  be  condemned  out  of  hand,  e.g.  by  dismissing  it  as  an  
example  of  traditional  power  politics,  or  as  a  convenient  euphemism  for  a  continuation  of  20th  
century  imperialism.  Indeed,  although  it  is  inherently  related  to  the  power  dynamics  between  
states,  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  not  simply  an  amoral  exercise  in  crude  power  
projection.  Rather,  contemporary  cases  raise  significant  questions  concerning  the  morality  of  
forcible  intervention,  including  if  and  when  such  an  intervention  can  be  morally  justified.  The  
thesis  approaches  the  topic  from  a  ‘Walzerian’  approach  to  the  concept  of  ‘Just  War’.  This  does  
not  mean  that  it  focuses  solely  on  the  work  of  Michael  Walzer,  but  while  it  draws  on  a  range  of  
authors  and  sources,  it  subscribes  to  the  fundamental  assumption  that  “war  is  a  social  practice  
that  has  a  ‘moral  reality’”,  as  Orford  (2013:  87)  has  accurately  described  Walzer’s  outlook.  The  
subsequent  assessment  of  this  moral  reality  is  grounded  in  inductive  reasoning  about  the  
casuistic  realities  of  warfare.   
  
Accordingly,  the  thesis  maintains  that  reductivist  attempts  at  ‘simplifying’  the  moral  
challenges  of  war,  which  ultimately  fail  to  capture  the  full  complexity  of  the  emerging  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  concept.  This  is  largely  due  to  their  identification  of  questions  
of  the  international  sphere  with  those  of  the  interpersonal  or  domestic  realm.  This  approach  can  
also  be  observed  in  relation  to  discussions  on  the  moral  challenges  of  FIRC:  a  basic  example  of  
this  reductive  mindset  is  the  so-called  ‘Pottery  Barn  Rule’,  which  is  almost  inevitably  referred  
to  in  relation  to  the  2003  Iraq  intervention.  As  is  argued  below,  although  the  rule  serves  as  a  
(supposedly)  intuitive  response  to  problems  of  postwar  responsibility  allocation,  its  actual  
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applicability  in  informing  our  judgment  of  the  intricate  problems  of  states’  responsibilities  is  
dubious.  
2.1  The  ‘Pottery  Barn’  Approach  to  Armed  Intervention  
The  Pottery  Barn  Rule  (PBR)  is  a  commonly  referenced  answer  to  questions  of  postwar  justice,  
especially  those  regarding  the  aftermath  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change.  It  makes  its  point  
in  the  form  of  an  analogy  which  is  intended  as  a  warning  about  the  perils  of  military  
intervention  and  the  responsibilities  that  follow  it.  Ultimately,  the  PBR  highlights  that  while  
states  might  be  tempted  by  the  potential  benefits  of  intervention,  their  initial  enthusiasm  should  
often  be  tempered  by  reflecting  on  the  inevitable  moral  and  material  costs  of  action.  For  
example,  Kurrild-Klitgaard  (2004:  28)  has  noted  that   
  
[m]any  might  prefer  that  the  U.S.  had  never  led  a  coalition  against  Iraq  in  order  to  oust  
Saddam  Hussein,  but  the  question  now  is  what  to  do  for  the  future,  and  as  the  columnist  
Thomas  Friedman  has  argued,  in  this  case  U.S.  foreign  policy  should  adhere  to  what  he  
has  called  ‘The  Pottery  Barn  Principle’:  If  you  break  it,  you  buy  it.  In  other  words,  in  
the  situation  that  is  post-Saddam  Iraq  those  in  charge  must  make  sure  that  the  
institutional  framework  that  is  designed  is  such  that  it  will  do  the  most  to  support  peace,  
liberty  and  prosperity.  
  
The  exact  origins  of  the  phrase  are  disputed:  while  it  is  occasionally  linked  to  Thomas  
Friedman’s  column,  it  has  since  been  associated  more  generally  with  Colin  Powell’s  term  as  
Secretary  of  State,  to  the  extent  that  he  is  often  credited  with  popularising  it.  According  to  
Powell,  he  used  the  expression  to  emphasise  the  possible  long-term  consequences  of  military  
action  to  President  Bush  (Gilsinan  2015).  The  rule  essentially  asserts  that  if  ‘ you  break  it,  you  
own  it’  or  ‘you  break  it,  you  buy  it’ .  As  such,  it  appears  to  be  a  sensible  maxim  at  first,  if  it  is  
taken  to  mean  that  responsibility  for  stabilisation  and  reconstruction  of  a  defeated  state  falls  to  
the  victorious  belligerent,  i.e.  that  the  victor  incurs  at  least  some  moral  burdens  by  engaging  in  
regime  change  warfare.  After  all,  if  a  person  breaks  one  of  our  possessions,  it  is  not  abnormal  
that  this  person  may  be  expected  to  ‘make  up’  for  the  damage  caused.  Likewise,  in  the  
domestic  setting,  if  someone  injures  us  physically,  she  might  (in  some  jurisdictions  at  least)  
also  be  legally  liable  to  bear  the  cost  of  medical  treatment.  
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According  to  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule’s  proponents,  a  similar  principle  would  apply  to  
states  subjected  to  foreign  invasion  and  regime  change.  The  rule’s  well-meaning  intent  is  
evidently  to  dissuade  actors  from  engaging  in  rash  interventions,  and  to  ponder  the  severe  
consequences  of  military  action  even  in  cases  where  recourse  to  conflict  might  seem  justified.  
As  Blake  (2014:  134)  has  stated,   
  
the  Pottery  Barn  rule  is  best  understood  as  a  piece  of  first-person  moral  guidance,  useful  
for  would-be  interveners  who  are  subject  to  the  same  cognitive  errors  and  biases  as  the  
rest  of  us.  It  is  not  that  we  ought  to  hold  interveners  more  responsible  than  others  for  
the  task  of  rebuilding  a  society  after  intervention;  it  is,  instead,  that  we  should  not  think  
ourselves  licensed  to  intervene,  unless  we  have  both  the  means  and  the  will  to  rebuild  
that  society  [...].  
  
Nonetheless,  even  the  comparatively  widespread  agreement  on  the  existence  of  positive 
postwar  duties  does  not  necessarily  entail  similar  consensus  on  the  identity  of  the  actors  
expected  to  carry  them  out.  Neither  does  the  PBR  specify  what  specifically  this  ‘rebuilding’  
would  consist  in,  as  historical  interventions  demonstrate.  Accordingly,  while  it  is  clear  that  
rather  than  a  literal  meaning  of  ownership  (i.e.  the  annexation  of  the  defeated  state)  the  Pottery  
Barn  Rule  variously  refers  to  the  moral  responsibility  for  the  reconstruction  of  infrastructure,  to  
the  bringing  to  justice  of  war  criminals,  or  indeed  even  to  the  imposition  of  a  new  political  
regime.  This  creates  a  host  of  derivative  problems.  Primarily,  of  course,  the  Rule  seems  to  
assume  that  the  imaginary  clumsy  ‘visitor  to  the  shop’  breaks  an  object  by  accident .  While  it  is  
perfectly  reasonable  that  damaging  an  expensive  vase  by  bumping  into  it  makes  one  liable  to  
pay  for  it,  the  situation  is  (rather  obviously)  much  less  straightforward  in  terms  of  international  
war.  It  goes  without  saying  that  much  of  the  severe  damage  caused  by  armed  conflict  is  
decidedly  not  an  unfortunate  byproduct,  but  rather  the  result  of  an  intentional  choice  by  the  
actors  involved.  
  
Consequently,  this  thesis  argues  that  ultimately,  warfare,  and  especially  foreign-imposed  
regime  change,  cannot  be  reduced  to  ‘interpersonal’  examples:  states  are  not  inanimate  objects  
which  can  be  ‘broken’  by  accident.  They  have  specific  histories  and  identities  which  inform  
their  actions  on  the  global  stage.  Unlike  an  item  of  pottery,  states  act  independently,  of  their  
own  volition,  and  make  moral  choices .  While  breaking  a  fragile  vase  by  accident  is  unfortunate  
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but  not  unusual,  the  invasion  and  occupation  of  a  sovereign  state  takes  lengthy  preparation,  and  
most  importantly,  intent .  The  defeat  and  dismantling  of  a  governing  regime  by  force  is  the  
central  objective  of  regime  change  interventions,  not  some  unforeseen  or  ‘accidental’  
occurrence.  Hence,  the  Pottery  Barn  concept  oversimplifies  matters  while  at  the  same  time  
making  rather  wide-ranging  assumptions  which  are  not  borne  out  in  reality.  It  subsequently  
fails  to  address  the  ethical  problems  identified  with  regime  change,  including  whether  ‘fixing’  
the  country  includes  ultimately  reinstating  elements  of  the  deposed  regime.  Most  victorious  
actors  will  neither  be  willing  nor  expected  to  reinstate  their  former  adversary,  especially  in  
cases  where  the  latter  has  threatened  global  security  or  has  been  carrying  out  mass  killings  of  
civilians.  Thus,  the  thesis  takes  into  account  states’  nature  as  moral  actors,  and  provides  a  more  
complex  assessment  of  post-war  justice.   
  
Accordingly,  the  next  pages  elaborate  on  the  current  state  of  the  Just  War  debate.  It  
stands  to  reason  that  thinking  about  war  solely  in  the  abstract  risks  turning  the  complex  nature  
of  conflict  into  a  sterile,  and  ultimately  unsatisfactory,  concept.  As  a  consequence,  there  is  
much  to  be  gained  by  the  casuistic  approach  which  is  often  associated  with  a  ‘traditional’  or  
‘orthodox’  understanding  of  Just  War  Theory.   
2.2  Adapting  the  Just  War  Theory  as  a  Conceptual  Framework   
  
The  location  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  at  the  intersection  of  post-Cold  War  US  
hegemony,  tensions  between  sovereignty  and  globalisation,  and  the  global  prominence  of  
human  rights  discourse  places  it  within  a  wider  field  of  interventionist  practice  and  theory.  This  
includes  the  broad  concept  of  ‘humanitarian’  intervention  through  warfare,  concerns  about  
human  security,  and  discussions  surrounding  states’  supposed  Responsibility  to  Protect.  While  
the  foundational  theories  of  International  Relations  (the  broadly  defined  ‘Liberal’  and  ‘Realist’  
traditions,  for  instance) 18  can  help  to  further  an  understanding  of  some  of  the  reasons  why   
18  Two  major  schools  of  International  Relations  theory,  (Neo-)Liberalism  and  (Neo-)Realism,  take  markedly   
different  approaches  to  the  occurrence  of  regime  change  missions.  This  largely  depends  on  their  view  of  ‘Anarchy’  
and  the  nature  of  the  state  system.  For  instance,  Geller  and  Travlos  (2019:  1-2)  have  stated  that  
  
[n]eoliberal  institutionalism  holds  that  the  effects  of  anarchy  and  the  use  of  force  in  international  politics  
can  be  minimized  through  the  development  of  international  norms  and  rules,  the  spread  of  
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states  might  engage  in  foreign  intervention  (e.g.  out  of  ideological  or  security  concerns),  they  
do  not  address  the  many  other  factors  affecting  foreign-imposed  regime  change  in  sufficient  
detail,  including  the  problematic  task  of  judging  the  many moral  considerations  of  armed  
conflict.  Accordingly,  an  approach  which  takes  into  account  the  enduring  appeal  of  Just  War  
Theory  is  the  most  appropriate  way  of  assessing  the  challenges  of  the  FIRC  concept.   
  
The  Just  War  approach  seeks  to  address  both  age-old  and  modern  questions  surrounding  
warfare.  As  Michael  Walzer  has  stated,  it  “provides  the  crucial  framework,  the  vocabulary  and  
the  conceptual  scheme,  with  which  we  commonly  argue  about  war.  This  is  the  way  war  has  to  
be  explained  and  defended  […]”  (2004  [b]:  37).  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  the  thesis  treats  the  
terms  ‘Just  War  Theory’  or  the  ‘Just  War  Tradition’  (both  commonly  abbreviated  to  ‘JWT’)  as  
interchangeable.  However,  although  the  terms  are  often  used  in  this  way,  it  is  important  to  note  
that  in  O’Driscoll’s  words,  “[t]o  insist  on  thinking  about  just  war  as  a  tradition  entails  rejecting  
the  idea  that  it  reduces  to  a  single,  coherent,  axiomatic  theory.  Approaching  the  Just  War  in  this  
way  involves  conceiving  of  it  as  a  historically  continuous  collection  of  closely  related  but  often  
competing  voices  that,  when  viewed  in  concert,  form  a  sustained  body  of  thought  and  practice”  
(2018:  234).  This  approach  also  allows  the  framework  to  retain  an  important  degree  of  
flexibility  in  adapting  other  concepts  to  its  needs.  In  addressing  a  wide  range  of  questions  about  
armed  conflict,  the  tradition  discusses,  amongst  other  things,  when  it  is  permissible  to  go  to  
war,  which  actions  are  allowed  in  engagements,  and  what  the  aims  of  postwar  justice  ought  to  
be.  Generally  speaking,  then,  the  approach  acknowledges  that  war  should,  whenever  possible,  
be  subject  to  rules,  albeit  imperfect  ones.  In  the  understanding  of  the  Just  War  employed  by  
Walzer,  these  rules  are  not  always  based  on  supposedly  immutable  moral  truths,  but  rather  on  
the  experience  of  centuries  of  warfare.  
intergovernmental  organizations,  and  the  coordination  of  foreign  policies  among  major  powers  through  
international  institutions  and  congresses.  While  structural  realism  rejects  these  factors  as  significant  causes  
of  nonviolent  international  processes,  neoliberal  theory  predicts  that  high  levels  of  major  power  policy  
coordination  channeled  through  international  institutions  should  be  associated  with  the  absence  or  
infrequent  occurrence  of  war.  
  
The  Realist  tradition  in  particular  is  often  perceived  to  be  opposed  to  the  Just  War  approach,  insofar  as  questions  of  
morality  are  expected  to  play  only  a  marginal  role  in  the  conduct  of  state  actors.  States  are  assumed  to  act  in  their  
own  interests.  In  this  view,  going  to  war  and  even  ‘fighting  dirty’  are  the  prerogatives  of  sovereign  states  and  should  
not  be  subject  to  the  moral  standards  expected  of  other  actors.  Hence,  realism  remains  popular  with  proponents  of  
so-called  Realpolitik.  However,  some  elements  of  the  Realist  schools  of  thought,  especially  international  
applications  of  ‘Christian  Realism’,  do  allow  for  a  partial  overlap  with  the  Just  War  tradition  (see  Carlson  2008).  
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Whereas  ethical  frameworks  addressing  the  justice  of  armed  conflict  are  in  evidence  in  
numerous  cultures  and  religions,  it  is  undeniable  that  the  historical  Just  War  Tradition  has  been  
predominantly  influenced  by  Christian  (particularly  Catholic)  theological  concerns. 19   
Reichberg  (2010),  for  instance,  recalls  the  fundamental  contributions  made  by  Saint  Thomas  
Aquinas  to  the  Just  War  debate.  Saint  Thomas,  along  with  the  earlier  Saint  Augustine  of  Hippo, 
have  often  been  credited  as  the  most  eminent  early  theologians  to  address  the  moral  
environment  of  warfare.  In  later  centuries,  prominent  early-modern  contributors  to  the  
developing  framework  include  Francisco  de  Vitoria,  Emer  de  Vattel,  Samuel  von  Pufendorf  and  
many  others  (Brunstetter  &  O'Driscoll  2018).  Yet  another  contributor,  Hugo  de  Groot,  
commonly  referred  to  as  Grotius,  has  played  a  prominent  role  in  the  development  of  both  the  
Just  War  and  early  modern  legal  theory  in  particular  (Forde  1998). 20  More  recently,  and  into  the   
present  day,  political  scientists,  moral  philosophers,  legal  scholars,  etc.  can  all  make  a  claim  to  
be  contributing  to  the  wider  debate  on  the  justice  of  war.  Common  to  all  is  a  sincere  concern  
for  the  deplorable  real-life  consequences  of  war,  paired  with  the  understanding  that  violent  
conflict  is,  occasionally,  inevitable  in  an  imperfect  world.  
  
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  theory  has  not  always  been  equally  popular,  especially  once  
international  legal  approaches  had  become  more  prominent.  However,  although  many  elements  
of  the  Just  War  approach  had  receded  in  importance  through  much  of  the  19th  and  20th  
centuries,  making  it  a  “marginal  doctrine”  (Makang  2015:  106)  save  for  the  realm  of  theology,  
its  resurgence  in  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  century  began  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  
War.  Its  further  development  has  since  been  prompted  by  the  controversies  over  other  conflicts.  
In  the  case  of  Michael  Walzer  himself,  the  ill-fated  American  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  War  
was  a  major  impetus,  whereas  more  recent  scholars  have  found  ample  material  in  the  United  
States-led  interventions  in  the  so-called  ‘War  on  Terror’.  
  
19  Just  War  Theory  has  in  part  developed  out  of  a  desire  to  combine  the  early  Christian  principles  of  non-violence   
with  the  often  unavoidable  military  conflict  in  the  late  Roman  Empire.  This  concern  for  the  right  conduct  and  
spiritual  wellbeing  of  the  Christian  statesman  and  soldier  persisted  into  the  Middle  Ages  and  continues  to  influence  
Christian  Churches'  approaches  to  warfare  today.  
  
20  His  De  Jure  Belli  Ac  Pacis ,  published  in  1625,  has  been  credited  with  initiating  an  important  move  away  from   
theological  concerns  and  towards  the  creation  of  international  law.  Thus,  whether  he  is  counted  primarily  as  a  Just  
War  theorist  or  as  a  legal  scholar,  his  work  on  the  Jus  Gentium  has  without  a  doubt  “enabled  international  law  to  
grow  into  the  discipline  that  we  know  today”  (Neff  2012:  xxxv).  
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Accordingly,  theorists  of  war  have  found  that  alongside  traditional  concerns,  new  
challenges  have  arisen.  These  include  questions  relating  to  terrorism,  non-state  actors,  and  the  
difficulties  in  effectively  discriminating  between  combatants  and  non-combatants.  In  addition  
to  these  developments,  “[t]he  changing  character  of  war  includes  not  only  the  use  of  new  
technology  such  as  drones,  but  probably  more  problematically  the  changing  temporal  and  
spatial  scope  of  war  and  the  changing  character  of  actors  in  war”,  as  Davidovic  has  claimed  
(2017:  603).  To  be  sure,  the  recent  emergence  of  these  challenges  is  significant.  However,  it  
neither  means  that  Just  War  Theory  as  a  whole  ceases  to  be  applicable,  nor  that  its  underlying 
principles  ought  to  be  discarded.  It  does  mean  that  scholars  continue  to  imagine  ways  in  which  
the  classical  theory  can  be  developed  in  order  to  be  applied  to  modern  questions,  including  the  
contemporary  FIRC  phenomenon.  This  is  especially  the  case  since  the  Just  War  approach  is  
founded  on  the  notion  that  “war  is  sometimes  justifiable,  provided  it  is  initiated  in  the  right  
circumstances  and  conducted  and  concluded  in  the  right  way  –  is,  as  many  might  think  
nowadays,  part  of  our  global  ‘common  sense’”  (Finlay  2018:  10).  
2.2.1  The  ‘Two  Camps’  of  Contemporary  Just  War  Theory  
  
In  spite  of  its  important  role  in  underpinning  this  ‘common  sense’,  the  Just  War  tradition  itself  
contains  numerous  ambiguities  and  diverging  opinions,  which  inevitably  also  affect  discussions  
on  regime  change.  In  part,  this  ambiguity  has  given  rise  to  several  important  strands  of  
revisionist  challenges  to  the  more  traditional  ‘orthodox  ‘approaches.  O’Driscoll  (2013:  47)  has 
described  this  debate  as  an  important  “rift  that  has  emerged  between  [...]  historical  and  
analytical  approaches  to  the  subject.”  Within  this  rift,  “discussion  has  been  mainly  structured  
by  the  debate  between  orthodox  (Michael  Walzer)  theory  and  the  revisionist  (Jeff  McMahan)  
challenges”  (Clark  2017:  329).  Indeed,  “[f]or  Walzer,  today’s  just  war  debate  falls  into  two  
camps.  First,  his  camp  which  considers  just  war  theory  to  be  about  war  and,  second,  the  
revisionist  camp  which  considers  just  war  theory  to  be  about  moral  philosophy”,  as  Braun  
further  emphasises  (2018:  354). 21    
21  Indeed,  Braun  writes  that  “[m]ost  revisionists  would  describe  themselves  as  working  on  the  ethics  of  war,  rather   
than,  as  Walzer  does,  on  just  war  theory.  Their  main  concern  is  to  write  novel  philosophy  on  war-related  issues  such  
as  the  ethics  of  harming,  the  duty  to  save  or  political  authority”  (idem:  353).  In  doing  so,  many  revisionist  scholars  
tend  to  claim  that  the  moral  questions  of  war  are  “not  so  substantively  different  from  ordinary  peacetime  morality  so  
as  to  require  a  whole  separate  set  of  paradigms”  (Davidovic  2017:  605),  and  indeed  that  “[t]he  only  morally  
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Accordingly,  the  revisionist  approach  suggests  “that  the  morality  of  war  is  constituted  
solely  by  the  moral  principles  that  govern  violence  between  private  individuals”  (Parry  2017:  
170).  These  debates  affect  our  understanding  of  the  FIRC  topic  as  well  as  wider  questions  
about  the  general  utility  of  reductivist  examples  in  addressing  the  complex  international  
situations  which  cause  armed  conflict.  Among  the  representatives  of  revisionist  scholarship,  
Neu  has  stated,  “fictitious  scenarios  blossom,  as  they  fit  the  binary  just  war  accounts  better  than  
the  real  world  ever  could”  (2013:  461).  Nonetheless,  this  thesis  joins  authors  such  as  Rigstad  in  
arguing  for  “the  sharp  curtailment  of  imaginary  examples  in  just  war  theory”  (2017:  124).  It  is  
true  that  these  examples  are  flexible,  and  can  therefore  be  tailored  to  the  argument  at  hand.  Yet  
in  spite  of  this  flexibility,  “imaginary  examples  are  generally  under-described  or  indeterminate  
in  comparison  with  the  fullness  of  factual  reality”  (idem:  127). 22  It  is  certainly  possible  to   
imagine  the  hypothetical  examples  of  the  sort  authors  such  as  McMahan  have  proposed  in  
several  impressively  refined  thought  experiments.  Ultimately,  however,  these  often  make  
unrealistic  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  interstate  conflict.  The  severe  limitations  of  moral  
reductivism  mean  that  Walzer  is  rightly  skeptical  of  such  examples.  He  even  writes  (2006  [c]:  
43)  that  
  
McMahan  means  to  provide  […]  a  careful  and  precise  account  of  individual  
responsibility  in  time  of  war.  What  he  actually  provides  [...]  is  a  careful  and  precise  
account  of  what  individual  responsibility  in  war  would  be  like  if  war  were  a  peacetime  
activity”,  and  asserts  that  “some  of  it  is  a  little  too  fine  for  my  head;  I  don’t  have  any  
clear  intuition  about  the  case  of  the  Implacable  Pursuer  (except  for  the  intuition  that  it  
isn’t  a  likely  case  in  the  world  that  I  know). 
  
significant  difference  between  war  and  ordinary  violence  between  individuals  is  that  the  former  takes  place  on  a  
larger  and  more  complex  scale”  (Parry  2017:  172).  
  
22  For  example,  a  simple  revisionist  approach  likely  begins  with  interrogating  the  parallels  between  foreign-imposed   
regime  change  and  interpersonal  ethics.  The  notion  of  ‘liability  to  harm’  is  central  to  many  aspects  of  Just  War  
Theory,  and  starting  from  an  assumption  that  there  is  a  basic  right  not  to  be  harmed,  any  cases  where  this  right  is  
weakened  must  involve  a  sense  of  liability.  Consequently,  an  initial  assessment  might  posit  a  regime  threatening  
civilian  populations  with  unwarranted  violence  could  be  reduced  to  the  notion  of  Person  (A)  threatening  Person  (B).  
Transposed  onto  the  regime  change  discussion,  reductivist  reasoning  might  frame  the  situation  as  a  form  of  
‘other-defence’,  where  (A)’s  threatening  of  (B)  makes  it  liable  to  harm  from  a  third  actor,  (C).  Nevertheless,  the  
required  conceptual  shift  from  interpersonal  violence  and  defence  to  the  question  of  regime  change  is  a  difficult  one.  
It  also  raises  further  questions:  does  (C)  have  a  right,  or  duty,  to  replace  (A)?  With  what?  What  if  (B)  does  not  
welcome  (A)’s  help,  and  so  forth.  
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Overall  then,  reductivist  approaches  have  the  effect  of  leading  us  on  a  “search  for  moral  truth  
which  requires  abstraction  and  thus  has  little  to  no  place  for  the  messy  circumstances  of  
real-world  employments  of  force”  (Braun  2018:  350).  Consequently,  this  thesis  rejects  the  
reductivist  approach  to  warfare  and  JWT,  and  maintains  that  a  clear  distinction  between  ‘the  
individual’  engaging  in  the  business  of  day-to-day  life,  and  ‘the  regime/state’  as  a  collective  
political  authority  engaged  in  warfare  remains  essential  to  a  better  understanding  of  FIRC.  
2.3  Just  War  Considerations  in  Assessing  Foreign-Imposed  Regime  
Change  
  
The  many  armed  conflicts  which  have  marked  the  past  decades,  especially  those  framed  as  
‘humanitarian’  wars,  have  shown  that  “there  remains  a  disjuncture  between  discourses  of  
human  rights  and  continuing  practices  of  human  wrongs”  (Bellamy  2002:  478).  Both  the  
language  of  human  rights  and  elements  of  the  Just  War  doctrine  have  repeatedly  been  
employed  by  governments  in  justifying  regime  change  interventions.  Inevitably,  this  prompts  
concerns  about  the  instrumentalisation  of  the  theory  by  policy  makers  who  often  seem  happy  to  
ignore  the  central  assumption  that  “[t]he  just  war  tradition  is  highly  restrictive;  it  is  about  
limiting,  not  legitimating,  war”  (Powers  2012:  para.  9).   
  
The  contemporary  Just  War  Tradition  approaches  the  study  of  conflict  under  three  
different  headings,  commonly  recognised  as  being  the  jus  ad  bellum ,  jus  in  bello ,  and  jus  post  
bellum .  Generally  speaking,  the  jus  ad  bellum  has  focused  on  the  rights  of  ‘Princes’  and,  more  
recently  sovereign  states,  to  go  to  war,  whereas  the  jus  in  bello  has  shown  more  concern  for,  
among  other  things,  belligerents’  and  civilians’  individual  fates  once  conflict  has  begun.  
Finally,  as  Douglas  (2003:  544)  has  emphasised,  “[t]he  virtue  of  continuity  demands  that  just  
warriors  think  not  only  about  whether  and  when  to  enter  war  and  how  to  fight  once  they  are  in  
it,  but  that  they  do  so  also  with  an  eye  to  getting  back  out.”  Given  this  goal,  the  distinctions  as  
well  as  the  links  between  the  three  components  remain  essential.  As  Lucas  (2007:  249)  has  
claimed,   
  
[o]ne  cannot  discuss  jus  ad  bellum  in  abstraction,  distinct  from  the  expectation  that  
combatants,  proposing  to  defend  or  enforce  justice,  must  employ  only  just  means  in  the  
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realization  of  just  ends  ( jus  in  bello ).  This  intention  must  precede  and  thoroughly  infuse  
combat,  even  as  the  intention  to  restore  peace  with  justice  and  to  repair  a  society’s  
ability  to  sustain  and  protect  its  citizens  ( jus  post  bellum )  must  infuse  both  deliberations  
about  war  and  the  subsequent  conduct  of  it.   
  
Of  course,  the  thesis’  focus  on  ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  questions  is  not  meant  to  discount  jus  
in  bello’ s  importance  to  the  Just  War  framework  in  general.  As  has  been  expressed  
appropriately  by  Whitman,  “[i]n  wartime  the  tension  between  winning  and  fighting  morally  
may  take  on  any  number  of  forms,  all  involving  very  grave  and  painful  decisions”  (1993:  261).  
Nonetheless,  the  specific  controversy  surrounding  FIRC  stems  from  concerns  about  its  
underlying  reasons  and  ulterior  ambitions.  Therefore,  in  the  course  of  a  regime  change  
intervention,  the  principles  of  jus  in  bello  remain  unchanged  from  any  other  type  of  armed 
conflict.  This  also  means  that  violations  of  the  jus  in  bello  during  (or  after,  in  the  case  of  
potential  insurgencies)  do  not  invalidate  the  reason  for  intervention,  nor  do  they  absolve  actors  
from  their  postwar  responsibilities.   
  
While  Rengger  rightly  points  out  that  “[t]he  just  war  tradition  cannot  tell  us  –  and  is  not  
designed  to  tell  us  –  whether  this  or  that  particular  instance  of  the  use  of  force  is  ‘just’  or  not  in  
the  generality”  (2005:  152),  the  demands  of  both  ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  justice  will  
inevitably  affect  our  understanding  of  the  legitimacy  of  past  and  future  regime  change  
missions.  The  discourse  leading  up  to  military  intervention  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  for  
instance,  involved  several  claims  that  these  states  were  posing  a  serious  threat  not  only  to  their  
own  citizens,  but  to  international  peace  and  stability  as  a  whole,  and  that  intervention  was  a  just  
response.  Moreover,  the  currently  ongoing  conflict  in  Syria  (cf.  Chapter  VIII)  and  the  resulting  
instability  in  the  wider  Middle  East  have  yet  again  raised  essential  questions  regarding  the  
goals  of  humanitarian  intervention,  the  potential  for  forcible  removal  of  the  Assad  government,  
and  other  considerations  regarding  post  bellum  justice  (e.g.  Byman  et  al .  2012:  11).  That  the  
significance  of  jus  post  bellum  has  increasingly  been  accepted  by  Just  War  theorists  is  partly  a  




Accordingly,  the  following  pages  provide  an  overview  of  the  ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  
considerations  which  highlight  the  moral  challenges  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
missions.  Thus,  whereas  jus  ad  bellum  criteria  can  assess  the  circumstances  in  which  a  FIRC  
war  may  be  initiated,  post  bellum  concepts  can  aid  in  addressing  the  subsequent  military  
occupation  and,  ultimately,  the  imposition  of  a  new  regime.  
2.3.1  The  Principles  of  Jus  Ad  Bellum  
“The  telos  of  a  just  war  is,  paradoxically,  peace”,  as  Douglas  has  correctly  stated  (2003:  544).  
Unlike  varieties  of  pacifism,  which  inevitably  champion  the  conviction  that  war  is  morally  
indefensible,  the  Just  War  doctrine  takes  into  consideration  that  violent  conflict  can,  on  rare  
occasions,  be  the  ‘lesser  of  two  evils’.  In  other  words,  the  tradition  asserts  that  “we  cannot  
make  the  general  presumption  that  war  results  in  more  evil  than  not-war”  (Biggar  2013:  321),  
and  that  therefore,  some  wars  are  not  only  politically  ‘justifiable’,  but  ‘just’  in  moral  terms.  In  
war  and  other  pursuits,  “[m]oral  thinking  seeks  to  make  sense  of  human  conduct  by  ordering  it  
in  terms  of  normative  principles  and  rules”  (idem:  4).  This  desire  to  formulate  rules  is  reflected  
in  “[t]he  ad  bellum  just  war  criteria  [...]  [which]  emerge  from  the  attempt  to  specify  the  kinds  
of  conditions  in  which  the  presumption  against  killing  may  be  overridden  and  recourse  to  war  
justified”  (Baer  &  Capizzi  2005:  121).   
  
Although  there  is  no  universally-accepted  list  of  essential  ad  bellum  demands,  the  
majority  of  Just  War  authors  tend  to  agree  on  the  following,  occasionally  overlapping,  
requirements:  
  
● A  just  cause  is  needed  for  initiating  the  conflict;  
● The  war  should  be  declared  and  fought  by  a  competent  authority;  
● It  should  be  fought  with  a  right  intention;  
● There  ought  to  be  a  reasonable  probability  of  success,  i.e.  of  winning  the  war;  
● The  war  must  be  considered  to  be  a  last  resort  to  remedy  injustice;  
● It  must  be  proportional  to  the  injustice  suffered  by  the  actor  or  by  others.  
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While  “the  just  war  tradition  does  not  present  a  series  of  boxes  to  check,  and,  should  you  get  
more  than  a  given  number,  then  war  it  is”  (Elshtain  2006:  109),  these  principles  play  an  
important  role  in  assessing  the  justice  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  missions.  Most  
importantly,  the  traditional  criterion  of  a  just  cause  must  be  met  in  order  to  justify  military  
action  and  eventual  regime  imposition.  The  identity  of  this  cause  has  been  debated,  however,  as  
an  examination  of  cases  in  coming  chapters  will  show.  Furthermore,  the  traditional  requirement  
of  ‘right  intent’  plays  a  significant  role  in  this  regard,  as  the  regime  change  is  not  just  another  
‘side  effect’  of  the  conflict,  i.e.  not  just  part  of  the  collateral  damage  of  interstate  conflict.  At  
the  same  time,  the  decision  of  intervention  must  of  course  be  at  least  roughly  proportional  to  
the  offence  committed.  However,  in  assessing  FIRC  the  principle  of  last  resort  remains  
somewhat  ambiguous.  It  is  generally  held  that  actors  should  resort  to  war  only  after  other  
options  to  halt  aggressive  behaviour  or  to  alleviate  human  suffering  have  been  exhausted  (e.g.  
increasing  diplomatic  pressure  on  the  rights-violating  state,  trade  embargoes  and  so  forth).  The  
last  resort  criterion  tends  to  assume  that  there  is  a  distinct  ‘sliding  scale’,  with  war  at  one  end.  
However,  as  later  chapters  show,  FIRC  interventions  pose  challenges  to  this  particular  
conception  of  ad  bellum  justice,  especially  when  carried  out  in  response  to  cases  where  
large-scale  human  suffering  is  ongoing  or  imminent.  Indeed,  actions  like  ethnic  cleansing,  
genocide  etc.  can  often  be  foreseen.  As  will  be  seen,  while  the  ad  bellum  requirements  in  such  
cases  are  clear,  effective  action  is  more  often  hampered  by  a  lack  of  political  will  and  failure  to  
allocate  responsibilities  for  action.  These  cases  of  inaction  yet  again  highlight  the  importance  
of  casuistry  in  assessing  the  ‘moral  realities’  of  the  FIRC  phenomenon  beyond  a  focus  on  
purely  abstract  principles.  
  
Given  the  important  challenges  to  interveners  posed  by  the  ad  bellum  principles  above,  
it  may  seem  tempting  to  avoid  the  resulting  debates  altogether  and  to  reduce  the  difficult  
questions  of  forcible  intervention  to  a  more  utilitarian  approach.  In  assessing  the  justice  of  
FIRC,  this  could  for  instance  be  attempted  by  focussing  on  the  presumed  overall  positive  or  
negative  effects  of  replacing  a  given  regime.  Indeed,  “[m]any  of  the  traditional  ad  bellum  
requirements  already  have  a  consequentialist  flavor,  such  as  last  resort,  proportionality,  and  
reasonable  probability  of  success”,  Jenkins  agrees  (2017:  964).  However,  attempts  to  reduce  
the  complex  moral  questions  associated  with  waging  war  to  calculations  of  an  ill-defined  
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‘greater  good’  (including  for  instance  a  notion  of  ‘freedom’,  which  is  as  appealing  as  it  is  
vague)  in  this  fashion  are  rarely  a  fruitful  way  forward  in  assessing  armed  interventions.  In  
part,  this  is  the  case  because,  “as  Walzer  notes,  considerations  of  utility  are  subordinate  within  
the  common  moral  world,  which  seems  intuitively  grounded  in  human  rights”  (Boyle  1997:  
88),  but  also  because  a  traditional  Just  War  appraisal  presents  us  with  a  structured  and  much  
more  useful  approach  to  foreign-imposed  regime  change. 23  This  is  the  case  precisely  because  it   
acknowledges  the  complexity  of  ethical  reasoning  about  warfare,  which  is  also  apparent  in  
discussions  on  the  potential  use  of  armed  force  to  punish  wrongdoers.  
2.3.2  The  Resurgence  of  ‘Punitive’  War  
  
Given  the  ‘moral  high  ground’  which  is  often  claimed  by  liberal  states,  punitive  regime  change  
seems  at  first  difficult  to  reconcile  with  liberal  interventionism’s  self-understanding  as  an  act  of  
protection  rather  than  one  of  forceful  imposition.  However,  “while  punishment  has  been  part  of  
the  discourse  of  great  powers  using  force,  it  can  also  be  found  in  more  humanitarian  discourses,  
though  perhaps  not  always  identified  as  such”  (Lang  2016:  296).  Certainly,  within  the  Just  War  
approach  we  encounter  an  old  “tradition  in  which  the  use  of  force  is  justified  not  only  in  
self-defense  but  also  to  punish  wrongs  and  protect  the  innocent.  This  tradition  is  in  some  
tension  with  modern  international  law  and  especially  with  the  UN  Charter''  (Nardin  2002:  57).  
Throughout  much  of  Just  War  Theory’s  long  and  complex  historical  development,  punitive  
intentions  have  indeed  been  accepted  (or  even  promoted)  as  valid  reasons  to  go  to  war,  by,  
amongst  others,  Saint  Augustine,  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  Cajetan,  and  to  some  extent  by  Hugo  
Grotius  (Luban  2011).  In  this  view,  punishment  is  understood  as  an  act  of  retributive  justice.  As  
Biggar  (2015:  333)  notes,  this  does  “not  mean  ‘retributivism’,  the  doctrine  that  prescribes  an  
eye  for  an  eye,  calling  for  a  wasteland  of  equal  suffering.  Rather,  I  mean  it  in  terms  of  its  
23  Indeed,  while  prudential  and  intuitive  ‘calculations’  are  certainly  part  of  the  extended  Just  War  toolkit,   
foreign-imposed  regime  change  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  simple  moral  calculus  designed  to  achieve  the  greatest  safety  
for  the  greatest  number  of  oppressed  individuals,  and  there  is  little  to  be  gained  from  establishing  the  details  of  such  
a  calculus  when  there  can  be  no  guarantee  that  foreign-imposed  regime  change  will  drastically  improve  the  lives  of  
those  affected.  What  is  more,  utilitarian  ways  of  reasoning  also  ignore  the  many  other  ethical  demands  on  states,  
including  their  duties  and  obligations  to  other  countries.  It  may  not  always  be  in  the  best  interests  of  a  state  to  
intervene  in  cases  of  human  rights  abuses,  but  it  may  nevertheless  have  a  responsibility  to  do  so  (cf.  Chapter  VI).  
Overall,  then,  “with  regard  to  the  rules  of  war  utilitarianism  lacks  creative  power.  Beyond  the  minimal  limits  of  
‘conduciveness’  and  proportionality,  it  simply  confirms  our  customs  and  conventions,  whatever  they  are,  or  it  
suggests  that  they  be  overridden;  but  it  does  not  provide  us  with  customs  or  conventions”  (Walzer  2006  [a]:  133).  
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etymological  origin  [...]  a  handing  or  paying  back  of  what  is  due.  ‘Retribution’,  therefore,  
means  simply  an  appropriately  and  proportionately  hostile  reaction  to  an  injustice,  and  as  such  
it  is  the  basic  form  of  all  punishment.”   
  
Many  early  Just  War  writers  deemed  warfare  to  be  an  appropriate  response  to  ‘Princes’  
who  disobeyed  the  jus  gentium.  For  example,  Langan  (1984:  25)  has  stated  that,  in  part,  “the  
attraction  of  the  punitive  model  of  war  for  Augustine  is  that  it  contributes  to  the  restoration  of  a  
moral  order  in  which  the  various  goods  are  properly  estimated  and  in  which  human  passions  
are  restrained.” 24  More  recently,  a  renewed  focus  on  the  topic  of  war  itself  as  a  means  of   
punishment  between  sovereign  actors  
  
assumes  (1)  that  states  or  other  armed  groups  can  commit  punishable  wrongdoing  
attributable  to  them  as  corporate  bodies,  much  in  the  way  that  under  some  countries'  
domestic  law,  corporations  as  legal  persons  can  commit  crimes  (which  does  not  exclude  
individual  culpability  for  those  same  crimes);  (2)  that  in  the  absence  of  a  world  
government,  individual  states  can  assume  the  role  of  punisher;  and  (3)  that  military  
strikes  on  a  wrongdoer  or  her  property  will  in  some  cases  be  the  only  feasible  form  
international  punishment  can  take  (Luban  2011:  301). 
  
However, Luban  further  notes  that  in  the  course  of  the  development  of  ‘modern’  Just  War  
Theory  “the  punishment  theory  of  just  cause  eventually  disappeared,  replaced  by  the  
proposition  that  self-defense  is  the  only  just  cause  for  war”  (idem:  312).  Reichberg  (2013:  175)  
adds  that   
  
[j]ust  war  was  accordingly  about  the  avenging  of  wrongs;  it  was  conceptualized  around  
the  theme  of  desert.  [...].  Soon  after,  a  competing  theory  was  advanced,  first  discretely  
by  Vitoria  but  later  more  explicitly  by  Molina  and  Grotius,  which  posited  liability  for  
wrongdoing,  rather  than  culpability,  as  the  foundation  of  just  cause.  Retribution  lost  the  
central  position  it  had  previously  occupied.  No  longer  was  war  taken  to  be  a  penal  
sanction  that  would  be  directed  against  enemy  combatants.  This  shift  away  from  desert  
opened  up  a  space  for  the  emergence  of  modern  laws  of  armed  conflict,  wherein  
punishment,  if  due,  is  relegated  chiefly  to  the  period  post  bellum .  
24  In  later  centuries,  Hugo  Grotius  argued  more  directly  for  the  right  of  states  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  others  for   
punitive  reasons,  stating  that  “26.  […]  Kings,  and  those  who  are  invested  with  a  Power  equal  to  that  of  Kings,  have  
a  Right  to  exact  Punishments,  not  only  for  Injuries  committed  against  themselves,  or  their  Subjects,  but  likewise,  for  
those  which  do  not  peculiarly  concern  them,  but  which  are  in  any  Persons  whatsoever,  grievous  Violations  of  the  
Law  of  Nature  or  Nations”  [quoted  in  T.  Kochi  (2013)]. 
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Even  so,  the  1990s  and  early  2000s  have  somewhat  surprisingly  witnessed  a  “punitive  turn  in  
Just  War  literature”  (O’Driscoll  2006[a]:  406) .  This  is  largely  based  on  the  assumption  that,  as  
Walzer  himself  states,  “if  states  are  members  of  international  society,  the  subjects  of  rights,  
they  must  also  be  (somehow)  the  objects  of  punishment”  (2006  [a]:  63).  As  future  chapters  will  
show,  punitive  intention  has  become  an  essential  part  of  the  21st  century’s  ‘War  on  Terror’.  
While  the  post-2001  war  in  Afghanistan,  for  instance,  has  on  occasion  been  justified  as  a  
‘humanitarian’  war  (to  stop  the  widespread  human  rights  abuses  committed  by  the  Taliban),  it  
was  also  a  punitive  war  (to  punish  the  Taliban  for  supporting  and  sheltering  Al  Qaeda  
operatives)  which  highlights  the  complex  evolution  of  intervention  and  regime  change  in  the  
Liberal  Order.   
  
Nonetheless,  O’Driscoll’s  ‘punitive  turn’  should  clearly  be  interpreted  as  an  addition  to,  
rather  than  a  replacement  of,  more  commonly  examined  motivations  for  war.  Thus,  in  spite  of  
its  additional  framing  as  a  punitive  and  humanitarian  endeavour,  the  intervention  in  
Afghanistan  was  primarily  presented  as  a  ‘classic’  case  of  self-defence  against  future  attacks.  
Indeed,  the  continuing  validity  of  self-defence  as  a  cause  for  war  is  reflected  in  the  broad  
international  support  for  US-led  intervention  in  Afghanistan.  The  different  ways  in  which  the  
war  was  justified  again  highlight  the  complexity  of  assessing  FIRC  cases.  Indeed,  the  
entanglement  of  factors  also  indicates  that  there  is  more  to  the  study  of  forcible  regime  change  
than  simply  assessing  the  justice  of  initiating  it.  Clearly,  relegating  all  questions  of  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  to  a  simple  aspect  of  jus  ad  bellum ,  with  a  focus  on  whether  
initiating  the  initial  war  was  justified,  runs  the  unwelcome  risk  of  avoiding  other  questions,  e.g.  
the  various  understandings  of  responsibility  and  the  difficulty  of  reconciling  democratising  
action  and  self-determination.  Accordingly,  many  current  efforts  to  limit  both  the  underlying  
causes  and  the  tragic  effects  of  armed  conflict  have  prompted  renewed  interest  in  the  meaning  




2.3.3  Regime  Change  and  Post  Bellum  Burdens  
  
In  addition  to  the  ad  bellum  assessment,  a  greater  emphasis  on  the  complexities  of  establishing  
a  framework  for  jus  post  bellum  is  essential  in  raising  greater  awareness  of  the  ethical  
challenges  posed  by  foreign-imposed  regime  change.  However,  whereas  the  first  two  segments  
of  the  Just  War  framework  ( jus  ad  bellum  and  jus  in  bello )  are  often  straightforward  in  their  
temporal  cut-off  point  (this  being  either  an  official  declaration  of  war  or  the  commencement  of  
armed  confrontation),  the  post  bellum  phase  is  rather  more  challenging  to  define.  Questions  
inevitably  arise  as  to  the  temporal  limit  for  this  category,  i.e.  when  conflict  comes  to  an  end.  
Traditionally,  a  military  conflict  is  considered  to  have  ended  once  the  ‘guns  have  fallen  silent’  
and  an  official  peace  treaty  or  armistice  has  been  signed  (anything  else  would  only  really  
constitute  a  truce).   
  
Although  the  majority  of  notable  conflicts  of  the  19 th  and  20 th  centuries  have  been    
concluded  by  formal  peace  treaties  (including  the  rare  occasions  where  international  society  as  
a  whole  has  been  ‘reshaped’,  for  example  in  case  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna),  such  relatively  
clearly  defined  distinctions  between  war  and  peace  has  become  much  less  clear-cut  in  the  21 st   
century.  The  in  bello  and  post  bellum  phases  overlap  especially  in  FIRC  conflicts,  and  often  do  
so  for  a  considerable  duration.  While  this  may  seem  counterintuitive  at  first,  recent  conflicts  
show  that  even  beyond  the  targeted  state’s  defeat,  low  or  even  high  level  insurgencies  against  
the  occupying  forces  or  the  new  regime  can  continue  for  an  indeterminate  length  of  time.  
Indeed,  once  a  regime  change  mission  has  been  launched,  the  initial  regime  removal  phase  is  
often  the  most  ‘straightforward’  component.  Although  the  targeted  states’  military  defences  are  
often  easily  overcome  by  powerful  interveners,  these  initial  successes  have  regularly  been  
undone  in  the  regime  imposition  phase,  i.e.  after  the  war  has  ‘ended’ .  This  has  led  to  an  
emphasis  on  the  jus  post  bellum ,  as  “[t]he  lack  of  guidance  in  this  area  can  cause  nations  to  
lengthen  their  strategic  engagements,  thereby  escalating  casualties  and  destruction”  and  lead  to  
mission  creep  and,  potentially,  even  to  the  creation  of  future  failed  states  (DiMeglio  2005:  
132).  As  has  been  stated  rather  skeptically  by  Allan  and  Keller  a  few  years  after  the  Iraq  War,  
“surprisingly  little  conceptual  thinking  has  gone  into  what  constitutes  a  peace  that  is  a  just  one”  
(2006:  1).  Over  the  past  decade,  the  jus  post  bellum  has  been  developed  by  numerous  authors,  
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and  it  is  now  generally  accepted  that  it  is  just  as  important  to  a  Just  War  as  ad  bellum  and  in  
bello  considerations,  especially  as  its  neglect  leaves  the  whole  of  Just  War  Theory  open  to  
attack  by  traditionally  competing  theories,  particularly  Pacifism  and  Realism  (Orend  2008:  36).  
  
Accordingly,  this  thesis  emphasises  that  debates  about  the  aftermath  of  regime  change  
must  be  taken  at  least  as  seriously  as  the  legitimacy  for  initiating  it.  This  includes  interveners’  
potential  responsibilities  to  rebuild  both  physical  and  political  structures  which  go  far  beyond  
the  legal  approaches  to  occupation.  While  Verdirame  states  that  “[t]he  law  of  armed  conflict  
has  a  small  but  important  group  of  rules  which  extend  to  post  bellum”,  including  military  
occupation  (2013:  308),  much  of  the  past  and  current  jus  post  bellum  debate  within  the  Just  
War  doctrine  is  rightly  sceptical  of  these  laws  (Bellamy  2008  [a]:  603),  in  part  because,  as  
Verdirame  writes,  any  “obligation  to  reconstruct  would  go  further  than  the  existing  law”  (2013:  
309).  Thus,  while  international  law  and  international  ethics  are  sometimes  complementary  and  
intersecting,  they  have  never  been  wholly  identical,  and  post  bellum  responsibilities  must  be  
examined  further,  especially  in  the  case  of  contemporary  FIRC.  
2.3.4  Postwar  Minimalism  and  Maximalism   
  
As  indicated  earlier,  conceptual  distinctions  bring  order  into  the  complexity  of  Just  War  
reasoning.  This  includes  questions  of  jus  post  bellum .  Alex  Bellamy,  for  instance,  has  
suggested  two  simple  concepts  which  help  frame  the  post-war  justice  debate,  which  he  terms  
Minimalism  and  Maximalism.  Bellamy’s  approach  is  quite  flexible,  especially  since  he  (2008  
[a]:  602)  writes  that  “we  can  identify  two  quite  distinct  positions  though  it  is  important  to  bear  
in  mind  that  most  writers  oscillate  between  them.”  However,  this  flexibility  also  blurs  the  line  
drawn  between  both  conceptions,  and  they  should  therefore  not  be  taken  as  permanently  fixed  
categories.  
  
Overall,  Bellamy  claims  that  “minimalists  tend  to  view  just  wars  in  terms  of  rights  
vindication  and  argue  that  combatants  are  entitled  to  wage  war  only  to  the  point  at  which  their  
rights  are  vindicated”  ( idem ).  Thus,  the  minimalist  aspect  of  post-war  justice  is  twofold:  once  
begun,  conflict  cannot  be  extended  to  achieve  other  goals,  such  as  for  example  regime  change,  
and  there  is  only  a  minimal  responsibility  towards  the  defeated  enemy  state  and  its  population.  
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In  essence,  the  minimalist  doctrine  holds  that  “the  victor  may  prosecute  the  war  'to  obtain  
justice  and  to  put  himself  in  a  state  of  security'  but  is  entitled  to  choose  not  to  [...]”  (Bellamy  
2008  [a]:  606).  The  First  Gulf  War  would  accordingly  be  a  fair  approximation  of  the  minimalist  
ideal  of  war  termination,  since  the  victorious  coalition  withdrew  from  the  invaded  area  after  its  
objective  of  halting  the  Iraqi  forces’  aggression  had  been  met  (Walzer  2012:  36).  As  a  
consequence,  minimalist  approaches  offer  a  rather  ‘straightforward’  solution  to  many  post  
bellum  challenges  which  avoids  many  of  the  moral  quagmires  of  long-term  postwar  
involvement.  Because  of  this  appeal  it  has  enjoyed  much  popularity  in  the  development  of  Just  
War  tradition  and  historical  precursors  to  the  minimalist  tradition  include,  but  are  not  limited  
to,  authors  such  as  Gentili,  Grotius, 25   and  de  Vattel. 
  
In  spite  of  its  appeal,  the  minimalist  position  does  raise  a  number  of  important  concerns.  
For  instance,  it  furnishes  victors  with  a  welcome  pretext  for  turning  a  blind  eye  to  the  often  
devastating  effect  of  warfare  on  civilian  populations.  Moreover,  minimalists’  occasional  
tendency  to  advocate  a  restoration  of  the  status  quo  ante  bellum  likely  only  offers  short-term  
chances  for  peace.  Simply  put,  it  has  often  precisely  been  the  contested  status  quo  ante  which  
has  led  to  an  outbreak  of  conflict  in  the  first  place.  While  minimalist  reasoning  facilitates  a  
swift  retreat  once  the  mission  (in  this  case  regime  change)  has  been  accomplished,  but  by  
leaving  prematurely,  states  often  knowingly  expose  recently  liberated  populations  to  the  
dangers  of  an  ultimately  damaging  power  vacuum.  Even  Michael  Walzer,  who  has  on  occasion  
been  described  as  something  of  a  minimalist,  acknowledges  that  a  victorious  state  has  at  least  a  
modicum  of  responsibility  towards  improving  their  defeated  enemies’  fate,  as  Bellamy  has  
noted  (2008:  610).  Whereas  the  conception  of  minimalism  is,  according  to  Peperkamp  (2016:  
404),  “backward  looking,  focused  on  the  former  belligerents”,  maximalism  focuses  on  creating  
the  structures  deemed  necessary  to  create  stability  and  thus  prevent  future  conflict.  Thus,  
current  understandings  of  maximalist  reasoning  envisage  a  substantive  reconstruction  
responsibility  (such  as  for  example  the  rebuilding  of  infrastructure  destroyed  during  the  
fighting),  and  consequently  a  responsibility  to  ensure  the  basic  necessities  of  human  life.  It  can  
25  However,  it  has  also  been  noted  that  “Grotius  lets  political  leaders  off  the  hook  the  moment  an  effort  to  protect  the   
vulnerable  beyond  borders  proves  difficult  or  expensive”  (Glanville  2019:  121).  Clearly,  this  does  not  align  with  the  
majority  of  current  legal  and  moral  conceptions  of  humanitarian  intervention,  including  incarnations  of  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect.  
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also  be  more  broadly  understood  to  encompass  taking  over  policing  and  other  stabilisation  
duties  while  the  defeated  state  is  ‘recovering’  from  the  war.  None  of  these  reconstruction  
efforts  explicitly  envision  an  imposed  regime  change,  however.   
  
Consequently,  post-FIRC  challenges  often  transcend  the  simple  
‘minimalism-maximalism’  dichotomy  introduced  above.  Accordingly,  future  chapters  will  
suggest  that  regime  impositions  occur  on  a  ‘spectrum’,  which  ranges  from  the  imposition  of  
minimally  just  regimes  to  a  comprehensive  restructuring  of  the  targeted  state.  The  illustration  
of  these  theoretical  challenges  through  a  focus  on  relevant  examples  is  reflected  in  the  thesis’  
‘Walzerian’  approach  to  the  study  of  armed  conflict.  
2.4  A  ‘Walzerian’  Approach   
  
In  highlighting  the  many  contradictions  of  FIRC,  the  work  of  Michael  Walzer  whose  “rich,  
descriptive  focus  on  law,  custom,  and  precedent  in  the  history  of  warfare  and  international  
relations  [...]  has  special  appeal  in  the  fields  of  international  relations  and  political  theory”  
(Lucas  2003:  129)  remains  essential  to  the  discussion.  Walzer’s  writings  on  global  justice  and  
modern  warfare  are  some  of  the  most  widely  known,  and  indeed  still  the  most  discussed,  
contributions  to  the  ‘orthodox’  Just  War  Theory  of  the  20th  and  21st  centuries.  Since  its  1977  
publication,  his  book  Just  and  Unjust  Wars  has  retained  its  relevance,  and  Walzer’s  
contribution  of  new  introductory  chapters  ensures  that  his  work  remains  at  the  heart  of  the  
debate. 26  As  one  of  the  most  significant  contributors  to  contemporary  Just  War  Theory,  many   
authors  have  engaged  critically  with  Walzer’s  work  and  have  sought  to  expand  and  reassess  his  
approach  to  the  Just  War  framework.  Brian  Orend,  for  example,  has  engaged  with  Walzer’s  
work  and  highlights  the  relationship  between  the  former’s  conception  of  distributive  justice  and  
his  writings  on  the  Just  War,  and  describes  Walzer’s  Just  War  Theory  as  being  opposed  to  the  
three  contending  philosophies  of  realism,  pacifism,  and  utilitarianism  (2002:  76).  
  
26  Indeed,  Sutch  (2009:  514)  points  out  that  “[b]y  the  time  of  the  fourth  edition  [of  Just  and  Unjust  Wars]  in  2006,   
the  introduction  is  startlingly  new.  Not  only  must  we  think  about  regime  change  and  jus  post  bellum  occupation  
(trusteeships  and  protectorates)  but  the  category  jus  ad  bellum  needs  to  be  extended  to  jus  ad  vim  (or  the  just  use  of  
force  short  of  war).”  
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Of  course,  Michael  Walzer’s  enduring  influence  on  the  Just  War  debate  should  not  
entirely  distract  from  his  works’  more  controversial  aspects.  He  has  repeatedly  been  criticised  
on  the  grounds  of  methodological  weaknesses  and  theoretical  inconsistencies.  For  example,  it  
has  been  pointed  out  that  “Walzer  fails  to  produce  a  theory  based  entirely  on  the  individual  
rights  to  life  and  liberty  [...]  he  cannot  justify  the  tenets  of  his  theory  of  jus  ad  bellum  by  appeal  
to  the  rights  of  individuals  as  he  conceives  them.  This  is  why  he  appeals,  contrary  to  his  own  
description,  to  the  overriding  intrinsic  value  of  political  communities  to  defend  his  theory  of  jus  
ad  bellum  and  produces  an  incoherent  theory”  (Parsons  2012:  664).  In  part,  this  can  be  
explained  by  “Walzer’s  more  general  moral  method,  that  moral  philosophy  is  a  matter  of  
interpretation  rather  than  discovery”  (Long  2012:  217),  and  that  even  our  most  sincerely-held  
moral  principles  may  end  up  contradicting  each  other  when  applied  to  an  examination  of  the  
‘real’  problems  of  warfare.   
  
Another  recurring  point  of  criticism  is  Walzer’s  supposedly  ‘sovereignty-centric’  
approach.  Rengger  (2005:  151),  for  example,  has  raised  the  point  that  “by  foregrounding  
intervention,  Walzer’s  version  of  the  just  war  has  not  only  reinforced  the  state-centric  and  
legalistic  character  of  the  dominant  contemporary  forms  of  the  tradition,  it  has  also  tended  to  
reinforce  the  view  amongst  both  supporters  and  critics,  that  the  purpose  of  ‘just  war  theory’  is  
to  determine,  by  means  of  some  kind  of  moral  calculus,  whether  this  or  that  war  was  ‘just’  or  
‘unjust’.”  This  misrepresents  the  purpose  of  Walzer’s  focus  on  the  state  and  its  sovereignty,  
however.  Walzer  is  right  in  recognising  that  there  are  few  alternatives  beyond  these  
state-centric  conceptions,  especially  in  addressing  the  ‘big  questions’  of  large-scale  political  
violence.  States  continue  to  shape  global  politics,  and  are  often  able  to  act  unilaterally  if  they  
so  choose.  This  is  obviously  the  case  in  ‘traditional’  interstate  warfare,  but  also  relevant  to  
armed  humanitarian  intervention,  for  example.  In  Eckert’s  assessment  of  past  military  
interventions,  “[s]tates  intervened  in  instances  where  they  had  an  interest  -  humanitarian  or  
otherwise  -  in  intervening  and  the  power  to  do  so.  The  selectivity  that  seems  to  plague  action  
under  the  frameworks  of  both  humanitarian  intervention  and  the  responsibility  to  protect  stems  
from  the  nature  of  the  international  system,  and  the  lack  of  a  realistic  alternative  to  state  action  
in  support  of  either  principle”  (2012:  87).  In  similar  fashion,  Wheeler  (2002:  310)  has  
remarked  that  “[g]overnments  are  notoriously  unreliable  as  rescuers,  but  where  else  can  we  
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turn  to  save  those  who  cannot  save  themselves?  At  present,  it  is  only  states  that  have  the  
capabilities  to  fly  thousands  of  troops  halfway  round  the  world  to  prevent  or  stop  genocide  or  
mass  murder.”   
  
Given  these  ‘political’  limitations  to  effective  action,  discussions  of  foreign  military  
intervention  and  regime  change  are  therefore  best  served  by  an  ‘internationalist’  stance,  
meaning  that  global  politics  is  mainly  shaped  by  the  interactions  of  states  based  on  their  mutual  
recognition  as  sovereign  countries  (cf.  Dower  2009).  This  means  that  the  Just  War  approach  
must  recognise  the  continued  moral  challenges  of  armed  state  interaction.  Boyle  states  that  for  
Walzer,  “the  proper  method  for  this  investigation  is  casuistic  -  that  is,  one  should  reason  about  
difficult  moral  cases  without  appeal  to  general  moral  principles.  The  kind  of  moral  reasoning  
Walzer  seems  to  have  in  mind  is  the  consideration  of  cases  -  examples  of  morally  problematic  
decisions  -  in  sufficient  detail  so  as  to  reveal  their  morally  relevant  features  in  ways  that  allow  
the  drawing  of  inferences  to  and  from  other  more  or  less  similar  cases”  (1997:  87). 27  
2.4.1  Walzer’s  Casuistry   
  
Two  distinct  types  of  casuistry  are  commonly  employed  in  the  relevant  literature.  One  is  a 
‘comparative  case  studies’  model,  through  which  similarities  and  differences  are  highlighted.  
However,  a  more  flexible  alternative  is  offered  by  the  ‘historical  illustrations’  approach  
favoured  by,  among  others,  Michael  Walzer.  It  allows  for  the  empirical  ‘anchor’  of  a  case  
studies  model  while  leaving  more  room  for  the  theoretical  discussions  required  by  the  Just  War  
tradition.  As  stated  earlier,  the  thesis’  approach  to  FIRC  relies  on  historical  examples  which  
illustrate  the  tensions  between  abstract  principles,  normative  claims,  and  political  constraints.  
This  use  of  casuistry  in  thinking  about  applied  ethics  is  central  to  a  Walzerian  approach  to  the  
Just  War.  
  
27  Luban  (2017:  4)  notes  regarding  Just  and  Unjust  Wars  that  “its  distinctive  philosophical  style,  the  use  of   
‘historical  illustrations’  not  merely  to  illustrate  but  to  propel  his  moral  argument.  In  his  preface,  Walzer  describes  his  
method  as  ‘casuistic,’  and  so  it  is.  Some  cases  describe  single  incidents,  some  describe  entire  wars,  some  scrutinize  
discrete  philosophical  arguments,  like  Mill  on  non-intervention  or  Sidgwick  on  in  bello  proportionality  and  
necessity.”  
54  
Nonetheless,  in  spite  of  his  prominence,  Michael  Walzer  is  evidently  not  the  only  Just  
War  scholar  who  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  case-based  moral  argumentation.  
“Casuistry  implies  the  existence  of  practical  reasoning”  (Miller  1996:  6)  and,  as  Thaler  notes,  
“[t]he  ‘practical  reasoning’  approach  to  Just  War  has  seen  a  remarkable  revival  in  recent  years,  
especially  through  the  works  of  Paul  Ramsey,  Jean  Bethke  Elshtain,  and  James  Turner  
Johnson”  (2014:  527).  Indeed,  casuistry  has  historically  been  the  method  of  choice  for  those  
associated  with  the  tradition.  This  includes  ‘Church  Fathers’  like  Saint  Augustine  and  
theologians  like  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  but  also  authors  on  the  secular  trajectory  of  Just  War  
Theory,  such  as  de  Vattel  and  Grotius.  Although  the  theory  has  for  the  most  part  moved  away  
from  the  Catholic  scholastic  approach  of  the  early  tradition,  and  has  subsequently  evolved  
towards  a  secular  approach  to  applied  morality,  it  has  not  forgotten  the  case-based  approach  
which  marked  many  early  Just  War  approaches.   
  
Although  casuistry  can  therefore  be  said  to  make  up  the  ‘backbone’  of  orthodox  
understandings  of  the  Just  War  Tradition,  this  thesis’  casuistic  assessments  also  recognise  that  
the  Just  War  tradition’s  precepts  are  not  perfected  rules  for  warfare.  Thus,  despite  valuable  
efforts  in  debating  its  permissibility,  instances  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  have  
remained  at  the  very  least  ‘morally  ambiguous’.  Given  that  a  morally  ‘flawless’  regime  change  
operation  is  unlikely  to  occur,  the  thesis  acknowledges  that  the  best  we  can  hope  for  is  one  
which  is  ethically  ‘satisfactory’.  This  concession  is  certainly  supported  by  the  traditional  Just  
War  understanding  that  human  justice  is  inherently  imperfect,  but  that  important  moral  
judgments  about  our  complex  world  can  nevertheless  be  made  based  on  the  principles  of  
authority,  intent,  proportionality  and  so  forth.  These  precepts  do  not  exist  in  a  vacuum,  and  
must  consequently  be  viewed  in  conjunction  with  other  concepts  in  order  to  be  fully  
understood.  Ultimately,  the  casuistic  approach  is  based  on  the  claim  that  our  judgment  is  
dependent  on  the  particulars  of  the  situation,  rather  than  the  notion  that  universal  principles  can 
be  uniformly  applied.  Accordingly,  “[c]asuistic  moral  arguments  do  not  pretend  to  work  in  all  
circumstances;  they  only  operate  in  specific  contexts,  for  specific  reasons,  and  with  specific  
effects”  (Thaler  2014:  525).   
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Though  it  is  crucial  to  remain  aware  of  the  ambiguous  relationship  between  
philosophical  argumentation  and  pertinent  empirical  cases,  several  examples  of  forcible  regime  
change  attempts  will  be  put  forward  over  the  following  chapters.  The  selection  of  appropriate  
cases  highlights  the  notion  that  “[n]ot  all  regime  changes  are  of  equal  significance.  A  small  
number  have  proved  pivotal,  becoming  freighted  with  significance  to  the  world  at  large”  
(Whitehead  2009:  215).   
  
The  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  focus  on  these  pivotal  cases.  These  illustrations,  drawn  from  
20 th  and  21 st  century  conflicts,  serve  to  demonstrate  the  concerns  for  policymakers  as  well  as    
the  lessons  that  can  be  learned  from  attempts  at  imposing  post-war  regime  transformation  over  
the  past  thirty  years.  In  particular,  this  means  a  particular  focus  on  the  cases  of  Iraq,  
Afghanistan,  Somalia,  Libya,  and  Bosnia.  These  differ  from  ‘historical’  instances  of  regime  
change  in  their  contextualisation  within  the  International  Liberal  Order  of  the  past  thirty  years.  
Thus,  while  there  have  been  many  past  instances  of  regime  change  which  sought  to  topple  
regimes  to  extend  imperial  power,  to  shift  a  balance  of  power,  or  where  regime  change  was  
simply  a  byproduct  of  military  victory,  the  contemporary  FIRC  phenomenon  has  both  different  
origins  and  other  goals.  As  subsequent  chapters  argue,  the  liberal  assumptions  underlying  the  
Liberal  Order  have  led  to  an  increased  distinction  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  states,  
which  has  supported  FIRC  attempts  to  remove  regimes  in  favour  of  democratic  alternatives.  
2.5  Conclusions   
  
This  chapter  has  built  on  the  introductory  section  in  several  ways.  Most  notably,  it  has  begun  to  
outline  the  disagreements  and  conceptual  distinctions  which  dominate  the  historical  and  current  
Just  War  debate,  including  the  punitive  aspect  of  war  and  the  subdivision  of  our  moral  
assessment  into  questions  of  jus  ad  bellum ,  in  bello ,  and  post  bellum .  In  addressing  the 
conceptual  framework  within  which  the  rest  of  the  thesis  will  operate,  as  well  as  its  underlying  
assumptions,  the  chapter  has  argued  that  approaches  like  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule  deny  states  
their  agency,  effectively  reducing  them  to  mere  objects  that  can  be  ‘broken’  and  ‘owned’.  This  
sense  of  ‘objectification’  ignores  the  fact  that  states  can  make  moral  decisions,  and  also  incur  
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moral  guilt.  In  other  words,  states  have  substantial  control  over  their  own  destiny,  as  opposed  
to  an  inanimate  object  such  as  a  vase,  no  matter  how  valuable.   
  
Although  simplification  and  abstraction  are  necessary  parts  of  international  political  
theory  (e.g.  Walzer’s  conceptualisation  of  the  ‘Domestic  Analogy’),  these  must  be  balanced  by  
an  appreciation  of  the  complexity  of  present-day  warfare.  As  the  chapter  has  noted,  
contemporary  Just  War  approaches  (especially  those  described  as  ‘revisionist’)  have  on  
occasion  been  criticised  for  a  propensity  to  engage  “with  neat  fictitious  worlds,  rather  than  the  
complex  real  world;  it  makes  clinical  moral  judgements  about  large-scale  killing,  mutilating  
and  suffering,  and  it  proceeds  as  if  absolute  moral  and  epistemic  certainty  could  always  be  
obtained.  Contemporary  just  war  theorists  have  turned  the  world  of  war  into  a  sterile  analytic  
playground”  (Neu  2013:  462).  This  weakness  is  best  remedied  by  a  renewed  focus  on  the  
‘disordered’  reality  of  war  and  on  suitable  case  studies  which  highlight  the  role  of  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  in  relation  to  the  themes  of  sovereignty,  human  rights,  and  
global  order.  Indeed,  as  Clark  has  for  instance  argued,  “[t]hose  interested  in  justness  in  the  
social  practice  of  just  war  therefore  acknowledge  the  integrated  trinity  of  ethics,  law  and  
politics,  and  the  quest  for  a  set  of  principles  to  be  implemented  in  that  specific  context,  not  in  
the  best  of  all  ethical  worlds.  Their  concern  is  to  depict  an  extant  social  reality  at  the  moment  
[…]”  (2017:  340).  T his  reality  is  best  approached  from  an  ‘orthodox’  perspective.  Despite  its  
name,  this  ‘orthodoxy’  does  not  consist  in  a  particular  method,  but  rather  in  an  overall  view  on  
the  tradition  and  its  approach  to  warfare:  war  is  considered  to  be  something  exceptional,  which  
necessitates  its  own  rules  and  moral  framework,  and  which  is  best  understood  with  reference  to  
particular  cases,  as  the  “method  of  practical  morality  is  casuistic  in  character”  (Walzer  [a]  
2006:  xxiv).  
  
As  the  next  chapters  will  show,  these  cases,  i.e.  the  FIRC  attempts  which  the  thesis   
examines,  have  increasingly  become  part  of  a  global  development  wherein  the  “moral  center  of  
gravity  has  shifted  from  unrestricted  state  sovereignty  to  international  human  rights”  (Luban  
2011:  316).  Whereas  this  development  indicates  that  humanitarian  intervention  has  increasingly  
come  to  be  seen  as  legitimate,  this  has  not  led  to  a  growing  acceptance  of  FIRC  among  many  
members  of  the  international  community.   
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Part  I:  The  Challenges  of  FIRC  
  
  
The  thesis’  introductory  chapters  have  indicated  that  the  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
concept  has  emerged  to  become  one  of  the  most  contentious  aspects  of  contemporary  
international  affairs.  It  has  played  a  very  controversial  but  undeniably  important  part  in  
maintaining  as  well  as  expanding  the  United  States’  ‘unipolar  moment’  of  the  1990s.  As  
Ikenberry  (2018:  7)  notes,  since  the  sudden  end  of  the  Cold  War,   
  
the  world  has  been  dominated  by  a  western  liberal  order.  [...]  [T]he  United  States  and  its  
partners  built  a  multifaceted  and  sprawling  international  order,  organized  around  
economic  openness,  multilateral  institutions,  security  cooperation  and  democratic  
solidarity.  Along  the  way,  the  United  States  became  the  ‘first  citizen’  of  this  order,  
providing  hegemonic  leadership  -  anchoring  the  alliances,  stabilizing  the  world  
economy,  fostering  cooperation  and  championing  ‘free  world’  values.  
  
More  recently,  these  values  and  regime  change  operations  have  become  intertwined  with  the  
‘War  on  Terror’,  in  which  a  regime's  legitimacy  has  increasingly  become  tied  to  their  
cooperation  in  accordance  with  the  expectations  of  the  US-led  world  order.  The  resulting  
discussion  adds  to  the  important  current  debates  which  surround  humanitarian  intervention,  
including  the  violation  of  sovereignty  and  the  supposed  ‘export’  of  democracy.  Owen  (2010:  1)  
has  for  instance  written  that  regime  change  “was  once  a  technical  neologism  used  by  social  
scientists  to  signify  the  alteration  of  a  country’s  fundamental  political  institutions.  Now,  around  
the  world,  it  is  a  political  term,  and  a  polarizing  one.”  In  part,  this  continued  controversy  stems  
from  the  obvious  tensions  between  two  sets  of  internationally-recognised  rights:  the  traditional  
claim  of  states  to  non-interference  from  other  members  of  the  international  sphere,  and  the  
emerging  prominence  of  universal  human  rights.  
  
The  sovereignty  principle’s  ongoing  evolution  is  evidenced  in  the  interplay  between  the  
rights  of  states  and  those  of  their  populations  in  the  20th  and  early  21st  centuries.  While  the  
claims  of  both  “have  been  a  central  concern  of  the  UN  since  its  founding”,  the  “conceptual  
meaning  of  both  norms  [...]  has  changed  over  time”  (Booth  Walling  2015:  385).  This  change  
has  also  influenced  the  concept  of  humanitarian  intervention,  the  legitimacy  of  which  was  not  
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generally  recognised  until  the  1990s.  The  underlying  humanitarian  sentiment  has  since  
culminated  in  the  development  (and  occasional  misappropriation)  of  the  ‘Responsibility  to  
Protect’.  This  understanding  of  responsibility  on  a  global  scale,  as  well  as  the  contiguous  
notions  of  ‘sovereignty  as  responsibility’,  ought  to  be  understood  as   
  
an  attempt  to  reconcile  or  at  least  deal  with  the  inherent  contradictions  in  the  idea  of  
sovereignty.  This  conceptualization  of  sovereign  responsibilities  suggests  that,  while  
peoples  have  a  right  to  govern  themselves  free  from  outside  interference,  this  should  be  
conditional  on  their  protection  of  human  rights;  the  legitimate  expression  of  the  will  of  
a  sovereign  people  entails  the  protection  of  their  individual  rights.  When  a  sovereign  
people  prove  unwilling  or  unable  to  protect  their  own  population,  they  yield  their  
sovereign  right  to  non-intervention,  and  the  responsibility  to  protect  passes  to  
international  society  (Glanville  2011:  249).  
  
Clearly,  while  states’  and  populations'  rights  are  not  by  necessity  mutually  exclusive,  they  have  
come  into  conflict  in  cases  where  one  (sovereignty)  has  been  infringed  on  behalf  of  another  
(human  rights)  by  a  third  party.  A  traditional  focus  on  states’  rights  to  non-intervention  has  
created  an  international  system  which  often  appears  unwilling,  or  at  the  very  least  ineffective,  
in  addressing  human  rights  abuses  while  maintaining  an  ambiguous  stance  on  the  validity  of  
regime  change.  What  remains  unclear,  however,  is  whether  such  events  are  also  sufficient  for  
regime  change  attempts  beyond  the  initial  intervention.  This  lack  of  clarity  has  regrettable  
consequences:  when  foreign-imposed  regime  change  occurs,  it  is  often  deemed  either  patently  
unjust  or  at  the  very  least  morally  ambiguous,  whereas  in  cases  where  armed  intervention  
would  be  warranted,  states  are  often  particularly  slow  (and  in  some  cases  even  plainly  
unwilling)  to  act  in  response.  The  resulting  controversy  raises  three  distinct  ethical  challenges,  
namely  when  and  how  intervention  should  occur,  and  who  the  intervening  actors  would  ideally  
be.  In  addressing  these  points,  the  challenge  of  maintaining  a  focused  approach  on  a  complex  
topic  such  as  regime  change  is  mitigated  by  a  systematic  treatment  which  includes  simple  
taxonomies  and  clarifications  of  important  concepts.  
  
Thus,  the  next  section  of  the  thesis  highlights  how  the  continued  erosion  of  sovereign  
equality  within  the  post-Cold  War  order  has  repeatedly  facilitated  the  occurrence  of  ‘regime  
change  wars’.  Finally,  it  will  examine  the  roles  of  the  motives  and  intentions  which  underlie  
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modern  regime  change  attempts.  This  distinction  will  also  facilitate  a  classification  of  cases  
into  ‘superficial’  and  ‘radical’  regime  change  outcomes  in  later  chapters.  First,  however,  the  
following  pages  discuss  the  evolving  nature  of  the  implications  of  sovereignty  by  referring  to  
ongoing  debates  surrounding  the  permissibility  of  humanitarian  intervention.  
Chapter  III:  Sovereignty  in  an  Age  of  Interventionism  
  
To  an  important  extent,  the  controversy  surrounding  FIRC  introduced  in  previous  chapters  
stems  from  its  grave  violation  of  states’  rights.  This  chapter  illustrates  the  accompanying  
challenges  by  contrasting  the  claims  of  states  to  non-interference  in  domestic  affairs  with  the  
emerging  norms  and  practices  of  humanitarian  intervention,  which  is  sometimes  thought  to  
‘undermine’  many  aspects  of  traditional  sovereignty.  The  chapter  then  contextualises  the  shift  
from  humanitarian  intervention  to  regime  change  in  the  ‘War  on  Terror’,  and  argues  that  
ultimately,  liability  to  intervention  should  not  be  equated  to  liability  to  regime  change.  
  
Clearly,  finding  an  appropriately  ‘just’  balance  between  the  demands  of  sovereignty,  
security,  and  the  protection  of  human  rights  is  not  only  a  challenge  for  Just  War  theorists,  but  
“has  remained  one  of  the  most  pressing  yet  elusive  goals  of  the  international  community”  more  
generally  (Erameh  2017:  517).  The  subsequent  section  highlights  this  debate  by  examining  the  
effects  of  sovereignty’s  continued  significance  within  the  current  world  order.  It  then  contrasts  
the  accompanying  claims  of  states  to  non-interference  in  domestic  affairs  with  the  emerging  
norms  and  practices  of  humanitarian  intervention  and  regime  change,  which  are  seen  to  
‘undermine’  many  aspects  of  this  sovereignty.  Indeed,  while  the  sovereignty  concept’s  
importance  to  the  study  and  practice  of  International  Relations  is  reflected  in  the  assertion  that  
it  “is  considered  to  be  the  grundnorm  of  international  society”  (Booth  Walling  2015:  386),  its  




3.1  ‘Westphalian’  Rights  to  Non-Intervention  
  
The  notion  of  sovereignty  remains  integral  to  the  Liberal  Order’s  understanding  of  a  global  
community  of  independent  states.  However,  while  the  concept  has  been  at  the  core  of  
international  affairs  since  the  Early  Modern  period,  its  specific  role  remains  a  matter  of  some  
dispute.  Glanville  (2011:  236),  for  instance,  defines  sovereignty  “very  broadly  and  
provisionally  as  a  legitimated  claim  to  political  authority”  but  also  asserts  that  “the  content  and  
meaning  of  the  authority  claim  is  not  static.  For  example,  while  the  right  of  non-intervention  is  
often  assumed  to  be  a  corollary  of  sovereign  statehood,  this  principle  is  historically  
contingent.”  The  complexity  and  ongoing  reinterpretation  of  this  historical  contingency  has  in  
part  been  addressed  by  Krasner  (1999),  who  has  outlined  four  distinct,  yet  interrelated,  types  of  
sovereignty.  He  has  drawn  a  useful  distinction  between  the  categories  of  ‘domestic  
sovereignty’,  ‘interdependence  sovereignty’,  ‘international  legal  sovereignty’,  and  
‘Westphalian  sovereignty’,  all  of  which  continue  to  play  important  parts  in  the  current  global  
order  of  states.  However,  the  ‘variety’  most  relevant  to  the  Walzerian  understanding  of  the  Just  
War  Tradition,  and  indeed  to  the  challenges  of  contemporary  regime  change  practices,  is  the  
Westphalian  aspect  of  sovereignty. 28   
  
The  prevalent  understanding  of  sovereignty  of  the  Westphalian  type  is  rooted  in  states’  
long-term  political  and  military  control  over  a  claimed  territory  and  population.  This  
interpretation  is  further  reflected  in  the  adjacent  concepts  of  ‘autonomy’,  ‘self-determination’  
and  ‘non-intervention’,  which  have  long  been  considered  to  be  inseparable  from  the  principle  
of  moral  equality  between  sovereigns,  regardless  of  their  political  regime.  Reus-Smit  (2005:  
73)  affirms  that  “[w]ith  the  codification  of  sovereign  equality,  recognised  states  gained  a  basket  
of  rights  and  entitlements.  Some  of  these  were  governance  rights,  or  rights  of  legal  standing  
and  participation  in  international  society  [...].  Others  were  rights  of  domestic  autonomy,  
28  This  is  not  just  the  case  for  the  Just  War  approach,  as  within  large  parts  of  modern  International  Relations  Theory,   
“[t]he  Westphalian  model  is  a  basic  concept  for  some  of  the  major  theoretical  approaches  to  international  relations,  
including  neo-realism  and  neo-liberal  institutionalism”  (Krasner  1996:  121).  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  
the  reality  of  interstate  politics,  “[r]ulers  have  always  had  the  option  of  violating  Westphalian  principles.  The  
assertion  that  the  contemporary  system  represents  a  basic  transformation  because  sovereignty  seems  to  be  so  much  
at  risk  is  not  well-founded:  it  ignores  the  fact  that  violations  of  the  principles  of  territoriality  and  autonomy  have  
been  an  enduring  characteristic  of  the  international  system  both  before  and  after  the  Peace  of  Westphalia''  (idem:  
123).  
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principally  the  rights  of  self-determination  and  non-intervention.”  Accordingly,  this  sentiment  
has  also  been  enshrined  in  the  United  Nations’  Charter:  its  Article  2(4)  unequivocally  states  
that  “members  must  refrain  from  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  
political  independence  of  any  state”  (1945).  
  
The  accompanying  ideals  of  non-interference  in  states’  domestic  and  political  affairs  
have  come  to  be  considered  keystones  of  the  Western  (and  later  the  global)  sovereignty 
paradigm  to  the  extent  that  they  have  long  since  transcended  their  European  origins,  and  have  
figured  prominently  in  former  colonial  states’  historical  fights  for  independence.  As  a  
consequence,  many  states,  in  particular  non-Western  countries,  have  often  been  understandably  
wary  of  Western  attempts  at  weakening  the  normative  power  of  sovereignty,  be  it  in  the  name  
of  trade,  human  rights,  or  other  causes  which  go  beyond  clear  instances  of  self-defence  against  
military  aggression.  Given  the  role  of  these  rights  as  potential  guarantors  of  independence  and  
autonomy,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  states  remain  exceptionally  protective  of  their  sovereign  
privileges.  Aloyo  (2016:  316)  ties  the  fundamental  ‘sovereignty  as  non-intervention’  
paradigm’s  continued  prominence  to  its  aims  to  
  
limit  international  aggression  of  powerful  states  against  weak  states.  Undermining  state  
sovereignty  by  permitting  humanitarian  intervention  may  allow  powerful  actors  to  
further  their  own  interests  by  abusing  the  justifications  for  when  intervention  is  
permissible.  [...].  A  second,  related  reason  humanitarian  intervention  is  contentious  is  
that  sovereignty  permits  collective  self-determination.  This  is  morally  important  
because  it  allows  groups  to  make  domestic  laws  reflect  cultural,  religious,  traditional,  
ethical,  and  other  differences  among  peoples.  [...]  many  accept  that  states  can  be  
legitimate  to  some  degree  in  part  because  states  allow  some  degree  of  collective  
self-determination.  A  third  reason  why  sovereignty  and  nonintervention  is  important  is  
because  interveners  almost  always  unintentionally  although  foreseeably  kill  and  maim  
innocents.  
3.2  Liability  and  Aggression  
  
Accordingly,  it  bears  emphasis  that  a  basic  “presumption  against  intervention  remains  in  place  
in  most  cases  based  on  the  assumption  that,  without  clear  contrary  indications,  even  
authoritarian  governments  are  sustained  by  at  least  acquiescence  and  even  positive  support”  
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(Finlay  2007:  576).  A  recourse  to  direct  armed  interference  in  a  sovereign  state’s  domestic  
affairs  (regardless  of  its  political  system)  in  the  absence  of  a  just  cause  (cf.  Chapter  V)  has  
traditionally  been  seen  as  a  grave  injustice  contrary  to  the  ius  gentium ,  the  common  tradition  of  
the  Law  of  Peoples.  Indeed,  as  Walzer  has  stated,  in  principle  “every  violation  of  the  territorial  
integrity  or  political  sovereignty  is  called  aggression”  (2006  [a]:  52).  In  turn,  this  means  that  in  
order  for  military  intervention  missions  to  be  morally  defensible,  something  (e.g.  a  particular  
behaviour)  is  required  of  a  state  actor  to  ‘override’  the  general  presumption  against  
interference,  i.e.  to  render  it  liable  to  harm  in  the  form  of  armed  external  intervention. 29    
  
In  the  majority  of  contemporary  Just  War  interpretations  of  justified  intervention,  both  
‘external’  and  ‘internal’  aggression  can  constitute  such  acts.  An  u nprovoked  military  strike  by  
one  sovereign  state  against  another  is  the  most  straightforward  case  of  ‘external  aggression’.  
Obvious  cases  of  external  aggression  are  found  throughout  history,  including  in  both  World  
Wars.  We  might  for  instance  think  of  Germany’s  invasion  of  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  in  
1914,  or  the  Empire  of  Japan’  attempts  to  subjugate  areas  within  the  entire  Pacific  region  in  the 
1940s  (Ienaga  1979). 30  In  such  cases  aggressors  act  in  a  way  which  is  deemed  impermissible,   
and  they  are  consequently  understood  to  forfeit  their  rights  to  non-interference  from  other  
states. 31    
  
29  As  Firth  and  Quong  have  stated,  “[n]early  all  accounts  of  liability  to  defensive  harm  state  that  in  order  for  a  person   
to  be  liable  to  such  harm,  he  or  she  must  have  fulfilled  some  backward-looking  condition  such  as  being  morally  
responsible  or  culpable  for  posing  an  unjust  threat  to  others”  (2012:  674).  Defensive  harm  designates  the  sort  of  
harm  that  may  be  inflicted  on  another  party  in  self-defence,  or  in  defence  of  others.  Acts  of  Defensive  harm  are  
therefore  opposed  to  the  aggressive  harm  concept.  While  the  act  (i.e.  inflicting  violence)  is  similar,  its  context  can  
often  change  our  moral  perception  and  judgment.  The  notion  of  defensive  harm  implies  the  forfeiture  of  a  right  not  
to  be  harmed  on  the  part  of  the  aggressor.  In  other  words,  by  attacking  an  innocent  party,  an  aggressor  can  lose  his  or  
her  own  right  to  safety  from  harm.  
  
30  Of  course,  this  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  Imperial  Japan  or  other  externally  aggressive  regimes  did  not  also   
commit  atrocities  and  human  rights  abuses.  However,  there  is  no  inherent  link  between  external  and  internal  
aggression,  and  states  can  at  least  in  principle  exhibit  one  without  the  other.  
  
31  This  principle  is  not  only  important  to  an  orthodox  understanding  of  the  Just  War,  but  is  recognised  by  many   
revisionist  writers  as  well.  Thus,  McMahan  has  written  that  “[m]oral  responsibility  for  an  unjust  threat,  or  a  threat  of  
wrongful  harm,  is  [...]  a  basis  of  liability  to  attack  in  war”  (2008:  227).  Finlay  rightly  points  out  that  “the  main  
thought  is  this:  if  someone  is  responsible  for  a  wrongful  threat;  and  if  the  only  (or  sometimes  even  the  best)  way  to  
diminish  that  threat  is  to  harm  them;  then  harming  doesn’t  wrong  them.  At  least,  it  doesn’t  wrong  them  so  long  as  
the  harm  they  suffer  isn’t  disproportionate  to  the  threat  it  prevents  and  to  the  degree  to  which  the  target  is  
responsible  for  the  threat”  (2018:  34).  
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However,  the  notion  that  liability  to  intervention  is  not  the  same  as  liability  to  regime  
change  is  central  to  the  thesis’  further  argumentation.  Indeed,  if  we  look  further  than  the  
high-profile  cases  which  have  prompted  the  ongoing  regime  change  discussion,  many  
contemporary  conflicts  between  states  have  not  ended  in  a  substantial  change  of  the  losing  
side’s  regime.  An  obvious  example  of  this  is  the  First  Gulf  War  of  1990  to  1991,  which  for  
Walzer  contrasts  sharply  with  the  2003  Iraq  War.  He  (2006  [b]:  104-105)  notes  that  “the  United  
States  and  its  allies  fought  in  strict  accordance  with  the  classic  just-war  paradigm:  they  stopped  
fighting  once  the  invasion  of  Kuwait  had  been  decisively  defeated.  They  did  not  march  on  
Baghdad;  they  did  not  aim  at  the  overthrow  and  replacement  of  the  Baathist  regime;  nor  did  
they  do  anything  to  make  it  possible  for  the  Iraqi  people  to  turn  Saddam  Hussein  out  of  office.”  
In  fact,  President  George  H.  W.  Bush  had  stated  (1991[b]:  para.  6)  that  in  intervening,  his  
administration’s   
  
objectives  are  clear:  Saddam  Hussein's  forces  will  leave  Kuwait.  The  legitimate  
government  of  Kuwait  will  be  restored  to  its  rightful  place,  and  Kuwait  will  once  again  
be  free.  Iraq  will  eventually  comply  with  all  relevant  United  Nations  resolutions,  and  
then,  when  peace  is  restored,  it  is  our  hope  that  Iraq  will  live  as  a  peaceful  and  
cooperative  member  of  the  family  of  nations,  thus  enhancing  the  security  and  stability  
of  the  Gulf.  
  
In  hindsight,  the  argument  could  of  course  be  made  that  much  bloodshed  could  have  been  
prevented  if  the  coalition  forces  had  used  the  momentum  of  their  victory  and  continued  on  to  
Baghdad  to  depose  Saddam  Hussein  from  power  there  and  then.  However,  this  did  not  happen,  
especially  given  the  regional  destabilisation  that  would  have  followed  and  the  continued  hope  
of  ‘rehabilitating’  Iraq  through  further  UN  resolutions. 32  In  short,  Iraq’s  aggression  against   
Kuwait  was  considered  a  just  cause  for  war,  but  not  for  a  subsequent  regime  change.  
  
Both  the  moral  and  political  repercussions  of  external  aggression  (i.e.  the  impermissible  
military  actions  of  one  state  against  another)  have  long  been  a  concern  for  Just  War  theorists.  
32  It  has  been  noted  that  “[t]he  logic  went  that  stability  was  preferred  to  regime  change  as  the  Bush  administration   
and  his  coalition  saw  no  reason  to  remove  Saddam  Hussein.  Secretary  of  Defence  Dick  Cheney  prophetically  
declared  in  1991:  If  you're  going  to  go  in  and  try  to  topple  Saddam  Hussein,  you  have  to  go  to  Baghdad.  Once  
you've  got  Baghdad,  it's  not  clear  what  you  do  with  it.  It's  not  clear  what  kind  of  government  you  would  put  in  place  
of  the  one  that's  currently  there  now.  Is  it  going  to  be  a  Shia  regime,  a  Sunni  regime  or  a  Kurdish  regime?”  (Burke  &  
Matisek  2020:  8).  
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However,  states  are  equally  capable  of  ‘internal’  aggression  against  their  own  population  (in  
the  form  of  excessive  human  rights  abuses  or  even  mass  killing).  The  resulting  liability  to  
intervention  had  been  recognised  in  early  Just  War  theory,  but  the  advent  of  the  
non-intervention  paradigm  has  often  led  to  this  understanding  being  relegated  to  the  
background.  Nonetheless,  it  has  since  reemerged  in  tandem  with  the  awareness  that,  as  
Wingfield  (2004:  94)  has  emphasised,  “[d]emocide,  the  intentional  killing  by  a  government  of  
its  own  people  within  its  own  borders,  has  consumed  millions  of  innocent  human  lives.  In  fact,  
it  has  taken  more  than  all  the  international  wars  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  rise  of  the  
modern  tyranny  and  its  proclivity  to  kill  its  own  citizens  has  shown  that  the  view  of  peace  
defined  solely  in  light  of  external  hostilities  can  no  longer  satisfy  the  demands  of  justice  and  
human  rights.”  The  accompanying  focus  on  states’  internal  aggressions  has  led  to  an  expansion  
of  discussions  regarding  the  potential  permissibility  of  armed  intervention  in  the  absence  of  
direct  military  confrontation.  
3.2.1  The  Emergence  of  ‘Humanitarian’  Wars  
  
The  notion  that  limited  but  armed  intervention  against  internally  aggressive  regimes  might  be  
permissible,  if  not  obligatory,  “had  begun  to  crystallise  in  the  1970s  when  humanitarian  reasons  
were  either  offered  or  assumed  as  part  of  the  rationale  for  the  intervention  of  India  in  East  
Pakistan  (1971),  Vietnam  in  Kampuchea  (1978)  and  Tanzania  in  Uganda  to  overthrow  Idi  
Amin  (1979)  -  as  well  as  for  the  French  government's  support  for  the  coup  against  Jean-Bedel  
Bokassa  in  Central  Africa  (1979)”  (Arbour  2008:  446).  However,  these  unilateral  actions  were  
not  ‘humanitarian  interventions’  in  the  contemporary  sense,  but  were  predominantly  influenced  
by  other  political  and/or  regional  security  interests.  The  ‘ideological’  interests  at  play  in  the  
1970s  had  other  repercussions  as  well.  For  example,  “in  the  case  of  the  Khmer  Rouge,  the  
regime  kept  Cambodia's  seat  in  the  UN  with  the  support  of  the  Western  world,  based  on  the  
sole  argument  that  the  regime  had  been  toppled  by  Vietnam,  an  ally  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  
Communist  country”  (Boniface  2003:  67).  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  in  fact  
these  cases  of  “occasional  unilateral  uses  of  force,  such  as  those  by  India  against  Pakistan  in  
1971,  Vietnam  against  Cambodia  in  1978-9  and  Tanzania  against  Uganda  in  1979,  gave  rise  to  
limited  debate  over  the  rightfulness  of  humanitarian  intervention,  but  [...]  served  largely  to  
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reinforce  international  society's  opposition  to  the  concept  rather  than  to  herald  acceptance  of  its  
legitimacy”  (Morris  2013:  1268).  
  
Both  the  initial  rejection  and  the  subsequently  emerging  acceptance  of  external  
intervention’s  permissibility  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  pervasive  polarisation  
which  affected  the  international  community  during  the  Cold  War.  Its  termination,  in  turn,  
heralded  the  beginning  of  a  partial  reassessment  of  the  status  of  sovereignty,  accompanied  by  
reinvigorated  debates  on  the  permissibility  of  external  humanitarian  interference.  The  prospect  
of  overcoming  the  20th  century’s  major  ideological  standoff,  which  allowed  regime-led  human  
rights  abuses  to  occur  all  too  often,  was  an  opportunity  to  establish  an  ‘apolitical’  system  of  
humanitarian  action.  This,  it  was  hoped,  would  put  the  focus  on  the  behaviour  of  states,  rather  
than  on  their  political  ideology  or  on  their  support  by  powerful  allies .  As  a  result,  it  would  “no  
longer  [be]  necessary  to  put  up  with  many  of  the  outrages  sanctioned  by  sovereignty  simply  
because  those  committing  the  outrages  are  on  'our'  side”  (Brown  2006:  21). 33    
  
A  further  noticeable  shift,  this  time  from  the  permissibility  to  a  potential  responsibility  
regarding  intervention,  emerged  as  “the  principle  of  non-interference  in  a  sovereign  State's  
domestic  affairs  came  under  intense  strain  in  the  1990s  [...]  as  the  Rwandan  genocide,  the  
atrocities  in  the  former  Yugoslavia,  and  a  proliferation  of  devastating  internal  wars  unfolded”  
(Arbour  2008:  446).  The  disturbing  reality  that  the  world’s  most  powerful  states  had  repeatedly  
stood  by  in  the  face  of  ongoing  democide  prompted  the  major  expansion  of  humanitarian  
discourse  which  has  developed  since  the  1990s.  At  the  core  of  these  humanitarian  ideals  lies  
the  notion  that  states’  responsibilities  extend  beyond  ensuring  the  survival  and  well-being  of  
their  own  citizens,  as  well  as  the  recognition  of  “the  hard  truth  [...]  that,  in  the  world  as  we  
know  it,  many  ‘alternatives’  to  the  use  of  force  cannot  be  implemented  until  there  is  sufficient  
surcease  from  terror  and  danger  that  ‘soft  power’  can  gain  a  foothold”  (Elshtain  2007:  137).  
Nicholas  Wheeler’s  seminal  book  Saving  Strangers  (2002),  to  name  a  prominent  example,  
addresses  global  humanitarian  action  before  and  after  the  Cold  War,  as  well  as  the  notion  that  
33  Throughout  the  Cold  War,  the  efforts  of  the  United  States  and  its  allies  were  focussed  not  only  on  containing  the   
Communist  threat,  but  on  actively  ‘rolling  back’  Soviet  influence  across  the  world.  This  included  numerous  overt  
and  covert  attempts  at  replacing  regimes  with  more  pliable  ones,  but  also  the  support  of  ideologically  allied  states, 
often  regardless  of  the  soundness  of  their  human  rights  policies  (Kinzer  2006).  
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states  in  the  international  community  have  a  responsibility  to  halt  human  rights  abuses  (and  
other  human  security  issues)  on  a  global  scale.  As  Wheeler  himself  has  written,  “[c]onfronted  
with  supreme  humanitarian  emergencies,  governments  should  be  prepared  to  risk  and  lose  
soldiers'  lives  for  primarily  humanitarian  reasons,  justify  their  actions  in  humanitarian  terms,  
[and]  work  to  secure  Security  Council  authorization”  (2002:  52).  While  he  notes  the  potential  
weaknesses  of  an  overreliance  on  the  UN  Security  Council  for  authorising  interventions, 34  h e   
insists  on  the  significance  of  “an  acceptance  by  governments  in  the  West  that  humanitarian  
intervention  is  both  morally  permitted  and  morally  required  in  cases  of  supreme  humanitarian  
emergency”  (idem:  310).   
  
Wheeler’s  work  further  underlines  the  powerful  emerging  notion  that  states  and  their  
regimes  which  engage  in  human  rights  abuses  cannot  be  left  to  hide  behind  their  sovereignty:  
in  ‘extreme’  cases,  the  protection  of  human  rights  can  outweigh  Westphalian  states’  traditional  
rights  to  non-interference. 35  Ultimately,  Saving  Strangers  is  a  late  reflection  of  the  substantial   
optimism  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  The  supposed  end  of  ideological  rivalries,  and  the  
democratisation  of  many  formerly  authoritarian  states,  was  thought  to  herald  the  eventual  
triumph  of  global  liberalism,  including  the  universal  recognition  of  the  value  of  human  rights  
and  the  preparedness  to  act  where  these  rights  were  threatened.  
  
This  notion  also  aligns  with  the  Walzerian  conception  of  an  emerging  “moral  
internationalism”  which  “has  sought  to  justify  humanitarian  intervention,  foreign  involvement  
in  civil  wars,  regime  change,  and,  most  recently,  the  responsibility  to  protect  concept”,  as  Anne  
Orford  has  described  it  (2013:  84).  Indeed,  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  this  kind  of  moral  
internationalism  “has  defined  the  legitimate  use  of  violence”  (Malito  2019:  106),  as  well  as  the  
balance  between  preserving  the  rights  of  individuals  and  communities.  The  ‘Responsibility  to  
Protect’  framework  is  the  most  developed  result  of  this  understanding,  and  its  principles  have  
indeed  been  influenced  by  Just  War  elements  to  a  considerable  extent.  As  has  been  noted  by  
34  These  weaknesses  are  readily  apparent  in  the  potential  for  UNSC  deadlock  or  indecisiveness,  as  will  be  discussed   
in  Chapter  V.  
  
35  This  development  also  affects  other  current  aspects  of  international  security.  Notably,  in  recent  years  “the   
traditional  concept  of  peacekeeping  (with  the  consent  of  parties  to  a  ceasefire  or  peace  agreement  for  managing  
conflict  peacefully)  has  given  way  to  a  much  broader  definition,  one  that  embraces  the  idea  of  peace  operations  in  
the  absence  of  either  a  ceasefire  and/or  consent  by  all  parties”  (Cooper,  Turner  &  Pugh  2011:  1998).  
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Elshtain  (2006:  110)  the  “earliest  formulations  of  the  just  war  tradition  (for  example,  St.  
Augustine's),  which  argued  that  an  outside  party  may  be  justified  in  intervening  in  a  state  in  
order  to  prevent  certain  harm  to  the  innocent.  Fascinatingly,  these  early  formulations  connect  
directly  to  the  current  norms  of  humanitarian  intervention  and  [the  Responsibility  to  
Protect].” 36   
3.2.2  The  ‘Responsibility  to  Protect’  and  its  Limits  
  
Whereas  it  is  certainly  the  case  that  “the  immediate  catalyst  for  efforts  to  better  codify  the  
responsibility  of  sovereigns  in  situations  of  mass  atrocity  was  nato’s  bombing  of  Serbia  over  
Kosovo  in  1999,  it  was  the  ghosts  of  Rwanda  and  Srebrenica  that  haunted  advocates  for  clearer  
rules  on  when  intervention  was  a  moral  and  legal  obligation”,  as  Hopgood  has  written  (2014:  
182). 37  Like  the  liberal  conception  of  FIRC,  the  R2P  has  its  origins  in  debates  about  the   
discourse  and  potential  ramifications  of  humanitarian  intervention.  And,  again  like  FIRC,  the  
development  of  the  R2P  has  not  been  a  linear  process.  Two  key  points  stand  out  regarding  its  
evolution:  the  2001  proposal  by  the  International  Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  
Sovereignty  (ICISS),  and  the  later  World  Summit  Outcome  Document  of  2005.  While  both  are  
crucial  elements  in  the  development  of  R2P,  they  also  ultimately  reveal  tensions  between  
liberal  ambitions  and  the  practical  reality  of  international  interaction.  The  ICISS  report,  which  
coined  the  ‘Responsibility  to  Protect’  term,  sought  to  balance  the  demands  of  interventionism  
and  humanitarianism.  In  doing  so,  it  incorporated  elements  of  the  Just  War  Theory.  Averre  and  
Davis  (2015:  815)  summarise  the  relation  between  JWT  and  the  R2P  as  follows:   
  
[t]he  ICISS  document  of  2001  elaborated  three  key  principles  for  military  intervention  
for  R2P  purposes.  The  ‘just  cause’  threshold  states  that  intervention  may  be  warranted  
in  the  case  of  large-scale  loss  of  life  arising  from  deliberate  state  action  or  from  neglect  
or  inability  to  act  (for  example,  in  a  ‘failed  state’  situation),  or  from  ethnic  cleansing.  If  
the  ‘just  cause’  threshold  is  met,  the  ‘precautionary  principles’  come  into  play:  these  
focus  on  right  intention,  which  should  be  to  halt  or  avert  human  suffering;  on  last  resort,  
with  military  force  being  justified  only  when  non-military  options  have  been  explored;  
on  proportional  means,  with  the  scope  of  the  intervention  being  the  minimum  necessary  
36  This  ‘appropriation’  of  historical  incarnations  of  the  Just  War  is  a  further  reflection  of  modern  liberal  optimism   
about  the  universality  of,  and  inevitable  progress  towards,  liberal  norms.  
  
37  In  light  of  these  experiences,  “the  responsibility  to  protect  norm  is  not,  as  some  have  suggested,  a  leap  into  wishful   
thinking.  Rather,  it  is  anchored  in  existing  law,  in  institutions  and  in  lessons  learned”  (Arbour  2008:  447-  448).  
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to  secure  the  objective  of  protecting  the  population;  and  on  reasonable  prospects,  
meaning  that  the  chance  of  success  in  achieving  the  objective  should  be  reasonable  and  
its  consequences  unlikely  to  be  worse  than  the  consequences  of  inaction.  Finally,  the  
principle  of  ‘right  authority’  [...]  reaffirmed  the  primary  authority  of  the  UNSC  and  
stipulated  that  states  in  favour  of  intervention  should  formally  request  its  authorisation.  
  
Although  the  ICISS  document  was  an  ambitious  attempt  at  redefining  the  relation  between  
states’  sovereignty  and  their  behaviour  towards  their  inhabitants,  ultimately  “much  of  the  
content  of  the  ICISS  report  fell  victim  to  the  diplomatic  machinations  required  to  secure  global  
consensus”  (Morris  2016:  204).  By  2005,  the  R2P  understanding  as  championed  by  the  UN  
limited  the  focus  to  only  four  cases,  and  re-emphasised  a  ‘Westphalian’  understanding  of  
sovereignty,  as  well  as  the  continued  importance  of  UNSC  approval  for  intervention.  Thus,  the  
2005  World  Summit  Outcome  Document  made  it  clear  that:  
  
138.  Each  individual  State  has  the  responsibility  to  protect  its  populations  from  
genocide,  war  crimes,  ethnic  cleansing  and  crimes  against  humanity.  This  responsibility  
entails  the  prevention  of  such  crimes,  including  their  incitement,  through  appropriate  
and  necessary  means.  […]  The  international  community  should,  as  appropriate,  
encourage  and  help  States  to  exercise  this  responsibility  […].  
  
139.  The  international  community,  through  the  United  Nations,  also  has  the  
responsibility  to  use  appropriate  diplomatic,  humanitarian  and  other  peaceful  means,  
[…].  In  this  context,  we  are  prepared  to  take  collective  action,  in  a  timely  and  decisive  
manner,  through  the  Security  Council,  in  accordance  with  the  Charter,  including  
Chapter  VII,  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  in  cooperation  with  relevant  regional  
organizations  as  appropriate,  should  peaceful  means  be  inadequate  and  national  
authorities  manifestly  fail  to  protect  their  populations  from  genocide,  war  crimes,  ethnic  
cleansing  and  crimes  against  humanity.  
While  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  remains  “a  radically  unfinished  program  [...]  by  
reconceptualizing  sovereignty  as  responsibility  and  situating  intervention  within  a  broader  
continuum  of  measures  designed  to  protect  individuals  from  genocide  and  mass  atrocities,  the  
UN  succeeded  in  reframing  the  debate”  (Martin  2018:  94).   
  
However,  in  doing  so  it  has  made  important  concessions  to  traditional  conceptions  of  
sovereign  states’  primacy  at  the  expense  of  Just  War  influences  and  a  thorough  
reconceptualisation  of  just  intervention.  As  Francis  Deng  (2010:  354)  has  summed  up  the  
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post-2005  R2P  framework’s  underlying  aspirations,  “the  best  assurance  for  maintaining  
sovereignty  is  therefore  to  establish  at  least  minimum  standards  of  responsibility,  if  need  be  
with  international  cooperation.  Thus,  the  role  of  the  international  community  is  to  render  
complementary  protection  and  assistance  to  those  in  need  and  to  hold  governments  accountable  
in  the  discharge  of  their  national  responsibilities.”  
  
This  grounding  in  the  notion  of  states’  ‘sovereignty  as  responsibility’  towards  their  
inhabitants  highlights  R2P’s  role  as  another  attempt  to  divorce  interventionism  from  
antagonising  political  restraints  while  retaining  a  focus  on  states’  sovereign  rights.  The  
accompanying  ideal  of  a  supposedly  ‘post-ideological’  regime  of  global  justice  has  persisted  
into  the  21st  century,  to  the  extent  that  “stories  of  progress  and  promises  of  a  finer  future  for  
‘humanity’  are  endemic  to  the  discourse  of  human  rights”,  Denike  writes  (2008:  98).  Indeed,  
Walzer  (2011  [a]:  69)  notes  that  “humanitarianism  is  probably  the  most  important  "ism"  in  the  
world  today,  given  the  collapse  of  communism,  the  discrediting  of  neoliberalism,  and  the  
general  distrust  of  large-scale  political  ideologies.”  In  light  of  an  ostensibly  widespread  
consensus  among  the  leading  members  of  the  global  order  that  extensive  human  rights  abuses  
by  a  state  are  morally  reprehensible,  i t  has  even  been  noted  that  a  “new  ideal  has  triumphed  on  
the  world  stage:  human  rights.  It  unites  left  and  right,  the  pulpit  and  the  state,  the  minister  and  
the  rebel,  the  developing  world  and  the  liberals  of  the  West.  After  the  collapse  of  communism,  
human  rights  have  become  the  morality  of  international  relations,  a  way  of  conducting  politics  
according  to  ethical  norms”  (Douzinas  2006:  355).   
  
The  Post-2005  R2P  framework’s  insistence  on  the  importance  of  global  security  and  
human  rights  protection  is  hardly  controversial.  Nonetheless,  while  it  certainly  represents  a  
welcome  step  toward  a  greater  emphasis  on  states'  relation  to  human  rights,  the  framework  has  
also  faced  increasing  criticism  on  several  counts,  including  an  alleged  lack  of  clarity  required  
to  be  an  effective  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  international  community  (Focarelli  2008),  especially  
given  actors’  frequent  reluctance  to  act.  “After  all”,  Graubart  (2013:  75)  affirms,  “few  
opponents  of  humanitarian  intervention  argue  that  sovereignty  is  more  important  in  the  abstract  
than  stopping  mass  atrocities.  The  debate  lies  in  whether  an  effective  and  desirable  regime  is  
possible  under  the  present  global  order.”  Consequently,  the  general  utility  and  prospects  of  
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success  of  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  concept  has  been  questioned  practically  ever  since  the  
moment  of  its  inception.  As  Hobson  (2016:  434)  suggests,  
  
[w]ith  each  humanitarian  emergency  comes  a  fresh  round  of  questions  about  whether  
R2P  has  succeeded  or  failed  […].  Darfur  was  dubbed  a  ‘failure  to  protect’  and  ‘the  big  
let  -  down’;  an  internal  report  described  the  UN’s  handling  of  human  rights  abuses  in  
Sri  Lanka  as  a  ‘grave  failure’,  and  noted  that  […]  R2P’s  ‘meaning  and  use  had  become  
so  contentious  as  to  nullify  its  potential  value’;  as  the  Libyan  intervention  morphed  into  
regime  change,  R2P  was  announced  ‘R.I.P.’;  and  in  Syria,  the  international  community  
has  ‘dismally  failed  to  uphold  its  responsibility  to  protect’.  
  
Thus,  and  “[i]n  case  after  case  –  most  notably  including  Libya,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  South  Sudan,  
Burundi,  Iraq,  Syria  –  the  application  of  the  R2P  doctrine  proved  to  be  anything  but  
straightforward,  and  amid  some  relative  successes,  more  frequently  an  outright  failure”  (Simon  
2020:  206).  Given  that  “humanitarian  intervention  remains  a  rare  and  selective  event”  (Booth  
Walling  2015:  384),  a  major  aspect  of  this  critique  is  R2P’s  supposed  failure  to  ensure  action  
when  rights  are  threatened.   
  
Even  more  importantly,  however,  critiques  of  the  R2P  tend  to  emphasise  its  potential  
‘misuse’  in  illegitimate  interventions  and  regime  change  attempts.  To  an  important  extent,  
these  developments  are  due  to  ambiguities  about  interventions’  ultimate  outcome.  Thus,  Dunne  
(2012:  para.  5)  writes  that  in  spite  of  its  relative  novelty,  “R2P  has  been  tarnished  by  its  
association  with  regime  change”,  whereas  McMillan  and  Mickler  (2013:  284)  argue  that  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect  and  similar  frameworks  have  come  under  increasing  scrutiny  in  the  
context  of  “recent  developments  [which]  have  led  to  claims  that  the  international  community  is  
now  in  the  highly  controversial  business  of  ‘regime  change’  in  the  name  of  humanitarian  ends.”   
  
Fears  concerning  the  potential  ‘instrumentalisation’  of  R2P  principles  and  humanitarian  
discourse  for  regime  change  goals  have  created  a  growing  sense  that  “[f]ar  from  offering  
protection  from  mass  atrocity  and  being  the  vanguard  of  a  progressive  change  towards  a  less  
violent  world,  the  R2P  serves  to  legitimise  a  moralistic  form  of  militarism.  Far  from  limiting,  
preventing  and  appropriately  responding  to  mass  atrocities,  the  R2P  gives  a  veneer  of  
legitimacy  to  military  interventions  [...]”  (Dunford  &  Neu  2019:  1097).  These  important  
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developments  have  consequently  played  a  major  role  in  fuelling  the  past  decades’  growing  
disillusionment  with  forcible  interventions  in  states’  internal  affairs.  In  fact,  while  “the  Western  
world  sees  foreign  intervention  as  proof  of  generosity  and  a  concern  to  help  others;  other  
countries  consider  interference  as  a  way  for  the  Western  world  to  challenge  another  country's  
independence”  (Boniface  2003:  64).   
  
This  distrust  is  not  solely  linked  to  the  misappropriation  of  R2P  and  humanitarian  
language  itself,  however.  It  is  also  reflective  of  earlier  developments  in  the  United  States-led  
‘War  on  Terror’,  which  is  predicated  on  a  binary  differentiation  between  supposedly  
‘law-abiding’  states  on  one  side  and  illegitimate,  ‘rogue’  regimes  on  the  other. 38  The  world   
order  which  emerged  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Cold  War  has  increasingly  tied  sovereignty  to  the  
notion  of  legitimacy.  In  this  understanding,  legitimacy,  and  therefore  sovereignty  itself,  can  be  
‘lost’  by  regimes  depending  on  their  behaviour ,  leading  to  a  situation  in  which  “in  however  
bizarre  and  unsatisfactory  a  fashion,  moral  discourses  and  judgements  permeate  the  war  on  
terror,  many  of  them  in  its  justification”  (Burke  2004:  330).  
  3.3  The  ‘War  on  Terror’  and  the  Erosion  of  Sovereign  Equality   
  
Whereas  sovereign  states  have  traditionally  been  considered  to  be  rightful  actors  per  se  (albeit  
ones  capable  of  illegitimate  acts),  the  status  of  legitimacy  has  increasingly  come  to  be  tied  to  
states’  behaviour.  For  instance,  on  the  eve  of  the  fateful  2003  Iraq  intervention,  President  G.W.  
Bush  stated  that  “a  regime  that  has  lost  its  legitimacy  will  also  lose  its  power.”  The  statement  
highlights  that  regime  legitimacy  has  become  an  increasingly  important  part  of  21st  century  
interstate  relations.  In  Wight’s  (1972:  1)  famous  definition,  which  remains  as  accurate  today  as  
when  it  was  written,  “international  legitimacy  is  an  elusive  and  nebulous  notion,  on  the  
frontiers  of  morality  and  law.  It  may  be  briefly  described  as  moral  acceptability  [...]  to  the  
remainder  of  international  society.”  In  the  course  of  the  late  20th  and  early  21st  centuries,  this  
sense  of  global  moral  acceptability  has  become  increasingly  linked  to  states’  adherence  to  the  
International  Liberal  Order’s  expectations.  
38  The  epithet  of  ‘rogue  state’  is  evidently  problematic  in  itself,  as  it  is  often  used  to  indicate  deviance  from  the   
ideals  of  the  US-led  world  order  rather  than  any  specific  behaviour.  
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Although  sovereign  states  formally  enjoy  equal  rights  to  non-intervention  and  
independence  regardless  of  ideological  differences  or  existing  power  inequalities,  the  
increasingly  antagonistic  rhetoric  of  the  War  on  Terror,  (e.g.  President  George  W.  Bush’s  
controversial  statement  that  “you're  either  with  us,  or  you're  with  the  terrorists”  [2002(c):  para  
13])  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  at  simplifying  the  complex  political  relations  of  the  post  9/11  
world  by  dividing  the  global  order  into  two  camps:  those  states  which  are  legitimate,  and  thus  
have  ‘earned’  their  sovereign  status,  and  those  whose  legitimacy,  and  therefore  their  
sovereignty,  can  be  called  into  question.   
  
The  resulting  conception  of  the  moral  difference  (including  an  informal  ‘hierarchy’  of  
sovereign  states,  ranging  from  liberal  to  repressive)  has  served  as  a  justification  for  powerful  
states  to  take  action  by  assuming  a  punitive  role  ‘on  behalf  of’  the  supposedly  universal  values  
of  the  International  Community .  The  intervention  in  Iraq  has  been  described  as  a  punitive  
action,  launched  in  retaliation  for  Saddam  Hussein’s  past  defiance  of  the  United  States.  
Accordingly,  “the  notion  of  punitive  war  figured  prominently  in  the  justifications  President  
George  W.  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  offered  for  the  invasion  of  Iraq  and  the  
overthrow  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime”,  O’Driscoll  has  for  example  noted  (2006  [a]:  405).  
Snyder  (2003:  654)  has  gone  as  far  as  claiming  that  the  motivation  in  intervening  was  not  only  
punishing  and  defeating  Iraq,  but  even  included  the  intention  of  “punishing  the  larger  Arab  
world  for  creating  the  conditions  that  gave  rise  to  Osama  bin  Laden  and  for  sympathizing  with  
bin  Laden  after  9/11.”  
As  noted  earlier,  the  idea  of  punitive  warfare  is  not  unheard  of  in  the  historical  Just  War  
Tradition  (cf.  Chapter  II).  However,  the  understanding  of  punishment  which  was  advocated  by  
many  of  the  early  Just  War  scholars  presupposes  an  ‘overarching’  (and  ideally  neutral) 39   
authority  capable  of  imposing  punishment.  It  is  clear  that  such  a  type  of  authority  is  lacking  in  
the  current  global  setup,  leaving  individual  states  or  organizations  themselves  to  act  as  judge,  
jury  and  sometimes  executioner,  when  and  where  they  see  fit.  This  is  facilitated  by  emerging  
39  This  notion  has  reappeared  in  more  modern  scholarship,  too.  Jacob  Blair  (2008:  306)  for  instance  highlights   
Rodin’s  notion  that  “individual  victim  states  do  not  have  the  authority  to  punish.  In  order  for  punishment  to  be  
legitimate,  at  the  very  least  the  one  implementing  it  should  be  impartial  towards  the  parties  who  are  involved  in  the  
dispute.  Justice  requires  that  the  one  administering  the  punishment  not  have  an  invested  personal  interest  in  seeing  
the  punishment  carried  out.”  
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distinctions  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  regimes,  as  t his  sort  of  punitive  reasoning  is  
inherently  tied  to  the  conceptions  of  hierarchy.  Thus,  although  Luban  (2011:  314)  is  correct  in  
asserting  that  at  least  in  principle,  “[i]f  equals  have  no  dominion  over  equals,  they  lack  the  
authority  to  punish 40  them,  including  through  warfare”,  the  Liberal  Order  has  sought  to   
‘circumvent’  this  problem  by  promoting  a  framework  in  which  ‘rogue’  states  are  not  deemed  
equal  to  rights  respecting  democracies. 41  Consequently  the  rights  associated  with  their   
privileged  position  as  sovereign  states  can  be  ‘lost’.  The  potential  scope  for  punitive  regime  
change  interventions  against  ‘illegitimate’  regimes  has  also  increasingly  prompted  comparisons  
to  a  supposed  practice  of  ‘global  policing’,  where  conceptions  of  global  human  rights  would  
function  as  a  quasi-legal  system.  
3.3.1  Intervention  as  Global  Policing  
  
Correspondingly,  Reed  has  claimed  that  “since  1989  the  use  of  force  has  increasingly  taken  the  
form  of  quasi-police  action”  (2004:  33). 42  Within  this  metaphorical  system,  the  United  Nations   
Security  Council  or  a  hegemon  (e.g.  the  United  States  of  America)  would  take  on  the  role  of  a  
‘global  policeman’  within  an  international  society.  This,  too,  can  be  seen  in  the  post-9/11  
interventions.  Indeed,  “the  idea  of  punishment  [...]  is  clearly  present  in  the  justificatory  
reasoning  with  which  Bush  and  Blair  chose  to  legitimate  the  invasion  of  Iraq.  The  war,  they  
told  us,  was  fought  as  a  means  of  law  enforcement,  of  holding  Iraq  to  account  for  its  violations  
of  international  law  and  the  writ  of  the  United  Nations”  (O’Driscoll  2006  [a]:  408).  O’Driscoll  
further  states  that  both  the  US’  and  the  UK’s  rhetoric  had  
  
pressed  the  case  quite  forcefully  that  Iraq  must  be  punished  for  its  indiscretions  and  
criminal  defiance  of  these  resolutions,  so  that  international  law  and  the  UN  system  
might  be  reaffirmed  and  vindicated.  If  Iraq  escaped  punishment  for  its  misdeeds,  the  
40  This  notion  is  also  reflected  in  the  assertion  that  “a  punitive  war  [...]  waged  by  a  victim  state  would  not  be   
justified;  the  victim  state  would  not  be  administering  legitimate  punishment”  (Blair  2008:  307). 
  
41  Evidently,  democratic  regimes  are  not  ipso  facto  exempt  from  undergoing  a  (hypothetically  justified)  forcible   
regime  change.  However,  the  nature  of  their  political  regimes  means  that  they  are  generally  less  likely  targets  in  the  
current  world  order.  
  
42  For  example,  as  Miller  (2000:  5)  has  written,  “[i]n  the  case  of  Somalia,  at  least  one  pacifist  classified  the  U.S.   
intervention  as  a  police  action  instead  of  a  war,  drawing  an  analogy  with  the  (acceptable)  use  of  force  in  the  civic  
realm.”  
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credibility  of  international  law  and  the  whole  UN  system  would  be  plunged  into  doubt.  
This  war,  then,  would  serve  to  vindicate  and  uphold  the  integrity  of  international  law  by  
censuring  one  of  its  most  egregious  violators  -  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq  (idem).  
Therefore,  as  Boyle  (2011:  151)  has  argued,  in  this  understanding  of  the  global  order  “regime  
change  [...]  makes  sense  under  a  punitive  conception  of  just  cause,  since  seriously  unjust  
actions  of  a  regime  towards  its  own  citizens  or  others  might  warrant  punishing  its  leaders  as  
criminals  or  even  imposing  on  a  community  something  like  a  communal  version  of  capital  
punishment  wholesale  reconstitution  of  its  way  of  life.”  Other  authors  have  made  use  of  similar  
policing  analogies  in  past  decades.  Lucas  (2003:  125)  has  for  instance  claimed  that  “the  calls  
for  preemptive  military  action  and  ‘regime  change’  in  Iraq  more  closely  resemble  the  rhetoric  
of  a  frontier  sheriff  trying  to  rally  a  reluctant  posse  of  citizens  to  place  their  own  lives  and  
security  at  risk  for  the  sake  of  a  common  moral  purpose  that  transcends  their  own,  narrowly  
defined  self-interests.”  
  
In  this  ‘armed  intervention  as  policing’  context,  O’Driscoll  notes  that  “we  understand  
the  practice  of  punishment  as  effectively  fulfilling  a  dual  function:  it  reaffirms  the  integrity  of  
societal  laws  and  norms  and  encourages  compliance  with  them.  In  a  word,  the  practice  of  
punishment  provides  a  means  of  law  enforcement  and,  in  so  doing,  contributes  towards  
upholding  the  social  order”  (2006  [a]:  407  -  408).  Evidently,  there  are  important  problems  with  
this  global  policing  analogy.  Most  importantly,  it  vastly  oversimplifies  the  many  challenges  of  
maintaining  an  international  (legal)  order.  Primarily,  of  course,  international  law  is  
comparatively  ‘weak’.  In  addition,  policing  by  states  acting  unilaterally  runs  a  risk  of  
devolving  into  international  ‘vigilantism’,  whereas  conceptions  of  the  United  Nations  Security  
Council  as  an  alternative  would  make  for  a  very  unreliable  and  often  biased  officer  of  the  law.  
More  importantly,  the  policing  analogy  fails  in  many  cases,  as  questions  about  the  culpability  
criterion  remain  unanswered.  Indeed,  as  Luban  (2011:  312)  has  written,  “the  fact  is  that  warfare 
has  no  obvious  domestic  analogy”,  and  that  therefore  all  attempts  to  draw  parallels  between  
humanitarian  intervention  and  the  exercise  of  criminal  justice  are  necessarily  flawed.  This  is  
not  least  the  case  because,  as  Walzer  acknowledges,  “the  police  are  self-appointed”  (2006  [a]:  
106).   
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As  will  be  discussed  shortly,  the  inevitably  complex  nature  of  actors’  intentions  and  
motives  make  the  pursuit  of  global  justice  much  more  difficult  than  the  global  policing  concept  
would  lead  to  believe,  and  perceiving  regime  change  as  mere  policing  is  consequently  of  
limited  use  in  furthering  an  understanding  of  the  FIRC  phenomenon.  What  the  discussions  
surrounding  policing  and  punishment  do  show,  however,  is  the  crucial  shift  away  from  
‘sovereign  equality’  to  ‘sovereign  hierarchy’  and  the  increasing  tensions  this  has  created.  As  
Buchan  (2007:  41)  has  correctly  asserted,  “whereas  the  reverence  for  sovereignty  created  an  
equal  world  order,  the  emergence  of  this  liberal/non-liberal  dichotomy  produces  a  hierarchical  
world  order  where  international  community  projects  itself  as  normatively  superior  to  
non-liberal  states.”  In  the  context  of  the  War  on  Terror,  this  means  that  there  is  an  increasing  
risk  that  powerful  states  see  foreign-imposed  regime  change  as  a  permissible  and  legitimate  
option.  
3.4  Conclusions   
  
This  chapter  has  primarily  affirmed  the  continued  importance  of  a  Westphalian  understanding  
of  sovereignty,  which  according  to  Krasner  (1996:  115)  is  “a  system  of  political  authority  based  
on  territory  and  autonomy.”  This  conception  of  sovereign  statehood  has  had  a  profound  impact  
on  the  way  the  global  order  has  been  conceptualised  as  “an  international  society  of  independent  
states”,  which  “has  a  law  that  establishes  the  rights  of  its  members  -  above  all  the  rights  of  
territorial  integrity  and  political  sovereignty”  (Walzer  [a]  2006:  61).  The  discussion  has  also  
emphasised  the  continued  ambiguity  in  the  relations  between  the  R2P  and  FIRC,  especially  
due  to  the  more  recent  iterations’  neglect  of  the  R2P’s  originally  prominent  Just  War  
background.   
  
The  chapter  has  shown  that  states’  rights  remain  an  important  theoretical  safeguard  
against  external  intervention.  At  the  same  time,  however,  “ [d]espite  enduring  commitment  to  
state  sovereignty  as  a  principle  by  the  international  society  of  states,  in  practice  the  revocation,  
temporary  suspension,  or  violation  of  sovereignty  rights  has  been  a  frequent  occurrence”,  
Booth  Walling  states  (2015:  386) .  These  violations  of  sovereignty  have  occurred  for  political,  
ideological,  and  military  purposes,  but  also  for  humanitarian  reasons.  As  the  chapter  has  seen,  
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whereas  such  “humanitarian  claims  were  not  accepted  as  a  legitimate  basis  for  the  use  of  force  
in  the  1970s  [...]  a  new  norm  of  UN‐authorized  humanitarian  intervention  developed  in  the  
1990s”  (Wheeler  2002:  8).  The  current  notion  of  using  force  for  ostensibly  humanitarian  
purposes  is  an  essential  part  of  the  post-Cold  War  liberal  international  order.  In  most  
contemporary  understandings,  a  state  must  be  liable  to  lose  its  sovereign  rights  and  for  a  
justified  intervention  to  occur.  The  two  commonly-accepted  causes  of  this  liability  are  military  
(‘external’)  aggression  and  fundamental  rights  violations  (‘internal  aggression’).  Consequently,  
while  the  traditional  view  of  sovereign  statehood  entails  a  right  to  non-intervention,  this  has  
increasingly  become  a  conditional  right.   
  
The  emergence  of  ‘humanitarianism’  as  a  distinct  phenomenon  in  the  late  20th  century  
has  shifted  the  discourse  surrounding  states’  rights  and  duties  towards  an  acknowledgment  that  
“[e]xternally,  states  must  respect  the  sovereignty  of  other  states  while  internally  states  must  
respect  the  rights  and  fundamental  dignity  of  their  citizens”  (Booth  Walling  2015:  406).  
Davenport  is  correct  in  stating  that  “since  humanitarian  intervention  became  a  central  issue  in  
just  war  theory  in  the  1990s,  a  broad  consensus  has  emerged  that  massive  violations  of  basic  
rights  are  a  just  cause  for  intervention”  (2011:  518).  The  progressive  shift  in  the  common  
understanding  of  sovereignty  over  the  past  decades  (from  a  ‘state-centric’  to  a  ‘people-centric’ 
one)  is  one  of  the  most  significant  in  the  development  of  the  ethics  of  international  relations.  
Accordingly,  this  humanitarian  ideal  has  been  at  the  root  of  the  development  of  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect.  
  
In  spite  of  states’  initial  skepticism,  Morris  (2016:  201)  notes  that  “through  an  often  
slow  and  inconsistent  process  characterised  as  much  by  cajoling  and  acquiescence  as  by  
enthusiasm,  the  UN  membership  has  come  to  adopt  a  more  expansive,  human-focused  view  of  
state  sovereignty,  culminating  in  acceptance  of  the  R2P.”  While  this  acceptance  marks  the  
highpoint  of  the  ideal  of  a  ‘depoliticised’  intervention  framework  thus  far,  the  incarnation  of  
the  ICISS’  ideals  in  the  (ultimately  less  ambitious)  World  Summit  Outcome  Document  shows  
that  the  current  framework  retains  many  assumptions  of  earlier  intervention  debates,  including  
its  insistence  on  UNSC  approval  and  rejection  of  regime  change  as  a  legitimate  way  of  
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addressing  rights  abuses. 43  Thus,  “in  a  global  legal  and  political  system  in  which  state   
sovereignty  still  reigns  as  a  guiding  ideal  and  informs  the  nature  and  content  of  new  initiatives  
(such  as  R2P  [...]),  regime  change  can  be  seen  as  a  limit  point  of  acceptable  and  legitimate  
international  intervention”  (idem:  291).   
  
At  the  same  time,  in  the  most  extreme  cases  of  internal  aggressions,  to  leave  the  
offending  regimes  in  place  seems  hardly  concurrent  with  R2P’s  aims  to  “end  the  worst  forms  of  
violence  and  persecution”  (UNOGP  2020:  para.  1)  and  as  a  result,  the  understanding  of  forcible  
regime  change  as  an  immovable  ‘limit  point  of  intervention’  is  not  shared  by  all.  Bellamy  has  
for  instance  contended  that  “although  regime  change  should  never  be  allowed  as  the  
legitimating  primary  goal  of  armed  humanitarian  intervention,  regime  change  is  sometimes  
necessary  as  a  means  for  the  protection  of  populations  terrorized  by  their  own  government”  
(2014:  167).   
  
Nonetheless,  in  spite  of  its  rejection  of  measures  amounting  to  foreign-imposed  regime  
change,  there  have  been  claims  that  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  “contributes  to  a  moral  
climate  in  which  violence  is  framed  in  a  particular  way  -  as  humanitarian,  civilised,  laudable  
and  virtuous”  (Dunford  &  Neu  2019:  1082).  Overall,  this  aligns  with  the  assessment  that  past  
instances  of  external  intervention,  in  particular  those  for  humanitarian  purposes,  have  “had  two  
conflicting  effects:  it  has  been  seen  either  as  a  progressive  principle  that  prevents  dictators  from  
freely  abusing  their  own  populations  or  as  a  repressive  tool  used  by  big  powers  to  impose  their  
rule  on  other  nations''  (Boniface  2003:  63).  In  the  eyes  of  critics,  understandings  of  ‘earned’  
sovereignty  serve  to  legitimise  the  spread  of  ‘Western’  conceptions  of  liberal  democracy  by 
threat  or  use  of  military  force  for  the  purpose  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change.  While  it  is  
easy  to  agree  with  Orend’s  straightforward  assessment  that  the  “violation  of  human  rights  is  a  
vicious  and  ugly  phenomenon”  and  ought  not  to  be  tolerated  (2004:  133),  the  various  
interventions  of  the  past  thirty  years,  humanitarian  and  otherwise,  have  not  generally  resulted  
in  unambiguously  positive  outcomes.  
43  Whereas  the  post-2005  R2P  framework  is  clear  on  its  rejection  of  FIRC,  the  earlier  ICISS  conception  is  somewhat   
more  ambiguous,  as  it  has  stated  that  “regime  change  is  not  a  legitimate  objective,  though  it  allows  that  disabling  a  
regime’s  ability  to  harm  its  own  people  ‘may  be  essential  to  discharging  the  mandate  of  protection’”  (Bachman  
2015:  57).  
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Indeed,  humanitarian  reasoning  has  repeatedly  been  ‘misappropriated’  in  creating  a  
moral  hierarchy  of  states,  ultimately  undermining  their  equality  and  legitimising  regime  change  
wars.  The  important  tensions  between  sovereignty  and  the  defence  of  human  rights  have  only  
intensified  in  recent  years  through  the  addition  of  a  third  element:  politicised  considerations  of  
national  and  international  security  in  the  context  of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’  and  associated  regime  
change  wars,  which  ultimately  reveal  a  contradiction  between  the  Liberal  Order’s  claims  to  
guarantee  both  international  stability  and  human  freedoms,  in  particular  when  the  causes  for  
liability  become  conflated  in  pursuit  of  regime  change.  Due  to  these  tensions,  past  regime  
changes  have  been  subject  to  criticism  for  very  different  reasons,  indicating  that  present-day  
FIRC  is  a  much  more  complex  concept  than  is  often  assumed.   
  
The  next  chapter  will  further  highlight  this  complexity  by  addressing  the  regime  change  
attempts  in  Iraq  and  Libya.  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  United  States  and  its  allies “used  
full-scale  combat  operations  in  the  former  and  limited  force  in  the  latter”  (Walldorf  2019:  198),  
and  the  subsequent  pages  argue  that  this  difference  reflects  superficial  and  radical  types  of  
regime  change.  The  chapter  then  uses  this  distinction  to  raise  important  questions  about  the  ad  
bellum  reasoning  and  post  bellum  intent  underlying  past  FIRC  attempts.  
  
  Chapter  IV:  Variations  of  Regime  Change  
  
So  far,  the  thesis  has  established  that  foreign-imposed  regime  change  has  come  to  be  a  
significant  and  controversial  phenomenon  within  the  current  world  order.  The  demise  of  Cold  
War  polarisation  had  “lifted  the  shadow  of  great  power  conflict,  significantly  reduced  
geostrategic  rationales  for  supporting  human  rights  violating  regimes,  and  heralded  a  period  of  
preponderance  for  Western  powers  and  the  liberal  values  which  they  espoused”  (Morris  2016:  
203).   
  
However,  it  is  also  notable  that  in  the  ostensible  defence  of  such  values,  “the  
willingness  of  Western  powers  to  use  force  for  apparently  moral  purposes  has  become  a  central  
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(and  worrying)  characteristic  of  the  post-Cold  War  settlement”  (Douzinas  2006:  360).  This  
willingness  has  taken  on  more  security-focused  undertones  in  the  context  of  the  ongoing  global  
War  on  Terror.  In  this  context,  previous  chapters  have  asserted  that  FIRC  is  conceptually  
distinct  both  from  general  humanitarian  intervention  and  from  the  more  recent  ‘Responsibility  
to  Protect’  framework.  Although  regime  change  interventions  have  been  carried  out  in  their  
guise,  the  justifications  for  forcible  regime  removal  have  often  gone  beyond  humanitarian  
goals.  What  is  more,  even  when  ostensibly  aimed  at  ‘saving  strangers’,  FIRC  missions  have  
exceeded  the  confines  of  humanitarian  intervention  in  toppling  the  targeted  regimes,  and  have  
repeatedly  done  so  without  the  UNSC  approval  required  by  the  current  R2P  framework.  As  
indicated  earlier,  these  aspects  of  FIRC  are  best  understood  in  the  context  of  Western  
liberalism’s  global  ambitions.  This  is  reflected  in  concerns  for  global  security,  but  also  in  the  
emphasis  on  human  rights  defence.   
  
Given  the  wide  variety  of  cases,  this  chapter  argues  that  a  conceptual  distinction  between  
intent  and  motive  is  crucial  to  understanding  why  there  cannot  be  ‘one  size  fits  all’  approach  to  
FIRC.  Accordingly,  subsequent  pages  focus  on  establishing  two  types  of  FIRC,  as  exemplified  
by  the  cases  of  Iraq  and  Libya.  
4.1  Intent,  Motive,  and  Types  of  Foreign-Imposed  Regime  Change   
  
Powerful  states’  apparent  instrumentalisation  of  liberal  rhetoric  in  pursuit  of  21st  century  
regime  change  has  prompted  increased  scepticism.  This  affects  the  hopes  of  creating  a  
‘depoliticised’  humanitarian  framework,  but  also  reflects  concerns  about  actors’  ulterior  goals.  
The  complexity  of  the  debates  within  which  discussions  about  regime  change  take  place  
indicate  that  treating  the  topic  as  a  uniform  construct  is  ultimately  fruitless.  Therefore,  the  
upcoming  section  of  the  thesis  proposes  conceptual  distinctions  between  actors’  motives  and  
the  intended  ‘superficial’  and  ‘radical’  outcomes  of  regime  change.  In  doing  so,  it  will  refer  to  
the  2011  intervention  in  Libya,  as  well  as  to  the  ongoing  debates  surrounding  the  United  
States-led  interventions  in  Iraq  eight  years  earlier.  To  be  sure,  the  war  on  Iraq  was  subject  to  
controversy  due  to  its  lack  of  Security  Council  authorisation.  However,  it  is  also  notorious  for  
more  general  discussions  surrounding  its  original  casus  belli,  as  well  as  for  its  contentious  
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aftermath.  Ultimately,  it  became  indisputably  clear  that  “US  war  aims  in  Iraq  were  primarily  
about  change,  the  removal  of  Saddam  Hussein's  regime  and  its  replacement  with  one  less  prone  
to  diplomatic  defiance,  violent  adventurism  and  domestic  repression”  (Dodge  2005:  707).  
Thus,  the  subsequent  efforts  at  replacing  the  Ba’athist  regime  in  Iraq  is  an  important  example  
of  what  the  thesis  terms  a  ‘radical’  regime  change.  Like  the  expression  suggests,  the  radical  
variety  of  regime  change  seeks  to  ‘uproot’  any  remnants  of  the  former  regime’s  power  
structures,  often  including  its  bureaucracies,  political  movements,  the  armed  forces,  and  so  
forth.  The  subsequent  imposition  of  an  alternative  regime  also  includes  making  major  changes  
to,  or  directly  impose,  a  state’s  constitution  (and  thus  influence  the  future  ‘nature’  not  only  of  
the  political  regime,  but  of  the  state  itself;  cf.  chapter  VII).  Thus,  radical  FIRC  does  not  merely  
separate  leaders  or  governments  from  political  power,  it  engages  in  the  reorganisation  of  
political  structures  as  a  whole.  These  invasive  measures  are  intended  to  remove  any  remaining  
sympathisers  of  the  old  regime  and  thus  prevent  the  return  of  supposedly  illegitimate  forms  of  
government.  Consequently,  interveners  tend  to  claim  that  a  radical  regime  change  facilitates  a  
‘fresh  start’  for  the  target  state.  However,  as  the  reference  to  the  Iraqi  case  highlights,  while  it  
presents  a  chance  to  challenge  the  population’s  adherence  to  destructive  ideologies,  radical  
regime  change  can  nevertheless  also  result  in  some  thoroughly  unstable  situations.  
  
This  radical  form  of  FIRC  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  aims  and  outcome  of  the  North  
Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO)’s  contentious  intervention  in  the  Libyan  Civil  War  
(2011).  Contrary  to  the  Iraqi  case,  this  intervention  was  notable  as  “the  first  time  the  Security  
Council  authorized  military  force  against  a  perpetrator  government  that  was  also  a  UN  member  
in  defense  of  human  rights”  (Booth  Walling  2015:  413).  However,  the  alliance  ultimately  
“exceeded  its  original  mandate  and  [...]  R2P  was  misused  for  illegitimate  and  controversial  
regime  change  purposes”  (Malito  2019:  115).  In  the  end,  the  intervention  in  Libya  resulted  in  
what  should  be  termed  a  ‘superficial’  regime  change.  Ultimately,  this  outcome  should  be  
understood  in  the  context  of  the  ‘lessons’  learned  from  previous  Western  experiences  in  the  
Middle  East,  but  has  led  to  an  equally  controversial  outcome.  In  assessing  these  variations  of  
regime  change,  the  following  pages  highlight  the  critical  distinction  between  regime  change  
actors'  intent  in  toppling  a  regime  and  their  motive  for  doing  so  (i.e.  the  reasons  for  engaging  in  
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a  regime  change  intervention). 44  This  is  especially  meaningful  where  there  is  a  potential   
contradiction  between  the  principles  underpinning  the  two.  Walzer  makes  this  clear  when  he  
reminds  us  of  the  case  of  “the  Red  Army  marching  on  Warsaw  to  create  communism  in  Poland  
[which]  (much  like  the  American  army  marching  on  Baghdad  to  create  democracy  in  Iraq)  
contradicted  by  its  actions  the  principles  it  espoused”  (2008:  354).  In  other  words,  the  intention  
of  removing  Saddam  Hussein  and  imposing  a  democratic  and  economically  liberal  government  
clashed  with  the  motives  for  doing  so,  which  ostensibly  were  self-defence  and  the  ‘liberation’  
of  the  Iraqi  people,  but  which  also  included  the  punitive  toppling  of  a  regime  supposedly  gone  
‘rogue.’  
  
The  controversy  of  recent  regime  change  operations  inevitably  raises  essential  questions  
about  the  intended  outcome  of  military  action.  The  ‘right  intention’  criterion  is  an  important  
part  of  the  traditional  jus  ad  bellum,  and  it  has  accordingly  been  noted  that  if  “we  think  that  we  
should  require  states  and  other  belligerents  to  not  only  accidentally  satisfy  just  war  criteria  but  
to  do  so  conscientiously,  we  cannot  do  so  without  a  right  intention  requirement”  (Steinhoff  
2018:  175).  Indeed,  while  it  retains  its  relevance  today,  the  criterion  has  formed  an  essential  
part  of  Just  War  thinking  for  centuries.  For  instance,  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas  himself  wrote  that  
  
it  may  happen  that  the  war  is  declared  by  the  legitimate  authority,  and  for  a  just  cause,  
and  yet  be  rendered  unlawful  through  a  wicked  intention.  Hence  Augustine  says  
( Contra  Faust .  xxii,  74):  ‘The  passion  for  inflicting  harm,  the  cruel  thirst  for  vengeance,  
an  unpacific  and  relentless  spirit,  the  fever  of  revolt,  the  lust  of  power,  and  such  like  
things,  all  these  are  rightly  condemned  in  war'  (1920  [ 1485 ]:  Q40).  
  
Ever  since,  theorists  have  continued  to  engage  with  the  ‘right  intention’  concept’s  demands,  
highlighting  both  its  importance  and  its  ambiguities.  After  all,  when  is  an  intention  suitably  
‘pure’  and  untainted  by  selfishness  to  be  permissible?  Consequently  some,  such  as  Purves  and  
Jenkins  (2016)  have  argued  that  there  are  simply  too  many  uncertainties  surrounding  the  classic  
44  As  Lang  (2016:291)  describes  the  distinction,  “the  intention  of  an  act  is  the  state  of  affairs  it  seeks  to  bring  about.   
A  motive,  in  contrast,  is  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  the  agent  acts—the  desires  and  other  passions  that  propel  him.”  
While  the  motive  is  the  actor’s  ‘underlying’  reasoning,  actors’  intentions  can  be  described  as  the  ultimately  desired  
outcome.  This  also  matters  in  a  humanitarian  context,  for  example:  Bachman  (2015:  57)  reiterates  Pattison’s  
argument  that  the  “intention  of  the  intervening  force  equates  to  the  purpose  behind  the  intervention.  For  the  intention  
to  be  humanitarian,  the  purpose  of  the  intervention  must  be  to  prevent,  reduce,  or  halt  the  human  suffering  resulting  
from  the  humanitarian  crisis”.  
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understanding  of  intention  to  allow  it  to  play  a  decisive  role  in  our  judgment  of  ad  bellum  
justice.  Others  have  sought  to  address  these  ambiguities  by  advocating  a  stricter  conceptual  
distinction  between  ‘intent’  on  the  one  hand  and  ‘motive’  on  the  other.  Lang  (2016:  291)  for  
example  notes  that  “when  it  is  discovered  that  a  war  may  have  been  undertaken  for  reasons  that  
are  not  morally  pure,  the  use  of  military  force  becomes  sullied.  This  particular  form  of  criticism  
results,  in  part,  from  a  confusion  about  the  difference  between  motives  and  intentions.”  
Similarly,  Janzen  (2016:  38)  has  made  the  claim  that  a  “distinction  between  motive  and  
intention  merits  emphasizing  because  commentators  will  sometimes  deem  a  war  unjust,  or  
express  misgivings  about  the  legitimacy  of  a  particular  war,  on  the  grounds  that  it  contravenes  
the  right  intention  condition,  but  since  they  have  conflated  motive  and  intention,  what  they  
really  mean  is  that  the  war  is  unjust  because  those  who  initiated  it  did  so  from  malicious  
motives.”  
  
It  is  clear  that  the  conceptual  distinction  between  intent  and  motive  advocated  here  is  
also  crucial  to  the  assessment  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change.  This  is  especially  the  case  
given  the  wide  variety  of  cases.  E ven  a  cursory  glance  at  past  instances  of  FIRC  and  other  
interventions  reinforces  the  notion  that  there  can  be  no  ‘one  size  fits  all’  approach  to  global  
injustices,  whether  they  involve  the  containment  of  militarily  aggressive  regimes  or  the  
violation  of  human  rights  by  citizens’  own  governments.  Almost  inevitably,  then,  every  
instance  of  regime  change  includes  different  motives  and  intentions.  After  all,  the  various  
discernable  motives  and  intentions  underlying  the  1990s  intervention  and  regime  imposition  in  
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  are  markedly  different  from  those  pertaining  to  the  2003  Iraq  War,  or  
from  the  intended  outcome  of  a  potential  intervention  in  the  Syrian  Civil  War  (cf.  Chapter  
VIII).  Several  taxonomies  have  been  proposed  to  reflect  the  variety  of  intentions  and  
approaches.  For  example,  reflecting  on  the  case  of  the  2003  Iraq  War,  Borneman  (2003:  32)  has  
suggested  three  general  “interpretations  of  regime  change  -  overthrowing  the  government,  
colonial  military  occupation,  and  caring  for  the  enemy”,  which  “have  been  employed  at  various  




Although  this  distinction  is  certainly  useful  in  recognising  interveners’  potentially  
diverging  ambitions  in  deposing  a  hostile  regime,  its  narrow  focus  on  the  Iraq  intervention  
likely  inhibits  its  translation  to  other  cases.  Conversely,  Willard-Foster  (2018)  has  chosen  to  put  
less  emphasis  on  actors’  intentions  and  has  proposed  a  straightforward  conceptual  distinction  
between  ‘full’  and  ‘partial’  regime  change  which  can  be  applied  to  various  cases.  The  latter  of  
these  “involves  removing  the  target  state’s  leader  or  top  policymakers,  whether  by  convincing  
regime  insiders  to  launch  a  coup  or  by  pressuring  the  leader  to  resign”  (idem:  8).  Clearly,  this  
conceptualisation,  too,  has  its  limits.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  exceedingly  broad  in  scope,  as  it  
aims  to  encompass  both  internal  and  external  attempts  at  changing  a  regime.  It  therefore  
neglects  the  critical  distinction  between  ‘direct’  and  ‘indirect’  regime  change.  What  is  more,  it  
is  likely  to  neglect  many  of  the  particular  challenges  of  military  action  which  is  highlighted  in  
the  Just  War  Tradition.  
  
As  a  consequence,  it  is  ultimately  helpful  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  intervener's  
ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  considerations,  respectively.  Thus,  when  discussing  actors  engaged  
in  regime  change  interventions,  we  must  take  into  account  the  following:  
  
● Their  ad  bellum  motives,  e.g.  defensive,  punitive  or  humanitarian  reasons  for  
intervention.  
  
● Their  post  bellum  intent,  in  the  form  of  a  ‘superficial’  and  ‘radical’  regime  change  
outcome.  
  
These  proposed  distinctions  can  in  principle  be  applied  to  any  case  of  regime  change.  However,  
they  should  not  be  understood  as  permanently  ‘fixed  categories’.  Rather,  they  are  ‘ideal  types’  
of  FIRC,  intended  to  simplify  the  complex  phenomena  they  describe.  Indeed,  real-life  
operations  have  a  tendency  to  exist  along  a  spectrum,  and  consequently  they  do  not  always  
entirely  match  the  abstract  parameters  of  the  taxonomy  proposed  here.  There  has  been,  and  
likely  will  be,  substantial  overlap  between  the  various  motives  and  intentions  attributed  to  
actors  which  ultimately  decides  much  of  the  ‘character’  of  a  regime  change  intervention. 45   
45  The  elements  suggested  above  can  of  course  occur  in  different  constellations.  A  particular  regime  change  attempt   
might  be  intended  to  be  superficial,  but  is  guided  by  humanitarian  motives.  Importantly,  this  does  not  mean  that  
other  motives  are  by  definition  excluded  from  the  intervener’s  actions,  and  any  intervention  will  be  propelled  by  
multiple  factors.  
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These  ‘types’  are  not  only  helpful  in  judging  actors’  ad  bellum  considerations,  however.  They  
also  directly  influence  our  assessment  of  post-FIRC  justice,  as  later  chapters  show.  The  
distinction  between  superficial  and  radical  change  also  prompts  the  question  whether  regimes’  
impermissible  actions  would  ultimately  determine  the  type  of  regime  imposition,  i.e.  whether,  
hypothetically,  relatively  minor  infractions  (disenfranchisement  which  stops  short  at  killing,  
perhaps)  would  result  in  only  a  superficial  regime  change,  whereas  more  extreme  violations  
would  lead  to  more  severe  ‘punishment’  in  the  form  of  radical  regime  change. 46   
  
However,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that  these  assumptions  are  not  necessarily  borne  out  in  the  
reality  of  recent  regime  change  wars.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  interveners’  motives  and  
intentions  favour  either  a  very  superficial  intervention  or  a  radical  regime  imposition,  but  
discourage  compromise.  Through  the  aforementioned  distinction  between  supposedly  
legitimate  and  illegitimate  regimes  which  has  become  a  major  element  of  the  liberal  
interventionist  discourse  of  the  past  decades,  interveners  feel  the  need  to  ‘validate’  the  justice  
of  their  motives.  Especially  in  the  context  of  the  existential  ‘War  on  Terror’,  compromise  itself  
is  seen  as  making  unacceptable  concessions.  Thus,  in  ostensibly  defending  global  security  and  
‘democratising’  authoritarian  states,  the  majority  of  the  pivotal  post-Cold  War  regime  change  
operations  have  aimed  at  a  refusal  to  accept  anything  less  than  radical  transformation  of  the  
targeted  state.  As  will  be  argued  later  on  (Chapter  VII),  the  radical  approach  to  regime  change  
is  often  thought  to  have  a  higher  probability  of  success,  but  instead  has  the  potential  to  create  a  
highly  volatile  situation.  This  has  the  adverse  effect  of  ultimately  worsening  the  global  security  
situation  and  necessitating  interveners’  long-term  involvement  in  stabilising  the  target  state.   
  
  
46  Though  this  correlation  is  evidently  ‘tricky’  to  determine,  tying  the  type  of  regime  change  to  the  transgressions  of   
a  regime  would  seem  plausible  at  first  sight,  especially  if  the  actions  are  due  to  the  regime’s  ideological  nature.  For  
instance,  we  might  consider  the  case  of  the  German  ‘Third  Reich’.  Due  to  the  severity  and  ideological  nature  of  the  
regime’s  transgressions,  a  more  ‘superficial’  postwar  settlement  in  which  the  upper  echelons  of  the  state  and  ruling  
party  would  have  been  deposed,  but  the  broad  base  of  National  Socialist  institutions  would  have  been  left  in  place,  
seems  morally  unacceptable  on  an  intuitive  level.  On  the  other  hand,  other  cases  might  see  a  superficial  regime  
change  followed  by  a  substantial  compromise  between  the  victors  and  the  remnants  of  the  old  regime.  Whether  the  
illicit  nature  of  a  state’s  actions  is  linked  to  the  severity  of  the  imposition  prompts  questions  about  proportionality.  
However,  as  with  most  Just  War  requirements,  there  are  no  strict  guidelines  which  would  lend  themselves  to  some  
sort  of  ‘calculation’  of  proportionality.  
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Before  we  can  examine  the  outcome  of  interventions,  ad  bellum  considerations  must  
first  be  discussed.  The  multifaceted  nature  of  reasoning  leading  to  FIRC  can  be  highlighted  by  
assessing  the  impact  of  interveners’  varying  motives  in  pursuing  the  intended  outcome  in  a  
particular  case:  the  radical  regime  change  in  Iraq.  
4.2  Iraq:  Disparate  Motives  and  Radical  Intentions  
  
Without  a  doubt,  the  FIRC  intervention  in  Iraq  marks  a  turning  point,  both  politically  and  in  the  
reemergence  of  Just  War  concerns.  The  initial  post-Cold  War  “optimism  of  the  early  1990s  that  
world  politics  was  being  remade,  and  that  the  threat  of  serious  conflict  was  receding,  vanished  
along  with  the  twin  towers  that  were  so  much  a  symbol  of  that  world”,  as  Rengger  has  aptly  
stated  (2005:  143).  The  subsequent  regime  change  wars  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  constituted  a  
major  part  of  the  ‘Global  War  on  Terror’  and  have  since  come  to  be  considered  to  be  amongst  
the  most  prominent  (and  indeed  the  most  controversial)  military  operations  of  the  past  decades.  
This  notoriety  stems  from  the  open  admission  that  regime  change  was  the  intent  of  military  
action,  but  also  from  a  particularly  dubious  part  of  post-9/11  rhetoric,  namely  the  conflation  of  
states’  authoritarian  systems  of  governance  with  a  tacit  or  even  overt  support  of  international 
terrorism.  
  
Ultimately,  whether  through  pointing  at  offensive  capabilities  or  associations  with  
global  terror  groups,  the  interveners  sought  to  discredit  regimes  by  presenting  them  as  posing  a  
direct  threat  to  the  security  of  the  United  States  and  indeed  to  the  wider  world.  Whereas  the  
political  situation  in  Afghanistan  was  highlighted  as  an  ‘indirect’  threat  due  to  its  Taliban  
regime  knowingly  harbouring  international  terrorists,  the  Iraqi  regime  was  additionally  
depicted  as  a  more  ‘traditional’  direct  threat  to  global  security.  Ultimately,  it  was  accused  of  
both  acting  as  a  state  sponsor  of  terror  and  being  in  possession  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  
(e.g.  G.W.  Bush  2002  [a]).  In  spite  of  worldwide  protests,  and  indeed  in  the  absence  of  UN  
Security  Council  authorisation,  the  United  States,  together  with  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia,  
and  Poland,  launched  an  invasion  of  Iraq  in  March  2003.  Baghdad  had  fallen  in  April,  and  the  
offensive,  also  known  as  ‘Operation  Iraqi  Freedom’,  had  come  to  an  end  within  little  over  a  
month.  To  be  sure,  the  “(il)legality  of  the  invasion,  the  motivations  behind  it,  the  conduct  of  
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operations  in  terms  of  civilian  casualties,  the  political  ramifications  for  the  states  involved  in  
the  coalition,  the  fate  and  state  of  the  United  Nations,  the  impact  on  terrorism  and  
anti-proliferation  and  a  host  of  other  issues  could,  and  have  been,  discussed”  (Williams  &  
Roach  2006:  2).  Many  Just  War  scholars,  including  Michael  Walzer  himself  (e.g.  2002;  2004),  
have  come  to  differing  verdicts  on  the  overall  ‘justice’  (or  more  often,  the  lack  thereof)  of  the  
conflict.  As  a  result,  the  following  paragraphs  do  not  seek  to  provide  an  in-depth  overview  of  
the  military  aspect  of  the  conflict  or  of  its  protracted  aftermath,  but  focuses  on  highlighting  the 
motives  for  the  intervention’s  culmination  in  a  ‘radical  regime  change’.   
  
For  instance,  in  the  2002  ‘Authorisation  for  Use  of  Military  Force  Against  Iraq  
Resolution’,  the  United  States  offered  a  range  of  reasons  to  engage  in  the  war,  all  of  which  
reflect  the  American  self-understanding  of  its  leading  position  in  the  liberal  world  order.  Porter  
writes  that   
  
the  invasion  was  supposed  to  be  a  stride  towards  the  spread  of  free  markets  and  
democracy,  and  the  emancipation  of  the  Greater  Middle  East,  to  correct  the  conditions  
that  spawned  security  threats.  The  Congressional  authorisation  of  force  included  
twenty-three  writs  justifying  Saddam’s  forcible  removal,  ranging  from  illicit  WMD  to  
sponsorship  of  terrorism,  human  rights  violations  and  genocide,  and  his  flouting  of  
international  accords  (2018:  335).   
  
Th ese  underlying  motivations  for  intervention  in  Iraq  are  best  understood  as  ‘security-based’  
and  ‘humanitarian’  motives. 47  The  United  States’  obvious  military  superiority  notwithstanding,   
Iraq  was  primarily  claimed  to  pose  a  significant  and  unacceptable  future  threat  to  national  and  
regional  security,  and  ultimately  to  the  global  order  as  a  whole.  US  Secretary  of  State  Colin  
Powell  had  even  claimed  that  Saddam  Hussein  “is  determined  to  get  his  hands  on  a  nuclear  
bomb.  He  is  so  determined  that  he  has  made  repeated  covert  attempts  to  acquire  
high-specification  aluminum  tubes  from  11  different  countries”,  at  the  same  time  adding  that  
47  Freedman  (2005:  93)  has  claimed  that  “[t]hree  different  types  of  arguments  were  used  to  justify  the  2003  Iraq  War.   
The  first  was  based  on  the  requirements  of  national  security.  Iraq  was  believed  to  be  developing  deadly  weapons  
which  it  might  use  against  neighbouring  states  or  hand  over  to  terrorist  groups  such  as  al-Qaeda.  A  second  argument  
was  based  on  international  security.  Iraq  was  supposed  to  comply  with  a  series  of  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  
and  was  failing  to  do  so,  thereby  undermining  the  credibility  of  the  leading  international  institutions.  The  third  
argument  was  based  on  human  security.  The  Iraqi  people  had  suffered  too  long  under  a  tyrannical  regime  and  this  
was  an  opportunity  to  overthrow  it  and  replace  it  with  something  much  better.”  
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“Al  Qaeda  affiliates  based  in  Baghdad  now  coordinate  the  movement  of  people,  money,  and  
supplies  into  and  throughout  Iraq  for  his  network,  and  they  have  now  been  operating  freely  in  
the  capital”  (Powell  2003,  quoted  in  Pan  2005:  para.  4). 48  Saddam  Hussein’s  persistent  
obstruction  of  the  United  Nations’  weapons  inspectors  was,  in  turn,  highlighted  as  a  further  
strong  indication  for  the  presence  of  unspecified  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Given  their  
potential  presence,  the  security-based  reasoning  underlying  the  decision  to  intervene  militarily  
was  in  accord  with  a  more  ‘traditional’  ad  bellum  conception  of  self-defence  (cf.  Chapter  V).   
  
Although  it  is  unclear  whether  it  was  aware  of  the  serious  consequences  of  its  actions,  
he  Iraqi  regime’s  stubborn  persistence  in  defying  both  the  United  States  and  the  United  Nations  
gave  rise  to  an  increasing  sense  of  liability  to  intervention.  US  President  George  W.  Bush  
(2002[d]:  para.  20-21)  had  taken  care  to  emphasise  that  “this  is  a  regime  that  has  something  to  
hide  from  the  civilized  world.  States  like  these,  and  their  terrorist  allies,  constitute  an  axis  of  
evil,  arming  to  threaten  the  peace  of  the  world.  By  seeking  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  these  
regimes  pose  a  grave  and  growing  danger.”  This  generalised  sense  of  threat  was  further  
amplified  by  the  Ba’athist  regime’s  supposedly  unpredictable  character.  As  Walzer  confirms,   
  
all  the  reasons  suggested  the  need,  this  time,  to  march  on  Baghdad  and  replace  the 
Baathist  regime.  The  most  important  reason  was  the  danger  that  Iraq  possessed,  or  in  
the  near  future  would  be  capable  of  producing,  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  But  the  
fact  that  France  (say)  possessed  weapons  of  mass  destruction  was  never  imagined  as  an  
occasion  for  war.  It  was  the  character  of  its  regime  that  made  Iraq  dangerous:  the  U.S.  
government  claimed  that  Saddam's  was  an  inherently  aggressive  and  an  inherently  
murderous  regime  (2006  [b]:  105).  
   
The  interveners  ultimately  conflated  a  legal  argument  (the  alleged  illicit  possession  of  WMD)  
with  a  moral  one  (an  unpredictable,  oppressive,  and  evil  ‘rogue’  regime  willing  to  use  them).  
Faced  with  this  purported  menace,  the  United  States  and  its  allies  were  in  agreement  “that  the  
old  policy  of  containment  was  no  longer  adequate  to  meet  the  security  challenges  of  the  
twenty-first  century”  (Snyder  2003:  653).  In  the  logic  underlying  the  intervention,  the  agents  
48  Similarly,  “the  UK  government  has  seemed  so  keen  to  make  it  clear  that  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq  was  in  the   
category  of  outlaw  and  failed  states,  that  it  was  portrayed  as  being  both  a  highly  authoritarian  state  bent  on  the  
acquisition  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  [...]  and  a  state  where  lawlessness  would  see  such  WMD  proliferate  to  
Al  Qaeda  or  other  Islamic  fundamentalist  trans-national  terrorist  organisations”  (Williams  &  Roach  2006:14).   
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acting  on  behalf  of  the  ‘civilised  world’  cannot  compromise  in  defence  of  its  norms.  Thus,  the  
end  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  rule  was  increasingly  seen  as  the  only  suitable  outcome.  In  light  of  
the  regime’s  characterisation  as  a  rogue,  irrational,  and  inherently  violent  actor,  the  allied  
forces  sought  to  make  it  clear  that  only  the  most  radical  form  of  regime  change  would  suffice  
in  response.  When  it  was  established  after  the  invasion  that  Iraq’s  military  capability  was  less  
advanced  than  had  initially  been  claimed,  and  the  suspected  large  caches  of  Weapons  of  Mass  
Destruction  did  not  in  fact  exist  (e.g.  Pilger  2004;  Betts  2007),  Roth  confirms  that  “the  Bush  
administration’s  principal  justifications  for  the  war  lost  much  of  their  force.  No  weapons  of  
mass  destruction  were  ever  found.  No  significant  pre-war  link  with  international  terrorism  was  
ever  discovered”  (2006:  84).   
  
However,  other,  secondary,  justifications  for  intervention  also  influenced  the  intended  
radical  regime  change  outcome.  Both  prior  to  the  intervention  and  in  its  aftermath,  the  
administration  also  claimed  to  act  out  of  a  genuine  concern  for  justice  and  the  protection  of  
human  rights.  However,  in  the  absence  of  both  “a  humanitarian  crisis  in  Iraq  of  the  sort  that  
had  existed  in  places  such  as  former  Yugoslavia,  Somalia,  Rwanda  and  East  Timor  where  the  
language  of  humanitarian  intervention  was  deployed”  (Williams  &  Roach  2006:  6),  or  
alternatively  a  credible  military  threat,  the  interveners  had  to  frame  their  mission  in  another  
way  in  order  to  justify  attacking  a  sovereign  (and  at  that  time,  non-aggressive)  state. As  has  
been  noted  by  Falk  (2004:  43),  for  example,  a  
  
possible  argument  for  humanitarian  intervention  existed,  but  it  was  far  weaker  than  in  
prior  years,  especially  during  the  early  1990s;  there  was  no  current  urgency,  the  
interventionists  had  previously  supported  the  Baghdad  regime  during  its  period  of  worst  
atrocities,  and  there  were  grounds  to  suspect  that  humanitarianism  was  invoked  as  a  
pretense  designed  to  hide  the  pursuit  of  oil  and  the  military  establishment  of  regional  
control.  When  the  war  in  Iraq  ensued  over  the  opposition  of  the  UN  Security  Council  
and  the  validating  claim  of  removing  improperly  possessed  weapons  of  mass  
destruction  soured,  the  Bush  administration  emphasized  the  liberating  impact  of  its  
intervention.  
  
The  President  himself  had  stated  that  “some  worry  that  a  change  of  leadership  in  Iraq  could  
create  instability  and  make  the  situation  worse.  The  situation  could  hardly  get  worse  for  world  
security  and  for  the  people  of  Iraq.”  Indeed,  he  continued,  “the  lives  of  Iraqi  citizens  would  
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improve  dramatically  if  Saddam  Hussein  were  no  longer  in  power,  just  as  the  lives  of  
Afghanistan's  citizens  improved  after  the  Taliban”  (Bush  2002  [a]).  Thus,  by  highlighting  the  
generally  repressive  and  authoritarian  nature  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  rule,  “both  US  President  
George  Bush  and  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  sought  to  justify  their  military  operations  
in  Iraq  by  arguing  that  the  eventual  result  would  be  to  trigger  a  new  surge  of  democratization  in  
what  was  referred  to  as  the  ‘Greater  Middle  East’”  (Whitehead  2009:  220).  Indeed,  as  the  
Prime  Minister  (2003;  quoted  in  Porter  2018:  344)  had  written  to  the  American  president,  
‘‘[o]ur  fundamental  goal  is  to  spread  our  goals  of  freedom,  democracy,  tolerance  and  the  rule  of  
law.  Though  Iraq’s  WMD  is  the  immediate  justification  for  action,  ridding  Iraq  of  Saddam  is  
the  real  prize.”  
  
The  above  outline  of  justifications  for  the  invasion  highlights  the  lack  of  one  single,  
specific  motive  for  the  war,  but  also  that  the  relative  weight  accorded  to  the  disparate  ad  bellum 
motives  for  intervention  varied  as  the  intervention  developed.  Though  multifaceted,  the  
intervention  illustrates  the  underlying  tensions  identified  earlier,  in  particular  the  uneasy  
relation  between  sovereignty,  security,  and  human  rights  within  the  current  World  Order.  The  
wide  range  of  motives  at  the  root  of  the  intervention  inevitably  influenced  its  ultimate  intent ,  
namely  a  radical  change  of  the  Iraqi  regime,  which  was  emphasised  as  being  the  only  option  
remaining  to  the  international  community.  In  the  end,  the  regime  change  in  Iraq  also  reflected  
the  allied  leaders’  view  of  their  countries’  role  in  maintaining  a  liberal  global  order.  Indeed,  the  
intervention  echoes  the  assumptions  of  Blair’s  ‘doctrine  of  the  international  community’  (cf.  
Chapter  II),  but  more  importantly  aligns  with  those  of  the  so-called  ‘Bush  Doctrine’.   
  
This  Bush  Doctrine  should  be  understood  as  an  evolution  of  the  earlier  ‘Clinton  
Doctrine’.  This,  too,  was  used  in  justifying  armed  interventions,  but  has  ultimately  been  
described  as  “a  hotchpotch:  not  strategic  realism,  not  just  war,  not  liberal  internationalism.  It 
established  no  clear  grounds  for  humanitarian  intervention  or  political  rescue,  offering  instead  a  
melange  of  ideas  and  desiderata  that  were  so  murky  it  was  nearly  impossible  to  glean  from  it  
any  clarity  for  either  intervening  or  refraining  from  intervening  in  situations  of  humanitarian  
catastrophe”  (Elshtain  2001:  9).  Conversely,  in  the  wake  of  the  9/11  attacks,  G.  W.  Bush’s  
understanding  of  US  power  moved  away  from  concerns  about  ‘humanitarian  catastrophe’  to  
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those  more  aligned  with  global  security  and  the  beneficial  results  of  American  global  power  
projection.  The  Bush  Doctrine  has  consequently  been  described  as  “an  idealistic  approach  to  
international  relations  that  imagines  a  world  transformed  by  the  promise  of  democracy  and  that  
sees  military  force  as  an  appropriate  means  to  utilize  in  pursuit  of  this  goal”  (Fiala  2007  [a]:  
28).   
  
Indeed,  in  the  Iraq  War’s  aftermath ,  Bush  had  claimed  that  ‘‘the  survival  of  liberty  in  
our  land  increasingly  depends  on  the  success  of  liberty  in  other  lands.  The  best  hope  for  peace  
in  our  world  is  the  expansion  of  freedom  in  all  the  world.  America’s  vital  interests  and  our  
deepest  beliefs  are  now  one’’  (Bush  2005,  quoted  in  Porter  2018:  335).  It  is  difficult  to  
overstate  the  significance  of  this  understanding.  Bush’s  statement  indicates  that  even  in  the  
absence  of  military  aggression  or  humanitarian  emergencies,  the  unilateral  recourse  to  regime  
change  against  governments  whose  performance  is  deemed  repressive,  illegal  or  dangerous,  has  
become  a  legitimate  cause  for  a  ‘just’  war.  Consequently,  the  Bush  Doctrine  even  “uses  the  
language  of  the  just  war  tradition  in  its  defence  of  an  expanded  use  of  warfare  as  a  means  for  
pre-empting  emerging  threats  and  disseminating  freedom  and  democracy”  (Fiala  2007  [a]:  
28-29).  Thus,  it  has  increasingly  come  to  adapt  the  ad  bellum  requirements  as  justifications  for,  
rather  than  as  restraints  on,  warfare.  As  Fiala  (idem:  31)  has  further  pointed  out,  “the  larger  
worry  is  that  the  rhetoric  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  (and  of  American  foreign  policy  in  general)  can  
lead  us  to  think  that  military  intervention  in  pursuit  of  regime  change  (in  the  absence  of  
egregious  human  rights  violations)  is  justifiable.”  
  
In  spite  of  its  common  association  with  the  Bush  administration,  the  doctrine’s 
elemental  notions  remain  an  essential  part  of  the  United  States’  current  self-understanding  as  
the  leader  of  the  liberal  order.  These  assumptions  continue  to  influence  successive  
administrations.  It  has  been  noted  that  initially,  the  Obama  Presidency  ostensibly  sought  to  
deviate  from  the  Bush  administration's  foreign  policy,  and  “US  foreign  policy  rhetoric  was  
marked  by  a  shift  away  from  Bush-era  crusading  both  as  Obama  recognised  the  material  limits  
91  
to  US  power  and  as  he  espoused  less  a  utopian  vision  of  human  perfectibility  than  a  more  
pragmatic  stress  on  human  imperfections”  (Widmaier  &  Glanville  2015:  376). 49    
Nonetheless,  while  the  new  administration  appeared  less  willing  to  wage  war  in  the  
name  of  democracy  and  ‘freedom’,  it  ultimately  retained  many  of  its  predecessor's  convictions  
about  America’s  role  in  the  world  as  well  as  its  instrumentalisation  of  Just  War  rhetoric.  For  
instance,  it  has  been  noted  that  “President  Obama’s  much-acclaimed  Nobel  Peace  Prize  address  
referred  to  the  notion  of  just  war,  albeit  in  a  truncated  version.  Placing  the  idea  in  the  context  of  
a  developmental  account  of  humanity’s  experience  with  armed  force,  the  president  explained  
the  concept  as  requiring  that  certain  conditions  be  met;  these  serve  to  distinguish  between  just  
and  unjust  fighting”  (Kelsay  2013:  268).  Indeed,  Wester  claims  that  the  “decision-making  
process  within  the  United  States  administration  shows  that,  ultimately,  President  Obama  was  
largely  guided  by  the  principles  of  the  ‘just  war’”  (Wester  2020:  185).   
  
Successive  US  Presidents’  adoption  of  the  Just  War  language  merely  reinforces  
concerns  that  the  theory  has  been  appropriated  to  lend  a  veneer  of  moral  justification  to  
controversial  interventions.  Rather  than  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Theory’s  precepts,  this  is  
more  likely  due  to  a  wilful  appropriation  of  the  doctrine  in  support,  rather  than  limitation,  of  
warfare.  Consequently,  the  theory’s  inclusion  in  interveners’  rhetoric  ultimately  rings  hollow  to  
those  with  a  deeper  concern  for  the  theory's  application.  Indeed,  in  spite  of  his  earlier  calls  for  a  
more  restrained  and  multilateral  foreign  policy,  and  his  reference  to  the  ideals  of  the  Just  War,  
the  US  President  soon  “shifted  back  to  adopt  a  more  assertive  stance  on  democracy  and  
humanitarian  concerns”  (Widmaier  &  Glanville  2015:  377)  which  directly  influenced  the  
United  States’  role  in  the  2011  intervention  and  regime  change  in  Libya,  both  in  its  role  as  
NATO’s  leading  power  and  in  its  individual  contribution  to  NATO’s  military  efforts.   
  
As  the  following  pages  aim  to  show,  the  superficial  nature  of  the  regime  change  in  
Libya  was  likely  influenced  by  the  desire  to  avoid  the  complications  which  interveners  
49  Walldorf  (2019:  194)  illustrates  the  more  restrained  approach  of  the  Obama  administration  by  pointing  out  that  “at   
the  time  of  the  Libyan  regime  crisis,  the  United  States  still  had  approximately  150,000  troops  in  Iraq  and  
Afghanistan  -  a  far  smaller  number  of  overseas  deployed  personnel  than  in  2003  when  the  Iraq  War  started.”  Of  
course,  this  partial  withdrawal  should  not  be  understood  as  the  end  of  American  attempts  to  exert  its  influence  in  the  
Middle  East  and  the  wider  world.  
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encountered  in  both  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  However,  in  intervening,  “NATO’s  ulterior  motives  
had  a  detrimental  effect  on  the  intentions  behind  NATO’s  use  of  force”  (Bachman  2015:  57). 50   
4.3  Libya:  From  Humanitarian  Intervention  to  Regime  Change  
  
In  many  ways,  the  Libyan  intervention  had  been  unanticipated.  The  2003  overthrow  and  
replacement  of  Saddam  Hussein  had  demonstrated  to  the  world  that  the  traditional  principles  of  
non-intervention  were  no  longer  a  guarantor  of  regimes’  survival,  and  had  led  to  a  number  of  
authoritarian  regimes  seeking  to  improve  their  relations  with  the  United  States  and  its  allies.  
This  was  the  case  for  Libya,  where  Colonel  Muammar  Gadaffi  had  been  holding  on  to  power  
for  several  decades,  defying  both  external  and  internal  pressures  (Zoubir  2006).  Davidson  
(2017:  96)  writes  that  “[d]espite  the  failed  plots  to  remove  him  and  the  apparent  
self-sufficiency  afforded  by  Tripoli’s  oil  wealth,  by  the  early  2000s  Muammar  Qadhafi  had  
tried  to  improve  his  relations  with  the  Western  powers”  both  economically  and  politically.  
Subsequent  to  the  events  of  9/11,  Libya  had  (unlike  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq)  attempted  to  
regain  a  role  in  the  US-dominated  order  after  years  of  marginalisation.  Presumably  as  a  result  
of  Hussein’s  toppling,  Gadaffi  had  also  given  up  on  pursuing  Libya’s  Weapons  of  Mass  
Destruction  programme.  At  the  time,  these  actions  had  even  prompted  Blair  (2003;  CNN)  to  
state  that  “ Libya's  actions  entitle  it  to  rejoin  the  international  community.” 51   
  
However,  this  process  of  rapprochement  was  brought  to  an  abrupt  halt  in  the  succession  
of  events  affecting  the  MENA  region  which  have  since  come  to  be  described  as  the  ‘Arab  
Spring’.  Gaddafi’s  forceful  resistance  to  domestic  calls  for  his  removal  changed  the  perception  
of  Libya  from  a  relatively  stable  (albeit  repressive)  state  to  one  of  a  borderline  anarchic  
country.  Once  the  clashes  between  regime  loyalists  and  rebel  factions  intensified,  and  mass  
slaughter  seemed  imminent,  the  rapidly  worsening  situation  prompted  calls  for  intervention  and  
50  In  part,  it  has  been  argued  that  President  Obama  ultimately  chose  to  support  intervention  because  he  “worried  that   
inaction  might  kill  the  Arab  Spring  uprisings  as  well  as  hurt  U.S.  credibility  and  his  own  reputation  given  his  
promises  about  defending  human  rights”  (Walldorf  2019:  191).  
  
51  At  the  same  time,  in  spite  of  the  rhetoric  about  improved  relations,  the  “regime  continued  to  be  blamed  for  a  1984   
gun  attack  on  demonstrators  outside  its  London  embassy  that  had  led  to  the  death  of  British  policewoman  Yvonne  
Fletcher,  and  of  course  for  the  downing  of  Pan  Am  Flight  103  over  Lockerbie,  Scotland,  in  1988”  (Davidson  2017:  
97).  It  is  not  unlikely  that  these  grievances  played  at  least  some  role  in  British  Prime  Minister  David  Cameron’s  
support  for  the  2011  intervention.  
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increased  pressure  on  the  international  community  to  take  military  action  in  order  to  prevent  
further  civilian  casualties.  W hile  it  did  not  call  for  forcible  regime  change,  UNSC  Resolution  
1973,  which  authorised  military  intervention  in  the  form  of  a  no-fly  zone,  is  notable  as  “the  
first  time  that  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  explicitly  mandated  the  use  of  force  against 
a  functioning  state  to  prevent  imminent  atrocity  crimes”  (Brockmeier  et  al .  2016:  113).  
  
While  this  has  set  an  important  precedent  for  future  interventions, 52  it  is  also  notable  as   
the  first  time  that  intervention  was  widely  seen  as  occurring  within  the  context  of  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect.  This  arguably  facilitated  deliberations  in  the  Security  Council:  
Booth-Walling  has  argued  that  “[b]y  appealing  to  sovereignty  as  responsibility  and  locating  
sovereign  authority  in  the  Libyan  people,  Security  Council  members  could  defend  the  
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Libyan  state  while  simultaneously  protecting  the  
human  rights  of  the  Libyan  population”  (2015:  411).  What  is  more,  this  relatively  rare  
agreement  in  the  Security  Council,  especially  on  something  as  momentous  as  armed  foreign  
intervention,  was  aided  by  “the  fact  that  relevant  regional  organizations,  in  particular  the  
League  of  Arab  States,  had  consented  to,  indeed  appealed  for,  the  adoption  of  such  a  
resolution.  In  this  instance  at  least,  skeptical  states  accepted  that  the  opposition  of  a  state  to  
interference  in  its  sovereign  affairs  could  be  trumped  by  the  approval  of  relevant  regional  
organizations”  (2013:  326).   
  
Undeniably,  many  of  the  early  motives  underlying  the  military  intervention  in  Libya  
seemingly  conformed  to  the  key  requirements  of  the  R2P  and  Just  War  principles  more  
generally:  the  military  action  had  a  just  cause  in  acting  as  a  last  resort  to  protect  innocent  
civilians,  the  establishment  of  no-fly  zones  seemed  to  be  proportional  to  the  threat,  and,  given  
its  Security  Council  authorisation,  intervening  states  possessed  an  additional  layer  of  right  
authority .  All  in  all,  neither  the  wording  of  the  UNSC  resolution  nor  other  leading  states  openly  
supported  regime  change  beyond  the  immediate  intervention.  President  Obama  had  stated  that  
“there  is  no  question  that  Libya  –  and  the  world  –  will  be  better  off  with  Gaddafi  out  of  power.  
I,  along  with  many  other  world  leaders,  have  embraced  that  goal,  and  will  actively  pursue  it  
52  However,  there  are  other  explanations  for  the  Security  Council’s  acquiescence.  Thus,  Walzer  notes  that  “Russia   
and  China,  who  opposed  the  intervention,  abstained  on  the  final  Security  Council  vote,  perhaps  because  they  can’t  
imagine  an  outcome  that  better  suits  their  interests  in  the  Middle  East  and  Africa”  (2011  [b]:  para.  3).  
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through  non-military  means.  But  broadening  our  military  mission  to  include  regime  change  
would  be  a  mistake”  (quoted  in  Hendin  2011:  para.  9).  
  
The  NATO-led  intervention  ostensibly  sought  to  prevent  Gadaffi’s  forces  from  taking  
the  embattled  rebel-held  city  of  Benghazi  (Kuperman  2013).  To  be  sure,  an  eventual  regime  
victory  would  likely  have  cost  many  innocent  civilian  lives,  as  Gadaffi  had  explicitly  
threatened  to  show  no  mercy  to  the  insurgents  defying  his  continued  rule  (Tharoor  2011).  As  
Lang  affirms  (2016:  296)  “the  reasons  for  the  resolution  are  many,  but  perhaps  the  one  that  
galvanized  members  of  the  international  community  to  act  was  the  speech  by  Qaddafi  on  
February  22,  2011,  in  which  he  described  the  rebels  as  ‘cockroaches’  and  said  that  those  
resisting  his  regime  should  be  hunted  from  house  to  house.  It  would  seem  clear  that  one  of  the  
reasons  for  the  intervention  was  to  punish  Qaddafi  for  such  statements  and  for  his  previous  
behaviour.”  Of  course,  as  has  been  noted  previously,  the  view  of  military  action  as  punishment  
is  controversial  but  not  new, 53  and  an  underlying  punitive  motive  seemed  to  be  at  least  tacitly   
accepted  by  the  coalition  of  states  engaged  in  the  intervention.  All  things  considered,  the  
intervention  in  Libya  initially  seemed  to  be  something  of  a  mirror  image  of  the  intervention  in 
Iraq:  it  had  the  broad  backing  of  the  United  Nations  and  regional  organisations,  it  was  carried  
out  in  response  to  a  credible  threat,  and  it  did  not  appear  to  envisage  the  toppling  of  the  regime.   
  
As  the  chapter  has  discussed  earlier,  the  distinction  between  motive  and  intention  is  
crucial  in  improving  our  understanding  of  cases  of  FIRC.  Whereas  the  various  motives  
underpinning  the  Libyan  intervention  appeared  fairly  straightforward,  the  interveners’  overall  
intentions  remained  unclear.  Walzer  himself  (2011  [b]:  para.  1)  had  noted  at  the  time  that  “there  
are  so  many  things  wrong  with  the  Libyan  intervention  that  it  is  hard  to  know  where  to  begin” 
He  argued  that,  ultimately,  
  
it  is  radically  unclear  what  the  purpose  of  the  intervention  is—there  is  no  endgame,  as  a  
U.S.  official  told  reporters.  Is  the  goal  to  rescue  a  failed  rebellion,  turn  things  around,  
53  As  (Boyle  2011:  148)  states,  “ Thomas  Aquinas,  citing  Augustine,  affirms  the  necessity  for  a  just  cause,  and  in   
doing  so  provides  an  implicit  definition:  a  just  cause  is  required,  namely  that  those  who  are  attacked,  should  be  
attacked  because  they  deserve  it  on  account  of  some  fault.  Wherefore  Augustine  says  (QQ.  in  Heptateuchum,  Q10,  
super  Jos.):  ‘A  just  war  is  wont  to  be  described  as  one  that  avenges  wrongs,  when  a  nation  or  state  has  to  be  
punished,  for  refusing  to  make  amends  for  the  wrongs  inflicted  by  its  subjects,  or  to  restore  what  it  has  seized  
unjustly’  [Aquinas  1947:  13590-60].”  
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use  Western  armies  to  do  what  the  rebels  couldn’t  do  themselves:  overthrow  Qaddafi?  
Or  is  it  just  to  keep  the  fighting  going  for  as  long  as  possible,  in  the  hope  that  the  
rebellion  will  catch  fire,  and  Libyans  will  get  rid  of  the  Qaddafi  regime  by  themselves?  
Or  is  it  just  to  achieve  a  cease-fire,  which  would  leave  Qaddafi  in  control  of  most  of  the  
country  and  probably  more  than  willing  to  bide  his  time?  (idem:  para.  2  ).  
  
In  spite  of  the  interveners’  declared  goal  of  establishing  no-fly  zones  for  civilian  protection,  
and  the  ostensible  rejection  of  any  ulterior  FIRC,  Davidson  notes  that  “[a]lmost  as  soon  as  the  
dust  had  settled  after  the  first  NATO  strikes,  evidence  began  to  mount  indicating  that  the  
participating  air  forces  had  little  intention  of  sticking  to  their  UN  mandate  of  enforcing  a  no-fly  
zone  and  protecting  civilians”  (2017:  108).  The  alliance’s  subsequent  involvement  indicates  
that,  contrary  to  the  writ  of  the  UN  Security  Council  resolution,  it  aimed  to  do  whatever  it  
could  to  support  rebel  advances  against  the  regime’s  forces.  By  the  time  that  several  states  had  
officially  expressed  their  growing  uneasiness  with  NATO’s  subsequent  role  in  bringing  about  
an  end  to  Gadaffi’s  long  reign,  the  alliance  had  openly  “ignored  the  restrictions  against  
targeting  Gaddafi  directly  in  a  transparent  effort  at  regime  change,  spurned  hints  of  any  
willingness  by  the  Gaddafi  regime  to  negotiate  a  ceasefire,  intervened  in  the  internal  civil  war,  
and  broke  the  UN’s  arms  embargo  by  supplying  weaponry  to  the  rebels'”,  as  Thakur  has  noted  
(2013:  70).  Indeed,  “[w]here  regime  change  fits  among  NATO’s  early  set  of  priorities  is  open  
to  debate;  however,  that  NATO  was  intent  on  regime  change  in  Libya  is  not”  (Bachman  2015:  
60).  Predictably,  the  alliance’s  overwhelming  military  force  proved  to  be  the  decisive  factor  in  
the  rebel’s  victory,  in  part  because,  as  Dunne  notes,  “when  coercive  power  is  unleashed  against  
a  regime  that  is  committing  atrocities,  it  is  impossible  to  discretely  isolate  means  and  ends;  
protecting  civilians  from  the  air  is  bound  to  alter  the  balance  of  forces  on  the  ground”  (2012:  
para.  12).  Having  lost  their  initial  air  superiority  over  rebel  fighters,  t he  initial  advance  of  
regime  troops  was  swiftly  halted  by  NATO  forces. 54  After  Gaddafi's  convoy  had  been  targeted   
by  airstrikes,  the  Colonel  was  eventually  ignominiously  killed  by  his  countrymen  near  the  town   
of  Sirte.  
54  Ronzitti  sums  up  the  military  engagement  as  follows:  “two  days  after  the  enactment  of  Resolution  1973,  the  US,   
UK  and  France  launched  the  first  strikes  against  Libya:  France  employed  its  air  force  in  operation  Harmattan ;  the  
US  and  UK  hit  Libyan  soil  with  missiles  from  ships  and  a  submarine  navigating  close  to  the  Libyan  coast.  
Subsequently,  military  operations  were  conducted  by  a  coalition  of  willing  participants  (operation  Odyssey  Dawn )  
and  within  a  few  days  these  were  brought  within  NATO,  since  a  number  of  European  countries  –  among  them  Italy  –  
did  not  want  France  and  the  UK  to  have  superior  roles  at  the  forefront  of  the  coalition”  (2011:  6).  
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On  the  whole,  the  intervention  in  Libya  not  only  differs  from  Iraq  in  the  nature  of  the  
motives  leading  to  intervention,  but  also  in  the  intended  post  bellum  outcome.  In  spite  of  
subsequent  ‘capacity  building’  efforts,  it  is  clear  that  NATO’s  initial  avoidance  of  ‘boots  on  the  
ground’  or  substantial  postwar  commitment  to  reforming  Libyan  politics  and  society  make  for  
what  has  earlier  been  termed  a  ‘superficial’  regime  change.  This  sets  the  case  apart  from  many 
of  the  other  post-Cold  War  regime  change  wars.  Both  the  rejection  of  the  radical  regime  change  
outcome  and  the  embrace  of  R2P  reflects  lessons  learned  by  Westerns  powers  from  regime  
change  in  Iraq  (Davidson  2017).  Walldorf  (2019:  193)  notes  that  the  appropriation  of  the  
rhetoric  of  the  R2P  did  not  only  facilitate  making  the  case  for  intervention,  but  that  the  
mission’s   
  
humanitarian  justification  limited  the  U.S.  role  and  responsibilities  in  ways  that  ensured  
the  United  States  did  not  ‘own’  Libya  once  Gaddafi  was  ousted.  Multilateralism  meant  
the  invasion  was  not  just  a  ‘U.S.  thing,’  while  the  limited  humanitarian  goal  (and  not  
regime  change)  meant  that  what  came  after  the  coalition  prevented  a  slaughter  in  Libya  
(i.e.  satisfied  the  mission’s  humanitarian  justification)  was  not  Washington’s  
responsibility,  either.  
  
The  experience  of  long-term  engagements  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  led  interveners  to  forego  
opportunities  to  impose  even  a  minimally  just  regime  (cf.  Chapter  VII).  However,  this  
reluctance  to  get  drawn  into  another  occupation  resulted  in  a  chaotic  post  bellum  situation.  
Whereas  Kuperman  states  that  in  the  intervention’s  immediate  aftermath,  “Western  media  and  
politicians  praised  the  intervention  as  a  humanitarian  success  for  averting  a  bloodbath  in  
Libya’s  second  largest  city  [...]”  (2013:  105),  he  is  nevertheless  forced  to  conclude  that  
  
[o]verall,  NATO  intervention  significantly  exacerbated  humanitarian  suffering  in  Libya  
[...],  as  well  as  security  threats  throughout  the  region.  The  only  apparent  benefit  is  that  
Libyans  have  been  able  to  vote  in  democratic  elections,  but  the  elected  government  has  
little  authority  in  a  country  now  controlled  by  dozens  of  tribal  and  Islamist  militias  
accountable  to  no  one  (idem:  132). 55    
55  Similarly,  Bachman  (2015:  63)  states  that  “while  celebrating  the  death  of  Qaddafi,  the  same  NATO  powers  that   
had  facilitated  the  rebels’  success  turned  their  backs  on  Libya.  Post-intervention  Libya  was  consumed  by  rampant  
lawlessness.  Some  of  the  most  horrific  human  rights  violations  were  perpetrated  by  the  rebels  against  both  real  and  
perceived  Qaddafi  loyalists.”  
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Hobson  (2016:  435)  largely  agrees  with  this  analysis,  and  writes  that  “[i]nitially  it  was  hailed  
as  a  great  success,  a  clear  example  of  how  the  international  community  could  act  decisively  to  
protect  civilians  and  use  force  for  humanitarian  ends.  Yet  it  was  not  long  before  such  optimistic  
prognoses  were  revised,  with  Libya  falling  into  anarchy,  split  apart  by  competing  militias.”  
This  had  famously  prompted  President  Obama  to  state  that  although  the  intervention  had  
“averted  large-scale  civilian  casualties,  we  prevented  what  almost  surely  would  have  been  a  
prolonged  and  bloody  civil  conflict.  And  despite  all  that,  Libya  is  a  mess”  (2016).  Other  
observers  have  agreed  with  this  sombre  assessment  in  subsequent  years.  Thus,  while  it  has  
rightly  been  claimed  that  the  intervention’s  controversy  should  not  obscure  “the  
democracy-affirming  nature  of  the  events  of  the  Arab  Spring  and  its  accompanying  grant  of  a  
new  dignity  to  the  peoples  of  this  region”  (Phillips  2012:  62),  it  is  ultimately  also  the  case  that  
“Gaddafi's  Libya  was  ghastly.  Post-Gadda  Libya  has  most  of  its  faults  plus  a  new  one  of  its  
own:  a  breakdown  of  security  and  therefore  of  the  nation”  (Lipsey  2016:  420).  Instead  of  the  
hoped-for  democratic  surge,  the  demise  of  the  authoritarian  government  precipitated  a  power  
vacuum  which  led  to  clashes  between  different  factions,  ultimately  leading  to  two  opposing  
governments  claiming  legitimacy,  a  sharp  rise  in  terrorist  activity,  and  further  civilian  casualties  
and  suffering  (Pedde  2017).  Only  more  recently,  with  the  efforts  of  the  UN-led  UNSMIL  
mission  and  repeated  attempts  to  stabilise  the  country,  a  tentative  peace  process,  including  a  
ceasefire  and  the  scheduling  of  further  elections,  has  perhaps  begun  to  put  an  end  to  the  Libyan  
Civil  War.   
  
In  the  context  of  this  thesis’  discussion  of  the  phenomenon,  the  Libyan  intervention  
highlights  key  challenges  of  contemporary  FIRC,  namely  the  potential  appropriation  of  
humanitarian  motives  for  regime  change,  and  the  unforeseen  and  potentially  catastrophic  
consequences  of  adequate  post  bellum  planning.  Accordingly,  it  prompts  important  questions  
about  interveners’  postwar  duties.  As  chapter  VII  will  argue,  after  removing  a  regime,  these  
responsibilities  likely  take  the  form  of  a  temporary  duty  of  care  for  the  affected  population,  
which  results  in  the  need  to  impose  at  least  a  rudimentary  ‘minimally  just’  regime.  In  addition,  
regime  change  in  Libya  exemplifies  the  invariably  slippery  slope  from  intervention  to  regime  
change,  especially  when  this  regime  change  involves  the  misappropriation  of  the  R2P  for  
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political  interests.  Ultimately,  the  NATO  alliance  “took  actions  that  were  unnecessary  or  
inconsistent  with  protecting  civilians,  but  which  fostered  regime  change”  (Kuperman  2013:  
113),  which  “poses  a  dilemma  for  those  who  support  the  principle  of  humanitarian  intervention  
but  oppose  foreign-imposed  regime  change,  given  that  one  tends  to  evolve  into  the  other”  
(idem:  136).  The  many  controversies  surrounding  past  interventions,  including  the  occasional  
‘misuse’  of  both  humanitarian  concerns  and  Just  War  rhetoric  in  pursuit  of  regime  change,  raise  
the  crucial  question  whether  a  threshold  can  be  established  beyond  which  not  only  intervention,  
but  regime  change  will  be  appropriate.  As  future  chapters  of  the  thesis  will  argue,  defining  the  
justified  reasons  for  initiating  regime  change  either  too  broadly  or  too  narrowly  leads  to  
different  objections,  but  is  nonetheless  fundamental  to  a  more  cogent  FIRC  framework.  
4.4  Conclusions  
This  chapter  has  added  to  the  thesis’  discussion  of  contemporary  liberal  FIRC  by  highlighting  
the  importance  of  distinguishing  between  regime  changers’  intent  and  motive.  It  has  argued  that  
this  distinction  can  help  to  understand  operations’  outcome  in  the  form  of  superficial  or  radical  
regime  change.  But  it  has  also  shown  that  the  notion  of  intent  is  one  of  the  most  important  but  
also  most  challenging  aspects  of  a  theoretical  assessment  of  FIRC.  This  has  been  illustrated  
with  reference  to  regime  change  missions  in  Iraq  and  Libya.  Whereas  in  Iraq  interveners  
attempted  a  radical  restructuring  of  the  country’s  political  and  economic  outlook,  the 
intervention  in  Libya  is  notable  for  an  attempt  at  regime  removal  without  a  subsequent  
imposition.  Ultimately,  both  of  these  controversial  interventions  illustrate  interveners’  often  
contradictory  motives  and  intentions,  both  of  which  “should  not  be  taken  at  face  value  and  
deserve  morally  critical  scrutiny”  (Biggar  2015:  336).  As  a  direct  consequence  of  these  
ambiguities,  each  intervention  is  inevitably  accompanied  by  wide-ranging  debates  surrounding  
the  nature  of  principles  which  ought  to  guide  the  conduct  of  regime  change  wars.  
  
In  further  building  on  these  debates,  the  thesis’  second  part  aims  to  establish  which  
elements  would  be  required  for  an  approximately  ‘just’  FIRC.  In  doing  so,  it  follows  the  logic  
underlying  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule  dismissed  earlier.  Although  the  quality  of  its  moral  guidance  
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is  questionable,  we  can  retain  its  basic  structure 56  in  the  form  of  asking  ‘when  is  action   
appropriate,  who  should  act,  and  what  should  the  result  look  like?’  
  
In  suggesting  answers  to  these  important  questions,  subsequent  chapters  argue  that  the  
evolving  view  of  the  intricate  relationship  between  states’  sovereignty  and  responsibility,  as  
well  as  the  global  moral  outrage  about  state-sanctioned  mass  killings,  indicate  that  there  are  
values,  in  this  case  the  fairly  straightforward  right  to  not  be  a  victim  of  such  killings,  which  
transcend  national  borders  and  whose  violation  should  spur  the  international  community  to  
action.  Consequently,  it  will  be  argued  that  a  clearer  focus  on  a  ‘thin’  conception  of  human  
rights  allows  for  near-universal  applicability  of  these  rights,  and  there  are  strong  peremptory 
norms  against  their  violation.  As  it  is  correct  that  “[p]osing  the  question  about  the  
permissibility  of  humanitarian  intervention  in  terms  of  what  is  legally  established  or  widely  
acceptable  within  what  Walzer  calls  the  common  moral  world  seems  unlikely  to  provide  an  
unambiguous  answer”  (Boyle  2006:  34),  the  next  chapter  aims  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  
competing  demands  of  sovereignty  and  human  rights.  It  does  this  by  setting  up  a  liability  -  
culpability  distinction.  It  argues  that  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  justified  only  in  the  
presence  of  a  ‘culpable’  regime.  In  other  words,  states  which  systematically  violate  their  
citizen’s  basic  rights  are  liable  to  have  their  sovereignty  violated  through  the  imposition  of  a 

















56  I.e.  something  is  ‘broken’  by  someone ,  which  subsequently  leads  to  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  aftermath  of   
the  act.  
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Part  II:  A  JWT  Approach  to  FIRC   
  
The  previous  chapter  concludes  the  first  section  of  the  thesis,  which  has  assessed  the  many  
challenges  raised  by  the  foreign-imposed  regime  change  phenomenon,  as  well  as  the  competing  
pressures  which  continue  to  affect  it  in  practice.  In  doing  so,  it  has  established  that  the  
sovereignty  paradigm’s  near-universal  recognition  reflects  its  essential  function  as  the  
foundation  of  the  contemporary  international  community.  This  status  is  reflected  in  the  
‘Westphalian’  tradition  of  non-intervention,  which  has  dominated  the  common  understanding  
of  international  relations  up  until  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  century.  As  has  been  noted,  in  the  
wake  of  the  Cold  War,  the  non-intervention  principle  has  increasingly  been  set  aside  both  in  
theory  and  in  practice,  illustrating  the  important  shift  from  a  notion  of  ‘sovereignty  as  
nonintervention’  to  one  of  ‘sovereignty  as  responsibility’,  which  has  become  an  important  part  
of  many  current  understandings  of  statehood.  Nonetheless,  in  spite  of  its  obvious  appeal,  this  
approach  is  complicated  by  numerous  uncertainties,  including  the  need  for  clarifying  which  
human  rights  can  be  defended  by  military  force  (i.e.  when  to  respond  to  internal  aggressions  by 
external  means),  or  whether  their  violation  can  open  up  the  possibility  for  potentially  justified  
regime  change  interventions,  especially  in  the  absence  of  externally  aggressive  behaviour  on  
the  part  of  states.  
  
Indeed,  the  past  decades  have  seen  a  notable  increase  in  intrastate  (as  opposed  to  
interstate)  war  and  conflict  (Lejbowicz  2000:  427),  and  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  “the  
overwhelming  majority  of  [...]  killings  were  perpetrated  outside  the  context  of  an  international  
or  even  civil  war”,  and  we  must  consequently  address  the  problem  that  “a  legal  and  moral  
system  which  begins  to  operate  only  after  the  first  tank  has  crashed  across  an  international  
border  leaves  much  to  be  desired.  If  the  [...]  victims  of  tyranny  who  are  not  victims  of  war  are  
not  to  be  merely  written  off,  then  an  application  of  the  just  war  doctrine  toward  the  change  of  
such  regimes  is  in  order  (Wingfield  2004:  114).  However,  both  the  liberal  FIRC  interventions  
of  the  past  thirty  years  and  notable  failures  to  act  underline  the  need  for  greater  clarity  on  the  
situations  which  would  warrant  a  regime  change  intervention.  Indeed,  when  states  do  act  in  
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removing  other  regimes,  they  almost  invariably  face  heavy  and  sustained  criticism  for  the  
accompanying  violation  of  sovereign  rights.   
  
This  essentially  leaves  the  permissibility  of  FIRC  at  a  point  of  some  uncertainty,  
especially  given  interventionist  actors’  claims  to  the  language  of  the  Just  War  in  justifying  their  
actions.  The  misunderstanding  and  misrepresentation  of  the  Just  War  doctrine,  coupled  with  the  
even  more  recent  misappropriation  of  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  discourse  has  inevitably  
resulted  in  an  increasing  distrust  of  Western  interventionism.  Thus,  Everett  notes  that  “the  use  
of  humanitarian  rhetoric  by  several  P5  powers  to  justify  regime  changes  and  other  interventions  
in  Iraq,  Libya  and  eastern  Europe  has  understandably  fueled  distrust  of  stated  humanitarian  
motives  for  military  operations”  (2019:  283).  At  the  same  time,  however,  we  should  note  that  
Just  War  Theorists  themselves  have  often  been  inconsistent  on  the  topic.  This  includes  Michael  
Walzer,  whose  treatment  of  the  regime  change  problem  in  Just  and  Unjust  Wars  is  
unsatisfactory.  Accordingly,  he  has  been  heavily  criticized  for  his  unresponsiveness  concerning  
military  intervention  against  tyrannical  governments.  Indeed,  “why  should  a  state  that  represses  
its  citizens  deserve  to  be  protected  from  external  intervention?  Would  it  not  be  better  to  relate  
the  entitlement  to  sovereignty  of  a  state  to  the  issue  of  whether  it  respects  the  rights  to  life  and  
liberty  of  its  citizens?”,  as  Moszkowicz  (2007:  287)  has  asked.   
  
Consequently,  the  second  part  of  the  thesis  sets  out  to  examine  whether  a  more  just  
foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  possible.  In  doing  so,  it  first  asks  in  which  cases  regime  
change  interventions  can  be  warranted,  before  addressing  the  actors  who  can  be  entrusted  with  
carrying  it  out.  Finally,  it  proposes  to  examine  the  ‘imposition’  part  of  regime  change.  In  doing  
so,  subsequent  chapters  engage  both  ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  considerations,  highlighting  
again  the  importance  of  the  traditional  Just  War  Theory’s  constituent  parts.   
  
In  justifying  the  use  of  force,  the  proponents  of  liberal  interventionism  and  regime  
change  have  on  occasion  appropriated  the  language  of  the  Just  War  Theory,  but  have  failed  to  
acknowledge  its  characteristically  cautious  and  critical  approach  to  armed  conflict.  Conversely,  
it  will  be  argued  that  an  actually  just  FIRC  mission  is  only  possible  in  very  rare  cases.  Namely,  
it  is  permissible  in  situations  where  states’  political  regimes  are  not  only  liable  to  intervention  
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(e.g  due  to  widespread  human  suffering),  they  also  must  be  deemed  culpable  for  intentionally  
and  consistently  abusing  human  rights  on  an  unacceptable  scale.  This  means  that  opportunities  
for  a  justifiable  regime  imposition  are  severely  restricted:  the  continued  importance  of  the  
sovereignty  principle,  as  well  as  the  inevitably  severe  consequences  of  warfare  mean  that  the  
‘bar’  that  is  set  for  liability  to  military  humanitarian  intervention  and  regime  change  must  be  
set  very  high  indeed.  Thus,  in  going  forward,  the  thesis  will  suggest  that  sovereign  states  can  
only  rightly  undergo  regime  change  in  cases  where  the  following  requirements  are  met:   
  
● The  regime  is  liable  to  intervention,  i.e.  it  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  fulfil  its  ‘duty  of  
care’  for  its  inhabitants.  
  
● The  regime  is  culpable,  i.e.  it  acts  with  the  manifest  intent  to  harm  large  numbers  of  its  
own  citizens,  or  it  foresees  that  its  actions  will  lead  to  widespread  suffering.  
  
● This  large-scale  threat  to  life  is  either  already  ongoing  or  imminent.  
  
● The  war  is  roughly  proportional  to  the  harm  inflicted,  i.e.  military  intervention  will  not  
foreseeably  make  the  situation  worse  for  civilians .  
  
In  elaborating  on  these  requirements,  the  following  chapters  address  the  requirements  of  just  
cause,  right  intention,  and  legitimate  authority.  It  will  be  argued  that  states’  responsibility  is  
accompanied  by  moral  duties  relating  both  to  the  state  itself  and  to  its  relation  with  its  
inhabitants,  which  in  turn  affects  its  legitimacy  as  an  international  actor.  Indeed,  contemporary  
“ notions  of  international  legitimacy  [...]  are  not  within  the  control  of  individual  agents”,  as  
Wheeler  has  stated  (2002:  6) ,  but  are  in  fact  determined  by  the  contemporary  global  order  
within  which  states  operate.  Within  the  span  of  three  decades,  regimes’  legitimacy  has  become  
intimately  linked  to  their  rights  to  sovereign  statehood.  As  a  consequence,  the  claim  that  “[t]he  
politics  of  legitimacy  permeates  almost  all  aspects  of  international  relations,  from  the  use  of  
force  and  diplomatic  practice  to  […]  the  codification  and  implementation  of  human  rights  
norms”  should  be  taken  seriously  (Reus-Smit  2014:  348).  First,  however,  the  following  pages  




Chapter  V:  The  ‘Just  Cause’  Criterion  and  Regime  
Removal   
  
In  order  to  establish  when  FIRC  may  be  permissible,  this  chapter  discusses  the  ad  bellum  
requirement  of  ‘just  cause’.  It  then  connects  this  concept  to  debates  about  preemptive  strikes,  
which  are  a  result  of  condemning  regimes  for  their  potential  rather  than  their  actual  behaviour.  In  
light  of  the  controversy  surrounding  past  interventions,  the  chapter  highlights  the  need  for  
distinguishing  between  the  liability  to  intervention  and  that  to  regime  change.  This  ultimately  
depends  on  establishing  a  threshold  for  the  permissibility  of  FIRC.  
  
As  the  thesis  has  emphasised  earlier,  contemporary  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
should  be  understood  within  the  context  of  a  global  order  of  states.  In  the  late  20th  and  early  
21st  centuries,  this  has  been  a  ‘Liberal  Order’  dominated  by  the  United  States.  While  this  
apparent  liberal  hegemony  is  often  defended  by  its  proponents  as  an  important  guarantor  of  
peace  and  stability,  it  has  increasingly  been  perceived  as  being  at  the  root  of  continuous  
international  conflict,  especially  in  the  aftermath  of  the  9/11  attacks.  This  raises  concerns  that  
the  recourse  to  intervention,  including  regime  change,  has  become  an  extension  of  the  foreign  
policy  of  leading  states.  Indeed,  it  highlights  the  notion  that  states  may  consider  these  
interventions  to  be  an  ‘inevitable’  part  of  ensuring  global  security.  For  instance,  it  has  been  
asserted  that  an  
  
important  feature  of  the  2000s  is  the  insistence  by  the  United  States  that  the  two  major  
military  interventions  it  has  led,  into  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  have  been  wars  of  necessity  
as  much  as  choice,  with  a  primary  purpose  of  national  security  although  clear  benefits  
for  international  and  human  security.  The  case  for  war  was  based  on  the  need  to  prevent  
further,  and  even  more  devastating,  terrorist  attacks,  following  the  outrage  of  September  
2001.  They  came  under  the  umbrella  heading  of  a  ‘global  war  on  terror’  as  declared  by  
President  Bush  (Freedman  2005:  106).  
  
In  this  context,  the  regime  change  interventions  in  the  Middle  East  and  Northern  Africa  have  
commonly  been  interpreted  as  an  effort  to  “demonstrat[e]  American  power  and  resolve  in  order  
to  deter  terrorists  and  ‘rogue  states’  [...]”  (Snyder  2003:  654).  The  accompanying  discourse  has  
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highlighted  the  expected  beneficial  results  of  armed  intervention  not  just  for  the  intervener,  but  
for  the  targeted  states  as  well:  FIRC  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  would  both  aid  in  ensuring  global  
security  and  enable  the  ‘liberated’  citizens  to  prosper  under  more  liberal  regimes.  As  
established  in  Chapter  IV,  several  key  explanations  had  underpinned  the  notion  that  Saddam  
Hussein’s  regime  was  illegitimate  and  ‘had  to  go’.  According  to  Porter  (2018:  335),  the  United  
States-led  alliance  had  
  
struck  Iraq  partly  in  the  name  of  counter-proliferation,  to  destroy  an  arsenal  of  Weapons  
of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)  that  turned  out  to  be  non-existent.  It  struck  partly  to  
disrupt  a  potential  nexus  between  terrorism,  destructive  weapons  technology  and  
‘‘rogue  states’’.  Washington  also  expressed  high  liberal  intentions.  Iraq  was  one  front  in  
the  ‘‘Global  War  on  terror’’,  declared  after  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks,  to  bring  an  end  to  
‘‘terrorism’’  itself  by  spreading  a  liberating  alternative.  The  invasion  was  supposed  to  
be  a  stride  towards  the  spread  of  free  markets  and  democracy,  and  the  emancipation  of  
the  Greater  Middle  East,  to  correct  the  conditions  that  spawned  security  threats.  
This  declaration  indicates  that  while  improving  civilian  lives  in  the  short  term,  intervention  
would  also  ensure  regional  stability  and  security  in  the  long  term.  In  the  end,  the  combination  
of  these  elements  led  the  interveners  to  believe  that  the  Iraqi  regime  fulfilled  the  conditions  of  
“[r]esponsible  agency  [which]  is  a  necessary  condition  for  liability  to  attack”  and  ultimately  
regime  removal  (Barry:  2011:  462).  Thus,  the  interveners  considered  themselves  to  be  in  
possession  of  a  ‘just  cause’  for  engaging  in  war  and  in  regime  change.  
  
The  traditional  Just  War  requirement  of  a  just  cause  for  the  use  of  armed  force  is  clearly 
closely  related  to,  but  ultimately  distinct  from,  the  criteria  of  right  intentions  and  motives  which  
the  thesis  has  discussed  earlier.  As  the  Just  War  Tradition  is  bound  to  the  conviction  that  might  
does  not  make  right,  it  has  traditionally  been  asserted  that  the  only  just  cause  for  war  stems  
from  an  injury  or  injustice  done  to  actors.  Thus,  the  tradition  “holds  that  there  are  two  just  
causes  for  war:  self-defence  and  ‘other-defence''”  (Beard  2019:  883).  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  
t he  criterion’s  chief  purpose  is  to  limit  the  acceptable  reasons  for  going  to  war.  Thus,  as  Boyle  
(2011:  150)  for  example  writes,  “not  all  reasons  for  undertaking  warfare  are  responses  to  
wrongdoing:  going  to  war  for  the  sake  of  maintaining  or  establishing  a  balance  of  power  is  not  
as  such  a  response  to  evil.  Nor  is  imperialistic  expansion  at  the  expense  of  one  community  
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because  of  competition  with  another.  Nor,  I  think,  is  ideologically  based  war  to  establish  in  
another  community  a  preferred  form  of  governance  or  religion.”   
  
Ultimately,  the  key  problem  here  is  not  a  lack  of  agreement  on  the  requirement  for  a  just  
cause  itself.  Indeed,  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  without  a  just  cause,  a  war  cannot  be  
legitimate.  Rather,  the  source  of  disagreement  lies  in  what  exactly,  i.e.  which  injustices  and  
injuries,  would  qualify.  In  the  terms  of  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule,  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  
circumstances  in  which  a  state  can  legitimately  be  ‘broken’.  Consequently,  this  chapter  aims  to  
highlight  the  lasting  importance  of  the  just  cause  criterion  to  the  FIRC  debate.  In  questioning  
under  which  circumstances  a  forcible  regime  change  can  be  justified,  it  first  rejects  both  
considerations  of  preemption  and  democratisation  as  permissible  catalysts  for  armed  
intervention.  
5.1  Just  Causes  for  Sovereignty  Infringement   
  
As  established  previously,  cases  of  unprovoked  and  overt  military  aggression  by  states  against  
others  are  considered  to  be  self-evident  arguments  for  war  in  response.  Since  aggression  is  
impermissible,  it  therefore  creates  liability  to  intervention.  The  justice  of  defence  against  an  
explicit  use  of  military  force  has  been  fairly  uncontroversial  and  straightforward  to  assess.  
More  controversial  are  considerations  of  ‘military  threats  short  of  war’  and  their  preemption  or  
prevention,  which  have  increasingly  influenced  the  21st  century  discussion  on  the  threat  of  
‘rogue’  states.  A  “state  preempts  when  another  state  is  poised  to  strike;  it  prevents  another  state  
from  striking  (through  disarmament)  where  that  strike  is  a  future,  but  not  immediate,  risk”,  as  
Snyder  has  clarified  (2003:  654).  While  in  practice,  both  terms  have  been  used  interchangeably,  
Beard  (2019:  892)  adds  that  “the  difference  should  be  understood  as  between  the  criteria  of  
evidence  required  for  justied  attack:  preventive  war  requires  that  the  attack  be  possible  or  
likely,  and  that  the  harm  from  the  attack  –  if  it  occurred  –  be  signicant;  pre-emptive  war  on  
the  other  hand  demands  certainty  that  the  attack  will  occur.  The  former  cannot  be  justied  
morally,  the  latter,  however,  is  within  the  rights  of  a  state. ”   
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Yet  again,  the  ongoing  War  on  Terror  can  help  illustrate  these  debates.  The  2003  FIRC  
intervention  in  Iraq  highlights  the  controversial  role  of  preemption  and  prevention  as  just  
causes.  In  actively  seeking  to  topple  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime,  but  also  in  striking  in  the  
absence  of  overt  aggression,  it  marks  a  clear  departure  from  US  policy  in  the  First  Gulf  War  
(cf.  Chapter  III).  Indeed,  both  in  the  case  of  Iraq  and  elsewhere,  since  the  9/11  attacks “the  
United  States  government  has  argued  for  a  broadened  understanding  of  the  Article  51  right,  
contending,  for  example,  that  it  should  be  construed  to  permit  ‘self-defence’  in  a  range  of  
circumstances  in  which  an  armed  attack  neither  has  occurred  nor  is  imminent”  (Delahunty  
2007:  871).  The  concept  of  prevention  has  been  used  to  frame  states  as  threats  to  global  
security  even  in  the  absence  of  overt  military  aggression,  for  example  when  their  regimes  are  
thought  to  abet  terrorism.  Thus,  it  has  been  claimed  that  “should  a  brutal  regime,  like  that  of  
the  Taliban,  become  a  sponsor  of  terrorism  and  openly  support  it,  that  takes  us  into  the  zone  of  
war  –  and  for  the  United  States,  post-9/11,  into  legitimate  self-defense”  (Elshtain  2007:  503).   
  
The  possibility  of  preemptive  or  preventive  warfare  has  also  been  debated  in  terms  of  
states’  more  ‘traditional’  offensive  military  capabilities,  especially  in  relation  to  Iraq’s  
supposed  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)  programme.  For  instance,  Finlay  (2007:  
555-556)  has  clearly  emphasised  the  Iraqi  intervention’s  supposedly  ‘preemptive’  nature,  
stating  that  “[o]fficial  accounts  at  the  time,  of  course,  spoke  in  terms  of  international  law  and  
were  framed  in  terms  of  two  kinds  of  pre-emption  case,  namely,  that  since  Iraq  was  an  
immediate  military  threat  (the  ‘45  minute’  claim)  and  constituted  a  threat  to  international  
security  and  order  (a  claim  which  invokes  Ch.VII  of  the  United  Nations  Charter),  attack  was  
the  most  appropriate  form  of  defence.”  Framing  the  invasion  as  a  form  of  ‘self-defence’  has,  
unsurprisingly,  been  widely  contested.  Beard  (2019:  885  -  886),  for  example,  has  clearly  stated  
that   
  
Article  4  of  the  UN  General  Resolution  on  the  Denition  of  Aggression,  which  states  
that  ‘No  consideration  of  whatever  nature,  whether  political,  economic,  military  or  
otherwise,  may  serve  as  a  justication  for  aggression.’  An  ‘anticipatory  defensive  
attack’  (and  it  is  worth  noting  the  paradox  –  or  perhaps  oxymoron  –  in  the  term  
‘defensive  attack’)  such  as  that  of  the  US  in  Iraq,  based  on  suspicion  of  WMDs  and  fear  
of  their  future  use,  cannot  be  considered  a  just  cause.  Nor,  according  to  Article  4,  could  
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a  desire  for  regime  change  in  light  of  the  antagonistic  and  unstable  regime  such  as  
Hussein’s  Iraqi  leadership  be  seen  as  a  just  cause.  
  
The  thesis  takes  the  view  that  ultimately,  prevention  cannot  be  condoned  as  a  just  cause  either  
for  military  strikes  or  for  more  sweeping  regime  change  interventions.  This  is  the  case  because  
it  is  simply  too  open  to  controversy  and  lack  of  agreement.  The  concept  of  a  ‘potential  threat’  
itself  is  problematic,  and  there  is  no  agreed-upon  cut-off  point  at  which  a  threat  would  
somehow  become  sufficient  to  automatically  justify  a  recourse  to  military  action.  Given  the  
severe  consequences  of  warfare,  its  justice  lies  in  a  reaction  to  an  actual,  not  a  potential  attack.   
  
Consequently,  while  a  general  presumption  of  peaceful  intentions  should  in  principle  
apply  to  all  states  until  their  aggressive  intent  is  established  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  a  
crucial  aspect  of  the  current  FIRC  debate  is  that  the  sort  of  reasoning  which  eventually  led  to  
attack  in  the  case  of  Iraq  also  lends  itself  to  acts  of  regime  change  more  generally.  After  all,  in  
this  logic  the  potential  threat  emanating  from  a  rogue  regime  is  ever  present,  a  metaphorical  
‘Sword  of  Damocles’  which  can  only  really  be  removed  by  deposing  the  regime  itself.  Indeed,  
the  notion  of  preemption  in  combination  with  a  categorical  condemnation  of  (invariably  
non-Western)  regimes  for  their  potential  rather  than  their  actual  behaviour  is  also  present,  albeit  
more  subtly,  in  debates  surrounding  the  justice  of  interventions  aimed  at  forcibly  
‘democratising’  authoritarian  states.  Modern  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  increasingly  
going  hand  in  hand  with  forcible  democratisation.  What  is  more,  Evans  (2005)  has  warned  of  
an  increasing  conflagration  of  the  Just  War  Theory  with  the  forcible  imposition  of  democratic  
regimes.  In  other  words,  two  entirely  distinct  concepts,  that  of  a  ‘just  war’  and  that  of  a  ‘war  on  
behalf  of  democracy’,  are  perceived  to  be  one  and  the  same.  This  too  is  directly  related  to  the  
liberal  understanding  of  the  present  world  order’s  goals.  Under  the  impression  of  past  and  
current  large-scale  human  rights  abuses  and  global  security  threats,  the  traditionally  accepted  
moral  equality  between  established  sovereign  states  has  been  increasingly  rejected  by  powerful  
liberal  actors,  to  the  extent  that  liberal  democracy  has  emerged  from  one  regime  type  amongst  
many  to  the  supposed  ‘standard’.  Against  this  ideal  all  other  regimes  are  measured,  and  often  
fall  short. 57   
57  Similar  understandings  have  influenced  the  so-called  Democratic  Peace  Theory,  to  which  even  some  Just  War   
authors  subscribe.  Orend,  for  instance,  has  affirmed  that  “rights-respecting  societies  do  not  go  to  war  against  each  
other”  (2006:  53).  This  assumption  is  not  unproblematic,  since  its  underlying  ideology  might  actually  encourage  
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Leading  Western  powers’  substantial  promotion  of  human  rights  beyond  their  own  
borders  has  increasingly  come  to  be  supplemented  by  a  conviction  that  certain  regimes,  i.e.  
liberal  democracies  are  best  placed  to  safeguard  these  rights.  These  liberal  and  democratic  
political  regimes  are,  in  this  understanding,  not  only  more  peaceful  actors,  but  ultimately  
morally  superior  to  other,  less  ‘civilised’  states,  which  is  reflected  in  the  assertion  that  
“America  speaks  with  one  voice  and  it  is  determined  to  make  the  demands  of  the  civilized  
world  mean  something ”  (Bush  2002).  As  a  result,  the  Liberal  Order’s  leading  members,  first  
and  foremost  the  United  States,  are  no  longer  content  with  peacefully  advocating  the  virtues  of  
democracy.  The  notion  that  these  must  be  expanded,  if  necessary  by  force,  resulting  in  ‘liberal  
wars’.  Milevski  (2020:  300)  accurately  states  that  
  
various  liberal  values  may  not  only  be  mutually  contradictory,  but  may  even  result  in  
the  real  or  perceived  need  to  wage  war,  either  to  defend  or  to  promote  those  same  
liberal  values.  This  leads  to  liberal  war,  an  ironic  concept  developed  to  grapple  with  the  
relationship  between  force  and  policy  in  the  liberal  conscience;  that  is,  between  liberal  
ends  and  the  illiberal  ways  of  war  which  may  be  required  –  or  seem  to  be  required  –  to  
achieve  those  ends.  
  
This  ‘liberal’  conception  of  warfare  also  has  a  defensive  aspect,  which  is  discernible  in  
arguments  in  favour  of  protecting  democratic  regimes  where  these  come  under  threat  by  
undemocratic  forces.  For  instance,  Buchanan  and  Keohane  (2011:  52)  have  suggested  that  “a  
coalition  of  democratic  states”  could  ensure  a  type  of  “Precommitment  Regime  for 
Democracy-protecting  Intervention”  (idem:  55).  The  crucial  point  here,  however,  is  that  they  
conclude  that  this  “is  not  designed  in  the  least  to  expand  democracy  to  societies  that  have  not  
experienced  it  -  certainly  not  by  force  -  but  only  to  help  maintain  it  where  the  people  of  a  
country  have  already  managed  to  institute  it  themselves”  (idem:  55).  Despite  its  very  real  
potential  for  legitimising  armed  interventionism,  the  defence  of  democratic  regimes  from  
‘missionary’  warfare  in  the  name  of  spreading  democracy.  After  all,  it  may  be  tempting  to  go  to  war  in  the  hopes  of  
securing  a  more  peaceful  future  for  all.  As  Fiala  has  put  it,  “[a]n  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  regulative  ideal  of  the  
democratic  peace  can  lead  to  aggressive  wars  aimed  to  create  democracy”  (2009:  95)  whereas  the  “Kantian  
principles”  favoured  by  Orend  would  “preclude  expansive  wars  aimed  at  regime  change  in  the  name  of  
democratization”,  for  example  (idem:  96)  [for  a  discussion  of  Kantian  approaches  to  intervention  see  for  example  
Franceschet  (2010)  and  Wilson  &  Monten  (2011)].  This  selectivity  in  assessing  the  supposed  superiority  of  
democracy  is  particularly  problematic  as  “liberal  democratic  systems  have  proven  readily  compatible  with  
aggressive,  self-serving  military-security  policies”  (Graubart  2013:  77). 
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external  threats  is  relatively  uncontroversial  compared  to  the  much  more  hotly  debated  issue  of  
forcible  democratisation  of  undemocratic  states.   
  
Owen  (2010:  21)  has  for  instance  noted  that  “[s]ince  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union,  
American  governments  have  continued  to  promote  liberal-democratic  regimes  by  force.”  This  
crucial  development  has  gained  further  momentum  in  the  new  millennium.  Under  the  post-9/11  
Bush  administration,  the  United  States  has  “expand[ed]  the  ordinary  understanding  of  just  
cause  by  claiming  that  military  force  may  be  used  to  transform  the  domestic  political  
arrangements  of  non-aggressive  sovereign  states.  This  idea  is  grounded  in  the  view  that  
undemocratic  nations  -  by  definition  -  pose  a  threat  to  democratic  nations  and  global  peace”  
(Fiala  2007  [a]:  33).  Inevitably,  he  writes  (idem:  36),  this  then  raises  
  
the  question  of  the  legitimate  means  for  bringing  about  the  ideal  of  a  liberal  
international  peace.  Liberals  in  general  (whether  progressive  or  neoconservative)  share  
a  long-run  ideal  that  has  been  described  by  Rawls  as  follows:  'the  long  run  aim  of  
[decent  well-ordered  societies]  is  to  bring  all  societies  eventually  to  honour  the  Law  of  
Peoples  and  to  become  full  members  in  good  standing  of  the  society  of  well-ordered  
peoples.'  
  
Consequently,  Merkel  has  for  example  posed  the  question  “whether  war  may  be  waged,  and  
whether  it  can  be  successfully  waged,  in  the  name  of  humanity  and  democracy”  (2008:  488).  
Ultimately,  this  question  must  be  answered  in  the  negative.  While  it  is  conceivable  that  a  
democratic  regime  change  occurs  in  the  course  of  a  justified  war  of  self-defence,  as  was  the  
case  in  the  aftermath  of  Allied  victory  in  1945,  Just  War  theorists  should  resist  the  temptation  
to  accept  democratisation  in  itself  as  a  just  cause  for  regime  change.  Not  only  is  it  likely  to  lead  
a  proliferation  of  armed  conflict,  it  would  also  give  even  more  opportunities  to  those  who  
would  use  the  Just  War  ideal  to  rationalise  wars,  rather  than  following  the  theory's  intention  of  
limiting  unjust  conflict.  Thus,  we  should  agree,  as  Walzer  ( 2008:  351)  adds,  that  sovereign  
states  
can  never  rightly  use  force  to  create  a  democratic  regime  in  someone  else’s  country.  
The  old  arguments  for  ‘‘nonintervention,’’  first  made  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  still  hold.  But  
once  states  have  used  force  for  some  other  legitimate  purpose,  to  defeat  the  Nazis,  for  
example,  or  (hypothetically,  since  we  did  not  do  it)  to  stop  a  massacre  in  Rwanda,  they  
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can  continue  to  use  it;  they  may  even  be  obligated  to  continue  to  use  it,  for  political  
reconstruction.  
  
This  ‘other  legitimate  purpose’  (i.e.  the  just  cause)  should  be  understood  either  as  the  defence  
against  direct  military  aggression  or  as  the  prevention  of  large-scale  human  suffering.  This  
aligns  with  the  prevalent  notion,  addressed  in  earlier  chapters,  that  the  right  to  nonintervention  
is  a  conditional  right,  which  rests  on  compliance  with  certain  moral  norms  and  thresholds.  
Thus,  as  Orend  notes,  “regimes  which  fail  the  conditions  of  minimal  justice  are  not  legitimate  
and  thus  have  no  state  rights,  including  the  right  to  not  be  attacked  and  overthrown”  (2006:  97).  
The  vast  majority  of  current  authors  writing  on  the  ethics  of  humanitarian  intervention  locate  
this  threshold  of  minimal  justice  in  substantial,  i.e.  ‘excessive’  violations  of  human  rights  
which  have  been  described  as  “the  demands  of  all  of  humanity  on  all  of  humanity”  (Luban  
1980:  174).  In  such  cases  where  political  regimes  refuse  to  protect  these  rights,  or  even  
intentionally  violate  them,  coercive  remedial  action  is  legitimate.  Since  such  regimes  are  
unlikely  to  give  up  the  reins  of  power  of  their  own  volition,  it  follows  that  forcible  removal  and  
replacement  can,  in  exceptional  circumstances,  be  an  appropriate  response.  As  the  following  
pages  argue,  however,  a  just  cause  for  humanitarian  intervention  is  not  by  necessity  a  just  cause  
for  a  subsequent  regime  change,  as  distinct  thresholds  apply  to  each.  
5.1.1  The  Humanitarian  Threshold  
  
The  attention  which  has  traditionally  been  accorded  to  the  just  cause  requirement  highlights  the  
exceptional  nature  of  armed  conflict,  including  regime  change  interventions.  What  is  more,  the  
controversial  status  of  recent  interventions  stems  not  only  from  their  infringement  of  states’  
sovereign  rights,  but  also  from  the  repeated  reference  to  humanitarian  language  in  doing  so.  
While  “[t]he  use  of  military  force  to  ‘save  strangers’  from  atrocities  in  other  countries  is  not  
new”  (Bellamy  &  McLoughlin  2019:  334),  it  is  vital  to  note  that  “few  adherents  to  this  view  
provide  a  philosophically  persuasive  or  clearly  argued  moral  rationale  for  why  some  forms  of  
human  suffering  are  permissible  grounds  for  humanitarian  intervention  and  others  are  not”  
(Heinze  2006:  283).  In  cases  where  humanitarian  discourse  underlies  attempts  at  toppling  and  
replacing  regimes,  this  is  particularly  important.  Interveners’  appeals  to  selfless  motivations  
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and  human  solidarity  are  common,  but  inevitably  subject  to  widespread  criticism.  For  instance,  
in  the  case  of  Iraq,  Roth  (2006:  91)  has  stated  that  in  hindsight,  
  
[t]he  killing  in  Iraq  at  the  time  was  not  of  the  dire  and  exceptional  nature  that  would  
justify  military  action.  In  addition,  intervention  was  not  the  last  reasonable  option  to  
stop  Iraqi  atrocities.  It  was  not  motivated  primarily  by  humanitarian  concerns.  It  was  
not  conducted  in  a  way  that  maximized  compliance  with  international  humanitarian  
law.  It  was  not  approved  by  the  Security  Council.  And  while  at  the  time  it  was  launched  
it  was  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  Iraqi  people  would  be  better  off,  it  was  not  
designed  or  carried  out  with  the  needs  of  Iraqis  foremost  in  mind.  
  
Since  so  much  depends  on  this  abstract  threshold  (after  all,  it  is  supposed  to  tell  us  when  
situations  are  ‘dire  and  exceptional’  enough  for  military  action),  its  parameters  must  be  clearly  
defined:  if  requirements  are  too  narrow,  many  state-sanctioned  human  rights  abuses  will  go  
unchallenged.  On  the  other  hand,  given  the  basic  but  compelling  presumption  against  war,  state  
sovereignty  should  not  be  infringed  upon  carelessly.   
  
Thus,  as  “the  very  real  risk  that  any  war  will  lead  to  large-scale  loss  of  life,  
humanitarian  intervention  should  be  reserved  as  a  threshold  matter  only  for  situations  of  
ongoing  or  imminent  mass  slaughter”  (Roth  2006:  85).  This  notion  of  imminence  and  
humanitarian  disaster  is  also  acknowledged  by  other  frameworks,  such  as  the  Responsibility  to  
Protect.  Walzer  has  for  instance  noted  that  intervention  under  the  R2P  cannot  be  “engaged  by  
the  ordinary  brutality  of  authoritarian  governments.  What  is  necessary  in  such  cases  is  local  
opposition,  political  struggles  that  can  legitimately  be  encouraged  from  the  outside  by  state  and  
non-state  actors  but  can’t  legitimately  be  supported  by  an  army  marching  across  the  border.  
Nor  is  the  responsibility  engaged  by  civil  war”  (2013:  para.  8). 58  Therefore,  while  it  is  already   
the  case  that  “a  wide  array  of  human  rights  have  been  codified  as  international  norms,  
including  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (UDHR)  and  other  conventions  which  
are  expected  to  be  followed  by  signatories”  (Erameh  2017:  519),  the  numerous  rights  listed  in  
the  Universal  Declaration  cannot  all  legitimately  be  defended  by  armed  force  (and  certainly  not  
by  means  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change). Clearly,  then,  something  ‘extraordinary’  is  
58  Similarly,  the  2005  R2P  World  Summit  Outcome  Document  itself  “expressly  rejects  any  intervention  for  ‘human   
rights  violations  falling  short  of  outright  killing  or  ethnic  cleansing’  such  as  systematic  discrimination,  systematic  
imprisonment  or  systematic  political  oppression”  (Deb  2015:  310).  
112  
required  to  trigger  states’  recourse  to  a  justified  regime  change,  something  which  likely  
involves  mass  killings  perpetrated,  or  at  least  actively  sanctioned,  by  a  state’s  political  
leadership.  Indeed,  Heinze  rightly  notes  that  “[v]irtually  all  serious  works  that  deal  with  the  
subject  of  humanitarian  intervention  argue,  and  sometimes  assume,  that  it  should  only  take  
place  under  the  most  ‘extreme’  or  ‘severe’  of  human  rights  violations”  (2006:  283).   
  
The  emphasis  on  the  extreme  and  exceptional  nature  of  rights  abuses  also  serves  as  a  
defence  against  the  sort  of  moral  relativism  which  would  conceivably  hinder  effective  
humanitarian  action,  as  various  states  and  cultures  likely  have  different  notions  of  the  
characteristics  of  global  (in)justice.  Although  there  have  been  claims  that  “proposals  for  
universal  ethics  or  common  standards  of  humane  governance  are  always  culturally  biased”  
(Bellamy  2002:  476),  such  moral  relativism  is  ultimately  detrimental  to  human  rights  
protection  as,  “if  there  is  no  natural  moral  law  or  basic  moral  reality,  then  the  now  widely  
popular  rhetoric  of  universal  human  rights  is  just  that:  rhetoric”  (Biggar  2013:  160).  In  
response,  theorists’  emphasis  and  defence  of  the  importance  of  universal  human  rights  should  
be  accompanied  by  an  awareness  of  the  important  cultural  limits  to  a  (Western)  claim  to  
universality.  It  is  for  instance  notable  that  “[m]any  Western  theorists  take  the  European  
experience  of  the  Second  World  War,  primarily  the  Holocaust,  as  the  (often  sole)  catalyst  for  
the  development  of  the  modern  international  human  rights  law  framework.  However,  in  other  
parts  of  the  world,  it  is  rather  the  revolt  against  colonialism,  and  all  of  its  attendant  forms  of  
gross  human  rights  violation,  and  the  struggle  for  self-determination,  which  are  often  the  major  
referents  for  concepts  of  human  rights”  (Bennoune  2002:  248).   
  
Accordingly,  it  is  imperative  to  establish  a  humanitarian  ‘baseline’  which  is  able  to  take  
such  cultural  differences  into  account  while  acknowledging  the  universal  impermissibility  of  
large-scale  abuses.  These  basic  rights  are  considered  to  be  universal,  i.e.  applicable  regardless  
of  culture  or  context.  In  the  words  of  Rodin,  “the  basic  rights  that  are  plausible  candidates  for  a  
universal  global  ethic  do  not  present  themselves  as  discretionary  [...].  First,  there  is  
considerable  global  agreement  on  the  existence  of  these  basic  rights.  Second,  though  there  
certainly  exist  groups  who  deny  each  of  these  rights,  we  do  not  regard  this  denial  as  reasonable  
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variation;  rather,  we  see  it  as  evidence  of  ignorance  or  iniquity”  (2012:  39). 59  Therefore,   
although  the  global  violation  of  these  fundamental  human  rights  is  observed  all  too  often,  this  
does  not  in  fact  “count  against  their  universality  because  the  universality  is  normative,  not  
descriptive”  (Orend  2006:  53).  Indeed,  he  states,  “[i]t  is  about  what  we  should  believe  and  how  
we  should  act,  and  this  cannot  be  dislodged  or  undermined  by  the  behaviour  of  
rights-violators”  (ibid.).  It  is  no  coincidence  that  these  descriptions  echo  the  natural  law  
tradition  which  underpinned  the  writings  of  many  early  Just  War  theorists.  Indeed,  Bain  notes  
that  “the  high  tide  of  legal  positivism  has  since  receded  and  with  it  natural  law  has  experienced  
something  of  a  revival  [...]”  (2010:  34). 60  In  part,  this  revival  can  be  credited  to  the  success  of   
Michael  Walzer’s  approach  to  the  discussion  of  war’s  relation  to  human  rights.  
5.1.2  Walzer’s  ‘Thin’  Rights,  and  Liability  to  Intervention  
  
In  light  of  their  claim  to  a  universal  appeal,  basic  human  rights  have  also  been  conceptualised  
in  Michael  Walzer’s  understanding  of  ‘minimal’  rights,  for  instance  in  his  writings  in  Thick  and  
Thin  and  Just  and  Unjust  Wars .  Boyle  (1997:  85)  has  stated  that  to  Walzer,  
  
there  is  a  body  of  moral  doctrine  that  is  widely  accessible,  that  profoundly  influences  
even  those  who  would  prefer  not  to  notice  it,  and  that  exists  independently  of  a  
particular  moral  theory  or  an  attachment  to  a  particular  moral  community.  While  he  
does  not  claim  that  everyone  accepts  or  should  accept  the  entirety  of  this  body  of  moral  
doctrine,  he  seems  to  think  that  it  is  hard  for  most  people  to  avoid  accepting  part  of  it. 
  
59  Heinze  claims  that  “[t]he  reason  that  permitting  humanitarian  intervention  only  in  situations  concerning   
deprivations  of  basic  human  goods  serves  a  utilitarian  concern  for  human  security  has  to  do  with  the  “fundamental”  
nature  of  basic  goods  as  they  relate  to  human  security”  (2006:  291).  
  
60  Even  before  this  recent  resurgence,  the  continued  importance  of  natural  law  can  for  instance  be  observed  in  the   
so-called  Martens  Clause,  an  addition  to  the  1899  Hague  convention.  It  states  that  "in  cases  not  included  in  the  
Regulations  [...],  populations  and  belligerents  remain  under  the  protection  and  empire  of  the  principles  of  
international  law,  as  they  result  from  the  usages  established  between  civilized  nations,  from  the  laws  of  humanity  
and  the  requirements  of  the  public  conscience"  (quoted  in  Ticehurst  1997:  para.  2).  The  clause  implies  that  “the  idea  
of  a  ‘humanity’  capable  of  being  shocked  by  the  infliction  of  severe  harm  on  persons  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  
development  of  the  international  legal  order”  (Sutch  2012:  10).  Thus,  according  to  Bellamy  “[p]ositive  international  
law  only  partly  reflects  Western  traditions  of  moral  reasoning  about  war  that  are  bound  together  in  the  multifaceted  
'just  war'  tradition”  (2004:  132).  However,  he  also  asserts  that  “natural  law  and  positive  law  should  not  be  
understood  as  separate  traditions  but  as  complementary  sets  of  ideas,  the  occasionally  competing  claims  of  which  
must  be  balanced  in  particular  cases”  (idem).  
114  
Seeking  to  avoid  misunderstandings  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  term,  Walzer  affirms  that  his  
understanding  of  moral  minimalism  “does  not  describe  a  morality  that  is  substantively  minor  or  
emotionally  shallow.  The  opposite  is  more  likely  true:  this  is  morality  close  to  the  bone”  (1994:  
6).  Consequently,  he  has  later  maintained  that  “our  understanding  of  the  moral  vocabulary  is  
sufficiently  common  and  stable  so  that  shared  judgments  are  possible”  (2006  [a]:  20).  In  spite  
of  this  affirmation,  his  conception  of  human  rights  has  been  subject  to  some  debate,  especially  
in  their  influence  on  his  writings  on  war  and  intervention.  While  Lund  (2011:  656)  has  argued  
that  Walzer’s  “basic  judgments  about  the  justice  of  war  and  its  conduct  are  grounded  in  
concerns  for  human  rights”,  Luban  (2017:  9)  contends  that  a  notion  of  “human  rights  actually  
plays  a  smaller  direct  role  in  the  argument  of  Just  and  Unjust  Wars  than  this  language  would  
lead  us  to  expect.”  This  is  not  necessarily  a  contradiction,  however,  given  Walzer’s  
understanding  of  these  human  rights  as  ‘moral  expectations’  rather  than  necessarily  
methodologically  derived  and  legally  enshrined  precepts.  According  to  Walzer  “the  theory  of  
justice  in  war  can  indeed  be  generated  from  the  two  most  basic  and  widely  recognized  rights  of  
human  beings  -  and  in  their  simplest  (negative)  form:  not  to  be  robbed  of  life  or  of  liberty"  
(1983:  xv). 61  Consequently,  Walzer  “expresses  ignorance  about  the  foundations  of  ethics  and   
notes  the  apparently  unending  controversy  about  such  matters”  (Boyle  1997:  85).  Nonetheless,  
he  affirms  that  “we  have  moral  expectations  about  the  behaviour  not  only  of  our  fellows  but  of  
strangers  too”  (1994:  17),  including  the  behaviour  of  states  towards  their  citizens,  as  the  rights  
of  states  “derive  ultimately  from  the  rights  of  individuals,  and  from  them  they  take  their  force”  
(2006  [a]:  53).  Thus,  his  “justification  of  humanitarian  intervention  can  be  interpreted  as  an  
interesting  and  subtle  mix  of  both  (liberal)  ‘cosmopolitan’  individual  rights  and  collective  
‘communitarian’  rights”  (Moszkowicz  2007:  296).  In  the  end,  regardless  of  these  rights’  
origins,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  that  their  defence  is  essential  to  a  Just  War  conception  of  FIRC.  
  
As  the  chapter  has  established  beforehand,  sovereign  states  can  become  liable  to  
intervention  if  they  cannot  guarantee  minimal  human  rights.  This  notion  underlies  the  majority  
of  current  understandings  of  humanitarian  intervention.  These  rights  therefore  constitute  what  
is  the  minimal  ‘just  cause’  threshold  for  legitimate  military  humanitarian  action  such  as  limited  
61  Here,  Walzer  echoes  Article  III  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (1948),  which  states  that   
“[ e]veryone  has  the  right  to  life,  liberty  and  security  of  person”  (UN  n.d.  [d]).  
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humanitarian  intervention,  the  creation  of  no-fly  zones,  safe  zones,  etc., 62  which  are  aimed  at   
preventing  unjust  harm  done  to  an  innocent  actor.  In  extreme  cases,  i.e.  where  the  state’s  
regime  is  actively  engaged  in  extreme  abuses,  intervention  may  necessitate  the  removal  of  the  
culprit  (in  this  case,  the  oppressive  regime)  from  the  situation  once  and  for  all.  However,  as  
regime  change  exceeds  humanitarian  intervention  in  its  violation  of  sovereignty,  it  requires  
more  than  simple  liability  to  intervention  in  order  to  be  proportional  to  the  potential  harm  it  
inflicts.  In  other  words,  the  bar  for  the  just  cause  for  FIRC  must  be  set  even  higher  than  that  for  
humanitarian  intervention.  It  is  justified  only  when  liability  to  intervention  is  the  result  of  
regimes'  culpability  for  imminent  or  ongoing  violations.  The  subsequent  section  of  the  thesis  
assesses  the  capability  criterion  in  relation  to  the  state’s  ‘duty  of  care’  for  its  inhabitants.  First,  
however,  it  establishes  that  the  moral  ‘nature’  ascribed  to  the  regime  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  
establish  this  culpability.  
5.2  The  Culpability  Criterion  
  
Authors  working  within  the  wider  Just  War  tradition  have  been  far  from  unified  in  their  views  
on  the  implications  of  regimes’  possibly  ‘criminal’  nature.  Walzer  explains  that  it  “is  a  feature  
of  just-war  theory  in  its  classic  formulations  that  aggression  is  regarded  as  the  criminal  policy  
of  a  government,  not  as  the  policy  of  a  criminal  government  -  let  alone  a  criminal  system  of  
government”  (2006  [b]:  103).  In  response,  however,  Elshtain  (2006:  109)  has  contended  that  “it  
may  not  be  a  rule,  but  there  is  a  very  strong  probability  that  a  criminal  regime  -  whether  
Fascist,  communist,  or  Baathist  -  will  engage  in  criminal  policies  externally  and  internally.”  
Given  this  supposedly  increased  likelihood  of  abusing  their  citizens  and  attacking  their  
neighbours,  the  debate  is  one  of  whether  the  nature  of  a  regime  (as  opposed  to  its  actions)  
could  make  it  culpable,  and  thus  in  itself  be  an  acceptably  ‘just’  cause  for  intervention  under  
jus  ad  bellum.   
  
62  Thus,  Aloyo  states  that  “there  is  a  just  cause  for  humanitarian  intervention  whenever  leaders  are  unable  or   
unwilling  to  minimize  prospective  violations  [of]  individuals'  human  rights.  This  holds  whether  one  views  human  
rights  or  collective  self-determination  as  more  important,  because  certain  individual  rights  are  necessary  to  exercise  
collective  self-determination”  (2016:  326).  
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As  a  modern  state’s  legitimacy  is  commonly  considered  to  be  intricately  tied  to  its  
responsibility  towards  its  citizens’  rights,  it  has  been  claimed  that,  ultimately,  “tyranny  causes  
the  collapse  of  sovereignty”  (Tesón  2011:  194).  However,  since  it  is  the  case  that  endogenous  
change  away  from  tyranny  is  slow  and  often  uncertain,  regime  change  has  been  presented  as  a  
‘shortcut’  towards  the  collapse  of  illegitimate  regimes.  Indeed,  as  only  legitimate  states  are 
thought  to  ‘deserve’  the  rights  to  autonomy  and  non-intervention,  attempts  at  delegitimising  
them  is  often  an  important  first  step  in  initiating  punitive  intervention  and  forcible  regime  
change.  Strachan  (2020:  53)  has  recently  noted  that  
  
[i]n  order  to  explain  to  their  nations  why  their  armed  forces  are  engaged  in  faraway  
places  of  which  their  peoples  know  little,  they  use  the  vocabulary  of  mass  mobilisation  
borrowed  from  the  Second  World  War.  They  are  ready  to  let  these  wars  be  called  ‘wars  
of  choice’,  but  they  employ  phrases  borrowed  from  ‘existential’  conflict,  which  suggest  
they  are  ‘wars  of  necessity’.  George  W.  Bush  compared  the  9/11  attacks  with  Pearl  
Harbor,  and  Tony  Blair  cited  the  appeasement  of  Adolf  Hitler  when  calling  for  action  
against  Saddam  Hussein.  
  
In  fact,  as  Downes  aptly  remarks,  “[a]lmost  every  target  of  U.S.  intervention  in  the  post–Cold  
War  world  has  been  labeled  another  Hitler”  (2011:  para.  8),  with  the  aim  of  eliciting  an  
emotional  response  from  the  public  and  laying  the  groundwork  for  not  just  a  political,  but  a  
moral  justification  for  intervention.  By  marking  the  targeted  regimes  as  ‘criminal’,  ‘rogue’  and  
ultimately  ‘evil’,  i.e.  intrinsically  morally  unacceptable  actors,  interveners  are  able  to  justify  
‘punitive’  action  even  beyond  initial  human  rights  protection.  Again,  the  particular  narrative  
which  underpinned  the  interveners'  actions  in  Iraq  illustrates  this.  As  Walzer  (2006  [b]:  105)  
sums  up,  
  
the  war  was  not  a  response  to  aggression  or  a  humanitarian  intervention.  Its  cause  was  
not  (as  in  1991)  an  actual  Iraqi  attack  on  a  neighboring  state  or  even  an  imminent  threat  
of  attack;  nor  was  it  an  actual,  ongoing  massacre.  The  cause  was  regime  change,  
directly  -  which  means  that  the  U.S.  government  was  arguing  for  a  significant  
expansion  of  the  doctrine  of  jus  ad  bellum.  The  existence  of  an  aggressive  and  
murderous  regime,  it  claimed,  was  a  legitimate  occasion  for  war,  even  if  the  regime  was  
not  actually  engaged  in  aggression  or  mass  murder.  In  more  familiar  terms,  this  was  an  
argument  for  preventive  war,  but  the  reason  for  the  preventive  attack  wasn't  the  
standard  perception  of  a  dangerous  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  that  would  soon  leave  
"us"  helpless  against  "them."  It  was  a  radically  new  perception  of  an  evil  regime.   
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Although  no  mass  killings  were  ongoing,  which  would  have  justified  unilateral  humanitarian  
interventions  (such  as  those  in  Kosovo  in  the  1990s,  for  instance),  the  regime  was  presented  as  
one  which  was  inherently  ‘evil’,  whose  past  behaviour  was  claimed  to  indicate  a  potential  for  
morally  unacceptable  acts  in  the  future.  For  instance,  a  “conception  of  punishment  present  in  
Bush  and  Blair’s  arguments  for  military  action  against  Iraq  is  attached  to  the  concept  of  evil,  
and  the  imperative  to  punish  it  wherever  it  may  be  found”  (O’Driscoll  2006  [a]:  410).   
  
To  the  interveners,  the  Iraqi  regime  was  not  only  a  potentially  lethal  threat  and  an  
oppressive  tyranny:  it  had  to  be  chastised  for  ‘recklessly’  turning  its  back  on  the  values  of  
civilisation  itself.  In  the  months  preceding  the  intervention,  terms  such  as  ‘rogue  states’  and  the  
infamous  ‘Axis  of  Evil’  terminology  propagated  by  United  States  officials  mark  states  as  
aggressive  outcasts  from  a  supposedly  ‘civilised’  peaceful  international  society  (Miles  2013).  
On  this  view,  a  regime  which  is  ‘evil’  and  ‘criminal’  per  se  does  not  have  to  be  engaged  in  
actual  harm  at  the  moment  of  intervention:  it  is  culpable  by  its  very  nature.  Elshtain  (2007:  
137)  has  argued  that  if  we   
  
suppose  that  a  state  has  engaged  in  genocidal  activity  in  the  past;  that  its  leaders  have  
not  foresworn  such  activity;  and  that  the  regime  in  question  has  perpetrated  other  forms  
of  culpable  mass  killing.  A  case  can  surely  be  made  that  a  regime’s  political  culture,  its  
documented  past  brutalities  that  have  not  been  renounced,  and  its  possession  of  the  
means  to  inflict  massive  harm  on  others,  even  if,  at  that  moment,  such  activities  are  not  
going  on  en  masse,  makes  it  culpable  under  just  war  and  humanitarian  law.  
  
In  his  efforts  to  highlight  the  ‘immoral’  nature  of  the  Iraqi  regime,  President  Bush  had  for  
example  insisted  that  “[w]e  have  seen  their  kind  before.  They  are  the  heirs  of  all  the  murderous  
ideologies  of  the  20th  century.  By  sacrificing  human  life  to  serve  their  radical  visions  -  by  
abandoning  every  value  except  the  will  to  power  -  they  follow  in  the  path  of  fascism,  and  
Nazism,  and  totalitarianism”  (2001:  para.  27).  The  President’s  allusion  to  the  regime’s  “radical  
visions''  unmistakably  emphasised  the  hypothetical  present  and  future  threat  to  human  life  and  
global  stability  emanating  from  Iraq.  By  drawing  parallels  to  totalitarian  and  genocidal  regimes  
of  the  past,  President  Bush  expressly  linked  the  invasion  of  Iraq  to  the  near-universal  
acceptance  of  the  ‘just  cause’  for  war  against  Nazi  Germany  as  a  ‘quintessential’  Just  War. 63    
63  Nazi  Germany  was  both  an  externally  and  internally  aggressive  and  ‘criminal’  regime.  Beyond  launching   
unprovoked  military  attacks  on  numerous  other  states,  it  also  committed  uncountable  acts  of  aggression  against  the  
civilian  populations  under  its  control,  which  ultimately  culminated  in  genocidal  crimes.  While  Germany’s  forcible  
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The  crucial  problem  with  this  type  of  rhetoric,  of  course,  is  that  2003  Iraq  was  not  Nazi  
Germany.  Elshtain’s  type  of  ‘retroactive’  culpability  does  not  hide  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  
intervention,  Iraq  was  not  poised  to  attack  its  neighbours  or  the  United  States,  was  not  actively  
seeking  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  was  not  cooperating  with  terrorist  groups,  and  was  not  
engaging  in  genocide.  To  be  clear,  this  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  Iraq  was  in  any  way  
under  a  particularly  just,  liberal,  or  peaceful  regime.  Nonetheless,  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  
was  kept  in  check  by  a  framework  of  sanctions  which  had  been  in  place  since  Iraq’s  aggression  
against  Kuwait.  Coupled  with  its  military  containment,  this  was  sufficient  in  preventing  the  
Iraqi  regime  from  any  internal  or  external  aggressions  resembling  those  of  the  Third  Reich .  In  
light  of  these  factors,  the  intervention  in  Iraq  has  often  been  considered  disproportionate  to  the  
threat  emanating  from  the  regime.   
  
Since  culpability  is  therefore  tied  to  a  sense  of  ‘imminence’  regarding  human  rights  
abuses,  a  regime  which  may  have  done  wrong  in  the  past,  but  which  has  since  refrained  or  
externally  deterred  from  rights  abuses  cannot  be  ‘retroactively’  culpable  in  a  sense  of  liability  
to  intervention.  Since  it  is  not  the  ‘nature’  of  a  regime  which  can  make  it  liable  to  regime  
change,  culpability  can  only  be  located  in  its  actual  behaviour.  Thus,  in  order  to  undergo  
foreign-imposed  regime  change,  a  state  must  be  deemed  culpable  through  an  active  
engagement  in  extensive  human  rights  abuses.  This  culpability  can  only  be  established  through  
the  regime’s  intentions  of  abandoning  its  ‘duty  of  care’,  which  is  inherently  tied  to  its  
legitimacy  as  a  sovereign  state:  “[f]or  Walzer,  the  state  exists  to  protect  the  individual  lives  and  
the  common  life  of  the  people  within  a  territory.  If  the  state  fails  to  fulfil  that  function,  it  will  
no  longer  qualify  for  the  principle  of  non-intervention  –  the  defence  of  such  a  state  will  have  no  
moral  justification”,  as  Orford  has  noted  (2013:  90).  
annexation  of  large  parts  of  Europe  was  illegal,  the  overwhelming  ‘moral’  condemnation  of  the  regime  surely  rests  
on  its  absolute  disregard  for  basic  human  rights.  Many  fanatical  National  Socialists'  sincere  belief  in  the  superiority  
of  the  Aryan  race  and  its  right  to  rule  other  peoples,  ultimately  does  not  make  the  results  of  this  belief  any  less  
condemnable.  Therefore,  such  basic  norms  cannot  be  challenged  by  ‘true  believer’  excuses  such  as  ideological  
conviction.  In  such  cases,  there  are  no  imaginable  cultural  explanations  or  exceptions  which  would  somehow  render  
impermissible  acts  acceptable.  As  Walzer  (2004  [b]:  36)  himself  notes,  “a  humanitarian  crisis  is,  as  it  were,  
independent  of  history  and  culture.”  Thus,  acts  of  genocide/democide  are  immoral  per  se ,  regardless  of  their  
motivation  and  ulterior  intentions.  
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5.2.1  States'  Duty  of  Care  
  
Walzer  writes  that  “the  moral  standing  of  any  particular  state  depends  upon  the  reality  of  the  
common  life  it  protects  and  the  extent  to  which  the  sacrifice  required  by  that  protection  are  
willingly  accepted  and  thought  worthwhile”  (2006  [a]:  54).  The  principle  underlying  this  
understanding  can  be  described  as  a  state’s  ‘duty  of  care’  for  its  inhabitants.  Of  course,  the  
notion  of  a  duty  of  care  has  been  employed  in  other  fields  (e.g.  medical  and  legal  ethics),  but  is  
applicable  to  the  thesis’  regime  change  debate,  too.  As  Miller  (1996:  47)  has  for  instance  
clarified,  “in  a  medical  context,  the  duty  of  care  ‘trumps’  the  duty  not  to  injure”,  and  similarly,  
“just-war  theorists  argue  that  war  constitutes  an  analogous  situation  of  moral  conflict.  Here,  
too,  the  idea  is  that  when  someone  needs  protection  against  aggression,  the  duty  not  to  harm  
may  conflict  with  other  duties,  like  the  duty  to  defend  or  protect.  The  duty  not  to  harm  may  be  
overridden  by  the  obligation  to  protect  oneself  or  third  parties  from  aggression.”   
  
When  applied  to  the  Just  War  debate,  therefore,  “the  underlying  assumption  in  both  the  
practice  and  theory  of  the  duty  of  care  is  that  the  state  sees  society  and  its  citizens  as  objects  of  
protection”  (Tsinovoi  &  Adler-Nissen  2018:  230).  Walzer’s  statement  above  illustrates  that  in  
the  modern  understanding  of  sovereignty,  the  duty  of  care  which  is  incumbent  on  states  is  also  
tied  to  their  legitimacy  as  sovereign  actors.  Thus,  the  continued  neglect  of  the  duty  of  care,  
whether  through  malice  or  incompetence,  ultimately  erodes  the  states’  legitimacy,  both  morally  
and  practically.  States  which  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  care  for  their  own  populations  are  thus  
seen  as  lacking  an  elementary  aspect  of  sovereign  statehood.  In  other  words,  human  rights  were  
not  violated  merely  by  omitting  to  act:  the  regime  is  actively  involved  in  directing  the  abuse.  
This  violation  of  basic  human  rights  must  have  been  an  end  in  itself,  not  an  unforeseen  side  
effect:  a  lethal  famine  as  a  result  of  mismanagement,  for  instance,  does  not  make  the  state  
culpable,  whereas  the  targeted  withholding  of  food  from  the  population  certainly  could.   
  
Consequently,  an  actors’  intent  is  crucial  in  determining  culpability,  as  “[o]ne  good  
feature  of  accounts  of  liability  to  attack  that  require  culpability  is  that  they  emphasize  
something  that  obviously  has  moral  significance:  culpable  agents  intend,  foresee  or  at  least  
should  foresee  that  their  conduct  will  make  them  responsible  for  wrongful  threats  of  harm”  
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(Barry  2011:  463).  In  the  context  of  regime  change  interventions,  states’  intentional  violation  
of  this  duty  of  care  results  in  regimes’  culpability,  and  thus  a  liability  to  be  overthrown  by  
external  force.  However,  actors’  culpability  is  not  always  equally  straightforward  to  establish, 
particularly  in  states  which  are  disintegrating  or  are  in  the  throes  of  civil  war. 64  In  other  words,   
what  becomes  of  culpability  and  liability  to  intervention  in  cases  where  there  is  no  functioning  
state  to  fulfil  a  duty  of  care?  
5.3  Civil  War,  State  ‘Failure’,  and  Regime  Imposition   
  
Many  of  the  past  decades’  conflicts  have  taken  place  within  states,  and  have  been  fought  not  by  
traditional  standing  armies  but  by  militias,  insurgents  etc.  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  has  led  to  a  
focus  on  a  number  of  states  which,  now  lacking  the  support  of  an  allied  superpower,  have  
disintegrated.  In  many,  severe  ethnic  and/or  religious  tensions  have  been  at  the  root  of  violent  
civil  wars.  Others  suffer  from  endemic  poverty,  and  lack  of  basic  human  security.  Cases  of  civil  
conflict,  or  even  the  full  disintegration  of  state  authority  are  simultaneously  detrimental  to  its  
citizens  and  to  international  stability.  In  these  cases,  questions  arise  not  only  as  to  regime  
toppling,  but  also  as  to  direct  regime  imposition  in  the  absence  of  a  functioning  regime.  Indeed,  
the  necessary  clarity  of  judgment  on  culpability  is  especially  difficult  to  achieve  during  an  
internal,  i.e.  non-international  armed  conflict. 65  The  sheer  complexity  of  many  countries’   
internal  strife  makes  it  especially  hard  to  point  to  a  particular  culpable  perpetrator,  and  often  
many  of  the  parties  involved  are  guilty  of  human  rights  abuses.  Since  it  seems  unlikely  that  a  
lack  of  culpability  should  prevent  interventions  in  genuine  humanitarian  emergencies,  we  must  
also  think  about  aspects  of  regime  imposition  in  cases  of  civil  war  and  in  so-called  ‘failed  
states’,  where  this  imposition  may  be  necessary  to  prevent  future  suffering.  
64  To  reassure  observers,  states  may  maintain  that  they  are  simply  upholding  law  and  order  within  their  borders,  and   
protecting  their  populations  from  terrorist  groups:  by  designating  its  victims  as  unlawful  combatants,  states  can  call  
into  question  the  legitimacy  of  its  victims  as  ‘innocent  civilians’.  Nevertheless,  it  is  generally  the  case  that  “[w]hen  
a  government  has  to  proceed  against  its  own  subjects  without  judicial  process,  we  could  argue,  it  has  clearly  lost  
authority.  Civil  war  is  a  measure  to  which  governments  resort  only  when  they  can  no  longer  call  on  the  ordinary  
procedures  of  judicial  control”,  as  O’Donovan  has  accurately  written  (2003:  21).  
  
65  It  has  been  stated  that  “[u]nder  Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949,   
non-international  armed  conflicts  are  armed  conflicts  in  which  one  or  more  non-State  armed  groups  are  involved.  
[...]  hostilities  may  occur  between  governmental  armed  forces  and  non-State  armed  groups  or  between  such  groups  
only”  (ICRC  Casebook  2020:  para.  1).  In  addition,  “[b]anditry,  unorganized  or  short  lived  insurrections  or  terrorist  
activities  are  [...]  excluded  from  the  applicability  of  the  1949  Geneva  Conventions”  (RULAC  2017:  para.  9).  
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5.3.1  Intervention  in  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  
  
The  challenges  of  culpability  allocation  as  well  as  its  effects  can  be  illustrated  with  reference  to  
the  bloody  fighting  surrounding  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  emergence  as  a  sovereign  state.  The  
Bosnian  War’s  (1992-1995)  notoriety  as  the  most  brutal  of  several  notable  conflicts  which  
followed  the  breakup  of  multiethnic  Yugoslavia  stems  from  the  conflict  between  opposing  
armies  and  irregular  militias,  but  also  from  the  widespread  torture  and  killing  of  civilians  
amounting  to  ethnic  cleansing  and  genocide.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  multifaceted  conflict  
was  both  a  war  between  states  (i.e.  an  interstate  war)  and  as  a  civil  war  (i.e.  an  intrastate  
engagement),  as  it  involved  both  state  actors  (the  former  constituent  republics  of  Yugoslavia)  
and  semi-independent  militias  formed  by  different  ethnic  groups.  In  light  of  the  ambiguities  in  
establishing  culpability  in  a  multifaceted  conflict,  the  international  community  was  hesitant  to  
intervene.  The  unexpectedly  rapid  disintegration  of  the  state  combined  with  the  competing  and  
incompatible  claims  to  legitimacy  of  the  various  ethnic  groups  resulted  in  the  often  
uncoordinated  actions  of  Western  states  and  international  organisations  due  to  a  lack  of  
consensus  on  the  issue  of  culpability.  Due  to  the  complexity  of  the  situation,  the  early  
  
UNSC  response  to  Bosnia  was  ambiguous  and  inconsistent.  Lack  of  agreement  about  
the  character  of  the  conflict  among  Council  members  prevented  unity  on  the  
appropriate  response.  Council  members  disagreed  about  the  appropriateness  of  
humanitarian  intervention  because  they  disagreed  on  the  sovereign  authority  of  Bosnia,  
whether  the  conflict  was  a  civil  war  or  an  external  aggression,  and  the  identities  of  
perpetrators  and  victims  (Booth-Walling  2015:  397).  
  
The  situation  was  complicated  by  a  lack  of  a  government  capable  of  fulfilling  its  duty  of  care.  
None  of  the  ethnic  groups  involved  in  the  fighting  could  lay  an  uncontested  claim  to  sovereign  
legitimacy.  Thus,  the  allocation  of  culpability  hindered  the  formation  of  a  consensus  on  the  
region’s  liability  to  intervention  or  even  regime  imposition.  The  important  effects  of  allocating  
culpability  in  facilitating  intervention  becomes  clear  in  the  subsequent  interventions  against  
Serb  forces.  Elements  of  the  international  community  became  progressively  more  decisive  in  
its  efforts  to  identify,  and  subsequently  address,  the  Bosnian  Serbs  not  only  as  the  main  
aggressors  of  the  conflict,  but  also  as  perpetrators  of  human  rights  violations,  including  ethnic  
cleansing  of  territories  under  their  control.  While  the  actual  question  of  Bosnian  sovereignty  
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itself  was  relegated  to  the  background,  Security  Council  Resolution  819  (1993)  asserted  that  
the  Council’s  members  were  
  
[c]oncerned  by  the  pattern  of  hostilities  by  Bosnian  Serb  paramilitary  units  against  
towns  and  villages  in  eastern  Bosnia  and  in  this  regard  reaffirming  that  any  taking  or  
acquisition  of  territory  by  the  threat  or  use  of  force,  including  through  the  practice  of  
‘ethnic  cleansing’,  is  unlawful  and  unacceptable  [para.  8].  
  
More  importantly,  it  singled  out  “the  continued  deliberate  armed  attacks  and  shelling  of  the  
innocent  civilian  population  by  Bosnian  Serb  paramilitary  units”  (idem).  The  apparent  lack  of  
cooperation  from  (Bosnian)  Serb  actors  with  United  Nations  peacekeeping  forces  had  already  
been  noted.  However,  reports  of  continued  killings  shaped  a  consensus  that  Serb  forces  were  
culpable,  and  that  their  advances  had  to  be  stopped  by  military  means.  After  the  killings  in  and  
around  Srebrenica,  “most  Security  Council  members  characterized  the  Bosnian  Serbs,  aided  by  
Serbia,  as  the  perpetrators  and  the  Bosnian  Muslim  government  and  the  people  it  represented  as  
the  victims”  (Booth  Walling  2015:  399).  This  assessment  of  culpability  also  established  a  ‘just  
cause’  and  served  as  the  much-needed  impetus  for  more  rigorous  intervention.  As  Abe  (2016:  
76)  has  noted,  “the  movement  for  military  sanctions  rapidly  accelerated—first,  a  Rapid  
Reaction  Force  was  sent  to  Bosnia  in  June,  designed  to  protect  the  UNPROFOR,  [...]  and  
second,  from  late  August,  a  massive  military  campaign  was  initiated  by  NATO, 66  which   
consequently  produced  a  military  balance  among  local  (para)militaries  on  the  ground  and  
opened  the  way  for  peace  negotiations.  Through  this  process,  the  crisis  in  Bosnia  came  to  an  
end  with  the  signing  of  the  Dayton  Accord  [...]”  which  paved  the  way  for  the  radical  regime  
imposition  discussed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  VII.  Thus,  while  initial  confusion  about  
culpability  hindered  intervention,  the  assignment  of  culpability  to  the  Serbian  factions  
66  United  Nations  Secretary  General  Boutros  Ghali  stated  that  if  “Bosnian  Serb  military  leaders  persist  in  their   
intransigence,  the  United  Nations  will  continue  to  support  the  sustained  use  of  NATO  air  power  to  ensure  that  the  
suffering  of  civilians  in  the  safe  areas  is  not  further  prolonged"  (quoted  in  CNN  1995:  para.  4).  In  the  organisation’s  
own  statement,  “at  the  request  of  the  United  Nations,  NATO  provided  close  air  support  to  the  UN  Protection  Force  
(UNPROFOR)  on  the  ground  and  carried  out  air  strikes  to  protect  UN-designated  safe  havens.  […].  NATO’s  air  
operations  against  Bosnian  Serb  positions  […]  helped  pave  the  way  for  a  comprehensive  peace  agreement.  The  
operation  […]  helped  shift  the  balance  of  power  between  parties  on  the  ground.  It  also  helped  persuade  the  Bosnian  
Serb  leadership  that  the  benefits  of  negotiating  a  peace  agreement  outweighed  those  of  continuing  to  wage  war”  
(2019:  para.  34-35).  
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ultimately  led  to  an  intervention  which  stopped  “one  of  the  most  horrific  wars  to  have  taken  
place  in  Europe  since  World  War  II”  (Milovich  &  Ossewaarde  2013:  75). 67    
  
In  spite  of  their  prominence,  the  interventions  in  the  Balkans  are  not  the  only  cases  
which  shaped  the  debate  on  intervention  and  regime  change  in  the  1990s.  The  developments  in  
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  echo  some  of  the  United  Nations’  and  the  United  States’  challenges  in  
addressing  the  Somali  Civil  War  in  the  early  1990s.  Here  too,  the  problem  was  one  of  
establishing  the  culpability  requirement  in  the  absence  of  a  functioning  state.  
5.3.2  Intervention  in  Somalia   
  
Somalia  is  often  highlighted  in  relation  to  the  issue  of  ‘failed’  states’  sovereignty.  However,  it  
is  clear  that  a  failed  state  does  not  ‘spontaneously’  lose  the  rights  related  to  its  sovereignty.  
After  all,  it  is  not  the  political  regime  itself  which  is  sovereign,  so  its  absence  does  not  signify  
the  absence  of  sovereignty  per  se.  Chan  (2013:  408)  writes  that  “under  the  Westphalian  system,  
the  ‘State’  does  not  (and  arguably,  cannot)  fail.”  At  the  same  time,  it  is  obvious  that  a  
‘regime-less’  state,  or  one  embroiled  in  a  long-term  struggle  between  competing  factions,  runs  
a  much  greater  risk  of  creating  the  volatile  situations  which  are  the  cause  of  power  vacuums,  
civil  war,  and  atrocities  against  civilian  populations.  Kuperman  (2013:  136)  has  noted  that  the  
“deliberate  killing  of  civilians  [...]  is  relatively  rare  in  civil  conflicts  that  prompt  calls  for  
intervention.  Typical  cases  more  often  resemble  that  of  Libya,  where  noncombatants  are  caught  
in  the  crossfire,  rather  than  being  targeted.”  Evidently,  the  important  questions  of  liability  and  
culpability  raised  previously  are  more  difficult  to  address  in  such  situations,  as  the  case  of  
Somalia  in  the  1990s  illustrates.  
  
For  much  of  the  1990s,  there  was  no  clear-cut  ‘central  authority’  present  in  Somalia  to  
which  a  duty  of  care,  or  even  overall  culpability  for  human  rights  violations  in  the  country  
could  have  been  allocated.  F ollowing  the  outbreak  of  civil  war,  the  civilian  population  suffered  
67  Comparisons  between  the  war  in  Bosnia  and  the  Second  World  War  are  surprisingly  common.  For  instance,  in   
highlighting  the  moral  responsibility  of  states  to  halt  the  killings  of  civilians,  British  Prime  Minister  John  Major  
stated  that  “there  had  been  nothing  like  it  in  Europe  since  the  second  world  war”  (1995:  para  4).  In  the  aftermath  of  
intervention,  Chesterman  (2004:  52)  has  noted  that  “the  presence  of  large  numbers  of  foreign  troops,  an  international  
war  crimes  process,  and  summary  dismissal  of  its  politicians  by  an  international  administrator  in  Bosnia  bore  more  
than  a  passing  resemblance  to  occupied  Germany  of  1945–1949.”  
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heavily  from  the  effects  of  violence  and  hunger.  This  suffering  was  compounded  further  by  the  
fact  that  most  humanitarian  aid  did  not  reach  them  (Clark  1993).  This  made  for  a  strong  case  
for  international  humanitarian  intervention,  which  was  supported  by  the  United  Nations  
Security  Council.  The  Security  Council  Resolution  794  (1992:  para  3)  unequivocally  notes  that  
“the  magnitude  of  the  human  tragedy  caused  by  the  conflict  in  Somalia,  further  exacerbated  by  
the  obstacles  being  created  to  the  distribution  of  humanitarian  assistance,  constitutes  a  threat  to  
international  peace  and  security.”  Consequently,  the  United  Nations  and  the  United  States  
resolved  to  intervene  in  order  “to  restore  peace,  stability  and  law  and  order  with  a  view  to  
facilitating  the  process  of  a  political  settlement  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations”  
(ibid.).  Crucially,  beyond  the  humanitarian  motives  for  intervention,  an  ideological  background  
is  discernible:  it  has  been  noted  that  President  George  H.  W.  Bush  “saw  the  intervention  as  a  
gesture  towards  his  publicly  articulated  vision  of  a  peaceful  ‘new  world  order’,  in  which  Cold  
War  politics  as  usual  had  been  suspended.  Somalia  was  to  be  the  poster  child  of  this  new  order,  
as,  in  contrast  to  the  recently  won  Gulf  War  [...],  the  US  had  no  obvious  national  (strategic  or  
energy-related)  interest  at  stake  here”  (Kapteijns  2013:  424).  Thus,  the  intervention  in  Somalia  
can  be  interpreted  as  being  one  of  the  first  in  the  long  line  of  ‘liberal’  wars  which  have  
continued  into  the  present  day.  
  
The  intervention  is  often  discussed  for  its  infringement  on  the  sovereign  rights  of  a  
nominally  autonomous  state.  It  has  been  noted  that  “unusual  about  [the  UNSC]  resolution  was  
not  just  the  authorization  of  the  use  of  all  necessary  force  but  also  its  disregard  of  Somali  
national  sovereignty,  justified,  also  under  Chapter  VII,  in  terms  of  the  threat  the  Somali  crisis  
posed  to  ‘international  peace  and  security’”  (Kapteijns  2013:  424).  In  this  case,  the  lack  of  a  
culpable  actor  was  not  seen  as  an  obstacle.  Rather,  it  even  facilitated  the  argument  for  
intervention:  Booth-Walling  argues  that  “[w]ithout  a  legitimate  government,  Somalia’s  very  
viability  as  a  state  was  in  question,  easing  the  perceived  tension  between  Article  2.7  of  the  UN  
Charter  and  human  rights  principles'”  (2015:  395).  She  further  notes  that  “Somalia  was  a  failed  
state  with  no  sovereign  government,  and  thus  no  sovereignty  to  be  undermined”  and  “[b]ecause  
sovereign  authority  was  absent  in  Somalia,  the  Council  was  able  to  undertake  early  forcible  
military  action  there  in  defense  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  principles”  (idem:  396).   
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5.3.3  Compounding  State  Failure  
  
The  lack  of  certainty  surrounding  the  sovereign  rights  of  ‘failed’  states  facilitated  an  initial  
humanitarian  intervention,  but  subsequently  also  prevented  a  successful  intervention  or  even  
the  imposition  of  a  new  regime.  From  the  outset,  the  intervention  suffered  from  a  lack  of  
unified  vision  for  a  post-conflict  Somalia,  and  the  complexity  of  the  situation  on  the  ground.  In  
other  words,  while  the  motives  for  intervention  were  clear,  its  intentions  were  not.  Although  
the  professed  aim  was  to  facilitate  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid  and  to  stabilise  the  overall  
situation,  how  exactly  this  would  be  achieved  in  the  long  term.  Indeed,  whether  something  akin  
to  regime  imposition  was  a  future  option  was  left  unclear.  Thus,  the  United  Nations  insisted  on  
“[r]ecognizing  that  the  people  of  Somalia  bear  ultimate  responsibility  for  national  
reconciliation  and  the  reconstruction  of  their  own  country”  (UNSCR  794:  para.  15).  Similarly,  
George  H.  W.  Bush,  in  his  ‘Address  to  the  Nation  on  the  Situation  in  Somalia’  of  December  4,  
1992,  stated  that  “to  the  people  of  Somalia  I  promise  this:  We  do  not  plan  to  dictate  political  
outcomes.  We  respect  your  sovereignty  and  independence”  (1992:  para.  14).  Later,  his  
successor  President  Bill  Clinton  (1993  [b])  had  yet  again  insisted  that  
  
[w]e  have  no  interest  in  keeping  any  clan  or  subclan  or  group  of  Somalis  out  of  the  
political  process  affecting  the  future  of  their  people.  The  clan  structure  seems  to  be  the  
dominant  structure  in  the  country.  It  is  not  for  the  United  States  or  for  the  United  
Nations  to  eliminate  whole  groups  of  people  from  having  a  role  in  Somalia's  future.  The  
Somalis  must  decide  that  with  the  help  and  guidance,  I  believe,  primarily  of  the  African  
states  and  leadership  around  them,  first  of  all  (para.  29).  
  
However,  the  mission  soon  turned  from  a  humanitarian  intervention  into  something  which  
much  more  resembles  the  counterinsurgency  campaigns  of  21st  century  regime  change  wars.  
After  one  of  the  many  factions  in  the  civil  war,  General  Mohammad  Aideed  and  his  Somali  
National  Alliance  faction  were  held  responsible  for  attacks  on  United  Nations  personnel  
(Gordon  1994),  the  UN  and  the  United  States  clearly  began  to  perceive  General  Aideed’s  
forces  as  the  main  destabilising,  i.e.  culpable,  factor  in  the  Somali  civil  unrest.  This  shift  
marked  a  distinct  change  in  the  overall  intent  of  the  mission.  President  Clinton  confirmed  that  
“the  Special  Representative  of  the  Secretary  General,  acting  pursuant  to  Security  Council  
Resolution  837,  ordered  the  arrest  of  General  Mohammed  Farah  Aideed  for  alleged  criminal  
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acts  against  UNOSOM  II  peacekeeping  forces  […]”  (1993  [a]:  para.  5).  Indeed,  as  the  former  
US  ambassador,  Robert  Oakley  has  noted,  “[o]nce  events  deteriorated  to  the  point  where  the  
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  was  passed  and  Aidid  was  clearly  the  enemy  even  though  it  
wasn't  specified  in  the  Resolution  itself,  it  put  everybody  in  an  extremely  difficult  dangerous  
situation  because  confrontation  was  there”  (1995:  para.  44).  The  allocation  of  culpability  to  a  
particular  actor  transformed  the  stabilisation  mission  into  a  direct  military  intervention  which  
was  to  be  led  by  the  United  States.  Thus,  it  has  been  concluded  that  ultimately  “the  intervention  
was  undermined  by  the  lack  of  strategic  coherence  and  cooperation,  but  also  by  the  fact  that  
international  forces  became  an  active  part  of  the  conflict,  exacerbating  and  legitimising  the  
existing  factional  conflict”  (Malito  2017:  291).  
  
In  response  to  the  steadily  deteriorating  security  situation,  ‘Operation  Gothic  Serpent’  
was  launched  to  locate  and,  if  possible,  capture  Aideed  in  Mogadishu.  However,  the  mission  
objective’s  abject  failure,  and  more  importantly,  the  death  of  United  States  military  personnel  
in  the  Battle  of  Mogadishu  led  to  a  complete  withdrawal  of  US  forces  from  the  conflict,  which  
caused  the  collapse  of  the  entire  intervention  (Lorch  1994).  Thus,  Stupart  asserts  that  after  “the   
intervention  of  the  United  Nations  in  Somalia  in  the  early  1990s  having  been  a  colossal  failure  
in  terms  of  conflict  prevention  and  resolution,  precious  little  effort  has  been  made  other  than  
World  Food  Programme  shipments  being  transported  regularly  through  the  pirate-infested  
waters”  (2011:  53),  adding  that  “since  the  UN’s  departure  in  1995  following  the  failure  of  
UNOSOM  I  and  II,  Somalia  has  suffered  virtually  constant  civil  war  at  the  hands  of  several  
clan  warlords  vying  for  their  own  segment  of  power  in  the  region”  (idem:  54).  In  the  absence  
of  a  commitment  to  substantial  regime  imposition,  the  intervention  in  Somalia  has  been  widely  
regarded  as  an  important  failure  to  act  on  the  ideals  of  the  US-led  new  world  order,  and  cast  
doubt  on  the  advantages  of  liberal  interventionism  in  promoting  global  stability.   
  
After  years  of  being  largely  ignored  by  the  rest  of  the  international  community  during  
the  remaining  years  of  the  1990s,  “the  notion  of  Somalia  as  an  area  of  chaos  endangering  
global  security  became  prevalent  after  2001  when  the  phenomena  of  radical  Islamist  
movements  in  Somalia  and  piracy  gained  new  significance”  (Kapteijns  2013:  438).  Indeed,  in  
Somalia  and  elsewhere,  “one  of  the  major  causes  of  pandemic  violence  in  the  world  today  is  
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state  failure”,  as  Walzer  (2004:  [b]  38)  has  acknowledged.  Similarly,  Chan  (2013:  396)  has  
noted,  that  “in  the  ‘post-9/11  era’,  failed  states  became  the  ‘bogeyman  of  the  international  
order’,  looming  threats  of  vastly  immeasurable  strength  that  represented  the  new  and  uncharted  
waters  of  the  modern  security  epoch  [...].”  Thus,  in  the  context  of  the  War  on  Terror,  
interventionist  states  have  increasingly  emphasised  the  threat  from  the  internal  conflicts  
afflicting  failed  (and  failing)  states.  Failed  states’  internal  conflicts  have  been  shown  to  attract  
(frequently  radicalised)  foreign  fighters  who  can  have  a  long-lasting  negative  influence  on  the  
state’s  stability  as  a  whole  (e.g.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  cf.  de  Roy  van  Zuijdewijn  &  Bakker  
2014).  Furthermore,  insurgents  and  terrorist  groups  exploit  the  weakness  of  the  state  to  launch  
incursions  into  neighbouring  states  or  terrorist  attack,  while  to  an  extent  being  protected  by  the  
sovereignty  of  their  (involuntary)  host  country,  e.g.  the  Al  Shabaab  militia’s  presence  on  
Somali  territory,  or  Al  Qaeda ’s  collusion  with  the  Taliban  government  in  Afghanistan.  
Although  the  notion  of  state  ‘failure’  should  be  acknowledged  as  problematic,  it  has  come  to  be  
seen  as  something  that  must  be  contained  and  remedied  by  the  international  community,  if  
necessary  by  force  and  through  an  imposition  of  ‘better’  structures  of  governance,  i.e.  through  
foreign-imposed  regime  change.  Since  failed  and  failing  states  have  once  again  come  to  be  a  
key  concern,  Walzer  (2004  [b]:  38)  states  that  “there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  practice  of  
humanitarian  intervention  aims  to  turn  the  decrease  in  sovereignty  into  an  increase.”  Thus,  
Chan  (2013:  408)  adds  that   
  
the  breakdown  envisioned  is  not  of  the  State  (at  least,  not  when  considered  from  a  
juridical  or  political  viewpoint),  but  of  government  and  its  annexed  institutions.  When  
this  happens,  in  cases  like  Afghanistan,  Iraq  and  Somalia,  both  the  internal  and  external  
sovereignty  of  such  governments  have  been  treated  as  if  they  are  no  longer  present  (or  
have  been  substantially  mitigated).  
  
Asargued  later  on,  this  dismissal  of  supposedly  failed  state’s  sovereignty  has  important  
consequences  not  only  in  the  decision  to  intervene,  but  ultimately  in  perpetuating  instability  
and  insecurity  through  the  mismanagement  of  post  FIRC  settlements.  
  
128  
5.4  Conclusions  
  
This  chapter  has  added  several  important  clarifications  to  our  discussion  of  the  past  decades  of  
liberal  FIRC.  Primarily,  it  has  argued  that  while  regime  change  should  not  be  dismissed  as  
impermissible  per  se ,  there  are  several  important  hurdles  which  must  be  addressed  before  a  
justified  regime  change  intervention  can  be  considered.  It  was  argued  that  an  important  
distinction  between  the  liability  to  intervention  and  that  to  regime  change  must  be  made,  where  
liability  to  intervention  is  a  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  condition  for  undergoing  an  enforced  
regime  change.  Instead,  a  regime’s  culpability  must  be  based  on  its  intentional  violation  of  its 
‘duty  of  care’  for  the  population  under  its  control.  
  
The  foregoing  pages  have  established  that  while  states  can  be  liable  to  intervention  
through  certain  impermissible  acts,  such  as  internal  or  external  aggression,  claims  to  intervene  
preemptively  or  in  the  name  of  democracy  cannot  be  considered  ‘just  causes’  for  intervention.  
This  is  important,  since  a s  Fiala  (2007  [b]:  126)  has  warned  us,  a  potential  “war  to  defend  the  
idea  of  democracy  abroad  can  easily  end  up  justifying  wars  in  a  variety  of  places.  And  since  
democratization  requires  regime  change,  these  wars  will  involve  invasion,  long-term  
occupation,  and  large-scale  social  upheaval.”  Overall,  then,  the  imposition  of  any  ideology,  
even  of  an  ostensibly  benign  liberal  democracy,  cannot  be  considered  a  ‘just  cause’  for  
launching  a  war.  A  clear  refusal  to  equate  Just  War  Theory  with  attempts  to  promote  
democracy  by  force  has  the  additional  benefit  of  defending  it  against  potential  accusations  of  
being  in  league  with  ‘Western  imperialism’.   
  
As  the  chapter  has  indicated,  the  pivotal  regime  change  conflicts  in  the  Middle  East  
have  prompted  important  questions  regarding  the  demands  of  the  jus  ad  bellum ,  as  in  many  
cases,  “a  regime's  wrongs  do  not  make  military  action  right”  (Boniface  2003:  61),  in  particular  
when  this  action  aims  at  deposing  and  replacing  the  regime  in  question  altogether.  We  should  
be  wary  of  imparting  certain  moral  properties  on  political  regimes.  Even  if  we  consider  liberal  
democracy  to  be  the  most  favourable  system  in  terms  of  stability  and  human  rights  
preservation,  democratisation  should  not  qualify  as  the  right  intent  for  waging  war.  A  
democratic  state  does  not  automatically  commit  morally  good  acts  while  an  autocratic  state  is  
129  
not  in  and  of  itself  a  moral  evil.  The  strength  of  Just  War  Theory  is  to  reserve  moral  judgments  
to  states  motivations  and  actions  rather  than  their  political  nature.  Since  the  most  vociferous  
criticism  of  interventionism  (and  regime  change  in  particular)  derives  from  the  supposed  
erosion  of  states’  privileges  and  equal  status  in  the  name  of  supposedly  universal  Western  
ideals  of  humanitarianism,  this  chapter  has  sought  to  outline  under  which  circumstances  a  
regime  might  be,  in  terms  of  the  Pottery  Barn  analogy,  ‘broken’.  
Evidently,  a  certain  threshold  is  required  to  minimise  the  occurrence  of  too  many  unjust  
interventions,  and  the  question  arises  as  to  which  rights  ought  to  be  defensible  through  
intervention.  States’  representatives  regularly  declare  their  unambiguous  support  for  human  
rights,  but  their  perception  on  what  these  rights  include  and  how  to  ensure  them  often  differs  
enormously.  The  chapter  has  then  proposed  that  the  only  just  cause  for  a  FIRC  intervention  
arises  when  a  regime  is  culpable,  i.e.  complicit  in  the  abuse  of  ‘minimal’  human  rights.  This  
addresses  some  of  the  challenges  in  establishing  a  benchmark  which  allows  for  effective  action  
in  emergencies,  while  at  the  same  time  preventing  the  abuses  of  power  which  are  all  too  often  
seen  in  state  interaction.  Agreement  upon  these  basic  rights  is  possible  “in  the  presence  of  deep  
theoretical  disagreements  about  their  justification”  (Boyle  1997:  89).  The  chapter  has  argued  
that  in  order  to  undergo  regime  change,  state  actors  must  be  deemed  directly  culpable  for  
human  rights  abuses,  as  “it  isn't  only  aggressiveness  [...]  but  also  murderousness  that  makes  a  
political  regime  a  legitimate  candidate  for  forcible  transformation.  Still,  the  primary  cause  of  
the  intervention  is  to  stop  the  killing;  regime  change  follows  from  that  purpose.  An  
authoritarian  regime  that  is  capable  of  mass  murder  but  not  engaged  in  mass  murder  is  not  
liable  to  military  attack  and  political  reconstruction”  (Walzer  2006  [b]:  104).  The  sole  
exception  to  this  rule  is  found  in  interventions  in  failed  states.  In  this  context,  the  challenges  
and  potentially  negative  consequences  of  culpability  allocation  have  then  been  illustrated  with  
reference  to  conflicts  in  Bosnia  and  Somalia  in  the  1990s.  Whereas  the  Bosnian  intervention  
resulted  in  a  long-term  regime  imposition,  the  withdrawal  from  Somalia  compounded  its  status  
as  a  ‘failed’  state,  highlighting  the  need  to  clarify  actors  post-intervention  responsibilities  (cf.  
Chapter  VII).  
  
In  light  of  the  numerous  episodes  of  human  suffering  in  both  authoritarian  and  failed  
states,  it  has  been  argued  that  “[i]t  is  a  measure  of  how  far  just  war  theory  has  moved  away  
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from  the  Westphalian  model  has  focused  on  whether,  on  nationalist  grounds,  he  gives  too  much  
weight  to  the  presumption  of  state  sovereignty  against  action  to  stop  unjust  regimes”  that  much  
of  the  contemporary  debate  about  Walzer's  influential  Just  and  Unjust  Wars  (Davenport  2011:  
523).  Ultimately,  if  we  accept  that  excessive  violations  of  explicitly  universal  human  rights  
should  have  consequences  on  the  perpetrator  state’s  sovereign  immunity,  the  international  
community  cannot  stand  by  while  its  members  commit  egregious  rights  abuses.  However,  it  is  
equally  clear  that  the  “use  of  force  -  no  matter  how  benevolent,  enlightened,  or  impartial  in  
intent  -  has  dramatic  consequences”  (Thakur  2013:  61).  
  
Chapter  VI:  Authority,  Legitimacy  and  Responsibility   
  
Now  that  the  previous  sections  of  the  thesis  have  focused  on  the  threshold  for  intervention,  this  
chapter  discusses  the  particular  responsibility  of  members  of  the  international  community  to  
avoid  human  rights  violations,  and  even  to  intervene  militarily  where  needed.  If  such  rightful  
actions  (in  the  form  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change)  exist,  then  there  are  also  appropriate  
actors  who  can  be  held  responsible  for  carrying  them  out.  Consequently,  the  following  pages  
address  actors’  authority  and  legitimacy,  and  argues  that  a  distinction  between  states’  general  
and  special  responsibilities  underlines  the  importance  of  context  in  judging  FIRC  interventions.  
Thus,  Toni  Erskine  writes  that  “judgments  of  moral  responsibility  must  be  directed  toward  
entities  capable  of  responding  to  ethical  imperatives.  In  other  words,  they  must  be  directed  
toward  moral  agents,  or  those  bodies  that  possess  capacities  to  contemplate,  recognize  the  
significance  of,  and  ultimately  execute  different  courses  of  action”  (2014:  118).  In  following  
the  logic  of  the  Pottery  Barn  example,  this  means  that  since  we  have  established  when  a  state  
may  be  broken,  we  must  also  examine  which  actors can  be  held  responsible  for  handling  the  
intervention  and,  perhaps,  influence  the  post-war  reconfiguration  of  the  regime.  In  other  words,  
after  discussing  when  to  intervene ,  the  next  chapter  asks  who  should  act.  
  
Despite  the  fact  that  numerous  liberal  heads  of  state  and  international  organizations  
continue  to  highlight  the  importance  of  global  justice  and  human  rights  protection,  few  seem  
prepared,  or  able,  to  take  significant  steps  in  acting  on  these  ideals.  Indeed,  it  has  been  claimed  
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that  “[w]ithout  effective  military  intervention  by  states  willing  and  able  to  enforce  these  rights  
[...]  the  rights  themselves  become  meaningless”  (Aronofsky  2007:  318).  Accordingly,  in  cases  
of  democide  and  similarly  grave  transgressions  against  ‘thin’  conceptions  of  human  rights,  
intervention  is  often  preferable  to  inaction,  and  can  in  some  rare  cases  even  pave  the  way  for  a  
justified  regime  change.  Indeed,  as  McMillan  and  Mickler  (2013:  286)  have  pointed  out,  
“seeking  to  protect  civilians  through  on-going  cooperation  with  a  genocidal  regime,  rather  than  
removing  it,  clearly  undermines  the  effectiveness,  if  not  the  very  notions,  of  both  the  
responsibility  to  protect  and  combating  sovereign  impunity.”  This  understanding  is  also  
reflected  in  the  ideals  of  the  Liberal  World  Order  which  has  emerged  following  the  Cold  War.  
In  this  context,  regimes’  legitimacy,  and  consequently  states’  sovereignty,  is  linked  to  their  
cooperation  with  this  order.  If  they  do  not  comply,  for  example  by  exhibiting  internally  
aggressive  behaviour,  they  can  become  liable  to  forcible  intervention  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  the  
‘international  community’.  
  
The  resulting  debates  about  humanitarian  intervention,  and  the  inevitable  parallel  
discussions  about  FIRC,  raise  questions  regarding  states’  legitimacy  and  their  global  
responsibilities,  as  well  as  the  role  of  the  UN  Security  Council  in  authorising  armed  
intervention.  Orford  has  noted  that  “[t]hroughout  the  1990s,  international  executive  action  in  
response  to  humanitarian  crises  expanded  dramatically.  With  that  expansion  in  the  scope  and  
complexity  of  international  operations,  it  became  clear  that  existing  political  and  legal  concepts  
could  not  fully  grasp  the  nature  of  this  form  of  rule  or  address  the  questions  about  legitimacy,  
authority,  and  credibility  to  which  it  gave  rise”  (2013:  98).  There  have  been  numerous  
‘humanitarian’  interventions  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  both  “those  authorized  as  
exceptional  Chapter  VII  missions  by  the  Security  Council  and  those  that  continue  to  defy  
authorization,  such  as  the  U.S.-led  invasions  of  Afghanistan  and  Iraq”  (Denike  2008:  96).  A  
lack  of  UNSC  backing  is  not  in  itself  cause  for  condemnation,  however,  as  it  is  also  the  case  
that  
  
meaningful  outside  military  interventions  in  genuine  humanitarian  emergencies  (as  in  
Cambodia,  East  Pakistan,  Uganda,  and  Haiti)  have  been  conducted  very  effectively  on  
behalf  of  the  ‘international  community’  by  unilateral  actors  and  regional  security 
organizations.  By  contrast,  as  in  Rwanda  and  initially  in  Bosnia,  the  United  Nations,  as  
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the  putative  representative  body  of  ‘the  international  community’,  has  not  been  nearly 
as  effective  as  these  unilateral  and  collective  regional  actors  in  rising  to  the  challenge  
that  humanitarian  intervention  imposes  (Lucas  2003:  126).  
  
6.1  The  ‘Legitimate  Authority’  Requirement   
  
In  potential  cases  of  an  ostensibly  ‘humanitarian  FIRC’,  debates  on  agency  unsurprisingly  raise  
the  question  as  to  whether  it  even  truly  matters  who  acts  in  global  emergencies.  Walzer’s  point  
that  ‘whoever  can’  act  in  halting  massive  rights  abuses  should  in  fact  also  do  so  (2017)  is  
appealing.  Nonetheless,  it  ultimately  clashes  with  the  classical  Just  War  tradition’s  aim  to  
restrict  the  number  of  actors  who  can  justifiably  use  lethal  force,  and  so  avoids  important 
concerns  about  the  nature  of  legitimate  agency.  The  Just  War  Tradition  has  long  held  that  a  
‘legitimate  authority’  must  be  present  to  engage  in  warfare. 68  Although  their  conflation  is   
common,  the  legitimacy  and  authority  concepts  are  ultimately  not  entirely  identical.  As  will  be  
argued,  the  authority  to  act  implies  a  sense  of  moral  (and  often  legal)  eligibility  for  action,  
whereas  legitimacy  is  derived  from  the  nature  of  the  intended  act.  Thus,  the  thesis  addresses  the  
demand  that  actors  must  fulfil  the  requirements  of  both  the  ‘authority’  and  ‘legitimacy’  to  
engage  in  armed  conflict.  Ultimately,  the  aim  is  again  to  limit ,  rather  than  expand,  the  pool  of  
potentially  acceptable  belligerents.   
  
Actors  in  possession  of  authority  are  considered  to  be  capable  of  moral  agency,  and  
Parry  notes  that  possessing  authority  “means  that  one’s  belligerent  activities  are  ‘eligible  for 
justification”  (2017:  170). 69  Many  of  the  early  iterations  of  Just  War  Theory  derive  temporal   
authority  from  the  eternal  authority  of  God.  Traditionally,  only  ‘Princes’,  and  later,  the  regimes  
of  sovereign  states  are  held  to  be  invested  with  the  authority  needed  to  conduct  war.  In  the  
more  recent  past,  actions  by  international  organisations  such  as  the  UN  and  NATO  are  
68  Pabst  (2007:  738)  has  for  instance  written  that  any  “truly  just  war  requires  [...]  a  genuine  cause  and  a  rightful   
authority.”  
  
69  While  the  Just  War  Theory  continues  to  play  a  crucial  part  in  interrogating  the  ethical  implications  of  such  use  of   
force,  “there  is  no  explicit  discussion  of  multinationalism  or  of  moral  cosmopolitanism  in  the  treatment  of  ‘right  
authority’  in  the  classical  just  war  tradition”  (Lucas  2003:  127).  
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generally  considered  to  ultimately  derive  their  authority  from  that  of  their  state  members. 70   
This  also  means  that  in  the  current  state-centric  system,  nongovernmental  organisations  are  
excluded  from  this  moral  agency:  the  various  non-state  agents  which  are  part  of  the  
international  sphere  (multinational  companies,  terrorist  groups  etc.)  are  not  generally  seen  as  
‘qualified’  to  engage  in  war. 71  This  restriction  of  international  authority  to  states  and  to  the   
organisations  they  have  established  is  not  universally  accepted.  Many  revisionist  scholars  
“conclude  that  the  authority  requirement  lacks  moral  foundations''  (Finlay  et  al .  2017:  167).  
Cecile  Fabre’s  ‘cosmopolitan’  conception  of  authority,  for  instance,  includes  calls  for  a  radical  
broadening  of  the  number  of  actors  with  the  authority  to  declare  and  wage  war.  She  criticises  
the  prevalent  state-centrism’s  supposed  clash  with  the  cosmopolitan  ideals  which  underpin  our  
understanding  of  humanitarian  intervention,  even  arguing  up  to  the  conclusion  that  “a  
cosmopolitan  account  of  the  just  war  must  renounce  the  requirement  that  a  war  be  declared  by  
a  legitimate  authority  in  order  to  be  just”  (2008:  968).  
  
However,  in  outlining  the  agents  of  FIRC  this  chapter  argues  that  the  ‘state-centric’  
view  of  international  authority  should  be  retained.  Given  Just  War’s  widely-acknowledged  aim  
to  limit  the  number  of  (unjust)  wars  and  regime  changes,  broadening  or  even  eliminating  the  
need  for  legitimate  authority  inevitably  muddles  an  already  complex  debate,  and  ultimately  has  
the  potential  to  precipitate  more,  rather  than  less,  conflict.  The  prominence  accorded  to  the  
requirement  of  authority  is  meant  to  reduce  the  number  of  those  capable  of  permissibly  waging  
wars  to  select  actors,  i.e.  the  international  community  and  the  individual  states  which  constitute  
it.  In  addition,  any  intervention,  and  especially  one  which  aims  at  regime  change,  is  unlikely  to  
succeed  without  actors  which  are  capable  of  such  a  commitment.  In  the  case  of  regime  removal  
70  In  the  21st  century,  agency  is  not  exclusively  limited  to  individual  states:  Toni  Erskine  (2014:  120)  contends  that   
“one  might  argue  that  most  states  and  many  intergovernmental  organizations  (including  the  United  Nations  and,  
perhaps,  some  regional  alliances  of  states  such  as  NATO  and  the  Arab  League)  possess  the  sophisticated,  integrated  
capacities  for  deliberation  and  action  that  allow  them  to  qualify  as  institutional  moral  agents.”  
   
71  In  contrast  to  most  Just  War  approaches,  “in  international  law,  there  is  no  single  overarching  concept  of  authority   
to  use  military  means.  Instead,  there  exists  authority  to  do  different  things  for  different  purposes,  allocated  to  
different  actors  who  base  their  authority  on  different  characteristics  (state  legitimacy,  level  of  representativeness,  
military  power,  or  control)”,  as  Wrange  notes  (2017:  208).  
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and  a  subsequent  imposition,  only  states  have  the  resources  required  for  intervention. 72  This  is   
the  case  because  
  
the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  and  egregious  violations  of  human  rights  -  
marginalised,  excluded,  often  persecuted  -  have  little  capacity  to  hold  their  national  
authorities  accountable.  Only  the  international  community  -  including  subregional,  
regional,  and  international  organisations  -  has  the  leverage  and  clout  to  persuade  
national  governments  and  other  concerned  actors  to  discharge  their  responsibilities  in  
this  regard,  or  otherwise  face  the  consequences  of  the  vacuum  left  by  irresponsible  or  
unresponsive  sovereignty  (Deng  2010:   370).   
  
Whereas  both  state  actors  and  international  organisations  have  the  potential  authority  to  act,  
they  do  not  necessarily  possess  the  legitimacy  to  do  so.  The  basic  premise  discussed  earlier,  
namely  that  actors  have  a  responsibility  to  halt  atrocities,  logically  entails  that  there  is  a  ‘pool’  
of  potentially  legitimate  agents  unto  whom  this  responsibility  can  be  allocated  in  times  of  
crisis.  Reus-Smit  writes  that  “[w]hen  we  describe  something  as  legitimate  we  are  saying  that  it  
is  normatively  acceptable;  that  it  is  consistent  with  our  established  beliefs  about  rightful  agency  
and  action”  (2014:  345).  Consequently,  in  assessing  legitimacy  in  FIRC,  it  is  tied  both  to  
actors’  motives  and  intentions,  and  to  the  underlying  ‘just  cause’  for  action,  but  is  also  more  
generally  applied  to  the  legitimate  nature  of  states.  
  
As  indicated  earlier,  contemporary  views  of  legitimacy  are  best  understood  within  the  
context  of  a  global  order,  which  is  embodied  in  the  notion  of  an  international  community.  Thus,  
as  Clark  writes,  “just  as  there  is  no  concept  of  legitimacy  outside  of  community,  it  can  equally  
be  held  that  a  community  does  not  exist  without  its  own  sense  of  legitimacy”  (2003:  80).  The  
contemporary  Liberal  Order  is  built  on  the  influential  notion  of  a  legitimate  international  
community  of  states,  which  “is  presumed  to  possess  agency,  the  ability  to  act  in  the  world.  
Moreover,  this  agency  is  often  assumed  to  be  explicitly  moral,  insofar  as  a  characteristic  usage  
is  to  suggest  that  the  international  community  has  a  moral  duty  to  do  such-and-such  -  come  to  
the  aid  of  famine  victims,  protect  the  human  rights  of  the  East  Timorese,  or  whatever”  (Brown  
72  Kurth  (2006:  90)  clarifies  that  “[t]he  possible  military  forces  have  varied  from  standing  expeditionary  forces  (e.g.,   
the  military  forces  of,  again,  the  United  States  or  Britain),  through  temporary  coalitions  of  similar  military  forces  
under  the  leadership  of  one  of  them  (e.g.,  the  NATO  forces  in  Bosnia  and  Kosovo),  to  ad  hoc  multinational  forces  
composed  of  disparate  military  units  drawn  from  several  different  states  (e.g.,  the  UN  peacekeeping  forces  in  the  
initial  phase  of  the  interventions  in  Somalia,  Bosnia,  and  Sierra  Leone).”  
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2001:  87)  and,  as  Denike  has  noted,  “the  apparent  willingness  of  the  so-called  ‘international  
community’  to  affirm  the  aspirations  of  human  rights  is  truly  exceptional”  (2008:  96).  The  
United  Nations,  its  Security  Council,  and  its  various  agencies  are  often  seen  as  the  chief  
‘representative’  of  this  international  community,  and  accordingly,  they  are  often  ascribed  a  
particularly  powerful  sense  of  both  legitimacy  and  authority.  
6.1.1  The  United  Nations  and  the  UN  Security  Council  
  
The  year  2020  marked  the  seventy-fifth  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the  United  Nations.  In  
the  decades  since  its  establishment,  both  its  expectations  and  its  ambitions  have  shifted.  Some  
early  proponents  of  the  United  Nations  system  had  expected  “that  by  absolutely  prohibiting  the  
use  of  non-defensive  force,  the  UN  Charter  would  usher  in  a  new  era  of  peaceful  relations  
among  states,  in  which  force  would  no  longer  be  necessary  to  maintain  that  peace.  
Furthermore,  it  was  thought  that  peace  itself  would  foster  the  conditions  necessary  for  justice  to  
flourish”  (Brown  2011:  125).  While  this  sense  of  global  justice  evidently  proved  to  be  elusive  
throughout  the  Cold  War,  Everett  notes  that  “[t]he  1990s  opened  with  great  optimism  about  the  
UN’s  capacity  to  improve  international  peace  and  security  absent  the  constraints  of  the  Cold  
War  superpower  competition”  (2019:  259).  Thus,  any  intervention  would  ideally  be  sanctioned  
by  a  UN  Security  Council  now  supposedly  ‘freed’  from  its  Cold  War  deadlock.  Indeed,  “after  
the  Cold  War”,  Kinacioglu  writes,  “with  revitalization  of  the  Security  Council,  the  Security  
Council  authorized  collective  action  to  restore  democratically  elected  government  in  two  cases  
-  Haiti  and  Sierra  Leone  -  whereby  it  determined  the  existence  of  a  threat  of  international  peace  
and  security”  (2012:  41).  The  multilateral  nature  of  UNSC  decisions  is  amplified  by  “[t]he  
classic  argument  in  favour  of  multilateral  approval  [which]  holds  that  it  is  desirable  because  it  
signals  compliance  with  widely-accepted  international  norms  and  comes  close  to  expressing 
the  ‘general  will’  of  international  society”  (Recchia  2017:  52).  These  presumed  advantages  of  
the  UNSC  system  have  also  influenced  more  recent  developments,  including  the  Responsibility  




It  is  evidently  not  the  thesis’  aim  to  be  drawn  into  the  wider  debate  about  the  particular  
strengths  and  faults  of  the  current  United  Nations  system,  or  indeed  about  its  future  capacity  
for  global  peacekeeping.  However,  when  discussing  intervention  and  the  legitimacy  required  
for  a  potentially  just  FIRC,  we  cannot  help  but  acknowledge  that  the  UN’s  successes  are  often  
overshadowed  by  its  failure  to  prevent  war  and  human  suffering,  giving  rise  to  increasing  
criticism  of  the  United  Nations  system  in  general  and  the  Security  Council  in  particular. 73   
Despite  its  ambitions,  the  UN  “sometimes  pretends  that  it  already  is  what  it  has  barely  begun  to  
be”  (Walzer  2006  [a]:  xx).  Thus,  it  continues  to  rely  on  member  states  to  take  up  the  burden  of  
intervention,  including  FIRC,  while  conferring  upon  them  the  legitimacy  of  acting  in  the  name  
of  the  community.  This  includes  the  possibility  of  actors  acquiring  legal  legitimacy  after  acting   
by  forms  of  ex  post  facto  Security  Council  legitimisation  (Kassab  2017).  However,  this  
‘delegation’  of  authority  has  also  been  criticised  more  recently,  especially  in  relation  to  its  
reliance  on  NATO.  As  Carati  (2017:  299)  notes,  “[t]he  practice  of  ‘delegated  authority’  by  the  
UN  was  consistent  with  another  normative  change:  a  reinterpretation  of  the  Just  War  theory  
that  saw  the  normative  requirement  of  the  Right  Authority  fading  in  favour  of  other  criteria  
including  just  cause,  right  intention,  proportionality,  prospect  of  success.”  He  goes  on  to  argue  
against  this  reinterpretation  and  the  increased  role  played  by  NATO,  and  rightly  states  that  
“[e]ven  when  acting  according  to  a  Security  Council  resolution,  NATO  is  not  an  executive  
branch  of  the  UN.  The  Alliance  is  not  accountable  to  it,  it  cannot  be  sanctioned  by  it  and  
arguably,  the  UN  does  not  have  the  power  to  detail  or  withdraw  the  mandate”  (idem:  301).  
  
What  is  more,  it  has  often  been  the  Security  Council  itself  which  has  been  the  target  of  
sustained  criticism,  especially  for  the  perceived  inaction  or  deadlock  of  the  UNSC  in  
humanitarian  emergencies,  including  where  foreign-imposed  regime  change  would  have  been  a  
possibility.  Since  effective  UN  action  rests  on  Security  Council  agreement,  it  is  clear  that  the  
need  for  UNSC  approval  constitutes  the  ‘Achilles  Heel’  of  many  potential  interventions.  For  
example,  Pabst  (2007:  738)  has  pointed  out  that  while  “in  principle,  the  United  Nations  is  the  
only  credible  vehicle  for  these  endeavours  [...]  an  unrepresentative  Security  Council  is  at  the  
mercy  of  the  major  nations  who  may  veto  any  majority  action.  National  self-interest  can  thwart  
73  Indeed,  “the  Security  Council’s  failure  to  act  effectively,  for  years  in  the  former  Yugoslavia,  and  with  devastating   
consequences  in  Rwanda,  drew  much  more  criticism  than  its  authorization  of  peacekeeping  actions  in  troubled  
societies  ranging  from  Angola  and  Mozambique  to  Guatemala”  (Buchanan  &  Keohane  2011:  49).  
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collective  global  justice.  In  the  absence  of  majority  voting  within  an  expanded  Security  
Council,  the  UN  (like  NATO)  remains  fatally  hidebound  by  its  veto-wielding  members.”  
Etzioni  has  added  that  it  would  be  “hard  to  regard  a  body  as  legitimate  when  its  ruling  can  be  
vetoed  by  any  of  the  five  permanent  Security  Council  members”  (2006:  82). 74  However,  even   
in  cases  where  the  veto  has  not  been  used  by  its  members,  the  UN  Security  Council,  and  by  
extension  the  UN  itself,  have  failed  to  prevent  mass  atrocities  where  intervention  and  even  
regime  change  would  have  been  justified,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  now-infamous  case  of  the  
genocide  in  Rwanda.  
6.1.2  Failure  to  Act:  The  Rwandan  Genocide  
  
The  Rwandan  Genocide  has  been  described  as  “the  most  murderously  efficient  bout  of  mass  
killing  in  the  twentieth  century”  (Berdal  2005:  117),  ultimately  involving  the  loss  of  hundreds  
of  thousands  of  lives.  The  ruling  Hutu  government  and  its  allies  clearly  fulfilled  the  
requirements  of  culpability  established  earlier,  and  thus  rendered  themselves  liable  to  removal  
and  replacement  in  order  to  halt  the  large-scale  killings.  The  failure  to  act  in  Rwanda  is  
routinely  considered  to  have  been  a  grave  mistake,  and  an  occasion  where  the  international  
community  would  have  had  a  particularly  clear  mandate  not  only  for  armed  intervention  but  for  
actions  amounting  to  a  forcible  regime  change.  The  regime  was  clearly  culpable  for  violating  
its  duty  of  care,  and  while  ‘counterfactual’  considerations  should  be  treated  with  skepticism,  
earlier  and  more  robust  action  by  the  United  Nations  against  the  regime  in  Rwanda  would  
likely  have  forestalled  at  least  some  of  the  mass  killings.   
  
Although  the  simmering  tensions  in  the  country  were  a  direct  legacy  of  its  colonial  
past, 75  neither  former  colonial  powers  nor  other  leading  states  appreciated  the  significance  of   
74  Of  course,  the  veto  system  had  been  created  in  the  context  of  an  emerging  Cold  War,  and  arguably  continues  to   
play  a  role  in  avoiding  great  power  confrontation  and  in  minimising  the  chance  of  unjust  wars.  Nonetheless,  as  is  
argued  later  in  this  chapter,  in  cases  of  obvious  human  rights  abuses  the  P5  have  the  duty  to  uphold  the  commitments  
to  human  rights  which  they  have  made  upon  the  creation  of  the  Security  Council.  
  
75  Pieterse  (1997:  82)  has  summed  up  the  origins  of  the  conflict  by  arguing  that  “differences  between  Hutus  and   
Tutsis  had  been  fluid  and  fuzzy  -  at  one  stage  they  amounted  to  no  more  than  the  number  of  cattle  in  a  family's  
possession.  But  they  were  frozen  into  a  "tribal  matrix"  during  the  period  of  German  colonialism  and  particularly  
during  the  Belgian  mandate  period  from  1916  to  1960.  Identities  were  fixed,  and  fuzzy  communities  transformed  
into  sharply  delineated  communities,  through  the  issue  of  tribal  identity  cards,  a  practice  continued  after  
Independence.”  
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the  developments  towards  open  and  increasingly  violent  conflict  between  ethnic  groups,  and  
the  UNAMIR  peacekeeping  force  failed  to  stabilise  the  situation  and  prevent  the  slaughter.  
From  the  start,  “the  early  UN  presence  did  not  have  the  right  mandate.  There  is  no  reason  to  
assume  that  greater  capacity  without  improved  political  analysis  and  appropriate  mandates  
would  make  a  difference,  other  than  making  matters  proportionally  worse  (Pieterse  1997:  89).  
Even  when  it  became  clear  that  large-scale  killings  were  a  clear  prospect,  Simon  argues  that 
“there  was  practically  zero  support  among  the  P5  for  more  robust  UN  peacekeeping  
engagement.  Russia  and  China  were  tepid,  at  best,  towards  the  very  concept  of  multilateral  
interventions,  wary  of  allowing  operations  that  seemingly  allowed  Western  powers  to  challenge  
global  norms  of  sovereignty”  (2020:  204).   
  
Ultimately,  the  international  community  which  was  emerging  in  the  post-Cold  War  era  
failed  to  commit  decisively  to  protect  civilians,  which  in  turn  severely  damaged  the  UN’s  
position  as  a  principal  advocate  of  human  rights. 76  While  a  few  years  later,  then-Secretary   
General  Annan  “claimed  for  the  first  time  that  the  principle  of  neutrality  was  overcome  by  the  
necessity  of  dealing  with  humanitarian  crises  in  a  more  active  way:  ‘Impartiality  does  not  -  and  
must  not  -  mean  neutrality  in  the  face  of  evil”  (Malito  2017:  283),  the  UN  itself  has  done  little 
to  adequately  address  the  concrete  problems  which  have  lead  to  its  past  inaction.  Of  course,  a  
focus  on  failure  to  the  failure  to  halt  the  genocide  in  Rwanda  has  also  played  a  role  in  the  
development  of  the  R2P.  However,  the  “RtoP  requires  that  the  use  of  force  or  other  forms  of  
coercion  to  protect  populations  from  genocide  and  mass  atrocities  be  authorized  by  the  UN  
Security  Council”  (Bellamy  2014:  172)  and  ultimately  faces  similar  concerns  surrounding  the  
UNSC  both  in  termsof  inaction  and  its  members’  veto  powers.  Thus,  as  Simon  (2020:  213)  
states,  even  today  the  Security  Council  
  
76  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  aftermath  of  the  conflict,  several  political  parties  have  been  banned  by  the   
government  in  attempts  to  cement  an  ‘internal’  form  of  regime  change.  Niesen  (2010:  709)  notes  that  “The  first  
wave  comprises  the  immediate  post-genocidal  bans  on  the  former  state  party  Mouvement  Révolutionnaire  Nationale  
pour  le  Développement  (MRND)  and  the  radical  Hutu  party  Coalition  pour  la  Défense  de  la  République  (CDR)  in  
1994.  The  second  wave  consists  of  a  single  case,  the  outlawing  of  the  formation  of  a  new  party,  Party  for  Democracy  
and  Regeneration  (PDR)  ‘Ubuyanja’,  in  2001.  In  a  third  wave,  the  largest  opposition  party,  Mouvement  
Démocratique  Républicain  (MDR),  was  banned  in  2003  and  a  successor  organization  barred  from  registering  in  the  
upcoming  elections.”  
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is  unlikely  to  authorize  either  a  protection-driven  intervention  mission  or  a  punitive  
procedure.  So  long  as  the  country  in  question  can  claim  a  measure  of  friendship  with  
one  of  the  five  veto-holding  permanent  members,  it  will  neither  be  prevented  from  nor  
held  accountable  for  the  commission  of  atrocity  crimes.  As  much  as  the  R2P  framework  
attempts  to  spell  out  criteria  and  procedures  for  intervention,  it  does  nothing  to  address  
the  issue  of  will.  It  fails  to  produce  a  case  for  a  country  to  subsume  even  relatively  
minor  national  interests  to  a  logic  of  joint  collective  action  in  the  name  of  civilian  
protection. 77   
  
The  many  violent  political  events  and  widespread  human  rights  abuses  which  have  occurred 
since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  clearly  illustrate  that  the  “Security  Council  rarely  acts  
effectively  in  crises,  not  only  because  of  the  veto  power  of  its  leading  members  but  also  
because  its  members  do  not  have  a  strong  sense  of  responsibility  for  global  security,  for  the  
survival  of  minority  peoples,  for  public  health  and  environmental  safety,  or  for  general  
well-being.  They  pursue  their  own  national  interests  while  the  world  burns”,  as  Walzer  has  
noted  (2011  [a]:  75).   
6.1.3  Legitimate  Action  beyond  the  UN  
  
The  widespread  notion  that  the  UN  is  often  either  unwilling  or  unable  to  act  efficiently,  has  
prompted  Kurth’s  (2006:  90)  assessment  that  “the  political  authority  with  the  greatest  
legitimacy  among  the  widest  number  of  states  is  the  UN.  However,  almost  any  proposed  
humanitarian  intervention  is  likely  to  be  viewed  by  one  of  the  five  permanent  members  of  the  
UN  Security  Council  as  a  threat  to  its  particular  interests  [...]  and  the  proposed  intervention  will  
likely  be  vetoed.  Thus,  the  most  legitimate  political  authority  is  also  likely  to  be  the  least  
efficacious  one.”  However,  “there  is  no  essential,  normative  moral  principle  that  one  can  cite  
from  the  standpoint  of  JWT  to  confirm  the  United  Nations’  (or  any  other  collective  entity’s)  
place  as  the  sole  legitimate  exemplar  of  the  ‘international  community’”  (Lucas  2003:  130).  As  
the  debate  about  the  legitimacy,  authority,  and  even  a  potential  duty  to  act  in  human  rights  
emergencies  continues,  the  thesis  argues  that  in  such  cases  where  resolutions  are  vetoed  due  to  
77  This  strongly  affects  the  Responsibility  to  Protect,  as  “the  most  widely  accepted  proposals  for  RtoP  still  require   
Security  Council  authorization  for  forceful  intervention,  and  strictly  limit  the  conditions  under  which  such  
intervention  may  take  place”  (Buchanan  &  Keohane  2011:  41).  
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competing  national  interests,  or  where  the  members  of  the  Security  Council  are  simply  too  
slow  to  act,  the  moral  legitimacy  of  intervention  should  trump  the  Security  Council’s  authority.   
  
Clearly,  interventions  without  UNSC  authorisation  are  not  without  precedent.  Indeed,  
“the  examples  of  India  in  Pakistan,  Tanzania  in  Uganda,  Vietnam  in  Cambodia,  the  United  
States  in  Haiti  and  Somalia,  and  some  NATO  states  (acting  on  behalf  of  all  European  nations)  
in  Kosovo  all  collectively  indicate  that  the  importance  of  seeking  prior  approval  of  ‘the  
international  community’  diminishes  to  the  point  of  vanishing  if  the  humanitarian  tragedy  is  
sufficiently  grave”  (Lucas  2003:  127).  For  example,  the  “intervention  in  Kosovo,  undertaken  
following  decisions  by  NATO,  has  been  referred  to  as  legitimate  but  illegal,  because  while  
many  have  deemed  it  morally  appropriate,  it  was  not  approved  by  the  UN”  (Etzioni  2006:  82).  
Thus,  waiting  for  UN  Security  Council  approval  is  morally  unacceptable  in  the  face  of  ongoing 
killings.  Thus,  while  “it  is  argued  that  there  is  no  exception  to  the  requirement  for  UN  
authorization  [...],  some  suggest  that  this  obligation  is  not  absolute  in  cases  of  exceptional  
humanitarian  emergencies”  (Badescu  2007:  52).  This  is  in  accordance  with  Roth’s  assessment  
that  “in  extreme  situations,  Council  approval  should  not  be  required.  In  its  current  form,  the  
Council  is  too  imperfect  to  make  it  the  sole  mechanism  for  legitimizing  humanitarian  
intervention”  (2006:  91).  This  means  that  alternative  actors  possess  both  the  authority  and  the  
legitimacy  to  act.  If  Security  Council  authorisation  for  intervention  against  a  regime  is  not  
forthcoming,  the  legitimate  authority  to  act  should  be  found  elsewhere.  There  are  essentially  
two  alternatives:  multilateral  or  unilateral  action  carried  out  by  sovereign  states.  Multilateral  
action  likely  takes  the  forms  of  either  established  international  organisations  or  ad  hoc  
coalitions.  Erskine  notes  that  alliances  have  repeatedly  acted  militarily  without  United  Nations  
authorisation,  in  the  form  of  ‘coalitions  of  the  willing’,  i.e.  “self-selected  (and  often  
self-authorized)  constellations  of  states  and  sometimes  nonstate  and  intergovernmental  actors  
(including,  for  example,  nongovernmental  organizations  and  regional  alliances  of  states,  
respectively)  that  come  together  to  respond  to  a  specific  crisis  and  [...]  act  outside  the  control  of  
any  formal,  overarching  organization  to  which  they  might  already  belong”  (2014:  121).  On  a  
more  practical  level,  actors  are  likely  to  be  more  enthusiastic  about  risking  regime  change  
intervention  if  they  do  not  have  to  shoulder  all  burdens  themselves  (e.g.  Wolford  2015;  
Mansoor  &  Murray  2016).  By  joining  a  coalition,  a  state  is  not  only  able  to  spread  the  risks  and  
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costs  associated  with  intervention,  but  may  also  be  swayed  by  the  sense  of  legitimacy  which  
multilateral  action  suggests.  
6.1.4  Regional  and  Unilateral  Action  
  
The  interventions  by  the  US  and  NATO  in  the  past  three  decades  have  repeatedly  raised  
concerns  about  the  supposedly  ‘imperialistic’  nature  of  regime  change  wars  whereas  UNSC  
deadlock  has  repeatedly  prevented  effective  action.  One  alternative  which  can  assuage  these  
concerns  is  a  renewed  focus  on  the  role  that  regional  organisations  can  play  in  ensuring  
stability  and  security,  but  also  their  role  in  halting  neighbouring  regimes  which  are  culpable  for  
rights  violations.  Thus,  as,  Badescu  suggests,  “instead  of  lamenting  that  interventions  can  only  
take  place  when  the  Council  authorizes  them,  we  should  regard  regional  organizations  as  
legitimate  alternatives  to  UN  authorization  when  the  Security  Council  is  at  a  deadlock”  (2007:  
74). 78  It  has  for  instance  been  claimed  that  the  most  effective  actor  in  such  a  situation  would   
ideally  be  
  
a  regional  organization  directing  a  standing,  modern  military  force  whose  units  are  
drawn  from  the  region.  As  an  example,  the  EU,  the  organization  with  the  greatest  
potential  capability  in  this  regard,  could  direct  a  standing  force  drawn  from  its  member  
states  that  would  be  available  to  intervene  [...].  The  organization  that  could  address  the  
greater  potential  need  would  be  the  53-member  African  Union,  if  it  developed  a  
standing  force  equipped  and  trained  up  to  modern  standards,  which  would  require  
substantial  financial  and  logistical  support  from  the  EU  and  the  United  States  (Kurth  
2006:101). 79   
  
78  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  focus  on  regional  actors  as  alternatives  to  the  UN  system  is  conceptually  different   
from  the  periodic  co-option  of  regional  organisations  by  the  UN.  This  latter  understanding  is  expressed  by  the  
assessment  that  “[s]ince  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  demands  placed  upon  the  UN  for  peace  support  operations  
have  increased  to  the  stage  where  a  further  development  in  the  nature  of  peacekeeping  deployment  has  been  
necessary  to  offset  the  UN's  over-stretched  capability.  This  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  a  possible  new  
paradigm  in  the  mechanisms  of  collective  security  which  has  seen  the  delegation  of  peacekeeping/  
peace-enforcement  operations  to  regional  organizations  and  defence  alliances”  (Dee  2001:  1-2).  
  
79  Similarly,  it  has  been  noted  that  “[a]ssuming  adequate  consensus  among  Security  Council  members  on  the  purpose   
for  any  intervention,  the  United  Nations  provides  the  most  suitable  institutional  framework  for  most  nation-building  
missions,  one  with  a  comparatively  low  cost  structure,  a  comparatively  high  success  rate  and  the  greatest  degree  of  
international  legitimacy.  Other  possible  options  are  likely  to  be  either  more  expensive,  for  example,  US,  European  
Union  or  NATO-led  coalitions,  or  less  capable,  for  example,  the  African  Union,  the  Organization  of  American  
States,  or  ASEAN”  (Dobbins  2004:  100).  
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Part  of  the  appeal  of  regional  coalitions  and  organisation  involves  the  ‘proximity  criterion’:  
their  geographical,  and  potentially  cultural,  proximity  means  that  regional  organisations  are  
likely  better  placed  to  engage  in  ‘monitoring’  their  immediate  neighbourhood  and  are  aware  of  
human  rights  violations  much  earlier  than  the  wider  international  community,  allowing  them  to  
act  more  efficiently.  In  addition,  they  may  also  have  a  better  knowledge  of  the  offending  
regime  and  its  weaknesses.  Finally,  regional  organisations  likely  enjoy  more  legitimacy  in  the  
opinion  of  the  people  on  behalf  of  whom  they  claim  to  act  in  cases  where  it  does  come  to  
regime  change.  This  prevents  the  controversy  attached  to  ‘Western’  interventions.  
Consequently,  it  has  been  noted  that  “Walzer  sometimes  favors  the  proximity  criterion:  
humanitarian  intervention  is  ‘probably  best  carried  out  by  neighbors’”  (Davenport  2011:  526).  
Other  authors  have  also  emphasised  regional  actors’  potential.  Glanville  (2013:  340)  addresses 
regional  organisations  and  their  relation  to  the  universality  of  human  rights,  stating  that  
  
[t]he  tentative  shift  toward  reliance  on  the  opinions  of  regional  organizations  in  
international  deliberations  about  civilian  protection  points  to  the  fact  that,  while  the  
society  of  states  is  global  in  scope,  different  regions  interpret  different  norms  and  values  
in  different  ways.  Willingness  to  be  guided  by  regional  opinion  would  seem  to  be  one  
way  of  attempting  to  uphold  universal  norms  and  values  in  such  a  pluralist  world.  [...].  
While  regional  differences  may  well  demand  respect,  the  efficacy  of  this  cautious  shift  
toward  accepting  that  regional  opinion  should  guide  international  action  will  be  at  least  
in  part  dependent  upon  the  extent  to  which  regional  organizations  can  consistently  
respond  to  crises  in  ways  that  facilitate  timely  and  decisive  action  to  protect  civilians  
from  mass  atrocities.  
  
Nonetheless,  regional  organisations  are  not  a  ‘solution’  to  problems  of  agency  as  such.  Indeed,  
regional  action  “is  currently  a  dead  letter  in  international  relations;  there  is  little  operative  
expectation  based  on  proximity.  Our  experience  in  Bosnia  and  Kosovo  should  be  decisive  in  
showing  that  proximity  criteria  will  not  solve  the  collective  action  problem”  (Davenport  2011:  
526).  Thus,  it  has  been  argued  that  
  
[t]he  question  is  ultimately  one  of  designing  international  institutions  that  combine  both  
‘legitimacy’  and  ‘effectiveness.’  None  of  the  currently  favored  mechanisms  for  
stabilization  through  the  use  of  force  manage  to  combine  legitimacy  and  effectiveness  
in  satisfactory  ways.  These  defective  mechanisms  include  the  Charter  system  itself,  the  
use  of  regional  security  alliances  such  as  NATO,  and  ad  hoc  ‘coalitions  of  the  willing’  
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led  by  the  United  States.  Pending  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  problem  of  designing  an  
acceptable  international  regime  governing  the  use  of  force,  the  United  States'  policy  of  
acting  ‘multilaterally  if  possible,  [but]  unilaterally  if  necessary’  will  and  should  
continue  to  be  followed  (Delahunty  2007:  872).  
  
Thus,  the  challenges  of  collective  action  have  seen  the  continued  occurrence  of  unilateral  
agency  by  states,  in  response  to  humanitarian  and  security  crises,  but  also  in  pursuit  of  
controversial  forcible  regime  change  interventions  in  the  course  of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’.  While  a  
potential  ‘right’  to  unilateral  intervention  without  UNSC  approval,  humanitarian  or  otherwise,  
has  remained  “highly  controversial”  (Williams  1999  [a]:  3),  the  United  States’  desire  to  never  
again  allow  attacks  similar  to  9/11  has  prompted  an  all-encompassing  attempt  to  confront  the  
opponents  of  the  US-led  world  order.  Successive  US  administrations  have  taken  the  view  that  
in  order  to  defend  international  ‘law  and  order’,  it  may  be  necessary  to  break  the  very  rules  it  is  
built  on,  including  the  violation  of  state  sovereignty  in  pursuit  of  regime  change.  This  has  
cemented  the  conviction  that  “that  there  can  be  exceptions  it  must  pursue  in  its  own  interest—a  
notion  embodied  in  the  famous  formula  ‘multilateral  if  we  can,  unilateral  if  we  must’”  
(Boniface  2003:  70).  What  is  more,  O’Driscoll  notes  that  authors  like  Elshtain  have  argued  that  
“the  United  States  must  assume  the  lion’s  share  of  responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of  law  
and  order  in  the  post-Cold  War  era.  In  terms  designed  to  echo  Saint  Augustine,  Elshtain  
declared  that  this  is  the  burden  of  American  power  in  a  violent  world”  (2006  [b]:  387).   
  
Of  course,  unilateral  action  remains  problematic,  not  solely  because  of  its  occasionally  
‘imperial’  undertones,  but  also  because  such  “actions  undermine  the  ideal  of  collective  security  
and  feed  the  pessimism  of  those  who  harbour  concerns  about  the  normative  capacity  of  the  
UNSC  to  constrain  the  hegemon”  (Morris  &  Wheeler  2007:  229).  What  is  more,   
  
since  the  U.S.  experience  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  strong  democratic  nations  will  be  
even  more  hesitant  to  respond  to  humanitarian  emergencies  without  a  prior  guarantee  of  
wide  multilateral  support.  Unless  an  institution  capable  of  generating  that  kind  of  
guarantee  is  in  place  before  the  crisis  arises,  it  is  unlikely  to  materialize  in  time.  The  
same  goes  for  proposals  to  divide  responsibilities  among  strong  nations  by  region,  by  
historical  connections,  or  by  anything  else.  Without  a  clear  prior  consensus  on  who  is  
responsible  and  sufficient  assurance  of  broad  international  support,  inaction  is  likely  
(Davenport  (2011:  525).  
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Ultimately,  compared  to  either  UN-led  interventions  or  the  actions  of  regional  organisations,  
unilateral  action  is  the  least  preferable  option,  especially  since  “the  use  of  disproportionate  
unilateral  force  outside  the  auspices  of  the  UNSC,  particularly  in  support  of  one  party  to  a  
conflict  leading  to  regime  change,  does  not  alleviate  the  suffering  of  the  population  but  risks  
precipitating  the  country  into  a  full-scale  civil  war”  (Averre  2015:  823).  
  
Nonetheless,  although  in  principle,  a  Security  Council  consensus  is  the  optimal  
outcome,  this  is  not  always  the  most  realistic  expectation,  of  course.  A  certain  pragmatism  is  
unavoidable  in  judging  interventions,  and  the  Just  War  approach  has  long  recognised  that  truly  
unambiguous  situations  are  rare  indeed,  and  that  the  best  which  mankind  can  aim  for  is  an  
approximation  of  (divine)  justice.  As  Pabst  has  noted,  from  the  early  beginnings  of  the  Just  
War  canon,  including  “[f]or  the  Church  Fathers  and  medieval  theologians,  'just  war'  was  a  
matter  of  practical  judgement”  and  not  just  of  abstract  theology  (2007:  723).  This  practicality  
must  also  guide  our  views  on  cases  of  regime  change  wars.  Nonetheless,  this  leaves  us  in  an  
ambiguous  situation.  Given  that  so  many  actors  are  potentially  legitimate,  interventions  cannot  
be  qualified  as  just  or  unjust  based  solely  on  the  actor’s  identity.  Indeed,  as  Orford  has  stated,  
“the  question  whether  any  actor  –  whether  the  UN,  the  US,  or  a  coalition  of  the  willing  –  can  
act  both  as  the  representative  of  collective  conscience  and  as  the  guarantor  of  peace  and  
security  remains  an  open  one”  (2013:  104).   
  
Some  of  the  many  ambiguities  of  international  action  beyond  the  ‘legitimate  authority’  
criterion  can  be  addressed  by  a  more  detailed  focus  on  the  concept  of  international  
responsibility.  Walzer  emphasises  that  “[i]nternational  humanitarianism  is  an  imperfect  duty.  In  
any  crisis  situation,  different  states  are  capable  of  acting,  but  no  single  state  is  the  designated  
actor”  (2011  [a]:  78),  and  the  same  is  true  for  regime  change  missions.  This  highlights  the  
problems  in  “reconcil[ing]  the  complex  institutional  duties  prescribed  by  international  law  with  
the  more  primitive,  noninstitutional,  duties  of  common  morality”  (Nardin  2002:  70).  Thus,  
when  addressing  questions  of  responsibility,  we  must  clarify  not  only  who  can  act,  but  who  
should  do  so.  
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6.2  Global  Responsibilities  to  Act  
  
Bain  (2010:  30)  has  argued  that  “it  is  with  reference  to  responsibility  that  expressions  of  praise  
and  blame  are  communicated;  and  to  that  extent  the  idea  of  responsibility  and  the  related  
concept  of  accountability  are  deeply  entangled  with  judgements  that  interrogate  conduct  in  
light  of  expectations  presupposed  in  shared  normative  standards.”  At  the  same  time,  however,  
it  is  not  always  clear  what  this  responsibility  entails  in  an  international  context.  Wheeler  has  
emphasized  that  any  “notion  of  common  humanity/human  solidarity  is  diametrically  opposed  
to  the  statist  paradigm  which  is  predicated  on  the  contention  that  state  leaders  and  citizens  do  
not  have  moral  responsibilities  or  obligations  to  aid  those  beyond  their  borders”  (1997:  10).  
Indeed,  it  may  be  difficult  to  find  an  agent  who  is  disinterested,  yet  also  willing  to  take  
significant  risks  in  launching  a  military  intervention.  Altruism  and  raison  d’état  do  not  always  
go  well  together.  Even  though  Walzer  (2004  [b]:  37)  has  claimed  that  “whether  to  intervene  is  a  
decision  determined  by  the  perception  of  human  suffering”,  it  is  clearly  the  case  that  the  
presence  of  suffering  alone  is  often  not  enough  to  persuade  states  to  act,  let  alone  engage  in  
regime  change  interventions,  especially  since  he  later  states  that  “the  lives  of  foreigners  don't  
weigh  that  heavily  in  the  scales  of  domestic  decision-making”  (Walzer  2006  [a]:  101  -  102).   
  
Unsurprisingly,  states  tend  to  act  in  ways  that  benefit  them,  and  often  avoid  actions  
which  are  detrimental  to  their  interests.  Regime  change  is  particularly  costly,  risky,  and  often  
offers  little  tangible  reward  even  if  it  succeeds.  Whilst  it  is  not  surprising  that  “[m]ost  states  do  
not  self-identify  as  ‘cosmopolitan’  and  are  bound  to  place  their  own  interests  –  and  those  of  
their  populations  –  above  those  of  outsiders”  (Bellamy  &  McLoughlin  2019:  343),  such  
statements  obscure  the  fact  established  earlier  that  global  responsibilities  to  stop  human  rights  
abuses  have  become  an  integral  part  of  the  liberal  world  order’s  self-understanding.  The  
humanitarian  discourse  emerging  since  the  Cold  War  has  expressed  the  notion  that  in 
emergencies,  halting  human  rights  violations  is  not  only  a  question  of  (moral)  authority to  
intervene  in  sovereign  states,  but  also  of  moral  and  political  responsibility ,  both  for  
international  organisations  and  for  individual  states.  For  instance,  as  US  President  Clinton  had  
stated  in  1999,  
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[i]t's  easy,  for  example,  to  say  that  we  really  have  no  interests  in  who  lives  in  this  or  that  
valley  in  Bosnia,  or  who  owns  a  strip  of  brushland  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  [...].  But  the  
true  measure  of  our  interests  lies  not  in  how  small  or  distant  these  places  are,  or  in  
whether  we  have  trouble  pronouncing  their  names.  The  question  we  must  ask  is,  what  
are  the  consequences  to  our  security  of  letting  conflicts  fester  and  spread.  We  cannot,  
indeed,  we  should  not,  do  everything  or  be  everywhere.  But  where  our  values  and  our  
interests  are  at  stake,  and  where  we  can  make  a  difference,  we  must  be  prepared  to  do  
so  (quoted  in  Klare  1999:  para.  8).  
  
Nonetheless,  the  ‘responsibility’  label  which  has  become  a  significant  part  of  the  ‘liberal’  
narrative  of  20th  and  21 st  century  International  Relations  is  often  used  in  a  rather  non-binding   
sense.  Indeed,  it  often  implies  little  positive  duty  to  act.  After  all,  engagement  in  international  
action  remains  voluntary.  Thus,  whereas  states  may  acknowledge  their  responsibility  to  protect  
etc.  in  the  abstract,  this  responsibility  is  not,  indeed  often  cannot  be,  enforced  by  other  
members  of  the  international  community  if  states  fail  to  act.  What  is  more,  the  ‘Responsibility  
to  Protect’  paradigm  discussed  earlier  does  not  do  enough  to  further  locate  this  responsibility  in  
any  one  actor.  Rather,  it  envisages  the  international  community  as  a  whole,  i.e.  all  actors  
constituting  it,  as  the  bearers  of  responsibility.  Accordingly,  all  states  are  in  principle  equally  
responsible  both  for  their  own  conduct  and  for  discouraging  unacceptable  behaviour  by  other  
states’  regimes.  The  key  challenge  regarding  the  current  responsibility  discourse  can  be  stated  
as  follows:  an  overgeneralised  conception  of  responsibility  makes  it  all  the  more  difficult  to  
identify  one  or  multiple  legitimate  actors.  
  
Conversely,  it  stands  to  reason  that  certain  actors  can,  on  occasion,  be  more  responsible  
than  others.  Moreover,  an  agent’s  responsibility  is  context-specific,  for  instance  when  its  
responsibilities  depend  on  the  sort  of  historical  or  legal  ties  it  has  with  another  state.  The  
following  pages  highlight  this  by  focussing  on  the  notion  that  different  actors  in  the  
international  order  will  likely  have  different  ‘types’  of  responsibility  regarding  regime  change  
interventions,  suggesting  an  important  distinction  between  a  generalised  idea  of  responsibility  
on  the  one  hand,  and  obligation  and  duty  on  the  other.  
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6.2.1  Facets  of  Responsibility:  Obligation-Duty  Distinctions  
  
“Conceptual  differentiation  of  aspects  of  responsibility  is  essential  to  bring  clarity  and  open  up  
space  for  articulating  concepts  that  are  more  adequate  for  practice,”  as  Visoka  and  Doyle  have  
rightly  stated  (2014:  688).  This  important  distinction  is  best  understood  as  one  of  ‘general’  and  
‘special’  responsibilities,  respectively.  A  general  responsibility  (as  is  reflected  in  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect  framework)  has  been  described  as  “one  held  by  all  members  of  a  
social  order,  or  by  all  participants  in  a  particular  regime  of  social  cooperation.  The  
responsibility  not  to  kill  is  a  general  responsibility  […],  just  as  the  responsibility  not  to  commit  
aggression  is  a  responsibility  of  all  of  today’s  sovereign  states.  Special  responsibilities,  in  
contrast,  are  held  only  by  select  members  of  an  order”  (Reus-Smit  2014:  354).  The  two  primary  
incarnations  of  these  special  responsibilities  can  be  termed  ‘duty’  and  ‘obligation’.  Although  
they  are  clearly  closely  linked,  these  distinctions  each  have  a  different  connotation  with  regards  
to  regime  change  discourse. 80  
  
Of  course,  it  is  true  that  “there  are  shades  of  linguistic  meaning  complicating  these  
definitions,  and  a  global  discussion  of  the  issue  necessarily  involves  trans-cultural  
interpretations  and  evaluations  of  the  concepts”,  and  that  “concepts  of  duty,  obligation,  and  
responsibility  are  deeply  embedded  in  the  diverse  historical,  cultural,  social,  political,  and  
ethical  contexts  in  which  they  arise”  (Saul  2001:  582).  Although  they  are  generally  treated  as  
near-synonymous  in  day-to-day  usage,  the  differences  between  these  terms  are  as  subtle  as  they  
are  important.  The  distinction  can  be  more  readily  apparent  in  other  languages,  such  as  in  the  
approximately  equivalent  German  terms  of  Verantwortung ,  Pflicht ,  and  Verpflichtung ,  
respectively.    
  
The  suggested  distinction  between  responsibility,  duty,  and  obligation  can  be  summed  
up  as  follows:  the  generalised  concept  of  Responsibility  applies  to  all  states  equally,  regardless  
of  their  status,  history  etc.  Unlike  such  ‘generic’  forms  of  responsibility,  duties  are  always  
context-specific ,  or  as  Miller  has  stated,  “prima  facie  duties  point  us  in  the  general  direction  of  
80  Of  course,  it  is  important  to  note  that  often,“[d]efining  and  allocating  special  responsibilities  does  not  obviate   
legal  sovereign  equality;  it  overlays  such  equality  with  a  mode  of  hierarchy  that  has  benefits  for  materially  strong  
and  weak  actors  alike”  (Reus-Smit  2014:  356).  
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what  is  morally  correct,  but  what  is  finally  imperative  may  differ,  depending  on  a  fuller  account  
of  the  situation  in  question”  (1996:  47),  and  the  same  is  evidently  true  for  states’  obligations.   
The  variety  of  potential  duties  and  obligations  highlight  that  even  though  there  is  a  large  pool  
of  potential  regime  change  actors,  there  are  often  specific  actors  to  which  our  expectations  of  
responsible  action  should  be  directed.  Indeed,  when  actors  fulfill  their  special  responsibilities,  
this  likely  increases  the  legitimacy  of  their  actions.  
  
The  term  ‘duty’  (the  German  Pflicht )  conveys  a  sense  of  morally  compulsory  behaviour  
which  exists  regardless  of  particular  circumstances.  The  term  also  suggests  the  existence  of  an  
overarching  moral  framework  to  which  actors  are  bound  by  their  very  nature.  The   
aforementioned  ‘duty  of  care’  is  intrinsically  tied  to  the  contemporary  common  understanding  
of  sovereign  statehood,  is  an  example  of  this.  More  importantly,  it  raises  the  question  whether  a  
responsibility  to  safeguard  human  rights  abroad  also  entails  a  positive  duty  to  do  so.  This  is  less  
unthinkable  in  the  supposed  ‘age  of  intervention’  and  of  the  R2P  than  it  had  been  previously.  
Lango  (2001:  183)  has  for  instance  suggested  that  
  
among  the  prima  facie  obligations  of  nonmaleficence  there  is  a  prima  facie  obligation  
not  to  extremely  violate  basic  human  rights.  Because  of  the  great  importance  of  human  
rights  -  and  especially  because  of  the  qualifications  "basic"  and  "extremely"  -  this  prima  
facie  obligation  is  most  definitely  sufficiently  strong.  Therefore,  by  applying  the  
intervention  principle,  we  determine  that  there  is  a  prima  facie  obligation  to  stop  people  
from  extremely  violating  the  basic  human  rights  of  other  people.  And  so  there  is,  in  
particular,  a  prima  facie  obligation  to  intervene  to  stop  mass  killing.  
  
If  the  supposedly  global  human  rights  have  any  substantial  meaning  beyond  mere  rhetoric,  
states  not  only  have  the  responsibility  to  uphold  the  rights  within  their  own  territories,  but  also  
a  positive  duty  to  monitor  other  states’  human  rights  regimes  and,  if  necessary,  to  act  in  order  
to  halt  rights  abuses.  Regarding  humanitarian  intervention,  Davidovic  has  succinctly  argued  
that  “permissibility  implies  obligation”  (2008:  137).  Employing  the  concept  of  a  ‘minimally  
decent  Samaritan’,  she  claims  that  “if  all  just  war  conditions  have  been  met,  then  an  
intervention  is  a  minimally  decent  action  and  is  obligatory”  (idem:  140)  and  accurately  states  
that  “there  seems  to  be  something  odd  about  human  life  has  so  much  worth  that  one  can  breach  
sovereignty  when  innocents  are  dying,  but  that  on  the  other  hand  there  is  no  requirement  to  do  
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so”  (idem:  141).  Consequently,  it  appears  “is  inconsistent  to  simultaneously  claim  that  there  are  
negative  duties  when  it  comes  to  human  life,  but  that  the  concomitant  positive  duties  […]  are  
not  binding”  (idem:  141).  
  
Various  origins  for  these  duties  have  been  suggested.  James  Pattison  (2013  [b]),  for  
example,  has  given  several  arguments  in  support  of  duties  to  act  under  certain  conditions.  
While  his  ‘negative  duty  argument’  (based  generally  on  Pogge’s  arguments  to  that  effect)  and  
‘correlation  argument’  are  not  entirely  convincing,  his  ‘positive  duty’  argument  relates  to  our  
earlier  defence  of  basic  human  rights.  He  states  that  “positive  duties  stem  from  the  basic  
premise  that  we  possess  duties  to  those  beyond  our  borders  simply  in  virtue  of  their  common  
humanity  (e.g.  their  universal  human  rights  or  moral  equality)  […].”  He  also  posits  that  “we  
have  duties  to  undertake  humanitarian  intervention  in  virtue  of  the  common,  global  institutional  
background  that  establishes  principles  of  justice”  (idem:  571).  This  background  also  affects  
duties  incumbent  on  the  UN  and  the  UNSC.  One  is  an  ‘institutional’  duty  which  allows  others  
to  act.  For  instance,  this  means  that  the  UN  arguably  has  a  duty  to  authorise  humanitarian  
intervention,  or  at  least  giving  retroactive  authorisation  to  an  ongoing  intervention  to  give  the  
war  a  legal  basis.  Another  variation  of  this  logic  is  found  in  discussions  surrounding  a  potential  
duty  incumbent  on  UNSC  members  to  avoid  using  their  veto  in  cases  of  humanitarian  
emergencies.  For  instance,  such  a  ‘Responsibility  not  to  Veto’  or  ‘RN2V’  “has  been  advanced  
as  one  of  the  mechanisms  that  can  operationalise  the  notion  of  the  R2P,  particularly  this  
notion’s  third  pillar  which  calls  upon  the  international  community  to  react  in  a  timely  and  
decisive  manner,  through  the  Security  Council,  when  a  state  manifestly  fails  to  protect  its  
populations  from  mass  atrocities”  (Essawy  2020:  300).  Indeed,  the  notion  “that  the  P5  should  
voluntarily  refrain  from  using  their  veto  in  the  event  of  atrocities  developed  after  NATO’s  
Kosovo  intervention  (1999),  and  was  revived  with  the  war  in  Syria  (since  2011)”  (Vilmer  2018:  
331).  Such  a  duty  would  be  in  line  with  Davidovic’s  earlier  arguments.  If  the  Security  Council  
has  a  duty  to  act  in  cases  where  action  would  be  permissible ,  even  if  this  might  conflict  with  
their  own  political  agendas,  this  clearly  includes  a  ‘lesser’  duty  to  avoid  blocking  others’  
actions.  Nonetheless,  the  implementation  of  such  duties  is  hindered  by  the  reality  that  “the  P5  
have  blocked  practical  attempts  to  introduce  any  restraints  on  veto  rights”  (Essawy  2020:  301).   
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Beyond  such  potential  institutional  duties,  individual  states  also  have  duties  which  are  
the  result  of  a  historical  or  cultural  bond  e.g.  the  relationship  between  former  imperial  powers  
and  their  now  independent  former  colonies.  Consequently,  historical  acts  of  oppression  and  
exploitation  conceivably  results  in  a  ‘duty  to  redress  past  injustices’,  such  as  providing  foreign  
aid  or  paying  reparations  for  slavery,  obviously  in  combination  with  a  more  general  
responsibility  to  prevent  similar  forms  of  exploitation  in  the  future.  Duties  are  overarching  
responsibilities  which  can  in  principle  last  indefinitely,  and  which  exist  regardless  of  whether  
oral  or  written  commitments  are  made.  This  sets  the  concept  apart  from  another  form  of  
responsibility,  namely  that  of  obligation.  
  
An  obligation  ( Verpflichtung )  is  a  special  responsibility  which  follows  a  ‘commitment’  
to  something .  Consequently,  obligations  are  more  context-specific.  This  includes  obvious  
engagements  stemming  from  being  signatories  of  international  treaties  and  membership  of  
alliances,  but  also  other  commitments  such  as  declarations  of  political  support  e.g.  as  the  
recognition  of  a  government  or  political  movement  as  legitimate.  This  can  have  foreseeable  yet  
unintended  consequences.  For  instance,  the  premature  call  for  Iraqis  to  rise  up  and  topple  the  
Ba’athist  regime  (i.e.  accomplish  an  internal  regime  change)  in  the  wake  of  the  Gulf  War  
included  the  statement  by  President  George  Bush  that  “t here's  another  way  for  the  bloodshed  to  
stop.  And  that  is  for  the  Iraqi  military  and  the  Iraqi  people  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands  
--  to  force  Saddam  Hussein,  the  dictator,  to  step  aside,  and  to  comply  with  the  United  Nations  
resolutions  and  then  rejoin  the  family  of  peace-loving  nations ”  (1991[a]:  para  5).  Although  
segments  of  the  Iraqi  population  certainly  had  a  ‘just  cause’  to  revolt  against  an  oppressive  
government  and  to  enforce  regime  change  from  within ,  American  declarations  of  support  acted  
as  a  final  catalyst  for  violent  action.  However,  as  Walzer  (2006  [b]:  104-105)  himself  has  
noted,  “having  called  for  rebellions  against  Saddam's  rule,  they  failed  to  come  to  the  aid  or,  
only  a  short  time  later,  to  the  rescue,  of  the  rebels.”  Since  the  United  States  could  have  
anticipated  this  course  of  events  (and  its  low  probability  of  success),  by  urging  on  the  
dissidents  it  had  incurred  an  indirect  obligation  to  aid  them  when  it  became  clear  that  they  
would  soon  be  overwhelmed  by  security  forces  (for  example  by  committing  to  arms  deliveries,  
to  a  further  extension  of  no-fly  zones  etc.  [cf.  Cohen  2009]).  
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The  German  recognition  of  Croatian  and  Slovenian  independence  in  1992  is  another  
case  which  might  illustrate  this  understanding  of  obligation.  Germany  notably  insisted  on  this  
course  of  action  in  spite  of  resistance  by  other  states  who  deemed  the  recognition  of  both  
nascent  countries  to  be  ‘premature’. 81  Hodge  has  added  that  the  German  “Kohl  government  
made  the  great  error  of  championing  the  wrong  precept  with  its  recognition  diplomacy,  passing  
up  the  opportunity  to  promote  individual  human  rights  as  the  animating  principle  behind  the  
legitimacy  of  statehood  in  post–Cold  War  Europe”  (1998:  17).  Instead  of  helping  to  resolve  the  
developing  territorial  disputes,  the  act  of  recognition  and  the  reliance  on  a  state-centric  
conception  of  international  order  only  intensified  the  ongoing  fragmentation  of  Yugoslavia,  
paving  the  way  for  further  violence  and  instability.  Since  Germany’s  insistence  on  political  
commitment  to  recognition  had  partially  foreseeable  negative  consequences,  it  had  a  moral  
obligation  to  help  remedy  a  situation  whose  escalation  it  indirectly  supported.  For  example,  it  
could  have  made  earlier  and  stronger  peacekeeping  commitments  to  the  region,  or  emphasised  
the  need  for  swift  international  action.  
  
Ultimately,  it  is  clear  that  considerations  of  both  duty  and  obligation  must  influence  a  
more  structured  FIRC  debate.  Their  distinction  indicates  that  despite  Walzer’s  proposal  that  
‘whoever  can,  should  act’,  viewing  regime  changes  in  their  political  context  likely  points  to 
actors  who  through  various  circumstances  have  a  more  distinct  responsibility  than  the  
‘international  community’  as  a  whole.  When  actors  do  act  according  to  these  expectations,  their  
actions  are  more  likely  to  meet  the  requirements  of  just  motives  and  causes  discussed  earlier.  
Nonetheless,  there  is  another  important  responsibility  which  affects  our  appreciation  of  regime  
change  cases,  namely  one  which  arises  in  the  aftermath  of  intervention.  
6.2.2  The  Responsibility  to  ‘Rebuild’  
  
While  the  facets  of  responsibility  discussed  above  clearly  address  intervention  more  generally,  
duties  and  obligations  also  influence  our  perception  of  cases  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
81  Similarly,  Mirkovic  claims  that  “[i]n  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  US  actively  supported  independence  even   
before  the  beginning  of  armed  conflict  in  1992”  (2009:  142).  This  too  created  important  obligations,  which  were  
ultimately  only  belatedly  addressed.  Indeed,  Daalder  writes,  “[f]or  over  four  years  following  the  breakup  of  
Yugoslavia  and  the  onset  of  war,  first  in  Croatia  and  then  in  Bosnia,  the  United  States  refused  to  take  the  lead  in  
trying  to  end  the  violence  and  conflict”  (1998:  para:  1).  
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more  specifically.  Given  that  numerous  innocent  human  lives  and  even  the  future  stability  of  
the  global  system  are  at  stake,  forcible  regime  change  inevitably  comes  with  important  
responsibilities  for  states  who  choose  to  engage  in  it.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  questions  
regarding  the  potential  ‘responsibility  to  rebuild’,  which  in  the  case  of  FIRC  indicates  a  
responsibility  to  rebuild  not  only  the  physical,  but  the  political  structures  of  a  state.  As  we  have  
stated  earlier,  regime  change,  and  particularly  the  regime  imposition  following  an  intervention,  
should  be  clearly  distinguished  from  the  separate  concept  of  ‘military  occupation.’  Although  
military  occupation  involves  a  complex  web  of  ethics,  law,  and  politics,  Peter  Stirk  has  
emphasised  that  “[t]here  is  a  semblance  of  stability  in  international  law  insofar  as  the  Hague  
Resolutions  of  1907  continue  to  form  a  point  of  reference”  (2004:  531).  These  clarify  that  
“[t]erritory  is  considered  occupied  when  it  is  actually  placed  under  the  authority  of  the  hostile  
army.  The  occupation  extends  only  to  the  territory  where  such  authority  has  been  established  
and  can  be  exercised”  (quoted  in  ICRC  2012:  para.  1).  The  implication  is  that,  following  a  
regime  change  intervention,  the  occupying  power  ought  to  ensure  a  minimum  of  law  and  order,  
but  that  it  is  the  target  population’s  own  responsibility  to  (re)establish  a  viable  and  more  just  
society  in  the  long  term.  In  principle,  this  basic  conception  of  military  occupation  is  not  
compatible  with  regime  change  missions.  
  
Past  interventions  in  Bosnia,  Iraq,  Afghanistan  etc.  have  all  gone  far  beyond  the  legal  
limits  of  military  occupation,  and  have  consequently  prompted  continued  discussion  about  
actors’  responsibilities  once  intervention  has  been  successful.  Clearly,  the  questions  of  
legitimate  authority,  as  well  as  actors’  rights  and  duties,  are  as  important  after  war  as  before.  
One  solution  to  these  problems  is,  of  course,  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule.  Adherents  of  the  PBR  
envisage  that  at  this  point  the  intervening  party  becomes  responsible  for  ‘owning’  the  situation,  
understood  as  taking  on  the  responsibility  for  the  target  state’s  future  viability  and/or  its  
citizens’  wellbeing.  At  the  same  time,  the  Pottery  Barn  concept  cannot  be  taken  to  mean  that  
actors  may  do  as  they  please:  evidently,  the  potential  permissibility  of  regime  change  action  
does  not  imply  full  license  to  determine  its  aftermath  in  ‘owning  it’.  This  important  check  on  
interveners’  powers  clearly  sets  the  contemporary  FIRC  attempts  apart  from  historical  
instances  of  regime  imposition  which  often  took  the  ‘ownership’  aspect  literally  (in  the  case  of 
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Imperialism)  or  at  least  sought  to  impose  ideologically  similar  and  subservient  regimes  (e.g  
during  the  Cold  War).  
   
FIRC’s  contextualisation  within  the  Global  Liberal  Order  means  that  rather  than  
creating  pliable  puppet  regimes  or  satellite  states,  there  is  an  expectation  that  interveners  aim  to  
minimise  the  duration  of  occupation  while  establishing  the  prerequisites  for  democratic  
governance  and  popular  self-determination. 82  This  high  bar  sets  contemporary  regime  change   
apart  from  its  historical  predecessors,  but  also  raises  important  questions  about  the  identity  and  
further  involvement  of  interveners  in  postwar  impositions.  Evidently,  the  PBR  assumes  that  the  
intervener  is  the  primary  agent  responsible  for  postwar  restructuring,  and  implies  the  existence  
of  further  responsibilities  without  ever  making  them  sufficiently  clear.  Thus,  while  the  notion  
that  ‘ you  break  it,  you  own  it ’  is  an  appropriate  response  to  the  average  clumsy  customer,  it  is  
rather  less  useful  in  matters  of  violent  interstate  conflict,  and  the  devastating  wars  of  the  past  
decades  have  shown  the  necessity  for  establishing  viable  post-conflict  peace.  However,  the  
PBR  does  capture  the  fact  that  after  the  initial  euphoria  of  victory  has  faded,  interveners  may  
often  find  themselves  suddenly  and  at  least  initially  shouldering  the  responsibility  for  the  
millions  of  civilians  affected  by  the  war.  Thus,  the  post-war  situation  of  past  regime  change  
interventions  highlights  the  need,  by  analogy  to  the  PBR,  to  ‘repair’  what  was  broken,  in  this  
case  the  state  whose  political  institutions  have  been  deposed  by  the  interveners.   
  
It  certainly  stands  to  reason  that  once  war  ends,  victorious  powers  have  at  least  some  
sort  of  responsibility  towards  the  state  which  is  now  ‘at  their  mercy’,  and  it  is  clear  that  “the  
duty  to  remedy  post-war  deprivation  does  not  shift  to  an  indeterminate  ‘everybody  else’  or  
‘international  community’”  (Peperkamp  2016:  429).  However,  who  should  be  charged  with  
overseeing  this  repair,  and  what  exactly  it  should  consist  of,  remains  contested.  It  is  
consequently  clear  that  further  clarification  is  needed  regarding  actors’  responsibilities  to  
ensure  stability  after  intervention.   
  
82  Of  course,  this  expectation  is  not  always  realised,  as  the  subsequent  chapter  illustrates.  Indeed,  given  the   
long-term  involvement  of  interveners  in  the  fate  of  the  targeted  states  like  Bosnia  and  Afghanistan,  the  distinction  
between  historical  puppet  regimes  and  those  imposed  by  liberal  interveners  is  blurred.  
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Peperkamp  is  correct  in  pointing  out  that  the  notion  of  post  bellum  justice  “can  only  be  
considered  a  fully-fledged  third  branch  of  Just  War  Theory  if  it  is  clear  who  bears  the  
responsibility  for  it”  (idem:  408).  Initially,  this  responsibility  lies  with  the  original  
intervener(s).  By  forcibly  removing  the  primary  agent  responsible  for  citizens’  wellbeing  (even  
if  this  agent  has  previously  neglected  to  do  so),  interveners  incur  an  obligation  towards  the  
population,  as  “by  disabling  the  actor  who  has  the  primary  responsibility  to  protect  and  to  
fulfill  human  rights,  they  inherit  that  primary  responsibility  in  the  occupied  areas  for  as  long  as  
they  exercise  effective  control  over  them”  (Lafont  2015:  76).  In  other  words,  the  ‘duty  of  care’  
established  earlier  will  temporarily  reside  with  the  occupier(s).  Accordingly,  Rodin  (2011:  362)  
has  claimed  that  “having  invaded  those  two  countries  and  overthrown  their  respective  
governments,  the  United  States  and  its  allies  were  obligated  to  remain  as  occupying  powers  -  at  
least  for  a  period  -  first,  in  order  to  prevent  a  catastrophic  descent  into  anarchy  and,  second,  to  
restore  (at  the  minimum)  basic  services  and  functional  government.”  This  is  further  confirmed  
by  Blake  (2014:  139),  who  writes  that  that   
  
what  the  United  States  has  acquired  is  a  duty  to  make  the  situation  in  Iraq  no  worse  than  
it  was  before  it  entered.  The  United  States  has  not,  on  this  analysis,  become  the  sole  
country  with  an  obligation  to  make  Iraq  a  functioning  rights-respecting  country;  all  
countries  continue  to  have  that  general  obligation.  But  the  United  States  has  a  particular  
obligation  as  well;  it,  unlike  other  countries,  has  the  obligation  to  reverse  the  specific  
damages  made  during  the  course  of  its  invasion,  so  as  to  make  the  country  no  less  
rights-respecting  (no  more  dangerous,  no  more  anarchic)  than  it  was  prior  to  that  
invasion.   
  
These  responsibilities  encompass  not  only  the  short-term  stabilisation  of  a  targeted  country,  but  
also  entail  a  longer-term  and  more  abstract  duty  of  ‘commitment’  to  the  targeted  state’s  future  
stability.  Intuitively,  this  is  especially  the  case  in  those  regime  change  operations  which  do  not  
develop  as  initially  hoped.  When  countries  decide  to  take  up  the  heavy  burden  of  regime  
change,  they  also  gain  a  moral  duty  to  not  abandon  the  process  if  they  encounter  unexpected  
challenges.  
  
Nonetheless,  while  it  is  generally  agreed  that  the  interveners  do  have  responsibilities  
towards  targeted  states,  the  particular  scope  of  these  responsibilities  has  been  contested,  
especially  regarding  the  ambitions  of  FIRC.  As  seen  in  earlier  chapters,  Just  War  scholars  
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roughly  fall  into  two  categories  according  to  their  intuitions  on  postwar  justice:  minimalists  and  
maximalists.  Bellamy  (2008  [a]:  602)  affirms  that  “[m]inimalists  envisage  jus  post  bellum  as  a  
series  of  restraints  on  what  it  is  permissible  for  victors  to  do  once  the  war  is  over”,  whereas  
maximalism  embodies  the  opposing  position  that  amongst  the  fruits  of  victory  are  not  only  
rights,  but  also  more  wide-ranging  responsibilities. 83  At  least  since  the  second  half  of  the  20th   
Century,  the  majority  of  Just  War  theorists  have  promoted  a  maximalist  rhetoric  of  increased  
responsibility  for  a  more  ‘just’  treatment  of  defeated  enemies.  This  includes  substantial  postwar  
duties,  ranging  from  efforts  to  stabilise  and  rebuild,  but  often  also  takes  the  form  of  attempts  to  
reshape  political  regimes  along  democratic  precepts  in  line  with  the  expectations  of  the  Liberal  
Order.  Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  “the  maximalists’  views  on  regime  change  not  only  
justify  ‘political  reconstruction’  as  morally  permissible,  but  also  endorse  both  a  wide  
ranging-scope  for  its  activities  and  a  strong  role  for  the  victor  and  for  external  actors  in  this  
process”  (Melandri  2011:  245).  
  
However,  rebuilding  efforts  which  are  led  by  a  former  enemy,  no  matter  how  
well-meaning,  are  unsurprisingly  controversial.  Pattison  (2013  [a]:  658),  for  example,  has  
claimed  that  “there  should  be  a  presumption  against  belligerents  rebuilding.  It  seems  that  in  
some  cases  (although  not  all)  they  will  lack  the  right  to  rebuild  and,  even  if  they  do  have  the  
right,  other  agents  may  be  in  a  better  position  to  rebuild.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  
post-war  occupation,  when  the  warring  parties’  involvement  in  the  conflict  can  lead  to  
significant  antagonism  among  the  local  population  and  therefore  mean  that  effective  rebuilding  
may  be  difficult  [...]”.  Another  challenge  to  the  rule’s  appeal  lies  in  situations  where  the  
defeated  state,  or  more  specifically,  its  newly  ‘liberated’  population,  might  not  actually  want  
the  victor  (the  clumsy  ‘shop  visitor’  in  the  Pottery  Barn  example)  to  ‘own’  the  situation,  i.e.  to  
bear  the  responsibility  of  further  post-war  duties.  To  their  occasionally  reluctant  hosts,  even  
objectively  just  victors  can  be  seen  as  invaders  whose  reconstruction  efforts  are  not  welcomed.  
While  the  imposition’s  success  depends  on  the  amount  of  trust  placed  by  the  population  into  its  
occupiers,  and  vice  versa,  this  sort  of  trust  is  likely  absent  following  a  military  confrontation:  
83  According  to  the  more  minimalist  versions  of  the  Just  War,  Bellamy  affirms,  “victors  are  entitled  to  protect   
themselves,  recover  that  which  was  illicitly  taken,  punish  perpetrators  and  [...]  prevent,  halt  and/or  punish  those  who  
gravely  violate  natural  law  by,  for  instance,  committing  genocide  against  their  own”  (2008  [a]:  605).  However,  this  
does  not  include  substantial  imposition  of  new  government  structures,  purging  the  latter  from  adherents  of  the  old  
regime,  etc.  
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the  civilian  population  may  see  the  intervening  forces  as  mere  occupiers  intent  on  exploiting  its  
former  adversary,  while  occupying  soldiers  have  to  be  wary  of  insurgents  hiding  amongst  
civilians.  In  short,  the  trust  which  is  required  for  an  equitable  post-War  settlement  is  often  
wholly  absent.   
  
What  is  more,  there  are  other  important  limits  to  interveners’  responsibility  to  rebuild.  
Few  states,  even  when  acting  with  the  ‘just  cause’  required  by  the  Just  War  Tradition  (cf.  
Chapter  V),  would  accept  being  burdened  with  the  sole  ‘ownership’  of,  i.e.  responsibility  for,  
an  occupied  and  often  volatile  country.  Indeed,  although  it  is  impossible  to  determine  a  cut-off  
point,  i.e.  saying  when  interveners’  obligations  and  duties  come  to  an  end,  it  is  conceivable  that  
this  takes  a  long  time.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  FIRC,  where  it  may  take  “minimally  two  
generations,  40  to  50  years,  for  a  shift  in  authority  and  for  time  to  stabilize  the  transfer  of 
power  to  sons  and  daughters”,  as  Borneman  has  claimed  (2003:  39).  
  
In  this  context,  and  although  he  remains  critical  of  current  attempts  at  establishing  a  
viable  post  bellum  framework,  Seth  Lazar  addresses  the  specific  question  of  regime  change  and  
argues  for  a  restructuring  undertaken  by  the  entire  international  community,  not  just  the  
belligerent  parties  (2012:  18).  As  earlier  chapters  have  argued,  the  United  Nations  is  generally  
upheld  as  the  chief  representative  of  this  community.  Concurrently,  Jenkins  points  out  that,  
“[r]ightly  or  wrongly,  the  failure  for  the  rule  of  law  to  take  root  in  Iraq  is  routinely  blamed  not  
on  foreign  occupation  as  such,  but  on  occupation  by  an  external  actor  widely  seen  as  motivated  
by  imperial  ambition.  By  comparison,  the  UN  now  oozes  legitimacy”  (2006:  73).  This  
conception  is  in  line  with  Pattison,  who  for  example  states  that  “it  seems  that  the  rebuilding  
process  should  not  only  be  authorized  by  the  UN  Security  Council,  but  also  generally  be  
carried  out  by  it  (for  example,  by  UN  peacekeepers  or  a  UN  transitional  administration)”  
(2013[a]:  658).  
  
Earlier,  the  thesis  highlighted  important  problems  with  seeing  the  United  Nations  as  the  
sole  legitimate  actor  in  regime  removal.  Nonetheless,  this  does  not  mean  that  it  cannot  play  a  
key  role  in  supporting  reconstruction  efforts.  As  a  consequence,  and  “assuming  adequate  
consensus  among  Security  Council  members  on  the  purpose  for  any  intervention,  the  UN  
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provides  the  most  suitable  institutional  framework  for  most  nation-building  missions”,  Jones  
and  Dobbins  note  (2006:  723).  Indeed,  the  United  Nations  have  repeatedly  played  a  major  role  
in  post-conflict  restructuring,  coming  to   
  
assert  some  or  all  government  powers  on  virtually  every  continent.  These  
responsibilities  included  staging  elections  in  Namibia  in  1990  and  Cambodia  in  1993,  
restoring  a  democratic  government  in  Haiti  in  1994,  administering  the  eastern  Danube  
region  of  Croatia  (Eastern  Slavonia)  from  1996  to  1998,  assuming  control  of  the  
Serbian  province  of  Kosovo  for  an  indefinite  period  from  1999,  and  ultimately  running  
the  entire  territory  of  East  Timor  from  1999  (Chesterman  2004:  51). 84    
  
The  next  chapter  contends  there  are  also  important  problems  with  the  UN’s  efforts  at  creating  
postwar  stability,  however,  as  will  be  illustrated  by  the  cases  of  the  type  of  ‘neotrusteeship’  
exhibited  in  its  role  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  At  the  same  time,  it  will  argue  that  unilateral  
efforts  at  stabilisation  and  imposition  such  as  in  Iraq  have  been  equally  controversial,  to  the  
extent  that  Etzioni  cautions  that  “[e]xpanding  the  mission  of  humanitarian  intervention  from  
stopping  atrocities  to  rebuilding  nations  unwittingly  puts  barriers  in  the  way  of  the  international  
community’s  fulfilling  its  responsibilities  to  protect  and  prevent”  (2006:  81).  Thus,  the  
challenge  lies  not  only  in  finding  a  suitable  actor  who  can  aid  in  restructuring  a  
post-intervention  state,  but  in  what  this  restructuring  would  ideally  look  like.  As  the  subsequent  
chapter  will  show,  the  expectations  of  liberal  FIRC  often  hinder,  rather  than  promote,  the  
emergence  of  a  suitably  stable  and  secure  regime.  
6.3  Conclusions   
  
This  chapter  has  continued  the  discussion  of  what  the  Just  War  approach  understands  as  the  jus  
ad  bellum ,  i.e.  the  requirements  for  launching  a  justified  war.  It  has  contributed  to  our  
understanding  of  FIRC  by  highlighting  the  conceptual  distinction  between  obligations  and  
duties.  Thus,  the  chapter  has  shown  that,  in  accepting  the  potential  permissibility  of  regime  
84  Dee  states  that  in  the  case  of  East  Timor,  “an  international  Australian-led  International  Force  East  Timor   
(INTERFET)  was  sent  under  a  United  Nations  (UN)  mandate  to  restore  order  and  provide  protection  and  security  to  
the  East  Timorese  people.  The  strength  of  this  force  ultimately  reached  over  13,000  [...]”.  (2001:  1-2).  It  ought  to  be  
clear  that  there  are  important  differences  in  past  initiatives.  For  example,  “UN  action  in  Namibia  and  East  Timor  
was  a  way  of  dealing  with  the  unfinished  business  of  decolonization.  The  UN's  role  in  Cambodia  from  1992-1993  
was  confined  mainly  to  overseeing  the  conduct  of  multiparty  elections”  (Jenkins  2006:  72).  
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change  in  humanitarian  emergencies,  we  often  run  into  problems  which  are  very  similar  to  
more  general  discussions  on  humanitarian  intervention:  it  is  often  far  from  clear  which  actors  
are  best-placed  in  halting  human  rights  abuses,  and  how  their  claims  to  legitimacy  relate  to  
their  potential  responsibilities.   
  
The  Liberal  World  Order’s  explicitly  universal  ambitions  notwithstanding,  consensus  on  
the  issue  of  international  intervention  has  proven  to  be  elusive,  especially  in  questions  of  
justified  regime  toppling.  Here,  much  hinges  on  the  question  of  who  can  be  responsible  for,  and  
capable  of,  enforcing  regime  change,  as  well  as  which  further  rights  and  duties  this  would  
impose  both  during  and  after  the  operation.  Consequently,  the  chapter  has  distinguished  
between  conceptions  of  duty  and  obligation,  and  ultimately  addressed  two  essential  questions:  
who  can  act  and  who  should  act?  
  
The  near-universal  regret  at  the  ineffective  response  of  the  International  Community  in  
Rwanda  has  directly  influenced  the  emergence  of  a  general  notion  of  global  responsibility  to  
halt  extreme  human  rights  abuses.  Indeed,  the  “genocide  against  the  Tutsi  in  Rwanda  elicited  
consternation  about  the  hollowness  of  the  post-Holocaust  commitment  to  the  mantra  ‘Never  
Again.’  It  also  ushered  in  volumes  of  genocide  studies  scholarship  and  efforts  at  public  policy  
reforms.  Yet  in  the  quarter  century  that  has  passed  since  the  genocide  in  Rwanda,  genocide  and  
mass  atrocity  have  continued”,  as  Simon  notes  (2020:  199).  The  lack  of  humanitarian  
intervention  in  these  cases  inevitably  raises  questions  about  regime  change.  After  all,  it  is  hard  
to  support  the  notion  that  a  political  regime  which  commits  human  rights  abuses  on  a  scale  of  
the  Holocaust  or  the  Rwandan  Genocide  should  be  left  in  power  even  after  a  potential  
intervention.  While  the  previous  chapter  has  discussed  when  foreign-imposed  regime  change  is  
a  possibility,  finding  appropriate  actors  to  carry  it  out  successfully  remains  an  important  
challenge.  Although  the  legitimacy  of  actors  engaging  in  non-consensual  intervention  has  often  
been  questioned,  i t  is  worth  bearing  in  mind  here  that  “we  should  not  dismiss  talk  of  legitimacy  




 Accordingly,  this  section  of  the  thesis  has  addressed  important  questions  revolving   
around  the  authority,  legitimacy,  and  responsibility  of  FIRC  actors.  It  has  argued  that  in  
principle,  there  is  no  preferred  type  of  actor,  as  many  possess  the  required  authority,  but  that  the  
legitimacy  of  their  actions  is  often  context  specific.  Similarly,  the  distribution  of  obligations  
and  duties  will  differ  between  states  according  to  specific  circumstances.  This  means  that  
instead  of  a  single  ‘Responsibility  to  Protect’,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  conceptualise  a  variety  
of  responsibilities  attached  to  statehood.  Accordingly,  it  should  be  emphasised  that  duties  to  act  
in  emergencies  are  dependent  on  the  particular  emergency’s  context,  and  instead  of  Walzer’s  
‘whoever  can,  should’,  it  is  rather  the  case  that  ‘whoever  can  act  legitimately ,  must  act  
according  to  their  responsibility’ .   
  
This  chapter’s  final  section  has  begun  to  draw  the  discussions’  focus  toward  the  field  of  
jus  post  bellum .  It  is  certainly  worth  emphasising  that  Just  War  considerations  do  not  cease  to  
apply  when  armed  hostilities  between  belligerents  ‘officially’  end.  The  post  bellum  framework  
is  consequently  less  concerned  with  either  the  existence  or  the  absence  of  formal  peace  treaties  
between  the  belligerent  parties.  Melandri  (2011:  242)  is  correct  in  stating  that  this  wider  post  
bellum  framework   
  
has  been  used  by  various  authors  to  indicate  different  sets  of  principles  intended  to  
apply  in  different  contexts  and  at  different  times.  The  variance  of  meanings  being  
attributed  to  this  notion  is  in  fact  so  broad  that,  at  this  stage,  it  might  even  be  imprecise  
to  speak  of  a  single  concept  of  jus  post  bellum.  In  general  terms,  however,  [...]  
discourses  on  jus  post  bellum  deal  with  questions  such  as  what  are  the  criteria  that  
constitute  a  just  peace  and  which  principles  should  guide  the  actions  of  a  just  combatant  
in  the  aftermath  of  war;  whether  the  belligerent  states  hold  any  moral  obligation  
towards  the  defeated  state;  when  and  to  what  extent  it  is  possible  for  just  combatants  to  
change  the  political  structure  of  a  defeated  aggressor;  and  who  should  be  responsible  to  
enact  such  restructuring.   
  
Past  FIRC  interventions  have  shown  that  even  in  such  cases  where  an  appropriate  actor  for  
regime  change  can  be  identified,  its  execution  can  still  ‘make  or  break’  the  justice  of  the  whole  
enterprise.  Indeed,  “the  call  for  a  jus  post  bellum,  or  justice  after  war,  in  addition  to  the  
traditional  cause  and  means  pillars  of  just  war  theory  gained  traction  especially  with  the  chaos  
that  developed  after  immediate  military  victories  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq”  (Banta  2017:  438).  
160  
The  ‘just  cause’  that  is  required  of  any  actor  wanting  to  provide  a  convincing  account  of  
their  right  to  intervention  (in  this  case,  saving  citizens  from  state-sanctioned  harm)  is  therefore  
at  least  partially  linked  to  the  justice  of  the  eventual  post  bellum  settlement  (ensuring  that  
citizens  are  not  harmed  in  the  future).  Of  course,  claims  by  interveners  notwithstanding,  regime  
change  efforts  are  not  always  welcomed  by  the  targeted  population  with  the  expected  
enthusiasm,  especially  when  imposing  the  occupier’s  vision  of  Western  liberal  democracy.  
Democratisation  efforts  have  been  a  major  aspect  of  several  recent  interventions,  and  these  
processes  should  therefore  be  scrutinised.  
Chapter  VII:  The  Challenges  of  Regime  Imposition   
  
In  order  to  highlight  the  numerous  challenges  of  achieving  a  just  postwar  outcome,  this  chapter  
will  focus  on  the  cases  of  postwar  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Afghanistan,  and  Iraq,  and  uses  them 
to  highlight  the  contradictions  and  paternalism  inherent  in  supposedly  ‘liberal’  attempts  to  
impose  democracy  by  force.  Their  post  bellum ,  i.e.  ‘post-FIRC’,  experience  indicates  that 
regime  change  and  forcible  democratisation  are  no  panacea  to  state  instability  and  human  
suffering.  Ultimately,  as  Knowles  states,  they  “have  shown  that  victory  in  war  and  ‘regime  
change’,  followed  by  military  occupation,  do  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  creation  of  politically  
stable  and  economically  prosperous  democracies”  (2013:  84).  
  
Accordingly,  the  chapter  begins  from  the  assumption  that  a  successful  military  
intervention  against  a  regime  has  taken  place  and  the  targeted  state  is  now,  in  terms  of  the  
Pottery  Barn  analogy,  ‘broken’.  Although  both  belligerents’  and  the  UN’s  potential  role  in  the  
reconstruction  of  states  has  been  assessed  earlier,  we  should  acknowledge  that  the  actual  
intervener  does  not  always  conform  to  our  ideals  of  legitimate  agency.  The  foregoing  pages  
ended  on  the  indication  that,  even  in  such  interventions  where  the  ultimate  intentions  were  
controversial,  this  does  not  absolve  actors  of  the  need  to  strive  for  a  just  outcome.  The  previous  
chapter  has  also  established  distinctions  between  a  generalised  sense  of  responsibility  and  
special  responsibilities,  i.e.  duties  and  obligations.  A  range  of  responsibilities  also  applies  in  a  
post  bellum  setting,  albeit  in  a  different  manner.  Regardless  of  the  identity  of  the  actors  
involved,  they  incur  a  temporary  duty  of  care  for  the  population,  which  is  acquired  by  toppling  
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the  old  regime.  The  question  of  responsibilities  beyond  this  initial  duty  is  much  less  apparent,  
however.  For  instance,  Walzer  (2013:  para.12)  has  noted  that  “if  protection  is  necessary  against  
a  murderous  regime,  and  that  regime  is  overthrown,  the  responsible  agents  do  acquire  
additional  responsibilities.  They  must  at  least  begin  the  political  reconstruction  of  the  country  
whose  people  they  have  rescued.  But  they  have  no  business  imposing  their  own  design  on  the  
reconstructed  state.”  
  
The  debate  has  been  reinvigorated  by  the  aftermath  of  regime  change  interventions  in  
the  Middle  East.  Many  of  the  questions  of  legitimacy,  sovereignty  and  security  which  prompted  
the  interventions  in  the  first  place  were  not  resolved  with  the  interveners’  victory.  Rather,  the  
debate  has  only  intensified  as  new  challenges  have  arisen,  including  the  many  challenges  in  
imposing  more  ‘legitimate’  regimes  on  states,  and  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  emergence  of  
the  FIRC  phenomenon  runs  parallel  to  the  rise  of  more  sustained  engagement  with  the  jus  post  
bellum .  Indeed,  although  it  is  correct  that  “[t]he  observation  that  international  interveners  may  
be  predisposed  to  project  their  own  political  and  ideological  biases  into  the  states  they  conquer  
or  occupy  –  or,  for  that  matter,  that  they  may  also  do  so  in  more  consensual,  post-conflict  
peacebuilding  operations  –  is  not  new”  (Paris  2015:  140),  the  specific  relationship  between  the 
Liberal  Order  and  the  imposition  of  regimes  on  sovereign  states  has  hitherto  remained  
underdeveloped.  
  
Ultimately,  this  debate  links  to  the  thesis’  earlier  discussions  on  the  two  ‘types’  of  
FIRC,  namely  superficial  and  radical  change.  As  has  been  argued  earlier,  the  majority  of  
interventions  which  have  taken  place  in  the  context  of  a  Global  Liberal  Order  have  aimed  at  
radical  change,  including  the  imposition  of  liberal  democratic  regimes.  As  the  subsequent  
pages  show,  however,  in  many  cases  of  FIRC  the  clash  between  normative  ambitions  and 
practical  realities  show  that  liberal  assumptions  about  the  link  between  deepgoing  change  and  
positive  outcomes  is  rarely  substantiated.  In  the  vast  majority  of  potential  cases,  the  forcible  
imposition  and  supervision  of  radical  FIRC  in  the  form  of  liberal  democratisation  is  neither  just  
nor  ultimately  beneficial  to  the  target  state  in  the  long  term.  As  noted  earlier,  since  the  end  of  
the  Cold  War,  postwar  regime  imposition  has  increasingly  taken  the  form  of  attempts  at  
‘democratising’  formerly  authoritarian  states.  The  controversy  surrounding  this  practice  lies  not  
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only  in  its  impermissibility  under  the  traditional  laws  of  occupation  (see  Chapter  VI).  It  also  
raises  important  questions  as  to  its  effects  on  the  long-term  stability  of  postwar  societies.  
Consequently,  the  following  pages  first  assess  the  ways  in  which  post-FIRC  actors  have  
attempted  to  impose  regimes  since  the  Cold  War,  arguing  that  ultimately,  the  insistence  on  
creating  liberal  democratic  regimes  is  at  best  unnecessary  and  likely  counter-productive.  This  is  
the  case  because  occupiers’  expectations  of  ‘Western’  liberal  democracy  cannot  easily  be  
transposed  onto  polities  which  have  not  undergone  the  same  historical  and  political  evolution  
as  many  states  in  the  West, 85  but  also  because  the  imposed  postwar  regimes  can  actively  stifle   
democratic  developments.   
  
As  a  result,  this  chapter  submits  that  in  engaging  in  FIRC,  an  actor  incurs  an  obligation  
to  engage  in  a  minimum  of  stabilisation  and  state  building,  but  that  this  is  accompanied  by  an  
overarching  duty  to  avoid  imposing  political  structures  which  might  inhibit  populations’  
self-determination.  These  responsibilities  are  plausible  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  that  it  
further  reduces  the  likelihood  of  interventions  for  inadmissible  motives.  As  we  have  seen  
earlier,  intervening  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  a  more  agreeable  political  regime  does  not  
constitute  a  just  cause  for  warfare.  The  second  reason  is  more  practical,  but  no  less  important.  
The  Just  War  tradition  often  notes  that  belligerents’  actions  should  meet  a  reasonable  
requirement  of  probability  for  success.  Compared  to  the  past  and  current  efforts  of  liberal  
interveners  to  impose  ‘ideal’  (and  frequently  idealised )  forms  of  government  on  war-torn  
states,  the  likelihood  of  success  is  greatly  enhanced  by  imposing  ‘minimally  just’  regimes.   
  
The  continued  international  ‘administration’  of  the  Republic  of  Bosnia  and  
Herzegovina’s  political  landscape  under  the  postwar  ‘Dayton  framework’  illustrates  these  
concerns.  Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  minimal  justice  and  popular  involvement,  Chandler  
(2006:  18)  has  for  example  argued  that  “the  Dayton  agreement  has,  in  fact,  created  an  'informal  
trusteeship'  which  has  made  opaque  the  relations  of  authority  and  accountability.  The  
framework  created  at  Dayton  was  an  extremely  flexible  one,  which  has  enabled  international  
actors,  unaccountable  to  the  people  of  Bosnia,  to  shape  and  reshape  the  agenda  of  post-war  
85  Indeed,  advocates  of  this  transposition  often  tend  to  conveniently  ignore  the  troubled,  non-linear,  and   
exceptionally  bloody  history  of  Western  democracy’s  emergence.  
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transition.”  Although  this  type  of  supervision  has  been  remarkably  effective  in  halting  human  
rights  abuses,  it  has  not  matched  the  international  community’s  expectations  of  creating  a  
democratic  ‘Bosnian’  identity  and  the  accompanying  ownership  of,  and  allegiance  to,  the  new  
state.  Ultimately,  the  Dayton  Accords  have  “created  Serb  and  Muslim-Croat  mini-states  and  a  
weak  national  government”  (Eland  2005:  para.  7).  This  national  government  remains  
dependent  on  the  authority  of  the  Office  of  the  High  Representative.  Indeed,  only  a  few  years  
after  the  Dayton  framework  was  established,  “the  term  of  the  international  administration  was  
extended  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time  and  OHR’s  powers  were  substantially  broadened  to  
cover  key  aspects  of  institutional  reform”  (Dimitrova  2005:  45).  Ultimately,  in  seeking  to  fulfil  
the  international  community's  responsibilities  to  the  emerging  state,  the  OHR  has  been  
“equipped  [...]  with  additional  powers  that  allowed  this  office  to  become  an  integral  institution  
of  governance.  Henceforth,  key  decisions  were  not  indigenously  generated  but  instead  were  
imposed  on  Bosnia  by  the  international  community”  (McMahon  2004:  575).  
  
In  assessing  the  repeated  failures  of  democratisation  efforts,  the  chapter  also  returns  to  
the  pivotal  cases  of  radical  FIRC  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Contrary  to  interveners’  overly  
optimistic  expectations,  regime  change  has  created  unanticipated  power  vacuums  in  both  states,  
which  further  diminished  the  probability  of  successful  imposition.  In  Afghanistan,  this  has  
resulted  in  a  weak  and  ineffective  government  which  has  been  unable  to  exercise  a  monopoly  
on  the  use  of  force,  whereas  the  Iraqi  government  has  failed  to  resolve  the  country’s  sectarian  
and  ethnic  tensions  almost  two  decades  after  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime. 86  Ultimately,   
the  failure  to  impose  viable  regimes  after  intervention  has  benefited  the  United  States’  
opponents  and  has  undermined  global  stability  in  the  long  term.  This  unanticipated  outcome  is  
particularly  relevant  to  the  initial  framing  of  both  wars  as  important  parts  of  the  ‘Global  War  on  
Terror’,  which  has  added  another  element  to  consider,  i.e.  that  of  ‘rehabilitation’.  The  notion  of  
rehabilitating  states  and  the  paternalistic  way  of  regime  imposition  which  accompanies  it  
ultimately  reflects  the  unequal,  contradictory,  and  increasingly  illiberal,  relationship  between  
regime  change  actors  and  targeted  states.  
86  For  example,  Katz  has  stated  about  the  postwar  arrangements  that  “while  the  United  States  created  the  conditions   
that  have  allowed  Iraq  to  hold  two  national  elections  for  its  parliament,  the  United  States  has  not  been  able  to  
persuade  or  cajole  important  Iraqi  groups  to  fully  -  or  even  less  than  fully  -  cooperate  with  one  another”  (2017:  para.  
8).  Without  this  important  cooperation  between  citizens,  a  democratic  government  which  is  both  able  to  safeguard  
the  stability  of  the  country  and  enjoys  the  support  of  all  ethnic  and  religious  groups  is  unlikely.  
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The  cases  examined  in  this  chapter  highlight  the  importance  of  the  considerations  
suggested  earlier,  in  particular  the  proposed  conceptual  distinctions,  i.e.  between  types  of  
FIRC,  motive  and  intention,  and  facets  of  responsibility.  These  distinctions  and  clarifications  
highlight  the  difficulties  which  liberal  FIRC  actors  face  in  establishing  regimes  which  are  both  
stable  and  just,  as  well  as  conform  with  liberal  expectations  of  legitimacy.  Thus,  the  chapter  
adds  important  elements  to  the  assessment  of  FIRC  in  the  context  of  the  jus  post  bellum .  
7.1  Regime  Imposition  and  the  Jus  Post  Bellum  
  
In  spite  of  interveners’  claims  to  the  contrary,  (e.g.  the  assertion  that  their  military  victory  is  
also  a  moral  triumph),  the  foreign-imposed  regime  change  missions  of  the  20th  and  21st  
centuries  are  a  powerful  reminder  that  military  success  does  not  always  equate  to  substantial  
political  or  ethical  progress.  The  evaluation  of  FIRC  necessarily  involves  the  third  facet  of  Just  
War  Theory,  the  jus  post  bellum ,  which  assesses  the  rights  and  duties  of  both  the  victor  and  the  
vanquished.  Whereas  re-establishing  the  status  quo  ante  bellum  and/or  the  provision  of  
reparations  to  the  victim  has  been  a  key  concern  for  past  peace  settlements,  the  devastating  
wars  of  the  20th  century  have  reinforced  the  necessity  for  establishing  what  constitutes  a  viable  
post-conflict  peace.  While  it  is  clear  that  the  jus  post  bellum  “seeks  to  regulate  the  ending  of  
wars,  and  to  ease  the  transition  from  war  back  to  peace”  (Orend  2005:  para.  36)  this  often  
includes  another  transition,  namely  from  a  supposedly  illegitimate  regime  to  a  ‘rehabilitated’  
member  of  the  international  community  of  states.  What  this  means  in  practice,  however,  has  
repeatedly  been  shown  to  be  far  from  straightforward.  Just  War  theorists,  including  Michael  
Walzer,  have  held  a  wide  variety  of  opinions  on  the  anticipated  outcome  of  military  
interventions,  regime  imposition  and  the  challenges  of  postwar  ‘management’.  Indeed,  
Walzer’s  own  views  of  jus  post  bellum  have  in  the  past  been  described  as  rather  “short,  spotty,  
and  unsatisfying”  (Orend  2000  [b]:  135).  However,  Nardin  (2013:  78)  has  noted  that  Walzer  
has  more  recently  taken  the  view  that  
  
when  a  government  is  engaged  in  murdering  many  of  its  own  people,  its  murderousness  
makes  it  ‘a  legitimate  candidate  for  forcible  transformation’.  And  the  intervening  power  
necessarily  takes  on  ‘some  degree  of  responsibility  for  the  creation  of  an  alternative  
government’.  A  new  regime  must  be  put  in  place  and  enforced  until  it  can  maintain  
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itself  without  outside  assistance.  How  this  can  be  done  effectively  depends  on  the  
circumstances,  but  it  is  clear  that  the  responsibility  to  protect  includes  a  responsibility  
to  replace  or  reform  the  government  that  so  signally  failed  to  perform  its  own  
responsibilities.  
  
In  reality,  however,  this  type  of  deceptively  simple  ‘government  reform’  has  been  the  source  of  
continued  controversy  in  discussions  of  FIRC.  Recent  Western-led  regime  change  attempts  
have  sought  to  replicate  in  part  or  as  a  whole  the  liberal  institutions  favoured  by  the  US  and  its  
allies.  Yet,  in  doing  so  they  have  failed  to  establish  the  functional  and  stable  democracies  which  
they  had  anticipated.  This  shows  that,  more  often  than  not,  the  intended  outcome  of  radical  
FIRC  can  be  counterproductive  and  ultimately  prolong  violent  conflict.  
7.1.1  The  Challenges  of  Postwar  Democratisation   
  
Earlier  chapters  have  established  that  prominent  members  of  the  Liberal  Order,  first  and  
foremost  the  United  States,  have  increasingly  pursued  a  controversial  hierarchisation  between  
supposedly  rights-respecting  democratic  states  on  the  one  hand  and  authoritarian  ‘rogue’  
regimes  on  the  other,  wherein  a  regimes’  legitimacy  is  tied  to  its  political  nature.  In  turn,  this  
means  that  once  a  regime  has  been  overthrown,  Western  actors  have  repeatedly  attempted  to  
impose  their  vision  of  a  legitimate  form  of  government.  Invariably,  this  legitimate  government  
has  been  cast  in  the  form  of  a  democratic  regime.  To  briefly  return  to  the  Pottery  Barn  
metaphor,  the  democratisation  of  governments  and  society  is  thought  of  as  the  ‘glue’  which  is  
supposed  to  mend  the  country  that  was  ‘broken’  in  the  conflict.  Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  
these  attempts  at  democratisation  have  taken  three  key  forms:  the  imposition  of  new  
constitutions  designed  to  provide  states  with  a  stable  democratic  foundation,  the  use  of  
elections  to  lend  legitimacy  to  newly-imposed  regimes,  and,  rarely,  the  long-term  ‘supervision’  
of  the  postwar  state  by  external  actors.   
  
As  is  common  in  discussions  on  foreign-imposed  regime  change,  the  recourse  to  the  
imposition  of  constitutional  legislation  is  almost  invariably  justified  with  reference  to  the  
successes  in  the  wake  of  the  Second  World  War  (cf.  Chapter  I).  T he  postwar  evolution  of  Japan  
and  West  Germany  are  commonly  presented  as  validating  foreign-imposed  constitutional  
change.  However,  this  undeniable  success  of  radical  FIRC  in  the  past  distracts  from  the  
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important  challenges  faced  in  more  recent  cases  (cf.  McCready  2009),  and  the  supposedly  
‘archetypal’  form  of  imposition  is  not  easily  transferred  to  more  current  experiences,  as  the  
cases  of  Iraq,  Afghanistan  and  others  have  repeatedly  shown.  Nonetheless,  constitutional  
imposition  has  become  a  popular  approach  to  anticipated  post-conflict  instability.  As  Querimi  
(2018:  3)  has  stated,  a  
  
particularly  unique  characteristic  of  constitution-making  in  the  twenty-first  
century—albeit  certain  more  contemporaneous  cases  date  back  to  the  down  [ sic ]  of  the  
twentieth  century—is  the  involvement  of  the  international  community,  or  powerful  
segments  of  it,  in  shaping  the  new  state  constitutions;  a  domain  traditionally  regarded  to  
be  part  and  parcel  of  a  state  and  its  people.  The  variety  of  instances  where  the  
international  community  or  parts  of  it  have  ‘induced,  accompanied,  steered,  or  even  
installed  new  state  constitutions’  could  be  evidenced  in  such  cases  as  the  constitutions  
of  Cambodia  (1993),  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (1995),  South  Africa  (1996),  East  Timor  
(2002),  Afghanistan  (2004),  Iraq  (interim  Constitution  of  2004),  and  Kosovo  (2008).  
  
Western  interveners  often  emphasise  that  these  constitutional  frameworks  should  be  founded  
on  liberal  and  democratic  understandings  of  just  rule,  but  simultaneously  be  sensitive  to  local  
cultural  and  political  customs.  What  this  means  in  practice  is  far  from  evident,  however.  Walzer  
has  for  instance  taken  the  position  that  “just  wars  and  humanitarian  interventions  will  often  be  
an  occasion  for  forcible  and  justifiable  democratisation,  and  that  will  sometimes  require  an  
attack  upon  traditional  hierarchies  and  customary  practices”  (2006  [a]:  xi),  but  later  adds  that  
“the  intervening  forces  have  a  mandate  for  political,  but  not  for  cultural,  transformation”  (idem:  
104).  Given  that  states’  political  and  cultural  transformation  are  likely  to  go  hand  in  hand,  this  
is  problematic.  After  all,  the  political  reconstruction  which  Walzer  seems  to  envisage  must  
necessarily  lay  the  foundation  for  the  future  development  of  the  state  in  question.  
  
FIRC  interveners  have  repeatedly  attempted  to  resolve  some  of  these  apparent  
contradictions  by  emphasising  the  crucial  importance  of  democratic  elections.  Elections  are  
thought  to  confer  a  sense  of  ‘ownership’  and  accountability  of  the  new  regime  to  the  
population,  and  thus  convey  a  sense  of  legitimacy  to  both  the  political  and  cultural  changes  
enshrined  in  new  constitutions.  Consequently,  they  are  presented  as  key  milestones  on  the  way  
to  regaining  the  legitimacy  that  had  been  lost  by  ‘rogue’  regimes:  the  first  elections  after  
intervention  are  thus  considered  a  turning  point  in  the  postwar  phase,  and  as  the  beginning  of  a  
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process  of  reconciliation  and  rebuilding.  For  example,  Greene  (2017:  570)  has  pointed  out  that  
“[w]hile  not  all  decision-makers  and  their  supporters  in  the  policy  community  were  convinced  
that  democratisation  in  Iraq  would  be  a  simple  task,  there  was  a  widespread  strategic  
assumption  that  elections  would  at  a  minimum  instil  broad  legitimacy  in  new  governments.”  
Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  democratic  elections  in  and  of  themselves  do  not  ‘automatically’  
confer  legitimacy  on  newly-imposed  regimes.   
  
Indeed,  externally-imposed  elections  have  repeatedly  been  observed  to  be  at  the  root  of  
further  instability  as  the  population  is  likely  to  be  heavily  polarised  in  the  aftermath  of  a  FIRC  
conflict.  Thus,  Greene  (2017:  570)  writes  that  “many  Afghans  and  Iraqis  did  not  understand  
elections  as  imputing  their  government  with  the  legitimacy  that  leads  men  and  women  to  risk  
their  lives  to  defend.  Indeed,  elections  in  both  states  may  have  served  to  heighten  rather  than  
diminish  sectarian  and  factional  divisions  as  elections  took  on  zero-sum  meanings.”  Not  only  
do  elections  often  encourage  further  instability,  they  are  also  an  opportunity  for  insurgents  to  
cause  civilian  casualties  while  simultaneously  destabilising  and  delegitimising  the  ‘imposed’  
democratic  electoral  process,  as  has  been  the  case  in  both  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  Furthermore,  
although  the  occupying  authority  often  chooses  to  exclude  certain  political  parties  or  
candidates  from  elections  in  an  effort  to  prevent  the  rise  of  radical  parties  or  to  block  the  
re-emergence  of  the  deposed  regime,  this  likely  only  serves  to  further  fuel  dissatisfaction  
among  the  occupied  and  undermine  the  legitimacy  of  the  new  regime.  This  is  certainly  in  line  
with  Phillips’  assessment  that  “[i]n  post-conflict  Iraq,  the  much-trumpeted  test  was  that  
elections  had  taken  place.  This  criterion  is  similarly  beset  with  difficulty.  The  holding  of  
elections  says  nothing  about  corruption,  the  deadening  hold  of  tribal  and  clan  loyalties  or  of  the  
protection  of  civil  liberties  (especially  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  women  and  of  religious 
and  racial  minorities)”  (2012:  57).  Therefore,  the  occurrence  of  democratic  elections  in  and  of  
itself  tells  us  very  little  about  the  states’  stability  and  future  prospects,  nor  does  it  necessarily  
infuse  imposed  governments  with  the  legitimacy  required  to  cement  its  control  over  the  state.   
  
The  ubiquitous  instability  encountered  in  many  post-conflict  societies  has  on  occasion  
led  to  proposals  for  long-term  international  supervision  or  even  administration,  in  accordance  
with  the  assessment  that  “[o]ne  might  overthrow  a  government  within  a  day,  but  the  
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neutralization  of  a  regime  is  never  enough  to  effect  regime  change.  One  also  needs  to  change  
culture  and  social  organization,  and  such  changes  rarely  occur  within  a  single  generation”  
(Borneman  2003:  39).  Accordingly,  in  such  cases  a  political  superstructure  would  remain  in  
place  to  enforce  the  peace,  supervise  elections,  but  also  impose  the  goals  of  a  new  
constitutional  framework  and  thus  ‘guide’  the  state  in  question  towards  regaining  its  full  
sovereignty.  The  notion  that  variations  of  this  type  of  international  administration  can  offer  a  
potential  solution  to  the  problem  of  unstable  states  has  been  periodically  evoked  by  both  
academics  and  practitioners.  For  instance,  faced  with  the  moral  and  practical  challenges  of  
FIRC  missions  in  Middle  East  and  elsewhere,  there  have  once  more  been  suggestions  
  
that  the  UN  system  of  trusteeship  should  be  revived  to  provide  a  framework  for  UN  
interventions  in  failed  states  —  a  framework  that  is  both  legally  viable  and  politically  
advisable.  [...]  While  the  Security  Council  should  continue  to  control  the  military  and  
police  aspects  of  UN  intervention,  the  Trusteeship  Council  should  assume  exclusive  
responsibility  for  the  governance  tasks  that  fall  within  the  category  of  postconflict  
peacebuilding  (Mohamed  2005:  812).  
  
The  term  ‘trusteeship’  here  refers  to  the  temporary  ‘sharing’  of  sovereign  privileges  between  an  
emerging  state  and  the  international  community  until  the  former  has  built  the  capacity  for  full  
independence.  Butler  (2012:  86)  adds  that  “[t]hough  specific  translations  of  the  concept  differ,  
it  is  almost  universally  associated  with  third-party  multilateral  initiatives  to  design  and  steward  
political,  social,  and  economic  institutions  within  societies  transitioning  from  conflict,  as  a  part  
of  (or  subsequent  to)  peace  operations.”  It  thus  echoes  the  goals  of  the  historical  League  of  
Nations  mandate  system,  as  well  as  those  of  later  UN-led  trusteeship,  which  “were  to  promote  
the  advancement  of  the  inhabitants  of  Trust  Territories  and  their  progressive  development  
towards  self-government  or  independence”  (United  Nations  n.d.  [c]:  para.  2).  
  
The  very  notion  of  extraneous  administration  itself  is  understandably  controversial.  Its  
negative  connotations  are  amplified  by  the  colonial  relationship  inherent  in  many  former  
trustee  relations,  but  also  more  generally  by  the  implication  that  some  states  are  simply  not  
ready  or  able  to  be  fully  independent.  Accordingly,  such  states  are  thought  to  require  a  more  
established  (and  historically  speaking,  a  powerful  Western)  state  to  ‘guide’  them  towards  full  
membership  of  the  international  community.  The  negative  perception  of  this  understanding  
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underlined  by  the  stance  of  the  UN  itself.  Indeed,  recent  publications  have  noted  that  “that  the  
eradication  of  colonialism  has  been  one  of  the  priorities  of  the  United  Nations  and  continues  to  
be  one  of  its  priorities”  (UNGA  2018:  1).  Consequently,  the  United  Nations  has  “declared  the  
period  2011–2020  the  Third  International  Decade  for  the  Eradication  of  Colonialism”  (idem:  
2).  Ultimately,  the  UN’s  position  is  based  on  the  1960  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  
Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples,  which  unequivocally  asserts  that   
  
1.  The  subjection  of  peoples  to  alien  subjugation,  domination  and  exploitation  
constitutes  a  denial  of  fundamental  human  rights,  is  contrary  to  the  Charter  of  the  
United  Nations  and  is  an  impediment  to  the  promotion  of  world  peace  and  co-operation.  
2.  All  peoples  have  the  right  to  self-determination;  by  virtue  of  that  right  they  freely  
determine  their  political  status  and  freely  pursue  their  economic,  social  and  cultural  
development.  
  
Nonetheless,  in  the  regime  imposition  attempts  of  the  past  three  decades  this  fundamentally  
‘liberal’  focus  on  popular  self-determination  has  increasingly  been  relegated  to  the  background.  
Indeed,  despite  its  seemingly  unambiguous  condemnation  of  colonialism,  imperialism,  and  
other  international  hierarchies,  the  UN  has  arguably  been  involved  in  practices  of  
‘neotrusteeship’  which,  while  lacking  the  global  institutionalisation  and  colonial  overtones  of  
its  predecessor,  retains  many  of  its  problematic  and  illiberal  assumptions.  Ultimately,  this  aligns  
with  the  assessment  that  “contemporary  practice  of  peacebuilding  may  be  viewed  as  a  modern  
rendering  of  the  mission  civilisatrice  -  the  colonial-era  belief  that  the  European  imperial  powers  
had  a  duty  to  ‘civilise’  their  overseas  possessions.  Although  modern  peacebuilders  have  largely  
abandoned  the  archaic  language  of  civilised  versus  uncivilised,  they  nevertheless  appear  to  act  
upon  the  belief  that  one  model  of  domestic  governance  -  liberal  market  democracy  -  is  superior  
to  all  others”  (Paris  2002:  628).  This  underlying  notion  of  ‘superiority’  has  not  only  influenced  
attitudes  towards  regime  imposition  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  but  is  also  at  the  heart  of  the  UN’s  




7.2  Bosnia:  An  Experiment  with  ‘Neotrusteeship’   
  
Since  the  end 87  of  the  historical  practice  of  Trust  Territories,  the  closest  the  international   
community  has  come  to  embracing  the  notion  of  what  can  be  termed  ‘neotrusteeship’  is  
represented  by  the  Office  of  the  High  Representative  (OHR)’s  continued  efforts  of  regime  
imposition  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  where,  “[f]rustrated  by  local  opposition,  the  OHR  has  
increasingly  implemented  a  "trusteeship  model"  of  imposing  peace  from  above.  The  evolving  
de  facto  practice  has  been  to  override  Bosnian  sovereignty  in  the  short  term”  (McMahon  2004:  
587),  although  ultimately  at  the  expense  of  an  emerging  ‘Bosnian  identity’. 88  I n  2009,  High   
Representative  Valentin  Inzko  claimed  that  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  “remained  stable  and  
secure,  but  the  State  was  not  yet  fully  viable”,  and  added  that  “its  sovereignty,  constitutional  
order  and  territorial  integrity  were  under  challenge  by  leaders  of  the  Republika  Srpska,  who,  in  
a  series  of  attacks  on  State  powers,  had  referred  to  the  possibility  of  unilateral  
self-determination”  (UNSC  2009:  para.  2).  Such  an  assessment  is  particularly  striking  in  a  
country  which  has  had  so  much  international  attention  devoted  to  establishing  a  thriving  
democratic  state,  and  that  for  over  a  decade.  Thus,  while  it  is  undeniable  that  “the  Dayton  
Accord  is  a  blueprint  for  the  ambitious  political  reconstruction  of  an  infant  state”  (Caplan  
2000:  216),  and  has  been  largely  effective  in  stabilising  the  country 89  it  has  also  been  noted  that   
“with  the  investment  of  billions  of  dollars,  the  erection  of  extensive  parallel  administrative  
structures,  and  with  extensive  legal  powers  at  its  disposal,  the  international  authorities  in  
Bosnia  have  largely  failed  in  their  efforts  to  create  and  install  elites  they  deemed  desirable”  
(Manning  2006:  732).  
  
87  The  final  remaining  territories  under  supervision  by  the  UN  Trusteeship  Council  became  fully  independent  in   
1994  and  the  supervisory  body  was  pronounced  inactive.  
  
88  The  lack  of  cooperation  between  ethnic  groups  and  the  failure  to  establish  a  Bosnian  identity  has  also  affected  the   
work  of  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia  (ICTY),  which  was  in  operation  from  1993  to  
2017.  In  the  end,  the  tribunal  found  itself  “caught  between  Serbian  and  Bosnian  Serb  obstructionism  on  the  one  hand  
and  inadequate  support  from  the  international  community  on  the  other”  (Hoare  2011:  85).  
  
89  As  Paddy  Ashdown  himself  had  pointed  out  in  2003,  we  ought  to  “consider  that  it  is  only  eight  short  years  since   
the  trauma  of  that  war;  the  225,000  killed  and  the  2  million  driven  from  their  homes”  (2003:  2).  He  added,  speaking  
of  the  Bosnian  population,  that  “[i]n  the  winter  of  2003,  they  live  in  fear  of  their  livelihoods,  but  no  longer  in  fear  of  
their  lives”  (idem:  4).  
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As  the  thesis  has  established  earlier,  in  fulfilling  its  duty  to  halt  the  ongoing  killings  in  
Bosnia,  the  international  community  had  a  just  cause  to  intervene  with  military  force  and  
impose  FIRC.  In  doing  so,  it  also  took  on  a  responsibility  to  prevent  further  violence  between  
ethnic  groups.  Nonetheless,  Western  involvement  in  the  war  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  is  a  
contentious  instance  of  post-war  regime  imposition.  In  trying  to  establish  conditions  that  went  
far  beyond  minimal  justice  and  attempting  to  create  a  liberal  multiethnic  Bosnia,  the  
international  community  exceeded  its  postwar  rights  and  responsibilities.  Ultimately,  this  has  
forced  it  to  defend  its  achievements  by  ‘illiberal’  means,  which  has  resulted  in  a  postwar  
settlement  which  has  become  more  controversial  than  the  intervention  itself.  The  ‘Dayton 
Accords’  of  1995,  which  are  at  the  heart  of  the  system  currently  in  place  in  Bosnia,  achieved  
several  notable  things.  Evidently,  the  treaty  put  an  end  to  a  brutal  war  which  had  affected  the  
region  for  years  and  established  “a  single,  democratic  and  multi-ethnic  state  with  two  entities:  
the  Federation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  the  Republika  Srpska”  (NATO  2019:  para.  36).  
As  Bischoff  has  stated,  at  the  end  of  “a  war  in  which  200  000  were  killed  and  2  million  
displaced,  the  Dayton  agreement  had  all  signatories  agree  to  provide  the  population  of  
Bosnia-Herzegovina  with  the  opportunity  to  rebuild  their  lives  in  an  atmosphere  of  peace  and  
allow  for  economic  reconstruction”  (2003:  110).  But  it  had  also  set  the  stage  for  a  complex  
political  settlement.  Influenced  by  the  liberal  ideals  of  the  post-Cold  War  period,  it  emphasised  
the  international  community’s  responsibility  in  preserving  the  fragile  peace  between  the  three  
ethnic  groups  in  newly-independent  Bosnia,  as  well  as  in  implementing  the  principles  of  the  
country’s  new  constitution.  This  constitution  was  externally  imposed,  i.e.  it  
  
was  quite  literally  prescribed  by  the  Dayton  Peace  Accords  [...].  Annex  4  of  the  
Agreement  contained  the  Constitution  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Besides  the  
provision  for  the  institutional  mechanisms  of  the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  
powers,  the  Bosnian  Constitution  also  contains  a  catalogue  of  human  rights  and  
fundamental  freedoms,  and  a  list  of  directly  applicable  international  human  rights  
instruments  annexed  to  it  (Querimi  2018:  3).  
  
While  the  system  imposed  on  Bosnia  was  nothing  if  not  ambitious,  ultimately  “the  final  
product  [...]  is  a  complex,  even  inconsistent  document  plagued  by  ambiguity  and  highly  
dependent  on  the  will  of  the  international  community”  (McMahon  2004:  584).  This  external  
control,  while  certainly  successful  in  ‘keeping  the  peace’  between  the  former  enemies,  has  
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faced  extensive  criticism  over  the  many  years  of  its  existence.  Seeking  to  ensure  the  
implementation,  the  United  Nations  imposed  an  extensive  post-war  regime  under  the  Office  of  
the  High  Representative  (OHR)  on  the  new  state,  which  was  intended  to  prevent  further  war  by  
reinforcing  its  democratic  institutions.  The  Office  of  the  High  Representative  has  since  
evolved,  and  accumulated  more  power  over  the  years,  especially  through  the  so-called  ‘Bonn  
powers’,  which  “provide  the  OHR  with  nearly  unchecked  power,  including  the  authority  to  
impose  legislation  and  dismiss  from  office  any  public  official  who  stands  in  the  way  of  the  
implementation  of  Dayton  and  interethnic  cooperation”  (idem:  587).  Similarly,  ten  years  after  
McMahon’s  assessment,  Banning  (2014:  261)  has  stated  that  “the  OHR’s  involvement  in  
Bosnian  domestic  politics  is  still  far-reaching  and  includes,  inter  alia,  the  imposition  of  
substantial  legislation,  the  amendment  of  Bosnian  legislation,  the  dismissal  of  elected  
government  officials,  and  the  annulment  of  decisions  of  the  Bosnian  Constitutional  Court.”  
Former  High  Representative  Paddy  Ashdown  in  particular  has  repeatedly  been  criticised,  
having  “promulgated  laws  and  subsidiary  instruments,  amended  and  repealed  legislation  
adopted  by  local  institutions  and  issued  executive  decisions  based  on  the  final  interpretation  of  
his  own  mandate”  (Knoll  2007:  359).  A  range  of  ethical  shortcomings  have  been  identified  by  
Knaus  &  Martin  (2003),  who  have  compared  Bosnia  to  a  ‘European  Raj’  and  have  critically  
highlighted  “the  unlimited  authority  of  an  international  mission  to  overrule  all  of  the  
democratic  institutions  of  a  sovereign  member  state  of  the  United  Nations”  (idem:  60).  
Ultimately,  the  OHR’s  enthusiasm  in  using  the  Bonn  powers  has  reinforced  the  sense  of  
‘paternalism’  inherent  in  FIRC  attempts,  and  in  neotrusteeship  projects  in  particular.  As  Barnett  
clarifies,  paternalism  should  be  understood  as  “the  substitution  of  one  actor’s  judgment  for  
another’s  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  in  the  latter’s  best  interests,  welfare,  or  happiness”  (2017:  
66).  In  Bosnia,  this  has  resulted  in  the  restriction  of  political  freedoms  by  the  OHR  in  seeking  
to  steer  the  country  on  its  ostensible  course  towards  full  self-government.  Thus,  in  seeking  to  
ensure  peace  and  stability,  interveners  have  effectively  placed  the  country  under  a  form  of  
international  stewardship  by  an  appointed  High  Representative  who  “is  empowered  to  
promulgate  law,  invalidate  elections  and  dismiss  public  officials,  even  those  at  the  highest  
level,  all  in  the  interest  of  promoting  the  creation  of  a  multi-ethnic  democratic  society  fit  for  
membership  in  the  European  family  of  nations”  (Bain  2006:  535).   
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The  result  is  fraught  with  contradictions:  the  Dayton  framework  presumes  that  the  
democratic  process  must  be  controlled  to  ensure  that  democratic  voices  will  prevail,  and  that  
the  right  to  self-determination  must  be  restricted  to  ensure  the  survival  of  a  multiethnic  state.  
The  Bosnian  case  thus  illustrates  Barnett’s  assessment  that  “many  otherwise  
autonomy-defending  liberals  resolve  this  tension  by  justifying  interference  on  the  grounds  that  
the  trustee  has  a  duty  to  help  with  both  short-term  shortfalls  and  the  longer-term  goal  of  
creating  the  conditions  for  liberty  and  the  capacity  for  reasoned  choice”  (2017:  85).  Ultimately,  
this  echoes  historical  trusteeship’s  assumption  that  some  populations  do  have  a  right  to  
autonomy  and  self-determination,  but  cannot  be  trusted  to  use  these  rights  ‘wisely’.  Bain  
(2006:  534)  points  out  that  
  
[t]he  dilemma,  then,  is  clear  for  all  to  see:  the  international  administrator  is  responsible  
for  promoting  and  protecting  human  rights,  including  a  right  to  liberty  that  presupposes  
the  authenticity  of  human  choice;  but,  cast  as  a  trustee,  he  is  able  to  do  so  only  by  
withholding  or  suspending  the  principle  that  human  beings  should  be  free  from  
coercion  save  where  they  have  given  their  consent.  In  other  words,  the  promotion  and  
protection  of  human  rights  [...]  must  involve,  albeit  temporarily,  the  violation  of  at  least  
some  of  the  rights  that  are  to  be  promoted.  
  
Thus,  while  it  has  been  noted  that  “Democracy  (in  modern  terms,  at  least)  assumes  that  the  
people  are  sovereign  and  therefore  have  a  right  to  govern  themselves”  (Etzioni  2006:  72),  the  
prospects  for  self-determination  have  repeatedly  been  hindered  by  regime  imposition,  and  
populations  have  been  consistently  denied  any  substantial  say  in  postwar  allocation  of  political  
power.  The  principle  of  self-determination  and  the  idea  of  local  ‘ownership’  is  often  neglected  
as  “[i]nternational  intervention  has  tended  to  marginalize  local  institutions  and  bypass  the  local  
political  process,  thus  disregarding  and  undermining  the  very  democratic  process  and  
democratic  culture  that  the  international  community  purports  to  be  nurturing  in  Bosnia''  
(Dimitrova  2005:  45).   
  
As  a  result,  the  Dayton  approach  to  FIRC  has  ultimately  failed  to  resolve  the  continued  
ethnic  tensions,  which  ultimately  increases  the  potential  for  future  instability  or  the  redrawing  
of  battle  lines. 90  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  held  together  despite  substantial  opposition  from  its   
90  One  example  includes  the  recent  event  of  Bosnian  Serbs’  celebration  of  a  “public  holiday  that  has  been  declared   
illegal  by  the  country’s  top  court  [...]  because  it  celebrates  an  action  that  triggered  the  country’s  devastating  war  in  
the  1990s”  (AP  2020:  para  1).  The  Bosnian  state  has  evidently  not  been  able  to  establish  its  legitimacy  among  part  
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Serbian  community.  It  has  even  been  argued  that  “the  last  several  years  demonstrate  not  only  
that  the  OHR  is  unable  to  resolve  Bosnia's  ethnic  dilemmas  but  also  that  its  involvement  in  the  
country's  governance  has  created  further  disincentives  for  local  leaders  to  cooperate  with  each  
other  and  has,  in  the  process,  further  weakened  the  Bosnian  state”  (McMahon  2004:  586).  
Bosnian  Serb  groups  in  particular  have  begun  to  question  the  OHR’s  grip  on  the  state  
apparatus,  and  indeed  the  future  of  the  multiethnic  state  itself  (see  Kovacevic  2019).  The  
Dayton  agreement  has  seemingly  only  ‘frozen’  the  conflict  in  place,  instead  of  attempting  to  
resolve  it  permanently,  while  taking  much  of  the  democratic  process  out  of  the  hands  of  the  
population  which  it  was  supposed  to  benefit.  Inevitably,  this  has  affected  the  country’s  future  
development,  as  “a  state  such  as  BiH,  which  is  fragmented  into  different  societies,  economic  
interests,  and  political  factions,  finds  that  any  effort  to  forge  a  consensus  on  the  state’s  future  
strategic  orientation  is  undermined”  (Herd  &  Tracy  2006:  554).  
  
Borger  (2015:  para.  10)  has  emphasised  that  ‘Dayton’  has  become  “a  noun,  a  verb,  an  
adjective  –  a  synonym  for  inertia,  neglect  and  despair.”  The  ‘Dayton  model’  of  regime  
imposition  has  encouraged  inefficiency,  a  widespread  disillusionment  with  politics,  and  has  
done  little  to  alleviate  the  lingering  mistrust  between  former  enemies.  Whether  the  Dayton  
arrangement’s  view  of  regime  imposition  is  a  long-term  guarantor  of  peace  between  ethnic  
groups  remains  contested,  and  Caplan  has  noted  that  it  “is  also  an  obstacle  to  peace,  or  at  least  
to  the  establishment  of  peace  on  the  basis  of  values  and  mechanisms  which  arguably  are  
required  to  overcome  the  forces  of  division  still  operating  in  the  new  climate”  (2000:  222).  
Ultimately,  according  to  Butler  (2012:  101)  the  so-called  
  
neo-trusteeship  approach  seems  better  characterized  as  the  latest,  and  most  egregious,  
manifestation  of  the  profound  disalignment  between  ambition  and  capacity  that  has  
long  impeded  and  undermined  UN  peace  operations.  Though  in  the  end  neo-trusteeship  
may  indeed  take  on  an  imperious  face,  this  face  represents  the  outward  visage  of  a  
bureaucratic  culture  defined  by  endemic  resource  constraints  and  typified  by  risk  
aversion.  The  apparent  ‘imperialism’  of  the  UN’s  major  role  in  administering  
Timor-Leste  (and,  similarly,  Kosovo,  Haiti,  and  beyond)  might  be  better  understood  as  
an  unintended  and  incremental,  though  no  less  problematic,  assumption  and  retention  of  
sovereign  control  over  post-conflict  societies.   
of  the  Bosnian  Serb  population.  In  part,  this  is  due  to  the  continued  existence  of  the  two  entities  which  make  up  the  
country,  as  “Dayton's  major  flaw  was  to  recognise  the  two  ethnically  cleansed  entities,  the  Federation  and  Republika  
Srpska”  (Bischoff  2003:  117).  
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This  problematic  situation  is  amplified  by  the  lack  of  a  clear  ‘exit  strategy’.  The  paternalistic  
restriction  of  political  freedoms  has  encouraged  the  rise  of  a  self-perpetuating  system:  the  
disillusion  resulting  from  decades  under  external  management  makes  it  only  more  likely  that  
the  multiethnic  state  would  ultimately  disintegrate  at  the  end  of  external  supervision.  Thus,  as  
the  Bosnian  experience  shows,  external  control  over  a  state  ‘for  its  own  good’  can  in  principle  
last  indefinitely.  Consequently,  Bain  (2006:  526)  has  submitted  that  “the  rights  and  wrongs  of  
international  administration  [...]  are  merely  assumed,  having  been  accorded  the  status  of  a  
priori  truths  that  are  placed  safely  beyond  the  searching  eye  of  moral  scrutiny”  and  that  “in  
some  circumstances  international  administration  might  itself  be  morally  objectionable;  for  it  
seems  as  if  international  administration  must  be  good  because  it  is  instituted  for  the  sake  of  
good  ends”  (idem:  527).   
  
Although  the  Office  of  the  High  Representative  claims  that  it  “is  working  towards  the  
point  where  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  able  to  take  full  responsibility  for  its  own  affairs”  
(2015:  para.  2),  this  crucial  milestone  has  evidently  not  been  reached  as  of  2020,  Indeed,  
without  more  concrete  benchmarks,  it  is  likely  to  remain  elusive.  These  benchmarks  also  raise  
questions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  liberal  project  more  generally,  especially  regarding  the  
ambition  of  simply  transposing  ‘Western’  expectations  unto  other  regions  and  cultures.  Thus,  
Perry  asks  “if  a  multinational,  heterogeneous  country  functioning  according  to  a  system  of  
guaranteed  human  rights,  power  sharing,  and  civic  citizenship  and  participation  cannot  be  
established  and  consolidated  in  Europe—with  its  resources,  economic  strength,  and  relative  
regional  stability  and  order—then  the  future  of  much  of  the  rest  of  the  developing  and  
transitioning  world  will  be  bleak”  (2009:  51). 91  The  supposed  ‘benchmarks  of  civilisation’   
91  Similar  concerns  regarding  external  supervision  are  visible  in  other  states,  too.  Similar  to  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina,   
the  Republic  of  Kosovo  emerged  from  the  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia  and  was  eventually  placed  under  
international  administration  following  a  short  but  brutal  civil  war.  Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  “Dayton  
Accords  which  settled  the  Bosnian  War  spurred  the  Kosovars  to  outright  rebellion  after  their  previous  attempt  at  
nonviolent  noncooperation  with  the  Serbs  failed  to  lead  to  consideration  of  their  complaints  at  Dayton.  By  turning  to  
violence,  the  Kosovars  hoped  to  trigger  a  disproportionate  Serb  reaction  that  would,  in  turn,  cause  the  West  to  
intervene,  politically  if  not  militarily”  (Milevski  2020:  309-310).  Subsequently,  as  Grasten  and  Uberti  state,  “the  
former  province  of  Serbia  came  under  the  administration  of  an  international  transitional  authority  (ITA)  following  
the  1999  NATO-led  humanitarian  intervention”(2015:  163).  This  transitional  authority  was  supported  by  KFOR,  
which  “is  a  peace  enforcement  operation.  Today,  KFOR  consists  of  approximately  3,500  troops  provided  by  27  
countries.  It  continues  to  help  maintain  a  safe  and  secure  environment  and  freedom  of  movement  for  all  people  and  
communities  in  Kosovo”  (NATO  2020  [a]).  Unlike  Bosnia,  Kosovo  remains  an  only-partially  recognised  state,  
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which  the  Liberal  Order  seeks  to  establish  cannot  simply  be  imposed  on  populations  without  
their  input,  and  ultimately,  the  international  responsibilities  to  prevent  suffering  should  not  be  
used  as  a  pretext  to  stifle  populations’  self-determination.  Much  like  later  interventions  in  the  
Middle  East,  the  regime  imposition  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  raises  questions  about  the  quest  
for  ideal  outcomes  which  results  from  the  liberal  optimism  of  the  universal  appeal  of  its  values,  
and  therefore  about  the  possibility  for  ‘rehabilitation’  in  the  absence  of  substantial  progress  
towards  popular  ownership  of  the  post-FIRC  democratic  process.  
7.3  Shifts  in  Liberal  FIRC  and  the  Problem  of  ‘Rehabilitation’   
  
In  light  of  the  lengthy  process  of  restructuring  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  “[p]olicymakers  have 
been  feeling  the  pangs  of  Balkan  fatigue  [...],  and  this  tendency  has  increased  as  resources  and  
attention  has  shifted  to  theaters  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq''  (Perry  2009:  51).  Indeed,  the  
challenges  of  the  Bosnian  regime  imposition  have  ultimately  also  prevented  international  
administration  from  being  seriously  considered  in  the  aftermath  of  subsequent  FIRC  
interventions.  But  it  is  not  only  disillusionment  with  progress  which  distinguishes  the  approach  
to  later  interventions  with  that  of  Bosnia:  the  different  approaches  also  indicate  shifts  within  the  
aims  of  the  liberal  order  in  the  past  thirty  years.  The  ‘neotrusteeship’  approach  reflected  the  
post-Cold  War  optimism  of  a  more  ‘enlightened’  international  community  which  would  enable  
multilateral  peacebuilding  and  liberalisation  and  could  assist  emerging  and  war-torn  states  until  
their  sovereignty  could  be  achieved.  In  the  new  millennium,  FIRC  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  
shows  the  influence  of  security  priorities  of  the  War  on  Terror,  resulting  in  a  more  unilateral  
approach  which  sees  liberalisation  as  an  essential  precondition  for  global  security.  This  also  
involved  a  reinterpretation  of  postwar  responsibilities,  which  entailed  a  shift  from  nation  
building  to  the  notion  of  rehabilitating  formerly  ‘rogue'  states.   
  
Kosovo  formally  declared  its  independence  in  February  2008  (Tansey  2009:  153).  However,  its  “political  status  
remains  unclear,  and  its  progress  uncertain”  (idem),  especially  as  much  like  in  Bosnia,  “the  interim  administrators  
have  partially  failed  in  their  aim  to  transform  individual  interests  into  a  collective  identity.  Kosovo  Serbs  still  
perceive  themselves  to  be  an  inherent  part  of  the  Republic  of  Serbia  and  refuse  to  incorporate  themselves  into  
Kosovo  society”  (Ondrovic  2013:  131).  Thus,  as  in  Bosnia,  ethnic  conflicts  have  only  been  ‘paused’,  while  the  
development  of  legitimate  and  sovereign  statehood  remains  elusive.  This  has  prompted  some  to  see  “the  Balkans  are  
a  "laboratory"  for  blueprints  of  societies  and  Statebuilding  after  interventions,  and  that  Kosovo  is  something  like  the  
independent  non-sovereign  state  as  a  result  from  such  interventions”  (Daxner  &  Riese  2011:  24).  
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Earlier  chapters  have  discussed  how  the  regimes  of  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  were  depicted  
as  ‘illegitimate’  prior  to  intervention,  which  to  the  interveners  meant  that  they  had  lost  their  
privileges  as  fully  sovereign  members  of  the  international  order.  In  the  case  of  Iraq,  for  
instance,  O’Driscoll  (2006  [a]:  409)  has  pointed  out  that  UK  Prime  Minister  Blair  “shied  away  
from  the  notion  of  retribution,  tending  instead  to  emphasise  the  rehabilitative  effect  a  war  upon  
Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq  might  have  upon  that  country.”  This  principle  of  rehabilitation  sets  
contemporary  foreign-imposed  regime  change  apart  from  the  imperial  annexations  experienced  
for  much  of  the  preceding  two  centuries,  and  is  an  essential  part  of  the  current  liberal  
understanding  of  FIRC.  It  presupposes  that  once  a  culpable  regime  has  been  removed  from  
power,  further  steps  are  necessary  to  complete  the  return  of  the  targeted  state  to  the  fold  of  the  
civilised  community.  
  
 However,  how  this  rehabilitation  is  supposed  to  be  achieved  is  generally  left  unclear.   
As  indicated  earlier,  Western  powers  have  invariably  sought  to  replace  the  deposed  regimes  
with  alternatives  modelled  after  Western  democracies.  This  was  expected  to  facilitate  the  
countries’  stabilisation  and  consequently  to  set  an  appealing  example  to  be  emulated  by  states  
in  the  wider  region.  Indeed,  in  the  view  of  interveners,  forcible  democratisation  was  not  seen  as  
an  imposition  at  all,  but  rather  as  a  liberation  from  the  old  regime.  Nonetheless,  the  principle  of  
rehabilitation  is  much  more  similar  to  historical  instances  of  external  imposition  by  
‘enlightened’  states  than  liberal  interveners  are  likely  to  want  to  admit.  Postwar  rehabilitation  
efforts  have  invariably  approached  legitimacy  from  a  Western  perspective,  which  emphasises  
the  ostensibly  universal  legitimacy  of  liberal  democracy.  As  a  consequence  of  this  perceived  
universality,  any  failures  are  not  ascribed  to  the  imposition  itself,  but  rather  to  the  target  
population’s  obstinacy  in  refusing  to  cooperate  in  their  ‘liberation’.  This  view  of  the  
universality  of  liberal  values  is  also  encountered  in  the  United  States’  frequently  inconsistent  
approach  to  the  responsibilities  for  regime  imposition  and  state  building 92  in  Afghanistan  and   
Iraq. 
92  State/nation  building  is  often  thought  to  be  necessary  “under  conditions  where  states  lack  not  only  capacities  to  
provide  security  and  services  but  also  legitimacy”  (Rubin  2006:  183).  
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7.4  Inconsistent  ‘State  Building’  in  the  War  on  Terror  
  
Unlike  Bosnia  &  Herzegovina,  post-intervention  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  did  not  ‘benefit’  from  a  
tightly-regulated,  long-term  framework  of  oversight.  However,  despite  avoiding  the  challenges  
associated  with  international  administration,  the  interventions  have  been  no  less  controversial  
in  their  quest  for  radical  regime  change.  Ultimately,  despite  meeting  many  of  their  initial  
operational  goals,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  “[t]he  American  Military  occupations  of  
Afghanistan  and  Iraq  have  been  neither  military  nor  political  successes”,  as  Goldstein  (2012:  2)  
has  pointed  out  almost  a  decade  ago.  To  a  large  extent,  these  failures  stem  from  tensions  
between  interveners’  motives  and  intentions,  as  well  as  from  seeking  to  meet  two  apparently  
conflicting  goals:  the  limitation  of  long-term  occupation  and  the  rapid  transition  to  stable  and  
democratic  self-government.  Seeking  to  avoid  the  type  of  lengthy  and  costly  commitment  
evident  in  Bosnia,  planners  took  an  inconsistent  approach  to  the  challenges  of  rebuilding.  In  
doing  so,  they  imposed  regimes  which  failed  to  be  accepted  as  legitimate  by  large  parts  of  the  
population.  The  occupiers  ultimately  did  not  meet  their  responsibilities  in  ensuring  popular  
self-determination  and  in  building  a  minimally  just  and  stable  state.   
  
Indeed,  their  intentions,  though  seemingly  straightforward,  were  contradictory  from  the  
start.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  interveners  aimed  for  a  radical  regime  change  outcome,  
including  the  imposition  of  ‘liberal’  forms  of  governance.  However,  they  also  aimed  to  do  so  
with  a  minimal  commitment  to  long-term  involvement.  Thus,  as  President  George  W.  Bush  had  
already  stated  in  2000,  that  “if  we  don't  stop  extending  our  troops  all  around  the  world  in  
nation-building  missions,  then  we're  going  to  have  a  serious  problem  coming  down  the  road.  
I'm  going  to  prevent  that”  (quoted  in  Schneider  2001:  para.1).  This  sentiment  was  later  echoed  
by  other  senior  functionaries  in  the  administration,  including  Donald  Rumsfeld,  who  famously  
affirmed  that  the  United  States  of  America  ‘doesn’t  do  nation  building’.  He  claimed  that  the  
concept  "does  not  have  a  brilliant  record  across  the  globe.  It's  a  very  hard  thing  to  do.  It's  a  hard  
thing  for  the  people  in  a  country  to  make  a  nation  work  well,  and  it's  even  harder  for  foreigners,  
strangers,  to  go  into  a  country  and  think  that  they  know  what  the  template,  what  the  model  
ought  to  be  for  that  country"  (2001:  para.  14).  This  assumption  has  consequently  directly  
influenced  the  course  of  the  two  major  post-9/11  regime  change  interventions.  Thus,  “in  both  
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Afghanistan  and  Iraq”,  Thierney  (2014:  82)  has  asserted,  “the  Bush  administration’s  aversion  
to  nation  building  undermined  planning  for  the  endgame  by  encouraging  the  belief  that  
extensive  stabilisation  operations  would  be  imprudent  and  unnecessary.” 93  Accordingly,  after   
initial  military  successes,  interveners  failed  to  predict  the  unstable  postwar  situation  in  
Afghanistan.   
7.4.1  Afghanistan  
  
The  case  of  Afghanistan  was  the  first  instance  of  a  post-9/11  FIRC  war.  In  stark  contrast  to  the  
later  war  in  Iraq,  Rubin  claims  that,  initially  at  least,  “intervention  in  Afghanistan  enjoyed  
international  legitimacy  (no  state  opposed  it)  and  considerable  support  in  Afghanistan,  where  
Afghans  saw  it  less  as  destroying  sovereignty  than  as  potentially  restoring  it  after  years  of  
interference  by  neighbouring  countries”  (2006:  183).  This  restoration  of  sovereignty  through  
regime  change  was  thought  to  increase  the  prospect  of  establishing  a  safe  and  democratic  state.  
Falk  (2004:  43)  notes  that  the  intervention  
  
emphasized  ‘regime  change,’  but  the  justification  strongly  stressed  the  abysmal  human  
rights  record  of  the  Taliban  regime  as  grounds  for  disregarding  its  sovereign  status.  In  
this  instance,  the  fact  that  only  three  states  accorded  diplomatic  recognition  to  the  
Taliban,  two  of  whom  broke  relations  after  September  11,  added  weight  to  the  view  that  
intervention  was  justified,  or  in  the  earlier  language,  at  least  ‘legitimate’,  and  possibly  
‘legal’. 
  
Although  there  was  no  ongoing  large-scale  campaign  of  government-sanctioned  murder  that  
would  have  been  a  legitimate  cause  for  rapid  intervention  and  regime  change,  the  country’s  
fundamentalist  Taliban  regime  was  doubtlessly  repressive.  The  group  had  carried  out  acts  of  
ethnic  cleansing  in  the  past  and  persisted  in  ruthlessly  punishing  anyone  deemed  in  violation  of  
its  laws.  In  enforcing  its  strict  interpretation  of  Islamic  law  and  indigenous  practices,  the  
Taliban  mostly  relied  on  decentralised  tribal  governance  and  informal  networks  rather  than  an  
effective  centralised  regime  (whose  removal  could  have  had  the  potential  to  halt  the  oppression  
93  Monten  notes  that  “assumptions  about  democracy  promotion  and  the  state  were  all  brought  to  bear  in  the  planning   
and  execution  of  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom  in  2002  and  2003,  as  well  as  in  the  postconflict  military  operations  and  
political  strategy  that  followed.  The  result  was  a  postwar  plan  that  de-emphasized  the  importance  of  state  institutions  
and  minimized  the  role  of  the  United  States  as  the  central  state  authority  in  Iraq.  U.S.  planning  was  driven  by  the  
assumption  that  a  democratic  transition  could  be  achieved  with  minimum  central  direction”  (2014:  188).  
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in  one  fell  swoop).  Ultimately,  the  US  and  its  allies  intervened  to  disrupt,  and  if  possible 
destroy,  the  Al  Qaeda  network  which  relied  on  the  safe  haven  the  Taliban  provided  them.  
However,  “despite  the  fact  that  the  US-led  war  in  Afghanistan  was  explicitly  not  a  
humanitarian  intervention,  American  policy-makers  would  come  to  embrace  the  language  and  
rhetoric  of  a  humanitarian  cause”  (Ayub  &  Kouvo  2008:  647).  
  
As  soon  as  the  dust  had  settled,  it  became  clear  that  the  United  States  had  a  distinct  
view  of  their  postwar  responsibilities:  establishing  an  environment  for  a  transfer  of  power  to  
their  Afghan  allies  (the  Northern  Alliance)  while  continuing  the  fight  against  a  growing  Taliban  
insurgency.  Ultimately  however,  planners  refused  to  countenance  that  the  type  of  centralised  
regime  they  sought  to  impose  could  be  inappropriate  to  the  Afghan  case.  Thus,  “post-Taliban  
Afghanistan  saw  the  coming  together  of  the  state-building  imperative  of  the  liberal  peace  and  a  
political  environment  marked  by  chronic  insecurity  and  the  failure  of  the  new  government  to  
extend  its  monopoly  of  violence”  (Mac  Ginty  2010:  578).  In  light  of  the  persistent  threat  by  
insurgents,  “the  United  States  and  the  broader  international  community  sanctioned  the  renewed  
activity  of  individuals  and  factions  with  unsavoury  pasts  in  the  name  of  stability  and  state  
building”  (Ayub  &  Kouvo  2008:  650).  That  these  individuals  were  not  necessarily  on  board  
with  the  liberal  ideals  of  humanitarianism  or  indeed  democratic  governance  was  largely  
ignored  in  the  pursuit  of  security  and  counterinsurgency  measures.  Indeed,  the  worsening  
security  situation  highlighted  the  need  for  a  more  permanent  military  presence  by  the  United  
State  and  its  NATO  allies.  This  was  contrary  to  early  expectations,  which  were  ultimately  
“based  on  the  overly  optimistic  assumption  that  these  forces  would  face  a  benign  security  
environment”  (Khalilzad  2010:  48).  Indeed,  while  the  eventual  2014  transfer  of  security  
responsibility  from  the  multinational  ‘International  Security  Assistance  Force’  (ISAF)  to  the  
Afghan  government  and  its  security  forces  was  highlighted  as  an  important  milestone,  similar  
to  the  earlier  sovereignty  ‘transfer’  to  the  new  Iraqi  regime,  there  was  no  doubt  amongst  
planners  that  without  a  substantial  foreign  military  presence  a  Taliban  resurgence  was  
unavoidable.  Overall,  day-to-day  security  concerns  have  largely  replaced  the  goal  of  
establishing  in  Afghanistan  a  democratic  and  legitimacy  government,  which  “has  resulted  in  a  
state-building  process  hampered  by  competing  and  largely  incompatible  agendas”  (Ayub  &  
Kouvo  2008:  647).  
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Thus,  in  spite  of  their  reluctance  to  engage  in  state  building,  interveners  were  ultimately  
forced  to  concentrate  “both  on  expanding  the  scope  of  the  Afghan  state  and  on  building  the  
strength  of  Afghan  institutions,  but  failed  to  make  significant  progress  in  accomplishing  either  
goal”  (Monten  2014:  183)  which  confirms  the  assessment  that  “encouraging  the  conditions  for  
peace  within  a  multiethnic  society,  scattered  over  a  vast  territory  and  with  long  traditions  of  
insular  local  governance,  should  focus  not  only  on  elite  leadership  and  on  a  supposed  centre  of 
power,  but  on  consultation,  participation  and  sustainable  policies  of  decentralization”  (Ayub  &  
Kouvo  2008:  656).  In  the  end,  after  two  decades  of  supposed  ‘capacity  building’  and  hundreds  
of  counterterrorism  and  counterinsurgency  operations,  many  Afghan  civilians  live  under  an  
illiberal  centralised  regime  which  has  been  unable  to  expand  its  authority  and  suppress  the 
Taliban  insurgency.  Overall,  it  has  been  estimated  that  “ [a]s  of  October  2019,  more  than  43,000  
civilians  are  estimated  to  have  died  violent  deaths  as  a  result  of  the  war”  ( Costs  of  Wa r  2020:  
para.  6).  Although  it  is  premature  to  state  that  Western  actors  have  ‘given  up’  on  Afghanistan,  
disillusionment  with  the  country’s  progress  has  been  a  main  driver  behind  a  potential  future  
deal  between  the  United  States  and  the  Taliban  who  were  the  target  of  the  initial  intervention.  
In  addition,  it  has  been  emphasised  that  “while  a  US  agreement  with  the  Taliban  is  an  
important  step  toward  peace,  such  a  deal  will  not  be  enough  by  itself”  (Pilster  2020:  121).  
Accordingly,  Pilster  adds  that  “sustainable  peace  through  power-sharing  in  Afghanistan  will  
require  sustained  international  community  engagement.  Such  an  investment  may  be  justified  to  
preserve  regional  stability,  prevent  terrorist  havens,  maintain  human  right  gains,  and  forestall  a  
migratory  crisis.  At  the  same  time,  continued  engagement  in  Afghanistan  will  be  challenging  
and  costly”  (idem:  138).  
  
The  case  of  Afghanistan  serves  as  a  further  illustration  of  the  contradictory  relation  
between  interveners’  idealism  regarding  the  possibility  of  radical  FIRC  on  the  one  hand,  and  
the  realities  of  an  unstable  postwar  country  on  the  other.  The  fact  that  the  US  and  its  Western  
allies  ultimately  resigned  themselves  to  an  increasingly  illiberal  Afghan  government,  as  well  as  
the  increasing  likelihood  of  a  peace  settlement  with  the  Taliban  shows  the  many  challenges  to  
liberal  FIRC’s  success  in  the  early  21st  century.  The  often  disappointing  results  of  interveners’ 
preference  for  radical  imposition  are  also  evident  in  Iraq,  where  the  occupiers’  assumptions  
about  postwar  responsibilities  and  state  building  led  to  similar  problems  of  instability.  
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7.4.2  Iraq  
When  the  US-led  intervention  brought  a  decisive  end  to  Ba’athist  power  in  Iraq,  this  victory  
seemed  at  least  initially  to  provide  a  welcome  opportunity  for  the  imposition  of  a  more  stable  
and  democratic  regime.  Prior  to  the  Iraq  intervention  and  regime  change,  its  planners  assumed  
that  “establishing  a  democratic  regime  in  Baghdad  [...]  could  serve  as  a  model  in  spreading  
liberalism  to  other  parts  of  the  Middle  East”  (Snyder  2003:  654) . 94  This  assessment  also  reflects   
interveners’  erroneous  assumptions  about  the  benign  effects  of  radical  regime  change  and  their  
intentions  in  imposing  liberal  frameworks.  As  stated  earlier,  it  was  assumed  that  a  thorough  
restructuring  of  the  Iraqi  state  apparatus  would  stabilise  the  country,  making  long-term  
occupation  and  monitoring  unnecessary.  
  
However,  as  was  the  case  in  Afghanistan,  interveners  in  Iraq  sought  to  impose  a  regime  
while  neglecting  to  ask  important  questions  about  the  nature  of  minimal  justice  and  its  link  tot  
Iraqi  self-determination.  The  intervention  again  reflects  the  unmistakably  paternalistic  
undertones  in  imposing  substantial  change  without  popular  consent  ‘for  their  own  good’.  At  the  
same  time,  interveners’  reluctance  to  engage  in  sustained  state-building  efforts  was  based  on  
their  perception  of  the  intervention  as  an  act  of  liberation,  not  one  of  imposition.  As  Deputy  
Secretary  of  Defence  Paul  Wolfowitz  had  stated,  intervention  did  not  “mean  that  we  are  
suddenly  going  to  go  changing  governments  by  force,  imposing  democracy,  as  though  
democracy  is  something  you  impose  on  people,  but  that  we  are  going  to  work  to  give  Arabs  the  
chance  to  build  the  kinds  of  free  institutions  that  we  have  lived  under  and  benefited  from  for  so  
long”  (2004:  para.  73).  Indeed,  in  providing  the  freedom  to  build  these  institutions,  planners  
seemed  to  have  vastly  underestimated  the  potential  for  instability  following  the  collapse  of  the  
regime.  This  is  further  reflected  in  Donald  Rumsfeld’s  attempts  to  downplay  widespread  
looting  and  unrest  was  merely  a  part  of  transition  to  freedom,  stating  that  “freedom’s  untidy,  
and  free  people  are  free  to  make  mistakes  and  commit  crimes  and  do  bad  things”  (quoted  in  
Loughlin  2003:  para.  3).  
94  In  fact,  it  is  notable  that  “US  invasion  of  Iraq  in  March  2003  marked  the  second  time  in  Iraq's  85  year  history  that   
foreign  intervention,  justified  in  the  name  of  state-building,  has  failed  to  deliver  on  the  promise  of  creating  stable,  
sustainable  and  democratic  governing  institutions.  While  widely  neglected  in  contemporary  debates  about  
state-building,  Britain's  failed  attempt  in  the  1920s  and  early  1930s  to  build  a  liberal  state  out  of  three  former  
provinces  of  the  Ottoman  empire  is  the  historical  backdrop  against  which  the  birth  and  violent  evolution  of  the  Iraqi  
state  has  to  be  understood”  (Dodge  2006:  187).  
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In  light  of  the  miscalculation  of  the  complexity  of  regime  change,  the  ambitions  were  
contradictory  from  the  start.  Interveners  seemed  to  both  envision  some  relatively  minor  
restructuring  and  a  thorough  democratisation.  Consequently,  according  to  Dodge  (2006:  188),  
“[t]he  working  assumption  underpinning  plans  for  post-war  Iraq  was  a  belief  that  invading  US  
troops  would  race  to  Baghdad  and  seize  the  Iraqi  state  intact.  They  would  then  use  its  
institutions  to  impose  order  on  and  then  rule  over  the  country.  Occupation  would  entail  the  
limited  reform  of  a  dictatorial  state,  a  form  of  coercive  structural  adjustment'”,  more  in  line  
with  the  superficial  regime  change  described  earlier  in  the  thesis.  However,  this  relatively  
limited  reform  quickly  spiralled  out  of  control.  The  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  took  
over  the  governance  of  Iraq  in  the  period  following  the  ousting  of  Saddam  Hussein  and  his  
ministers  (Dobbins  2009).  During  its  relatively  short  tenure,  its  “primary  goal  was  to  restore  
the  central  state  as  an  effective  apparatus  of  rule,  albeit  one  that  would  embrace  the  principles  
of  electoral  democracy  and  freemarket  capitalism”  (Paris  2015:  150).  As  the  planners  saw  
Iraq’s  political  and  economic  system  as  “bloated  and  inefficient”,  they  favoured  “the  
introduction  of  a  series  of  free  market-oriented  reforms,  including  privatizing  state-owned  
companies;  rolling  back  the  state  sector;  and  eliminating  a  vast  network  of  state  subsidies”  
(Monten  2014:  182).  This  aim  to  liberalise  the  economy,  accomplish  democratisation  and  avoid  
nation-building  at  the  same  time  was  inconsistent  and  ultimately  doomed  to  fail.  The  former  
head  of  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  in  Iraq,  L.  Paul  Bremer  et  al.  (2008:  54)  have  noted  
that   
  
[i]t  has  been  rightly  said  that  no  war  plan  survives  first  contact  with  the  enemy.  It  is  also  
true  that  no  post-war  plan  is  likely  to  survive  first  contact  with  the  former  enemy.  The  
true  test  of  any  planning  process  is  not  whether  it  accurately  predicts  each  successive  
turn  in  an  operation,  but  whether  it  provides  the  operators  the  resources  and  flexibility  
to  carry  out  their  assigned  tasks.  This  the  planning  process  for  post-war  Iraq  failed  to  
do.  
  
Similarly,  Lipsey  (2016:  415)  writes  that,  after  all,  “the  prime  lesson  of  the  Iraq  war  was  clear  
to  all:  do  not  go  into  battle  unless  you  have  some  plausible  vision  of  the  ultimate  outcome  you  
are  after.  The  American  bungling  of  the  post-Saddam  reconstruction  led  to  the  situation  in  Iraq  
being  turned  from  victory  to  defeat.”  
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As  stated  previously,  interveners  have  an  initial  obligation  to  establish  the  basis  for  a  
minimally  just  government  but  also  a  wider  duty  to  consider  the  wishes  of  the  population  in  
doing  so.  In  Iraq,  a  failure  to  address  the  latter  ultimately  led  to  a  failure  of  the  former.  Indeed  
“the  CPA  never  understood  -  or  even  listened  to  -  the  people  it  was  seeking  to  help.  Instead,  it  
adopted  an  ex  cathedra  approach  by  which  Bremer  alone  dictated  what  mechanisms  would  be  
taken”  (Stover  et  al.  2005:  856). 95  Beyond  the  efforts  at  de-ba’athification  and  the  power   
transition  to  the  new  government  (an  ‘Interim’  Government  which  was  followed  by  a  
‘Transitional’  Government)  there  was  little  effort  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  (or  the  other  
actors  involved)  to  resolve  the  historical  tensions  between  Sunni,  Shia,  as  well  as  Kurdish  
Iraqis,  which  left  a  post-regime  change  legacy  of  increased  destabilisation  which  is  still  felt  
today. 96    
  
Of  course,  this  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  it  was  the  interveners’  responsibility  to  
permanently  ‘resolve’  these  tensions.  Nonetheless,  the  intention  of  creating  a  multiethnic  Iraq  
within  its  existing  borders  caused  interveners  to  avoid  creating  a  framework  within  which  these  
debates  could  have  been  addressed.  Failure  to  create  this  opportunity  resulted  in  unanticipated  
consequences.  Ultimately,  as  Godfroy  and  Collins  (2009:  140)  have  argued,  “[t]he  power  
vacuum  generated  by  the  elimination  of  a  repressive  government  and  American  lack  of  
preparedness  for  governing  an  entire  country  created  near  perfect  conditions  for  long-standing  
rivalries  and  hostile  armed  groups  to  wreak  havoc  on  the  Coalition  military  and  the  Iraqi  state.”  
In  part,  this  was  the  case  because  planners  “overlooked  important  features  of  the  Iraqi  political  
system,  including  the  role  of  religious  leaders  (Sunni  and  Shia),  ethnic  groups  (Arabs  and  
95  Essentially  from  the  day  of  its  inception,  the  Provisional  Authority  immediately  issued  several  controversial  orders   
which  were  aimed  at  regime  transformation.  ‘Order  1’  spells  out  that  “[o]n  April  16,  2003  the  Coalition  Provisional  
Authority  disestablished  the  Ba`ath  Party  of  Iraq.  This  order  implements  the  declaration  by  eliminating  the  party’s  
structures  and  removing  its  leadership  from  positions  of  authority  and  responsibility  in  Iraqi  society”  (CPA  2003a).  
The  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  has  been  consistently  criticised  for  many  of  its  early  actions,  but  especially  for  
its  controversial  decision  to  disband  the  influential  Iraqi  armed  forces.  “Possibly  the  most  disastrous  mistake  of  the  
US  administration  was  dismantling  the  army  by  decree  on  23  May  2002  after  Paul  Bremer  took  over  as  
Administrator  of  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority''  as  Barakat  has  pointed  out  (2005:  579).  The  CPA’s  intent  was  
to  recreate  the  successes  of  regime  change  in  post-war  Germany  (Naftali  2004;  Dobbins  et  al.  2009).  Unfortunately,  
in  deviation  from  the  West  German  experience,  the  radical  purge  of  institutions  only  destabilised  the  country  further,  
leading  to  unemployment  and  a  rising  disaffection  among  the  population  (Dobbins  2009).  
  
96  Thus,  Paris  claims  that  while  “US  policy  downplayed  the  political  role  of  Sunni  tribes  and  local  governance,   
focusing  instead  on  killing  insurgents  and  building  up  the  institutions  of  the  central  government,  violence  in  the  
country  worsened,  leading  to  the  deaths  of  30,000  Iraqis  in  2006  alone”  (2015:  152).  
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Kurds)  and  tribes  and  tribal  confederations  (mainly  in  Sunni  Arab  rural  areas)  in  the  informal  
governance  of  the  country”  (Paris  2015:  151). 97  Indeed,  it  is  true  that  “America’s  ending  of   
Arab  Sunni  dominance  [...],  combined  with  its  inability  to  establish  peace  among  Iraq’s  three  
main  communities  [...]  suggests  that  stable  democracy  is  not  likely  to  take  root  in  Iraq  any  time  
soon”  (Katz  2017:  para.  16).  
  
Similar  to  the  Afghan  case,  interveners’  insistence  on  imposing  the  trappings  of  liberal  
democracy  without  encouraging  broad  popular  participation  has  ultimately  had  adverse  effects.  
Indeed,  the  illiberal  and  “authoritarian  government  in  Iraq  under  Maliki  would  eventually  
become  more  entrenched  and  beholden  to  Iranian  interests,  which  seeded  resentment  in  the  
Sunni  population,  laying  the  foundation  for  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq  (ISIS).  Far  from  aiding  US  
national  security  interests,  Iraq  became  a  haven  for  the  same  terrorist  activities  the  invasion  
was  designed  to  eradicate”  (Godfroy  &  Collins  2009:  166). 98  Of  course,  in  terms  of  geopolitics   
the  rise  of  Iranian  influence  is  far  more  significant  to  the  United  States’  ambitions  than  the  
threat  posed  by  ISIS.  Ottaway  has  (2015:  9)  confirms  that  Iraq  “today  has  been  shaped  more  
deeply  by  Iran  than  by  the  United  States.  The  Iranian  version  of  nation-building,  based  on  
building  up  organizations  that  share  its  goals,  has  trumped  that  of  the  United  States,  which  
depends  on  superimposing  on  Iraq  institutions  the  U.S.  thinks  the  country  should  have  and  
training  people  to  staff  them.”  As  of  2020,  “[r]ather  than  curbing  Iranian  influence,  the  United  
States  helped  facilitate  Tehran’s  inroads  to  eclipse  Washington  all  while  pouring  billions  of  
dollars  into  supporting  a  government  already  compromised”  (Abdulrazaq  2020:  para.  7).  
  
Therefore,  although  strictly  speaking  “Iraq  was  a  regime  change  success  [...]  both  
ideologically  and  geopolitically  the  success  and  results  of  its  democratisation  has  been  far  more  
mixed”  (Milevski  2020:  311).  If  the  goal  was  ‘merely’  to  remove  Saddam  Hussein  and  the  
Ba’athist  party  from  power,  then  this  has  clearly  been  achieved.  The  regime  was  defeated  and  
97  As  Paris  notes,  “[a]lthough  the  Baghdad  authorities  agreed  to  create  a  new  organization  to  determine  which  Sunni   
groups  they  were  prepared  to  work  with,  once  the  US  presence  in  the  country  started  to  wane,  the  Iraqi  government  
arrested  and  imprisoned  many  of  the  local  Sunni  leaders  who  had  come  forward”  (2015:  154).  
  
98  Incidentally,  this  assessment  highlights  the  shift  in  motives  for  intervention.  As  stated  earlier,  once  the  search  for   
Iraq’s  WMD  proved  to  be  fruitless,  the  intervention’s  secondary  role  in  combating  terrorism  was  emphasised.  
Ironically,  while  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  Iraqi  regime  ever  colluded  with  Islamist  terrorism,  the  intervention  
fostered  the  conditions  for  the  rise  and  spread  of  ISIS  and  thus  proved  a  major  setback  in  the  ‘War  on  Terror.’  
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swiftly  deposed.  If,  however,  the  main  objective  was  to  substantially  improve  the  lot  of  the  
Iraqi  people  in  the  long  term  and  to  make  the  wider  region  ‘safe  for  democracy’,  the  end  result  
is  invariably  frustrating.  Many  Iraqi  citizens  may  indeed  have  welcomed  the  demise  of  Saddam  
Hussein’s  dictatorial  and  rights-violating  regime,  but  felt  more  than  dissatisfied  with  the  United  
States-led  efforts  at  subsequently  imposing  their  vision  of  a  ‘free’  Iraq.  Thus,  Dodge  has  stated  
that  “[t]he  military  task  of  defeating  the  Ba'athist  regime  proved  to  be  comparatively  
straightforward,  but  the  political  task  of  reconstituting  the  state  has  been  complex,  
unpredictable  and  costly”  (Dodge  2006:  197).  Iraq’s  future  stability  is  not  only  dependent  on  
the  relation  between  ethnic  and  religious  groups,  but  also  on  the  roles  the  United  States  and  
Iran  choose  to  play  in  the  future  of  the  country,  whereas  the  Afghan  case  highlights  the  
complex  relationship  between  War  on  Terror  and  foreign-imposed  regime  change  and  the  
problems  of  a  mission  aimed  at  achieving  both.  This  ‘muddling’  of  key  objectives  exacerbated  
problems  of  bringing  the  conflict  to  a  decisive  conclusion.  As  the  following  section  will  argue,  
the  interventions  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  case  of  Bosnia  call  into  question  the  liberal  
principles  underlying  post-Cold  War  FIRC  by  undermining  the  very  sovereignty  which  would  
be  required  for  states’  rehabilitation.  
7.4.3  Incomplete  Sovereignty  after  FIRC  
  
Earlier,  the  thesis  has  established  the  continuing  importance  of  ‘Westphalian’  sovereignty  to  
legitimate  statehood,  but  also  highlighted  the  important  shift  from  views  of  sovereignty  as  
non-intervention  to  one  of  sovereignty  as  responsibility.  In  seeking  to  help  states  address  this  
responsibility,  “intervention  is  seen  not  only  as  a  mechanism  for  the  protection  of  human  rights,  
but  also  as  a  vehicle  for  the  recovery  of  full  sovereignty”  (Mohamed  2005:  837).  However,  the  
examination  of  Bosnia,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  in  this  chapter  indicate  that  FIRC  is  likely  to  
affect  sovereignty  long  after  the  end  of  the  initial  intervention,  often  leading  to  a  sense  of  
‘incomplete’  sovereignty.  The  result  is  long-term  instability  and  dependence  on  external  
support,  ultimately  resembling  the  ‘failed  state’  concept  discussed  earlier.  In  the  case  of  
Bosnia,  sovereignty  is  hampered  by  continuous  and  invasive  supervision  by  the  OHR,  whereas  
in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  the  imposed  regimes’  survival  depends  on  being  propped  up  by  other  
states,  be  it  the  US,  NATO  or  America’s  rivals  like  Iran.  
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The  resulting  lack  of  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  large  parts  of  the  population  is  
exacerbated  by  the  new  regimes’  lack  of  monopolies  on  many  of  the  essential  prerequisites  for  
sovereign  statehood.  Krasner  has  emphasised  the  position  that  “if  one  state  successfully  coerces  
or  imposes  on  another  changes  in  the  latter's  institutions,  policies,  or  personnel,  then  the  target  
is  no  longer  a  Westphalian  state:  its  policy  is  constrained  not  simply  by  the  external  power  of  
other  states,  but  also  by  the  ability  of  others  to  change  the  nature  of  the  target's  internal  
politics”  (1995:  136).  In  the  cases  highlighted  in  this  thesis,  new  regimes  have  been  unable  to  
assert  many  of  their  sovereign  rights  against  their  states’  ‘liberators’,  especially  regarding  the  
powers  of  policing,  defence  (i.e.  the  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force).  Even  when  states  have  
nominally  ‘regained’  their  sovereignty  after  occupation,  their  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force  has  
regularly  been  usurped  in  part  by  the  US  and  its  allies  in  the  name  of  continuing  the  War  on  
Terror,  often  through  the  negotiation  of  SOFA  Agreements. 99  Given  their  postwar  instability,   
new  regimes  are  likely  unable  to  refuse  these  agreements,  even  if  they  would  want  to. 100  For   
example,  in  the  case  of  Afghanistan,  Jenkins  accurately  noted  that  “the  Kabul  regime's  tenuous  
hold  over  its  territory  (the  sine  qua  non  of  domestic  sovereignty)  depends  on  a  NATO  force  that  
operates  under  a  UN  mandate”  (2006:  72).  Currently,  two  distinct  ongoing  operations  remain  in  
place,  one  involving  NATO,  the  other  carried  out  by  the  United  States. 101  The  NATO  ‘Resolute   
Support  Mission’  is  a  non-combat  operation  focused  on  providing  training  and  other  support  to  
the  Afghan  security  forces,  while  the  United  States’  ‘Freedom’s  Sentinel’  mission  is  a  part  of  
continued  American  efforts  to  wage  the  War  on  Terror.  Though  both  share  the  eventual  goal  of  
cementing  regime  change  and  stability  in  Afghanistan,  their  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  the  
ostensibly  sovereign  Afghan  government,  remains  ambiguous.   
99  “A  SOFA  is  an  agreement  that  establishes  the  framework  under  which  armed  forces  operate  within  a  foreign   
country”  (Mason  2009:  1),  and  the  SOFA  agreement  in  Afghanistan  essentially  established  a  significant  cooperation  
between  the  United  States,  NATO,  and  Afghan  security  forces  in  a  bid  to  prevent  a  Taliban  resurgence .  
  
100  Thus,  Mason  states  that  “[o]n  May  23,  2005,  President  Hamid  Karzai  and  President  Bush  issued  a  “joint   
declaration”  outlining  a  prospective  future  agreement  between  the  two  countries.  It  envisions  a  role  for  U.S.  and  
NATO  military  troops  in  Afghanistan  to  ‘help  organize,  train,  equip,  and  sustain  Afghan  security  forces’  until  
Afghanistan  has  developed  its  own  capacity,  and  to  “consult  with  respect  to  taking  appropriate  measures  in  the  event  
that  Afghanistan  perceives  that  its  territorial  integrity,  independence,  or  security  is  threatened  or  at  risk”  (2009:  9).   
  
101  The  (sometimes  confusing)  overlap  between  missions  (who  share  the  same  commander,  General  Miller)  has  not   
been  conducive  to  the  overall  situation  on  the  ground.  The  two  concurrent  missions  in  Afghanistan  differ  in  their  
size,  composition,  and  ultimate  goals,  but  have  been  unable  to  resolve  many  of  the  underlying  problems  of  the  
country.  Thus,  in  spite  of  consistent  efforts  by  the  combined  United  States  military,  NATO  forces,  and  Afghan  army,  




In  fact,  it  has  been  noted  that  “the  countries  and  groups  involved  in  the  current  conflict  
have  acted  with  callous  disregard  for  Afghanistan’s  sovereignty.  Foreign  armies  crisscross  the  
country  free  of  any  legal  or  statutory  constraints.  They  are  able  to  imprison,  kill,  and  even  
torture  with  impunity.  The  Kabul  government  is  too  feeble  and  dependent  to  demand  the  
respect  of  its  sovereign  rights,  assuming  that  it  is  aware  of  them”  (Akram  2012:  para.  8).  Eight  
years  after  this  assessment,  there  is  little  progress  towards  a  substantial  reassertion  of  the  
central  governments’  power,  as  continued  instability  and  the  aforementioned  potential  deal  
with  the  Taliban  illustrate.  Similar  concerns  about  the  lack  of  the  monopoly  on  the  use  of  force  
have  been  noted  in  the  case  of  Iraq,  where  the  United  States  continues  to  maintain  a  military  
presence  but  has  also  conducted  military  operations  without  the  knowledge  of  the  increasingly  
Iran-aligned  government  in  Baghdad.  This  interference  has  culminated  in  the  assassination  of  
Iranian  General  Qasem  Soleimani  on  Iraqi  soil,  prompting  increased  tension  between  Iran  and  
the  US  and  exacerbating  the  decreasing  popularity  of  US  influence  in  Iraq  and  the  region. 102   
The  assassination  and  other  violations  of  Iraqi  sovereignty  by  the  United  States  has  even  led  to  
calls  for  a  complete  withdrawal  of  all  American  forces  remaining  in  the  country  (CBS  2020).  
  
 For  the  past  three  decades,  but  especially  in  the  context  of  a  post-9/11  world,  the  targets   
of  regime  change  intervention  have  increasingly  become  new  battlegrounds  rather  than  
examples  of  successful  democratisation  and  rehabilitation.  Ultimately,  this  reflects  the  sense  of  
objectification  and  lack  of  agency  which  we  earlier  dismissed  in  the  Pottery  Barn  Rule.  Thus,  
as  indicated  earlier,  the  probability  for  successful  FIRC  is  often  undermined  by  Western  
insistence  on  a  contradictory  agenda  which  seeks  the  imposition  of  liberal  regimes,  the  
avoidance  of  state  building,  and  the  combatting  of  terrorism  and  insurgencies,  all  at  the  same  
time.  Consequently,  the  final  part  of  this  chapter  emphasises  the  importance  of  pragmatism  and  
‘minimal  justice’  in  regime  imposition.  
102  Of  course,  Iran  has  been  subject  to  US-sponsored  regime  change  in  the  past,  and  its  continued  rivalry  has  marked   
it  as  a  potential  future  target.  Thus,  Tarock  notes  that  “[f]or  the  past  quarter  of  a  century  the  question  whether  to  
engage  or  confront  Iran  militarily  has  been  debated  at  the  highest  levels  of  government  in  Washington”  (2006:  81), 
and  that  “the  US  has  several  courses  of  action  available  to  it.  They  include  the  invasion  and  occupation  of  Iran,  
bombardment  of  its  nuclear  energy  facilities,  sanctions,  assisting  opposition  groups,  or  engaging  Iran.  [...]  perhaps  
the  best  option  would  be  engaging  Iran,  if  Washington’s  real  intention  of  ‘regime  change’  were  to  bring  democracy  
to  the  country”  (idem:  99).  
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7.5  From  Liberal  Democratisation  to  ‘Minimally  Just’  Regimes  
While  it  has  been  claimed  that  “the  appeal  of  democracy  stems  in  part  from  its  association  with  
the  advancement  of  the  quality  of  life  for  all  human  beings”  (UN  n.d.  [a]),  the  aftermath  of  
recent  attempts  at  democratisation  have  called  into  question  in  how  far  the  quality  of  life  of  the  
affected  citizens  has  actually  improved,  and  in  how  far  this  has  furthered  the  prospect  for  peace  
in  the  targeted  states.  Attempts  at  establishing  international  stability  through  forcible  
‘democratisation’  have  faced  mixed  fortunes  in  the  past  decades.  Brown  has  noted  (2006:  21)  
that  “the  ending  of  the  Cold  War  has  allowed  for  political  action  in  support  of  the  principles  of  
sovereignty  and  self-determination  to  take  place  without  reference  to  the  consequences  of  such  
action  for  a  global  power  struggle.  But  what  this  freedom  of  action  has  revealed  is  that  these  
principles,  however  politically  attractive  and  legally  sound,  do  not,  in  practice,  'cash  out'  in  
ways  that  are  always  comfortable,  or  always  solve  more  problems  than  they  create.”  Indeed,  
past  interventions  have  shown  that  forcible  change  can  turn  into  protracted  occupations  if  
stabilisation  goals  are  not  achieved.  In  pursuit  of  these  goals,  the  precepts  of  Western  liberal  
democracy  seem  ‘self-evident’  to  the  occupying  state  but  are  much  less  readily  accepted  by  the  
targeted  population.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  claimed  that  many  of  the  recent  attempts  at  
imposing  democratic  structures  may  have  floundered  due  to  “Enlightenment  over-optimism”  
(Biggar  2013:  304),  especially  since  states  are  not  ‘black  boxes’  to  which  neat,  abstract  
solutions  can  be  applied,  and  democratisation  is  no  panacea  to  postwar  instability.   
  
Time  and  again,  turning  authoritarian  regimes  into  more  or  less  liberal  democratic  
republics  has  been  shown  to  be  beset  with  problems  which  are  both  ethical  and  practical.  Thus,  
in  Iraq  but  also  in  many  other  cases,  in  the  end  “the  US  settled  for  the  thinnest  veneer  of  
democracy,  which  proved  to  be  a  mask  for  yet  another  authoritarian  government”  (Godfroy  &  
Collins  2009:  165). This  also  raises  more  deepgoing  questions,  especially  regarding  the  type  of   
regime  which  ought  to  be  imposed  after  intervention  instead.  Thus,  as  Reus-Smit  argues,  if  “an  
autocratic  state  were  about  to  engage  in  genocide,  it  would  be  reasonable  for  democratic  states  
(or  any  states,  for  that  matter)  to  judge  that  the  will  of  the  threatened  people  favoured  
humanitarian  intervention.  But  this  is  very  different  from  democracies  making  judgments  about  
how  subject  peoples  would  view  the  general  allocation  of  political  rights  within  international  
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society”  (2005:  91).  This  has  prompted  some  to  state  that  “common  morality  can  allow  some  
actions  outside  established  authority,  but  common  morality  can  not  authorize  an  intervening  
state  to  do  what  it  cannot  do”,  and  this  includes  “remaking  a  regime  or,  more  radically,  a  
constitution  and  political  culture,  [which]  appear  to  be  among  the  things  intervening  powers  
can  not  successfully  carry  out  by  warfare  and  so  should  not  undertake  to  do”  (Boyle  2006:  53).  
This  assessment  illustrates  the  problematic  nature  of  the  assumption  that  radical  regime  change  
is  preferable  to  alternative,  less  invasive,  solutions.  Accordingly,  and  contrary  to  interveners’  
expectations,  FIRC  is  often  more  successful  the  less  it  attempts  to  achieve.  This  means  that  
from  the  start  of  the  intervention,  actors  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  ultimate  intent  of  
imposition  is  to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  minimal  justice.   
7.5.1  Responsibilities  for  Minimal  Justice  
  
Regime  change  actors  are  often  faced  with  a  dilemma.  Democratisation  is  an  uncertain  
endeavour,  and  the  accompanying  efforts  will  likely  take  years  and  substantial  commitment.  
On  the  other  hand,  by  simply  removing  a  supposedly  culpable  regime  but  avoiding  further  
responsibilities,  it  creates  a  potential  power  vacuum  and  further  instability,  as  the  superficial  
regime  change  in  Libya  shows.  In  light  of  the  resulting  controversies,  the  Just  War  Tradition’s  
practical  and  pragmatic  approach  to  conflict  remains  essential.  A  key  precept  of  Just  War  
teaching  is  that  military  action  must  have  a  high  probability  of  success:  an  attack  should  be  
avoided  if  one  is  not  confident  of  bringing  it  to  a  decisive  conclusion.   
  
Evidently,  this  probability  for  success  is  equally  important  in  cases  of  FIRC.  The  failure  
of  radical  attempts  at  imposition  in  the  past  indicates  that  a  more  pragmatic  view  of  postwar  
justice  is  necessary.  Ultimately,  this  aligns  more  with  the  traditional  minimalist  conceptions  of  
postwar  justice  than  the  more  maximalist  responsibilities  associated  with  victory.  This  is  
ultimately  in  line  with  the  pragmatic  outlook  offered  by  traditional  Just  War  approaches,  and  
ensures  that  postwar  situations  are  not  made  worse  by  overzealous  attempts  at  replicating  the  
ideals  of  the  Liberal  Order.  Post-intervention  measures  should  be  based  on  ensuring  the  
protection  of  the  ‘thin’  human  rights  whose  defence  caused  intervention  (or  should  have  done  
so)  in  the  first  place.  Thus,  in  those  very  rare  cases  where  regime  change  is  actually  warranted,  
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there  is  no  necessary  basis  for  the  imposition  of  ‘Western-style’  liberal  democracies.  
Consequently,  it  has  been  argued  that  “[w]hile  democracies  tend  inherently,  but  not  inevitably,  
toward  this  human  rights  orientation  on  behalf  of  their  citizens,  it  is  not  impossible  or  even  
improbable  that  other  forms  of  political  organization  -  a  well-disposed  monarchy,  or  even  a  
benign  authoritarian  dictatorship,  such  as  that  of  Tito  in  Yugoslavia  -  might  reveal  such  an  
orientation  (once  again,  in  both  policy  and  practice)  and  thus  reveal  itself  to  be  ‘minimally  
just’”  (Lucas  2007:  250).  Indeed,  it  has  been  noted  that  
  
[t]he  necessary  connection  between  a  just  and  lasting  peace  and  a  democratic  form  of  
government  is  a  tenuous  one.  Of  course,  democratic  governments,  in  comparison  with  
other  forms  of  government,  do  have  an  impressive  track  record  when  it  comes  to  
keeping  the  peace.  Nevertheless,  the  U.S.  will  have  done  a  satisfactory  job  if  it  can  
simply  create  space  for  a  decent  and  honorable  Iraqi  government.  A  democracy  would  
be  ideal,  but  what  John  Rawls  refers  to  as  a  mere  ‘well-ordered  regime,’  is  a  much  more  
reasonable  goal,  and  that  is  enough  for  success  (Cole  2011:  182).  
  
Thus,  a  “legitimate  government  [...]  need  not  be  an  ideal  government  or  even  a  good  
government”  (Lackey  1982:  537).  They  need  only  be  minimal  rights  respecting  and  tolerable  to  
the  population,  i.e.  what  in  Rawlsian  terms  can  be  called  a  ‘decent  hierarchical  society’.  This  is  
simultaneously  less  costly  for  the  intervening  state(s)  and  allows  for  flexibility  in  the  face  of  
culturally  dissimilar  approaches  to  government.  In  addition, this  minimally  just  regime  must  
take  into  account  local  authorities  and  decision  maker s,  leaving  increasing  freedom  for  
peoples’  self-determination .  This  sort  of  minimal  imposition  could  ultimately  mean  long  
periods  of  negotiation  or  even  the  end  of  multiethnic  states’  territorial  integrity,  so  should  not  
be  seen  as  a  ‘straightforward;  alternative  to  more  maximalist  assumptions.  Nevertheless,  as  
Boyle  (2006:  53)  writes,  “when  one  goes  beyond  stopping  atrocities,  preventing  ethnic  
cleansing,  protecting  refugees,  and  perhaps  deposing  a  tyrant,  what  is  needed  to  establish  the  
rights  under  threat  involves  many  steps  and  much  decision  making.  This  process  can  not  be  
carried  out  by  appeal  to  the  authority  of  the  moral  law  alone  but  also  requires  the  discretion  and  
authority  of  local  political  leaders.”  What  exactly  the  result  might  look  like  depends  on  the  
stakeholders  involved,  but  ultimately  avoid  many  of  the  pitfalls  of  forcible  centralisation  and  
democratisation.  
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7.6  Conclusions   
  
The  discussions  above  illustrate  how  the  thesis’  conceptual  framework  can  aid  in  assessing  
instances  of  FIRC  by  highlighting  the  contradictions  between  intentions  and  outcomes.  In  the  
reality  of  FIRC,  more  substantial  change  does  not  guarantee  a  more  desirable  outcome.  Indeed,  
the  cases  of  Bosnia,  Iraq,  and  Afghanistan  above  illustrate  the  many  pitfalls  of  both  regime  
removal  and  regime  imposition.  They  indicate  that  regardless  of  the  system  of  government  
which  is  imposed  in  the  end,  the  justice  of  ‘post-conflict’  situations  cannot  easily  be  
determined  by  singling  out  any  particular  point  in  time.  Regime  change  interveners  have  been  
drawn  into  lengthy  military  occupation,  bloody  counterinsurgency  campaigns,  or  long-term  
oversight  of  target  states.  This  shows  our  Just  War  understanding  of  regime  change  for  what  it  
is:  a  complex  process  of  evaluating  decisions  and  their  voluntary  and  involuntary  
consequences.  
  
By  emphasising  the  importance  of  jus  post  bellum  considerations,  Just  War  approaches  
strive  for  the  recovery  of  “tranquillitas  ordinis  —  a  concept  reflecting  the  importance  not  
merely  of  national  sovereignty,  but  also  of  fundamental  human  rights  and  the  relative  
legitimacy  of  various  governments”  (Wingfield  2004:  120).  Achieving  a  return  to  this  state  is  
the  key  challenge  for  all  attempts  at  foreign-imposed  regime  change,  but  has  often  proven  to  be  
elusive.  Thus,  as  stated  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  FIRC  actors  do  have  an  obligation  to  
engage  in  minimal  state  building,  but  also  the  duty  to  facilitate  the  population’s  influence  on  
the  ultimate  outcome.  
  
 The  chapter  has  shown  that  postwar  mismanagement  can  cause  further  instability  in   
civil  society,  especially  when  post-FIRC  priorities  shift  from  the  promotion  of  democratic  
institutions  to  a  strategy  of  counterinsurgency  and  counterterrorism.  As  is  the  case  with  the  rest  
of  the  Just  War  approach,  post  bellum  justice  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  checklist  approach.  Each  
instance  of  warfare  raises  complex  questions  about  the  road  to  peace.  This  creates  new  ethical  
challenges:  in  discussing  the  Afghan  and  Iraqi  cases  as  well  as  the  Bosnian  ‘solution’  to  
post-intervention  instability,  the  chapter  has  considered  the  notion  that  forms  of  neo-trusteeship  
are  a  solution  to  post-imposition  instability.  Ultimately,  without  the  substantial  involvement  of  
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the  targeted  population  in  the  democratic  process  and  self-determination,  both  neotrusteeship  
and  other  forms  of  imposition  represent  little  more  than  a  ‘temporary  fix’  to  the  latent  
instability  in  a  country.  Consequently,  they  often  fail  to  address  the  underlying  tensions  which  
prompted  instability  in  the  first  place.  However,  there  is  an  even  more  important,  underlying  
problem,  namely  an  inconsistent  approach  to  regime  legitimacy  and  national  sovereignty.  This  
inconsistency  ultimately  illustrates  the  shifts  in  understandings  of  legitimacy  and  sovereignty.  
  
As  the  thesis  has  illustrated,  ‘Western’  states’  expectations  of  sovereignty  have  evolved  
over  the  past  decades,  and  have  encompassed  ideological,  humanitarian,  and  security  concerns.  
That  is  to  say,  whereas  during  the  Cold  War  regimes  were  supported  for  their  perceived  
anti-communism,  in  the  1990s  this  expectation  made  way  for  a  more  sustained  focus  on  the  
‘humanitarian’  aspect  of  liberalism.  In  the  wake  of  the  9/11  attacks,  this  has  again  shifted  
towards  imposing  and  supporting  regimes  whose  liberal  credentials  are  questionable,  but  which  
play  important  roles  in  fighting  global  insurgencies  against  the  US-led  Western  order.  These  
shifts  highlight  yet  again  the  thesis’  emphasis  on  the  need  to  understand  phenomena  in  their  
wider  context,  instead  of  relying  on  reductivist  abstractions.  
  
Past  cases  of  FIRC,  from  Bosnia  to  Iraq,  show  that  a  ‘just’  outcome  is  not  by  necessity  
tied  to  the  ‘type’  of  regime  change.  Few,  if  any,  instances  of  FIRC  can  be  seen  as  unambiguous  
success  stories.  This  calls  into  question  the  empirical  claims  by  liberal  interveners  that  the  
imposition  of  liberal  democratic  regimes  is  the  best,  or  even  the  only,  way  of  ensuring  peace  
and  prosperity  for  the  targeted  population.  The  contradictory  liberal  conceptions  of  ‘imposed  
freedom’  have  ultimately  both  encouraged  the  pursuit  of  FIRC  and  hindered  a  more  successful  
conclusion  to  these  interventions.  Indeed,  as  past  cases  show,  these  paternalistic  assumptions  
have  more  often  than  not  resulted  in  impositions  which  have  either  been  problematic  due  to  
their  long-term  interference  in  the  democratic  process,  or  due  to  their  adverse  effects  on  
national,  regional,  and  ultimately  global  security.  The  liberal  approach  to  regime  imposition  has  
often  had  adverse  effects  and  has  led  to  an  increasing  backlash  in  the  form  of  terrorism,  
insurgencies,  and  even  more  importantly,  the  undermining  of  the  liberal  order  itself,  to  the  
extent  that  “this  is  nevertheless  a  rare  moment  in  International  Relations  (IR),  in  which  all  
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mainstream  theories  concur  that  the  hegemony  of  the  liberal  world  order  is  over”  (Duncombe  
&  Dunne  2018:  25).  
  
Accordingly,  the  final  chapter  of  the  thesis  assesses  the  potential  effects  of  this  
ostensible  ‘end’,  or  at  the  very  least  decline,  of  this  liberal  order .  In  doing  so,  it  summarises  
preceding  chapters  and  highlights  their  contribution  to  the  thesis’  overall  goals,  while  showing  
how  obstacles  faced  in  formulating  a  Just  War  approach  to  FIRC  present  important  
opportunities  for  future  research  and  debate.  
Chapter  VIII:  Conclusions  
  
This  chapter  concludes  the  thesis’  argumentation.  Before  recalling  the  project’s  key  contributions  
to  knowledge  and  potential  opportunities  for  further  research,  the  coming  pages  discuss  the  
advent  of  a  ‘post-American’  world  order  and  its  potential  effects  on  the  future  of  the  FIRC  
phenomenon.  
  
As  has  been  argued  throughout  the  thesis,  the  liberal  order  emerging  in  the  post-Cold  
War  period  has  increasingly  come  to  see  sovereign  equality  as  a  hindrance  to  propagating  its  
ideals.  As  this  paper  has  sought  to  show,  the  underlying  justifications  for  violating  states’  have  
changed  over  the  years  and  have  increasingly  taken  into  account  both  security  concerns  and  
humanitarian  challenges.  However,  foreign-imposed  regime  change  has  since  gone  from  being  
perceived  as  a  potential  last  resort  in  protecting  human  lives  to  a  controversial  and  distrusted  
‘Western’  tool.  As  a  consequence,  i n  the  post  9/11  world,  it  appears  as  though  “policy  
instruments  such  as  pre-emption  and  regime  change,  are  not  so  much  transgressions  of  state  
sovereignty  as  instruments  to  preserve  and  protect  a  ‘well-ordered  system  of  sovereign  states’”  




8.1  The  End  of  the  Liberal  Order?  
  
The  evolution  of  liberal  foreign-imposed  regime  change  as  a  distinct  phenomenon  has  
proceeded  in  three  phases  since  1945.  Whereas  the  Cold  War  phase  was  marked  by  debates  
surrounding  the  legitimacy  of  overt  intervention  in  sovereign  states,  the  second  phase,  under  
the  impression  of  the  seeming  triumph  of  liberal  values,  led  to  a  widespread  acceptance  that  
such  interventions  can  be  warranted  in  humanitarian  emergencies.  However,  the  third  and  
current  phase,  has  seen  increasing  concerns  about  the  instrumentalisation  of  FIRC  by  leading  
Western  states  in  pursuit  of  their  own  political  and  security  interests.  These  “offensive  liberal  
wars  characterised  by  strategic  motive  and  humanitarian  intent  illustrate  that  any  political  actor  
has  myriad  other  considerations  besides  simply  the  constitution  of  its  government”  (Milevski  
2020:  311).  As  a  result,  the  regime  change  phenomenon’s  infringement  of  sovereignty  is  
symptomatic  of  the  multitude  of  pressures.  These  pressures  have  multiplied  in  the  aftermath  of  
the  9/11  attacks.  Speaking  just  before  the  intervention  Iraq,  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  
(2003)  had  stated  that  
  
[t]he  outcome  of  this  issue  will  now  determine  more  than  the  fate  of  the  Iraqi  regime  
and  more  than  the  future  of  the  Iraqi  people  [...].  It  will  determine  the  way  Britain  and 
the  world  confront  the  central  security  threat  of  the  21st  century;  the  development  of  the  
UN;  the  relationship  between  Europe  and  the  US;  the  relations  within  the  EU  and  the  
way  the  US  engages  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  will  determine  the  pattern  of  
international  politics  for  the  next  generation  (para.  10-11).  
  
Blair’s  words  were  certainly  prophetic,  though  perhaps  not  in  the  way  he  had  originally  
intended.  Overall,  the  ongoing  debates  about  the  justice  and  effects  of  interventions  in  the  
Middle  East,  combined  with  the  lack  of  progress  in  Eastern  Europe  have  severely  dampened  
the  enthusiasm  for  similar  undertakings  in  the  future.  Thus,  we  have  seen  that  in  Iraq,  “internal  
conict  has  trumped  the  initial  triumph  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  overthrow.  But  Afghanistan,  after  
initial  successes,  is  hardly  a  exemplar  of  a  successful  liberal  intervention,  and  Libya  has  been  
reduced  to  ungovernability.  A  doctrine  that  leads  to  such  results  is  not  self-evidently  one  to  
which  we  should  continue  to  adhere”  (Lipsey  2016:  416).  This  increased  scepticism  about  the  
viability  of  regime  change  as  a  political  instrument  has  had  important  repercussions  on  the  
international  community’s  willingness  to  intervene  in  the  ongoing  civil  war  in  Syria.   
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Since  2011,  the  Syrian  conflict  has  raised  important  questions  regarding  humanitarian 
intervention,  regime  change,  and  other  considerations  regarding  post  bellum  justice  (e.g.  
Byman  et  al .  2012:  11)  as  well  as  states’  responsibilities  beyond  their  borders.  Buckley  writes  
that  “[t]hough  most  states  in  the  international  community  oppose  the  violence  being  committed  
by  Assad's  regime  against  the  opposition,  the  international  community  has  been  at  an  impasse.  
Toppling  Assad  is  not  simple  because  of  the  sectarian  divisions  in  Syria,  complications  
introduced  by  Syria's  alliance  with  Iran,  and  Russia  and  China's  opposition  to  military  
intervention  in  Syria”  (2012:  97). 103  Whereas  Western  powers  have  generally  supported   
opposition  forces’  calls  for  Assad’s  resignation,  others  (first  and  foremost  the  Russian  
Federation)  have  supported  the  Assad  government’s  claim  to  be  the  sole  legitimate  
government. 104  In  spite  of  the  Syrian  regime’s  repeated  transgressions  against  sections  of  its   
own  population,  there  has  been  no  full-scale  humanitarian  intervention  against  it,  and  “amid  
reports  of  a  chemical  weapons  attack  carried  out  by  the  Assad  regime  in  Douma,  there  arose  a  
familiar  call  for  the  international  community,  and  ‘the  West’  in  particular,  to  ‘do  something’”  
(Dunford  &  Neu  2019:  1081).  A  number  of  earlier  ‘red  lines’  suggested  by  the  United  States,  
such  as  the  alleged  use  of  chemical  weapons,  have  done  little  to  dissuade  the  regime  from  other  
rights  abuses, 105  and  neither  the  successive  Obama  nor  Trump  administrations  have  seriously   
103  Indeed,  in  the  Syrian  question,  “China  actively  intervened  to  ensure  that  a  firm  line  against  non-consensual   
intervention  would  be  held,  and  in  this  case  alone,  China  committed  to  three  diplomatic  innovations:  casting  
multiple,  successive  veto  votes;  rebranding  to  delegitimize  intervention  as  ‘regime  change’,  and  engaging  in  
norm-shaping  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  regarding  the  use  of  force”  (Fung  2018:  693).  
  
104  For  instance,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  “[i]n  February  2012,  Russia  and  China  each  vetoed  a  second  draft  UN   
Security  Council  resolution  aimed  primarily  at  halting  violence  against  civilians  that  had  erupted  in  Syria  a  year  
earlier  as  part  of  the  Arab  Spring  uprisings”  (Mcmillan  &  Mickler  2013:  283).  It  is  conceivable  that  this  veto  may  
have  emboldened  the  Syrian  regime  to  continue  its  assault.  Thus,  Abe  notes  that  in  conflicts  like  “Syria  and  Ukraine,  
the  dire  situation  may  also  provoke  calls  for  ‘something  to  be  done’,  but  intervention  would  trigger  heated  debate  
over  fear  of  involvement  and  potential  confrontation  with  Russia,  which  would  only  make  the  situation  more  
complicated”  (2016:  81 ).  
  
105  Naqvi  has  stated  that  “[t]he  international  response  to  the  use  of  chemical  weapons  in  2013  –  the  crossing  of  US   
president  Barack  Obama’s  famous  “red  line”  –  led  to  the  removal  and  destruction  of  Syria’s  declared  stockpile  of  
chemical  weapons,  implemented  and  overseen  jointly  by  the  Organisation  for  the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons  
(OPCW)  and  the  UN”  (2017:  961).  However,  on  the  other  hand  it  is  clear  that  “[t]here  have  been  a  myriad  of  
international  humanitarian  law  violations  committed  during  the  war  in  Syria.  The  United  Nations  (UN)  Special  
Envoy  for  Syria  estimated  that  400,000  people  had  been  killed  during  hostilities  by  May  2016.  Many  of  these  deaths  
have  reportedly  been  the  result  of  war  crimes,  such  as  indiscriminate  attacks,  disproportionate  civilian  harm,  
targeting  of  medical  facilities  and  murder.  Other  atrocities  such  as  systematic  rape,  torture,  persecution  and  
inhumane  acts  have  been  widely  documented  and  reported”  (idem:  960).  
197  
contemplated  a  regime  change  response  since.  Hence,  while  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  conflict  
saw  discussion  on  the  possibility  of  FIRC,  the  current  military  stalemate  and  political  situation  
makes  it  exceedingly  unlikely  that  the  Assad  government  will  fall  through  any  overt  external  
interference.   
  
The  lack  of  armed  response  to  human  rights  abuses  by  the  Syrian  government  has  
highlighted  the  United  States’  reluctance  to  be  drawn  into  yet  another  full-scale  military  
confrontation  in  the  Middle  East,  but  also  a  broader  reconsideration  of  its  global  position  and  
interests:  Donald  Trump  had  campaigned  on  the  promise  to  ‘end  America’s  endless  wars’.  
Thus, since  his  election,  “[i]n  challenging  the  U.S.  commitment  to  NATO  and  the  trading  rules  
of  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  and  the  World  Trade  Organization,  
Trump  has  called  into  question  the  United  States'  traditional  role  as  the  leader  of  the  liberal  
order”  (Deudney  &  Ikenberry  2018:  22).  This  marks  a  radical  departure  from  previous  
administrations’  policy  of  global  power  projection,  and  in  how  far  subsequent  administrations  
will  reverse  this  decision,  remains  to  be  seen:  they  too,  will  have  to  wrestle  with  the  notion  that  
US-led  interventionism  of  the  past  decades  has  achieved  much  less  than  was  hoped  for.  
Accordingly,  it  is  true  that  “whatever  one’s  opinions  of  the  wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  it  is  
clear  that  Western  populations  have  no  taste  for  new  forms  of  military  interventionism  and  
lasting  engagement  in  the  global  borderlands”  (Evans  2011:  754),  leading  to  the  assertion  that  
“it  is  widely  agreed  that  the  US-led  liberal  international  order  [...]  is  at  the  very  least  in  
transition,  if  not  in  crisis”  (Parmar  2018:  151).  
  
Indeed,  it  has  been  claimed  that  the  conflict  in  “Syria  poses  the  first  humanitarian  crisis  
of  the  post-American  world  order”  (Duncombe  &  Dunne  2018:  36).  The  potential  end  of  US  
hegemony  (or  at  least  a  global  withdrawal)  has  important  knock-on  effects,  both  regarding  its  
conceptualisations  of  global  responsibility  and  the  emergence  of  competing  non-Western  and  
‘non-liberal’  narratives  of  intervention.  Ultimately,  it  likely  means  the  end  of  the  liberal  FIRC  
idea.  Thus,  following  interventions  in  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  and  Libya,  “it  is  highly  unlikely  that  
China,  Russia  and  powerful  members  of  the  Global  South  will  sanction  similar  Western-led  
‘regime  change’  interventions  in  the  near  future”  (Adebajo  2016:  1199).  While  the  
conceptualisation  of  regime  change  has  mainly  taken  into  account  the  traditionally  Western  
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views  on  human  rights  and  sovereignty  (including  the  apparent  tension  between  universal  
human  rights  and  Westphalian  non-interference),  other  perspectives  have  increasingly  affected  
global  discourse.  It  is  undeniable  that  many  non-Western  states  harbour  a  sense  of  distrust  
about  Western  countries’  motivations,  having  had  first-hand  experience  of  Western  interference  
during  the  age  of  imperialism,  the  Cold  War,  and  beyond.  Interventions  in  the  Middle  East  have  
done  little  to  assuage  fears  that  the  United  States  and  its  allies  employ  human  rights  defence  as  
an  expedient  excuse  for  military  dominance.  The  Iraq  War  in  particular  has  prompted  the  
development  of  an  increasingly  multipolar  understanding  of  both  FIRC  interventions  and  
global  justice  more  broadly.  In  general,  these  competing  narratives  are  advanced  by  powerful  
non-Western  states  such  as  the  BRICS  countries, 106  most  notably  the  UN  Security  Council   
members  Russia  and  China  (Stuenkel  2014). 107   
8.1.1  Emerging  Challenges  and  the  Future  of  Liberal  FIRC  
  
In  aiming  to  be  more  assertive  on  the  global  stage,  Russia  has  increasingly  sought  to  influence  
the  debate  about  international  interventionism.  And  simply  put,  “Moscow  does  not  believe  the  
Security  Council  should  be  in  the  business  of  either  implicitly  or  explicitly  endorsing  the  
removal  of  a  sitting  government”  (Charap  2013:  36)  which,  as  illustrated  by  Russia’s  actions  in  
Crimea,  indicates  distrust  in  the  UNSC  rather  than  regime  change  as  a  political  option.  Russia’s  
distrust  of  Western  UNSC  member’s  motives  and  intentions  is  in  part  reflected  by  its  continued  
support  for  Assad  in  Syria.  In  2015  Russia  deployed  troops  into  Syria  which  helped  stem  the  
advance  of  both  the  Islamic  State  insurgents  (ISIL)  and  the  rebel  groups  supported  by  the  West,  
and  turned  the  tide  in  favour  of  the  Syrian  government.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  has  
succeeded  in  appropriating  much  of  the  liberal  discourse  underlying  FIRC  for  its  own  ends.  
Although  United  States-led  interventions  have  been  the  main  subject  of  the  thesis,  Russia  has  
106  In  the  case  of  Libya,  for  instance,  “the  BRICS  countries  (Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China,  South  Africa)  objected   
strongly  to  the  shift  from  the  politically  neutral  posture  of  civilian  protection  to  the  partial  goal  of  assisting  the  rebels  
and  pursuing  regime  change”  (Thakur  2013:   70).  
  
107  These  countries’  relation  to  the  UNSC  is  ambiguous  and  often  influenced  by  national  interests.  Thus,  “the  link   
between  China’s  interest  in  Sudanese  oil  and  arms  sales  and  its  obstinate  refusal  to  impose  sanctions  or  other  
measures  on  that  country’s  government  despite  its  clear  responsibility  for  crimes  against  humanity  and  possibly  even  
genocide  in  Darfur  is  well  known.  More  recently,  Russia’s  decisions  to  repeatedly  block  UN  action  on  Syria  were  
prompted  by  its  interest  in  preventing  the  spread  of  radical  Islamism  to  its  southern  Caucasus  region  and  protecting  a  
friendly  regime”  (Bellamy  &  McLoughlin  2019:  344).  
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itself  been  involved  in  foreign-imposed  regime  change  in  the  post-Cold  War  period,  especially  
within  its  traditional  ‘sphere  of  influence’,  notably  in  Georgia,  and  Ukraine.  It  is  also  
remarkable  that  “[a]  close  reading  of  Russia’s  justifications  for  its  military  assertiveness  reveals  
a  strategy  of  emulating  NATO’s  interventions  in  its  own  ‘near  abroad’,  be  it  Kosovo  (1999)  or  
Libya  (2011)”  (Duncombe  &  Dunne  2018:  29).  The  annexation  of  the  Crimean  Peninsula  in  the  
course  of  the  war  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  which  began  in  2014,  for  example,  was  claimed  
not  to  be  an  occupation,  but  rather  an  intervention  to  ‘protect’  the  self-declared  republics  of  
Donetsk  and  Luhansk.  Of  course,  it  is  also  the  case  that   
  
Moscow’s  questioning  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  Georgian  and  Ukrainian  governments  
and  its  exaggeration  of  the  abuses  suffered  by  the  peoples  of  South  Ossetia  and  Crimea/  
eastern  Ukraine  to  justify  its  interventions  -  and  its  drawing  of  parallels  to  the  Kosovo  
case  -  appear  no  more  than  a  claim  to  the  right  to  defend  selectively  its  own  regional  
order.  This  suggests  that  it  is  prepared  to  disregard  the  costs  of  defection  from  the  
norms  of  international  society  when  its  own  perceived  vital  interests  are  at  stake,  and  
indeed  has  the  added  purpose  of  drawing  attention  to  the  West’s  own  disregard  of  
international  legal  norms  [...]  (Averre  &  Davies  2015:  831).   
  
Compared  to  other  P5  Security  Council  members  such  as  the  United  States  and  the  Russian  
Federation,  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (PRC)  has  been  much  less  conspicuously  involved 
in  regime  change,  and  it  has  been  noted  that  “[n]on-interference  is  a  basic  principle  of  China’s  
foreign  policy.  In  the  Chinese  context,  the  principle  generally  means  that  a  country  shall  not  
interfere/intervene  in  other  countries’  internal  affairs,  which  in  essence  come  under  domestic  
jurisdiction”  (Zheng  2016:  351).  It  has  chosen  to  refrain  from  intervention  in  international  
conflicts  such  as  Syria, 108  focusing  instead  on  increasing  its  influence  by  more  subtle  means.   
There  are  several  reasons  for  this  apparent  reluctance  to  engage  in  international  military  
intervention.  Primarily,  the  Chinese  leadership  has  emphasised  the  importance  of  national  
sovereignty  and  nonintervention,  and  has  promoted  them  as  cornerstones  of  the  international  
system’s  stability  in  Security  Council  debates.  In  part,  this  emphasis  stems  from  concerns  that  
have  been  raised  about  the  PRC’s  own  human  rights  record.  Although  this  does  not  necessarily  
mean  that  the  People’s  Republic  will  not  engage  in  regime  change  in  the  future,  the  motivation 
108  In  doing  so,  it  has  joined  Russia  in  its  suspicion  of  Western-led  regime  change.  For  instance,  in  February  2012  as   
UNSC  Draft  Resolution  on  Syria  was  “vetoed  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  unbalanced  and  a  thinly-/veiled  attempt  to  
impose  regime  change  in  Damascus  through  armed  struggle”  (Thakur  2013:   71).  
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for  this  will  most  likely  stem  from  reasons  of  state  rather  than  a  commitment  to  ‘Western’  
conceptions  of  human  freedoms.  Thus,  as  Zheng  (idem:  374)  notes,   
  
[i]n  the  past  few  years,  changing  situations  and  growing  self-confidence  have  pushed  
Beijing  to  innovate  and  explore  policy  options  that  stretch  the  previously  known  limits  
of  the  non-interference  principle.  Its  behaviour  is  hence  becoming  more  and  more  
pragmatic  and  flexible.  For  instance,  China  has  participated  in  certain  international  
involvements  in  the  domestic  conflict  resolution  of  other  countries,  but  avoids  use  of  
the  term  ‘intervention’.  The  emergence  of  new  concepts  like  ‘creative  involvement’  
facilitates  this  gradual  change,  and  equips  Beijing  with  more  leeway  to  pursue  an  
increasingly  engaged  foreign  policy  posture.  109   
  
This  raises  the  issue  “of  an  illiberal  China  in  a  liberal  world  order  and  one  which  is  highlighted  
by  the  interpretivist  analysis  of  R2P  is  whether  the  link  between  human  rights  and  a  liberal  
vision  of  world  order  continues  to  be  a  dominant  feature  of  how  legitimacy  is  achieved”  
(Odgaard  2020:  244).   
  
The  increasingly  public  questioning  of  liberal  conceptions  of  legitimacy  by  Russia  and  
China  signals  that,  after  only  thirty  years,  the  age  of  liberal  interventionism  may  already  be  
coming  to  an  end.  This  decline  is  exacerbated  both  by  a  lack  of  actual  global  leadership  by  
liberal  states  and  the  increased  questioning  of  the  liberal  order  itself  by  emerging  and  
increasingly  confident  non-Western  states.  Indeed,  while  “(m)uch  of  the  post-Cold  War  
scholarship  on  sovereignty  debated  whether  the  world  was  entering  a  post-Westphalian  era  [...]  
observers  have  noted  the  apparent  reaffirmation  of  Westphalianism  and  the  efforts  of  many  
countries  to  ‘reclaim’  Sovereignty”  (Paris  2020:  483).  Thus,  claims  of  a  ‘post-Westphalian’  
world  tend  to  ignore  the  continued  importance  of  state  autonomy  and  the  practice  of  general  
nonintervention.  Nonetheless,  while  it  is  clear  that  current  global  power  dynamics  are  shifting,  
these  transformations  are  slow  and  not  linear.  Therefore,  proclaiming  the  permanent  demise  of  
liberal  interventionism  is  premature.  While  the  global  appeal  of  a  post-1990  ‘ Pax  Americana ’  
has  clearly  worn  off,  the  United  States  remains  by  far  the  most  powerful  actor  on  the  
109  It  has  recently  been  stated  that  to  some  extent,  “signs  of  a  more  fundamental  challenge  may  be  found  in  its   
willingness  to  compromise  with  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  regime  consent  when  UN-based  regional  
institutions  with  formal  universal  legitimacy  endorse  the  need  for  intervention  in  their  home  region.  In  addition,  
Chinese  R2P  implementation  has  demonstrated  that  there  are  cracks  in  China’s  claim  to  not  interfere  in  the  domestic  
affairs  of  other  states  without  consent,  which  suggests  that  this  position  may  not  be  sustainable  in  the  long  run”  
(Odgaard  2020:  244).  
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international  stage,  and  in  spite  of  increasing  multipolarity,  this  is  unlikely  to  change  in  the  near  
future.  The  fact  that  Western  intervention  in  Syrian  Civil  War  continues  to  be  discussed  
highlights  that  in  spite  of  mounting  criticism  in  the  wake  of  the  other  interventions  highlighted  
earlier,  foreign-imposed  regime  change  has  not  yet  been  relegated  to  the  proverbial  ‘dustbin  of  
history’.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  “[s]tating  that  there  is  no  alternative  to  liberal  
peacebuilding  is  tantamount  to  arguing  that  those  who  oppose  it  or  criticise  it  are  holding  up  
the  locomotive  of  history  or  forcing  it  off  the  main  track  into  a  siding.  This  is  unjustifiably  
deterministic”  (Cooper,  Turner,  &  Pugh  2011:  2007).  At  the  same  time,  Ikenberry  argues  that  
“there  is  simply  no  grand  ideological  alternative  to  a  liberal  international  order.  China  does  not  
have  a  model  that  the  rest  of  the  world  finds  appealing.  Neither  does  Russia.  These  are 
authoritarian  capitalist  states.  But  this  type  of  state  does  not  translate  into  a  broad  set  of  
alternative  ideas  for  the  organization  of  world  order”  (2018:  23).  The  discussion  about  the  
future  of  United  States-led  FIRC  and  the  survival  of  the  liberal  order  itself  is  consequently  far  
from  over.  
8.2  Thesis  Contribution  
  
In  joining  this  discussion,  the  thesis  has  made  several  key  contributions  to  knowledge  by  
raising  questions  about  the  theoretical  assumptions  underlying  the  contemporary  regime  change  
and  its  practical  effects  on  both  the  interveners  and  the  targeted  states.  The  project  has  
questioned  both  the  justice  and  the  effectiveness  of  post-Cold  War  FIRC  operations.  As  the  
majority  of  research  on  this  topic  has  been  argued  to  be  inadequate,  the  thesis  has  proposed  a  
number  of  questions  which  should  guide  a  more  structured  approach  to  modern-day  regime  
change.  In  short,  it  has  provided  structure  to  the  debate,  both  by  making  conceptual  distinctions  
and  emphasising  a  number  of  key  points  about  the  importance  of  the  supposedly  liberal  context  
in  which  FIRC  occurs.  This  context  is  not  only  helpful  in  understanding  the  motives  for  regime  
change,  but  improves  our  Just  War  approaches  to  the  topic  of  intervention  as  a  whole.  The  need  
for  contextualisation  has  also  informed  the  thesis’  rejection  of  ‘revisionist’  approaches  to 
contemporary  conflict,  which  also  affects  our  understanding  of  both  the  traditional  Just  War  
criteria  and  the  proposed  conceptual  distinctions,  several  of  which  stand  out  in  the  assessment  
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of  FIRC.  The  more  these  different  factors  coincide,  the  greater  the  likelihood  that  a  regime  
change  operation  can  be  described  as  ‘just’.  
  
Thus,  in  light  of  the  discussion  highlighted  in  the  previous  seven  chapters,  it  stands  to  
reason  that  a  legitimate  actor,  whose  motivations  and  intentions  allow  it  to  act,  according  to  its  
responsibilities  and  for  the  just  cause  of  halting  the  actions  of  a  culpable  regime,  is  acting  
according  to  the  demands  of  a  just  FIRC.  Needless  to  say,  these  occasions  are  rare  but  not  
inconceivable,  which  yet  again  point  at  the  paramount  importance  of  interventions’  historical  
and  political  context.   
  
The  thesis  has  therefore  argued  that  the  notion  that  instances  of  foreign-imposed  regime  
change  over  the  past  30  years  have  been  more  than  random  occurrences  in  interstate  conflict,  
and  that  FIRC  is  a  significant  subject  of  inquiry  in  and  of  itself.  In  doing  so,  it  has  argued  that  
the  emergence  of  the  notion  of  conditional  sovereignty  means  that  regime  legitimacy  is  no  
longer  a  basic  assumption  of  sovereignty.  Accordingly,  a  situation  has  arisen  where  only  
legitimate  states  are  seen  to  possess  rights  to  nonintervention,  but  where  this  legitimacy  is  
increasingly  decided  by  the  most  powerful  proponents  of  the  liberal  world  order.  In  this  
context,  the  discussion  of  the  permissibility  of  regime  change  wars  within  broader  Just  War  
Theory  plays  a  small,  but  nonetheless  important,  part  in  a  much  greater  discussion  about  the  
morality  of  21st  century  warfare.  The  phenomenon’s  examination  as  an  independent  concept  
highlights  the  contrast  with  other,  more  established,  types  of  military  action,  including  
variations  of  humanitarian  intervention.  Regime  change  has  been  carried  out  for  ostensible  
security  and  humanitarian  purposes,  yet  current  approaches  (including  the  work  of  some  Just  
War  authors)  tend  to  underestimate  the  many  moral  problems  that  accompany  a  forcible  change  
of  political  regime  and  the  myriad  factors  which  influence  our  moral  judgments.   
  
Accordingly,  the  foregoing  chapters  have  highlighted  that  while  FIRC’s  treatment  as  a  
uniform  concept  belies  its  moral  complexity,  this  does  not  mean  that  moral  assessment  of  such  
interventions  are  impossible.  The  many  ethical  ‘grey  areas’  surrounding  forcible  regime  
imposition  underline  the  need  for  clearer  distinctions  between  types  of  FIRC,  including  a  more  
nuanced  appraisal  of  the  responsibilities  which  accompany  them.  In  response,  and  given  the  
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inevitably  controversial  relationship  between  intervention,  regime  imposition,  and  states’  
rights,  the  thesis  has  argued  that  FIRC  benefits  from  further  conceptualisation,  in  particular  
with  regards  to  its  typologies  and  the  responsibilities  of  states  once  regime  change  occurs.  As  
overly  ‘simplistic’  approaches  do  little  to  clarify  the  complex  assessments  which  are  needed  for  
just  military  action,  this  thesis  has  rejected  the  ‘Pottery  Barn’  analogy  of  post-war  
responsibility  (i.e.  ‘you  break  it,  you  own  it’).  While  this  represents  an  intuitive  reaction  to  
postwar  justice,  it  has  too  many  flaws  to  be  considered  a  viable  approach.  As  the  Iraq  example  
highlights,  most  regime  change  scenarios  do  not  allow  for  easy  and  clear-cut  moral  
assessments.  Indeed,  many  Just  War  scholars  acknowledge  that  there  are  rarely  any  
straightforward  answers  in  the  study  of  armed  conflict  and,  as  Williams  has  stated,  “[d]efinitive  
answers  to  these  great  philosophical  and  normative  questions  are,  of  course,  elusive,  but  that  is  
what  makes  the  questions  so  important  and  the  pursuit  of  answers  such  a  rewarding,  
enlightening  and  stimulating  form  of  intellectual  activity”  (2011:  1241).   
  
In  examining  contemporary  FIRC,  the  thesis  has  emphasised  the  continued  importance  
of  the  Just  War  Tradition.  In  doing  so  it  has  addressed  important  claims  that  the  “contemporary  
just  war  theory  has  become  both  ahistorical  and  apolitical”  (Neu  2013:  461),  in  particular  in  its  
‘revisionist’  incarnations.  The  translation  of  the  interpersonal  analogy  to  the  interstate  sphere,  
and  the  logical  ‘jump’  required  to  do  so  (e.g.  from  the  principles  of  self-defence  to  the  rights  of  
states  to  non-intervention)  is  not  always  beneficial,  since  the  supposed  analogy  between  the 
interactions  of  states  and  those  of  individuals  is  unsatisfactory  and,  on  occasion,  far-fetched.  
Ultimately,  as  Walzer  correctly  asserts,  “wars  and  battles  are  not  ‘cases’  to  which  the  law  and  
morality  of  everyday  life  can  be  applied;  by  definition  they  don't  take  place  in  civil  society”  
(2015:  337).  Thus,  the  paper’s  argumentation  and  its  theoretical  background  have  been  
substantially  influenced  by  a  ‘Walzerian’  conception  of  the  Just  War.  This  had  led  the  thesis  to  
drawn  on  a  number  of  historical  illustrations  selected  from  post-Cold  War  regime  change  
interventions,  while  bearing  in  mind  the  central  notion  underlying  Walzer’s  works  that  “‘the  
moral  world’  is  not  easily  avoided,  even  by  the  resolutely  immoral,  realist,  or  manipulative”  
(Boyle  1997:  84).  Although  firm  foundations  for  this  moral  world  are  not  always  obvious,  he  
further  argues  that  “practical  morality  is  detached  from  its  foundations,  and  we  must  act  as  if  
that  separation  were  a  possible  (since  it  is  an  actual)  condition  of  moral  life”  (Walzer  1977:  xv).  
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Thus,  ethical  principles  are  indispensable,  and  their  application  to  cases  can  reveal  some  of  the  
contradictions  and  inconsistencies  which  invariably  affect  the  study  of  morality  of  warfare.  The  
selected  illustrations  have  allowed  the  chapters  to  examine  the  particular  challenges  inherent  in  
FIRC  attempts.  These  challenges  have  been  addressed  by  following  the  logic  of  the  Pottery  
Barn  Rule,  prioritising  the  goal  of  identifying  actors  who  are  liable  to  regime  change,  finding  
others  who  are  capable  of  remedial  action,  and  highlighting  the  challenges  of  the  postwar  
period.  
  
This  thesis  has  made  important  conceptual  distinctions  which  aid  in  constructing  a  
framework  for  assessing  the  potential  justice  of  FIRC  operations.  It  has  first  distinguished  
between  two  types  of  regime  change,  i.e.  superficial  and  radical  FIRC.  In  assessing  these,  the  
thesis  has  argued  that  it  is  helpful  to  distinguish  between  interveners’  intentions  and  motives  
for  engaging  in  regime  change.  Ultimately,  the  thesis  argues  that  states’  legitimacy  as  FIRC  
actors  is  rooted  in  their  authority  as  sovereign  actors  (or  in  the  case  of  organisations,  their  
constitution  by  sovereign  actors)  to  which  is  added  a  just  cause  for  action  and  the  presence  of  
right  intentions  and  motives.  The  focus  was  then  shifted  toward  the  target  of  the  intervention.  
  
In  determining  the  justice  of  FIRC,  the  thesis  has  argued  that  we  must  make  a  
distinction  between  liability  and  culpability.  This  means  that  while  liability  to  intervention  is  
necessary,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  a  just  FIRC.  A  state’s  regime  must  be  culpable,  i.e.  it  must  
play  a  direct  and  ongoing  role  in  the  large-scale  violation  of  ‘minimal’  human  rights  and  so  
abandon  its  ‘duty  of  care’  for  its  population.  In  halting  these  abuses,  the  members  of  the  
international  community  have  a  range  of  responsibilities,  and  the  thesis  has  argued  for  a  split  of  
the  overarching  responsibility  concept  into  aspects  of  ‘duty’  and  ‘obligation’.   
  
Finally,  the  paper  has  discussed  the  aftermath  of  regime  change  interventions,  i.e.  post  
war  regime  imposition,  discussing  such  efforts  in  Bosnia,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  The  many  
factors  which  affect  the  justice  of  regime  change  operations.  In  the  end,  this  raises  the  question 
as  to  what  a  just  regime  change  would  ideally  look  like,  which  the  previous  chapter  has  
identified  as  a  form  of  minimal  regime  imposition.  Although  this  type  of  superficial  regime  
change  runs  contrary  to  liberal  interveners’  expectations,  it  has  a  much  higher  probability  of  
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success  than  ambitious  but  ultimately  flawed  efforts  at  replicating  Western  democratic  
institutions.  Accordingly,  the  thesis  has  sought  to  reconcile  the  ethical  demands  of  the  Just  War  
Tradition  with  the  ‘muddled’  realities  of  regime  change  missions.  It  occupies  a  part  of  the  
wider  debate  surrounding  non-consensual  intervention  and  the  evolving  status  of  sovereign  
statehood.  While  no  radical  paradigm  shifts  or  reappraisals  of  traditional  orthodoxy  have  been 
suggested  in  the  foregoing  pages,  the  thesis  strengthens  Just  War  Theory’s  claim  to  continued  
relevance  to  current  debates.  Nonetheless,  as  the  subsequent  section  notes,  there  are  some  
unavoidable  limitations  to  a  Just  War  conceptualisation  of  the  FIRC  phenomenon.   
8.3  Limitations,  and  Opportunities  for  Future  Research   
  
Inevitably,  the  thesis  has  had  to  restrict  its  focus  of  enquiry  to  foreign-imposed  regime  change  
itself,  as  opposed  to  wider  debates,  such  as  those  regarding  the  future  development  of  the  
Responsibility  to  Protect  or  more  general  questions  of  the  moral  basis  for  humanitarian  
intervention.  In  addition,  the  main  focus  has  been  on  the  United  States,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  Nations  as  key  actors.  While  these  have  played  a  major  
role  in  almost  all  instances  of  FIRCover  the  past  decades,  either  through  their  involvement  or  
their  inaction,  this  also  means  that  the  thesis’  selection  of  examples  cannot  encompass  the  full  
spectrum  of  all  instances  of  externally-enforced  regime  change  in  the  past  thirty  years.  In  
addition,  while  the  thesis  has  focused  on  a  number  of  elementary  aspects  e.g.  the  difficulties  in  
establishing  culpability  and  identifying  an  appropriate  actor  for  intervention,  each  case  must  to  
some  extent  be  considered  individually  both  with  regards  to  ad  bellum  and  post  bellum  justice.  
This  means  that  a  direct  comparison  between  cases  is  often  impossible.   
  
Thus,  according  to  Daalder,  many  observers  of  the  early  post-intervention  situation  in  
Iraq  had  been  “pointing  to  Bosnia  and  the  Dayton  Peace  Accords  as  the  way  to  go.  But  Iraq  
isn’t  Bosnia,  which  is  why  a  Dayton-like  solution  isn’t  likely  to  work”  (2006:  para.  1).  ‘Iraq  
isn't  Bosnia’  is  a  pithy  statement,  which  nevertheless  contains  within  itself  the  core  truth  that  
regime  change  concepts  cannot  be  uniformly  compared  between,  and  applied  to,  diverse  
polities.  As  a  result,  casuistic  approaches  sometimes  face  accusations  of  moral  subjectivity  and  
questions  whether  an  objective  assessment  can  ever  be  reached  if  judgment  is  dependent  on  the  
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setting.  However,  this  criticism  arguably  misrepresents  the  chief  aims  of  casuistic  reasoning.  
The  efficacy  of  casuistic  methods  depends  not  only  on  the  choice  of  cases,  but  also  on  the  way  
in  which  these  are  related  to  the  theory  underlying  the  enquiry.  As  Miller  ( 1996:  47)  has  
written,  “by  examining  the  anomalous  features  of  this  war,  casuistry  of  a  more  inductive  sort  
might  deliver  us  from  an  ahistorical  application  of  just-war  tenets,  requiring  us  to  operate  
self-consciously,  and  pragmatically,  by  joining  history  and  ethics.”  
  
Thus,  while  it  is  true  that  Just  War  theory  is  “as  old  as  Western  civilization  but  
consonant  with  our  most  recent  knowledge  on  the  nature  of  tyranny,  [and]  provides  us  with  the  
foundations  of  a  moral  and  effective  response  to  well-armed  evil”  (Wingfield  2004:  122),  it  
must  be  acknowledged  that  “using  just-war  criteria  cannot  guarantee  a  consensus  about  the  
morality  of  any  particular  war”  (Miller  1996:  44)  and  “that  as  there  is  no  necessary  
correspondence  between  knowledge  and  reality  there  is  no  guarantee  that  even  our  most  firmly  
held  beliefs  would  never  need  revision”  (Bellamy  2002:  489).  Even  when  Just  War  
requirements  are  met,  no  single  element  can  ‘make  or  break’  the  assessment  of  armed  conflict.  
As  such,  there  is  rather  frustratingly  no  linear  progression  to  a  successful  outcome,  but  rather  a  
series  of  twists  and  turns  which  interveners  must  navigate.  Consequently,  whether  they  
subscribe  to  orthodox  or  revisionist  approaches,  Just  War  theorists  are  not  consistently  able  to  
pass  judgment  with  the  same  conviction  as  that  of  international  legal  scholars.  To  this  we  must  
add  that  the  thesis  is  located  within  the  context  of  a  Western-centric  understanding  of  
international  affairs.  Its  critics  are  correct  in  pointing  out  that  overall,  Just  War  Theory  is  a  
historically  Western-centric  approach  to  the  ethics  of  conflict,  and  focused  on  judging  the  
actions  of  mostly  Western  states  against  Western  standards.  However,  the  thesis  has  sought  to  
argue  that  many  of  these  standards  have  strong  claims  to  universality  as  part  of  the  basic  
concepts  accepted  by  the  actors  who  make  up  the  international  community  of  states.  
Ultimately,  while  “the  just  war  tradition  is  thick  with  the  soot  of  history  and  cannot  be  
wrenched  free  from  particular  cases,  as  Walzer  insists”  (Elshtain  2006:  109)  the  traditional  
tenets  of  Just  War  Theory  are  as  relevant  in  the  21st  century  as  they  have  ever  been.   
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Of  course,  Just  War  Theory  does  not  lend  itself  to  a  simple  ‘checklist’  approach  to  
moral  evaluation  (Crawford  2003:  7). 110  The  awareness  that  most  interventions  are  ultimately   
rooted  in  a  balance  of  political  expediency  and  normative  concerns  has  always  been  a  key  
concern  for  the  orthodox  strand  of  Just  War  Theory,  which  emphasises  that  it  is  preferable  to  
fight  wars  by  imperfect  guidelines  than  fighting  by  no  rules  at  all.  As  it  does  not  propose  to  
apply  a  ‘yardstick’  approach  to  the  morality  of  war,  the  Just  War  lends  itself  to  constant  
reinterpretations  of  its  precepts.  This  allows  it  to  adapt  to  the  current  practices  of  warfare,  and  
to  take  the  realities  of  international  politics  into  account  without  becoming  ‘politicised’.  This  
results  in  an  appropriately  pragmatic  outlook,  which  combines  a  concern  for  human  rights  with  
the  acceptance  of  a  morally  imperfect  world,  in  which  ‘grey  areas’  are  an  integral  part  of  many  
conflicts.  Ultimately,  “[t]here  can  be  no  claim  that  the  Just  War  tradition  has  evolved  to  a  point  
of  perfection”  (Roberts  2006:  62).  However,  in  light  of  Walzer’s  “meta-ethical  objection  
against  theories  of  justice  with  universalistic  pretensions”  (Moszkowicz  2007:  283),  this  
imperfection  is  not  necessarily  detrimental.  Indeed,  it  offers  important  opportunities  for  further  
inquiry  into  warfare  in  general  and  the  FIRC  phenomenon  in  particular.  
  
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  of  these  opportunities  is  to  include  additional  cases  in  future  
assessments.  This  would  likely  improve  and  nuance  the  proposed  taxonomies,  enabling  
theorists  to  categorise  regime  change  operations  more  comprehensively.  This  must  also  include  
a  more  detailed  engagement  with  some  contentious  aspects  of  forcible  regime  imposition,  
including  the  role  which  self-determination  might  play  in  post-intervention  settings.  Doppelt  
has  remarked  that  “once  people  have  formed  a  political  community  through  ‘consent’,  only  
they  have  the  right  to  alter  its  terms,  transform  its  political  institutions,  carry  through  a  
revolution,  or  resolve  a  civil  war.”  He  adds  that  in  his  past  writings,  “Walzer's  view  is  an  outlier  
on  this  point,  as  he  seems  to  imply  ‘a  duty  of  self-determination’  stronger  than  a  mere  right”  
(1978:  10).  Although  the  rhetoric  of  self-determination  has  been  a  key  element  of  the  
decolonisation  process,  there  is  no  clear  consensus  on  what  exactly  constitutes  the  ‘people’  in  
which  this  right  is  supposedly  vested  (one  might  think  of  questions  of  ethnic  homogeneity,  of  
the  numbers  of  individuals  required,  etc.).   
110  Ultimately,  we  should  heed  Walzer’s  caution  that  “[a]ll  the  obvious  prudential  calculations  about  the  costs  of   
intervening,  the  probability  of  winning,  and  the  likely  aftermath  are  morally  necessary.  They  are  part  of  the  set  of  
factors  that  determine  whether  a  use  of  military  force  is  just”  (2004  [b]:  37).  
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More  work  on  the  relation  of  popular  self-determination  to  the  FIRC  phenomenon  is  
also  likely  to  raise  additional  questions  about  the  conceptual  relation  between  regime  change  
and  the  Responsibility  to  Protect.  The  R2P  and  the  FIRC  phenomenon  represent  ‘two  sides  of  
the  same  coin’,  as  the  potential  for  instrumentalisation  of  the  Responsibility  illustrates.  Both  
are  symptomatic  of  the  momentous  shifts  in  the  understanding  of  state  sovereignty  since  the  
Cold  War.  While  proponents  of  the  R2P  tend  to  focus  on  the  positive  aspects  of  this  
transformation,  i.e.  the  opportunities  for  the  emergence  of  a  global  concern  for  human  rights  
protection,  the  hierarchisation  of  states  and  the  accompanying  occurrence  of  regime  change  
wars  represents  a  much  more  problematic  aspect  of  contemporary  global  interaction. 111  Overall,   
the  debates  on  intervention  by  (or  on  behalf  of)  the  international  community  suffer  from  the  
fact  that  “the  question  of  moral  authority  remains  a  tortuous  one  in  an  era  when  the  UN  is  
hamstrung  by  its  Security  Council  procedures  and  the  only  force  seemingly  capable  of  
supplying  much  of  the  strength  in  intervening  -  the  US  -  has  a  highly  problematic  status  in  the  
eyes  of  people  in  many  states”  (Finlay  2007:  576). 112    
  
The  future  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  also  raises  questions  about  the  potential  
for  a  wider  engagement  with  the  ‘Responsibility  While  Protecting’,  as  it  includes  “a  clearer  
statement  of  interventionist  motivations  and  means,  and  ongoing  monitoring  of  interventionist  
practice  against  mandate”  (McMillan  &  Mickler  2013:  316).  Ultimately,  this  also  indicates  that  
further  research  is  required  as  to  the  link  between  such  interventionist  frameworks  and  the  
nature  of  the  minimally  just  regimes  which  have  been  proposed,  and  which  measures  offer  the  
most  promising  way  forward  in  making  sure  that  intervention  benefits  above  all  else,  the  
targeted  population.  
111  It  has  also  been  noted  that  the  “central  problem  for  R2P”  is  “the  fact  that  whilst,  in  extremis,  forcible  intervention  
may  offer  the  only  chance  to  alleviate  gross  violations  of  human  rights,  it  nevertheless  remains  apparent  that  for  a  
large  proportion  of  international  society  support  for  the  concept  is  inversely  proportionate  to  the  probability  that  its  
invocation  will  result  in  recourse  to  such  force”  (Morris  2016:  206).  
  
112  As  is  in  part  illustrated  by  the  complexity  of  the  Syrian  conflict,  this  discussion  is  further  complicated  by  the   
possibility  of  ‘counter-interventions’  by  powerful  states  disapproving  of  the  initial  FIRC  attempt. 
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8.4  Concluding  Thoughts   
  
From  Afghanistan  to  Syria,  discussions  of  foreign-imposed  regime  change  have  played  a  
defining  role  in  many  of  the  pivotal  events  shaping  International  Relations  in  a  still  young  21st  
century.  Given  the  results  of  past  interventions,  recent  US  policy  has  been  more  cautious.  Thus,  
while  President  Obama  had  stated  in  (2011)  that  “the  future  of  Syria  must  be  determined  by  its  
people,  but  President  Bashar  al-Assad  is  standing  in  their  way”,  two  years  later  he  clarified  that  
“I  don’t  think  we  should  remove  another  dictator  with  force  —  we  learned  from  Iraq  that  doing  
so  makes  us  responsible  for  all  that  comes  next”  (quoted  in  Lafont  2015:  76).  Ultimately,  this  
shows  that  Powell’s  Pottery  Barn  warning  still  echoes  in  the  minds  of  Western  governments.  
Nonetheless,  as  has  recently  been  noted,  
  
[r]egime  change  will  always  tempt  Washington.  So  long  as  there  are  states  that  threaten  
American  interests  and  mistreat  their  people,  U.S.  leaders  and  pundits  will  periodically  
be  pulled  toward  the  idea  that  Americans  can  use  their  unparalleled  military,  
diplomatic,  and  economic  power  to  get  rid  of  bad  regimes  and  replace  them  with  better  
ones  (Gordon  2020:  para.  18).  
  
As  this  thesis  has  argued,  the  practice  of  Western-led  regime  change  is  fraught  with  apparent  
contradictions.  It  wages  war  to  achieve  peace  and  stability,  it  infringes  on  sovereign  rights  on  
behalf  of  sovereignty,  and  it  restricts  political  rights  in  the  name  of  democracy.  This  illustrates  
the  important  tensions  between  sovereign  equality  and  sovereign  hierarchy  which  continues  to  
pose  a  challenge  to  advocates  of  the  liberal  world  order  seeking  to  reconcile  them.  The  notion  
of  legitimate  sovereignty  which  is  contingent  on  a  responsibility  for  universal  human  rights,  
sees  foreign-imposed  regime  change  as  the  ultimate,  albeit  fallible,  deterrent  against  
right-abusing  regimes.  Nonetheless,  any  states  considering  engaging  in  regime  change  wars  
must  consider  the  many  ethical  pitfalls  of  a  seemingly  straightforward  solution.  Otherwise,  it  
will  invariably  be  the  very  same  civilian  population  that  should  be  saved  which  ultimately  
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